A Better High Middle Ages for the Abode of Islam

[LSCatilina]

And...this is unique to Al-Andalus...how again?

That's the problem. Why can't Al-Andalus find the right combination when say, Scotland could?

Because both Scotland or...let's say Maghreb didn't have a different religion just front of them. As you said in another thread, "religious war" is probably the easiest pretext to