So what if the German Unification under either Austria or Prussia failed for whatever reason? What would a 1900s or even modern Germany look like?
A Failed German Unification
- Thread starter da Racontor
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The 'how' is very important. The two most obvious way would be Prussia and Austria remaining on par and highly competitive, one dominating North Germany, the other the south. Another might be long term domination of Germany by an outside power or power(s), perhaps some sort of Napoleonic France paired with Russia? The details could very tremendously of course.
One of the more interesting scenarios is a French intervention in the Seven Weeks' War in 1866. I don't know enough about the French military at that point to say how they would've faired, but their involvement would almost certainly have stopped the rapid Prussian advance into Austria and given the Austrians time to call up reserves and dig in. Personally, I see this war lasting no more than two years before an armistice is signed. The overwhelming superiority Prussian forces demonstrated in the 1870 war makes me think they could've fought the Austrians and the French to a standstill, but wouldn't have been able to push them back.
The aftermath of such a war would probably see a Prussian-dominated North German Confederation and an Austrian-dominated South German Confederation (of sorts) as competing spheres of influence and customs unions within the German-speaking world. In this case, the natural line of separation might be the boundary between Catholics in the south and Lutherans in the north, but other divisions are easily possible. The Austrians would probably align themselves with the French, while the Prussians could look for foreign assistance and alliances with the British or Russians (probably one or the other and not both). In this way, the strategic set-up might look a lot like the Seven Years' War.
One of the knock-on effects that becomes important farther down the line could be less Habsburg involvement in Hungary and the Balkans (due to greater involvement in Germany itself), leading to more Russian and Turkish influence in the region.
Whether Prussia and Austria are ever united would likely be determined by the fortunes of the war that would almost inevitably be fought between the two sometime between 1900 and 1920. I can see the Prussians and British against the French and Austrians, with the Russians and Italians looking for a way to get in without much danger to themselves. For example, early Prussian victories against Austria might be enough to convince the Russians to go for Galicia (if that's an Austrian border territory) and for the Italians to try their hand at an offensive in the Tyrol. The results of this war would determine the alliances and grievances, if any, that would trigger the next war, probably twenty to forty years after the end of this one.
The aftermath of such a war would probably see a Prussian-dominated North German Confederation and an Austrian-dominated South German Confederation (of sorts) as competing spheres of influence and customs unions within the German-speaking world. In this case, the natural line of separation might be the boundary between Catholics in the south and Lutherans in the north, but other divisions are easily possible. The Austrians would probably align themselves with the French, while the Prussians could look for foreign assistance and alliances with the British or Russians (probably one or the other and not both). In this way, the strategic set-up might look a lot like the Seven Years' War.
One of the knock-on effects that becomes important farther down the line could be less Habsburg involvement in Hungary and the Balkans (due to greater involvement in Germany itself), leading to more Russian and Turkish influence in the region.
Whether Prussia and Austria are ever united would likely be determined by the fortunes of the war that would almost inevitably be fought between the two sometime between 1900 and 1920. I can see the Prussians and British against the French and Austrians, with the Russians and Italians looking for a way to get in without much danger to themselves. For example, early Prussian victories against Austria might be enough to convince the Russians to go for Galicia (if that's an Austrian border territory) and for the Italians to try their hand at an offensive in the Tyrol. The results of this war would determine the alliances and grievances, if any, that would trigger the next war, probably twenty to forty years after the end of this one.
French état-major was really reluctant to the whole thing, and once the politique de pourboires was settled, you had a rather strong stance on neutrality and focus on balance of power (it was even discussed to help Prussia if Austria was clearly winning). It's really unlikely to see Nappie III attacking Prussia, with which he had relatively normalized relationship just for ensure an Austrian victory that was as much frowned upon than a Prussian one.
Yeah, but any balance was shattered later when Prussia formed the German Empire. So with a little bit more of foresight the French could have intervened to stop the Prussians and the result would have been as said two German Federations, one north lead by Prussia and a Southern one led by Austria.
It's less about foresight tough, than being coherent with the aformentioned politique des pourboires, that consisted roughly to do the same in Germany that was made in Italy (exchanging military support or neutrality in exchange of territories). Austria wasn't really able to pull a support for Napoleonic interests, which were roughly these.
Black : French border in 1866
Dark blue : French borders in 1814 (First treaty of Paris)
Blue : Luxembourg
Light blue : Regions french état-major and/or diplomatic corps presented interest controlling or annexing
While Prussia was able to support some of these interests (or rather, Bismarck said he will for what mattered Luxembourg and Belgium when it would come to international negociation), Austria was in no way able to do the same.
Eventually it all comes down to Prussia being realistically a better choice to enforce French interests along its borders than Austria.
Black : French border in 1866
Dark blue : French borders in 1814 (First treaty of Paris)
Blue : Luxembourg
Light blue : Regions french état-major and/or diplomatic corps presented interest controlling or annexing
While Prussia was able to support some of these interests (or rather, Bismarck said he will for what mattered Luxembourg and Belgium when it would come to international negociation), Austria was in no way able to do the same.
Eventually it all comes down to Prussia being realistically a better choice to enforce French interests along its borders than Austria.
raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
That's actually not a very neat boundary line dividing east and west. It would actually be more jigsaw like, and even the below illustration does not capture the entire complexity:
I myself once wrote a scenario where Prussia loses the Franco-Prussian War due to a lot of things that were out of their control (they were the fall guy for Russia's rage with something) and the North German Confederation is left with... itself. Bavaria is a vassal of Austria-Hungary, Schleswig-Holstein is Danish again, along with Lubeck, the rest of the South German States are French Vassals... yeah, things were not looking good for the German nationalist movement. French also took control of the Rhineland for a long time. Memories of Napoleon do a lot to fuel people's fear.
Granted, that scenario had a lot of issues.
Granted, that scenario had a lot of issues.
Maybe Nappy invades the Prussian Rhenish Provinces and gives them to Bavaria. Then you've got a "tripartite" Germany with Greater Bavaria holding the balance between the other two.
Remove Napoléon III, as his foreign policy was, well, a catastrophe. We can have a PoD in late 1861, after the first liberal reforms. Napoléon III dies by falling in some stairs, Napoléon IV is 5, his mother is not very well liked. Morny manipulates the institutions (he is President of the House) and the regent is the Prince Napoléon (Napoléon-Jérôme), a republican-leaning man. If the Regent and Morny led a more liberal policy, starting by sacking Rouher, the all french foreign policy would change. First consequence is the withdrawal from Mexico at the same time as the British and Spanish (april 1862), but also no "Roman Question" as the French would not intervene to protect the Pope in 1863-1864. Angered, the Church leads a campaign to elect conservative deputies. So in 1865, the Regent is confronted to a conservative and catholic majority and, because of the reforms he himself have supported, has to go on with at least some of their revendications. As part of the compromise, Alexandre Colonna-Walewski is named President of the Council of Ministers. As the conservative and a part of the liberal minority (Thiers) are afraid of a Prussian unification of Germany, the Walewski administration decides to support the Austrians in the 1866 War. Surely the french army is not enough for Austria to win the war, but at least stalemate. But the French policy could change later with new elections, so another Austro-Prussian war is likely.
Why Should it not be enough to win?
Koniggratz was a close-run thing even OTL. If half the Prussian Army is ties up on the Rhine, how can Prussia possibly win?
Time : the Austrian mobilization (well, German Confederation) was june, 14. The french army suffered from many logistic issues and I do not see how its own mobilization could be effective for several weeks - or even months. It would not act in force before Sadowa. Of course, when it did intervene in Rhineland and South Germany, the french army would allow the Bavarians and the other anti-Prussian states to defeat the Prussians and maybe allow enough breathing time for the Austrian to counter-attack.
ITTL, I do not see a true Austrian-French alliance, but rather a defensive action against Prussia with no previous planification, explaining the lack of coordination between the two powers at the start of the war. Without a thorough reform, both the Austrian and the French army are not up to Prussia's level.
Very unlikely if not ASB.
The regency act of 1856 sets Empress Mother to be regent, and Prince Napoléon would come in position in the event of her demise. Even there, he does have to go along a Regency Council that is filled with people most of whom are hostile to him. In fact, Prince Napoléon was despised by almost everyone (he didn't improve this with his very independent behaviour) and first by Napoléon III (who viewed the House of Jérôme as who the Orléans were to the Bourbons); his father, King Jérôme resigned his seat as President of the Senate in 1852 because the Emperor and his fellows had formulated succession and regency laws very hostile to Prince Napoléon (one proviso was to allow the Emperor to adopt a heir in a collateral branch of the Bonaparte dynasty to bypass his cousin).
So, by the terms of the regency act of 1856, the regent doesn't have free hands with the government, especially if the other members of the council are opposed to him.
Then Morny. He was no doubt a great schemer but the Mexican adventure was essentially his work as he had financial interests in the matter (he had many "interests" in business ventures and he often used his position to advance his own interests like in the case of Mexico).
The only fault of Napoléon III's foreign policy was the weak character of the Emperor himself; he may have been somewhat clumsy at moments, especially after his health deteriorated from 1865 onwards, he was relatively smart to put the accent on diplomacy by contrast to his uncle's failures; he managed to build some understanding with the British and successfully brought France back in a position of influence it lost after 1815.
In any event, it's more likely that Republicans are to win the most from a confrontation between Conservative bonapartists and Prince Napoléon, and at this point, the Corps Législatif (lower house) was a rubber-stamp institution of which the only usefulness was to take a measure of the public opinion.
Saphroneth
Banned
Pretty good, frankly. Their artillery's crap but their doctrine is really very good against anyone but the Prussian regulars themselves, and the western theatre was a lot less of a done deal OTL than the eastern so it might cause a Prussian pullback.
The War of 1859 commenced April 29, and the first armed clash came on May 20. No reason for it to take longer in 1866.
So all Benedek need do is avoid battle for about three weeks - after which Prussia will be forced to move troops west to defend the Rhine.
That would most likely see the Prussians at the gates of Vienna.........
Why? Even OTL, from the opening of hostilities (Jun 16) until Koniggratz (July 3) took about 2½ weeks, so I don't see why Benedek couldn't have avoided it a bit longer.
And even if he were forced back all the way to the Danube, that would have been a defensible line, and well placed for communication with the French and Bavarians.
Because you can't just surrender Bohemia to the Prussians without a fight. It wouldn't sit well with most Austrians who had a say in the matter, nor would it help Austrias unity at a time when it's constituent parts were waking to nationalistic feelings. Hungary for example.
And then to let the enemy walk up to the Danube without a fight? Benedeck could never afford to do that. He would be sacked by the Emperor.
To let Prussian guns have the chance of shelling the outer parts of the capital?
It would be politically inexpedient at best and reckless in the extreme to give up Austrias biggest recruiting ground to Prussia. Especially as to do so would jeopardise Austrian Silesia, Galicia and Moravia in addition to Bohemia to occupation and potential for annexation in any settlement. This is not a matter of time, but one of possession. Austria has to stop Prussia from overwhelming Austrian controlled lands or it loses them.
And then to let the enemy walk up to the Danube without a fight? Benedeck could never afford to do that. He would be sacked by the Emperor.
To let Prussian guns have the chance of shelling the outer parts of the capital?
It would be politically inexpedient at best and reckless in the extreme to give up Austrias biggest recruiting ground to Prussia. Especially as to do so would jeopardise Austrian Silesia, Galicia and Moravia in addition to Bohemia to occupation and potential for annexation in any settlement. This is not a matter of time, but one of possession. Austria has to stop Prussia from overwhelming Austrian controlled lands or it loses them.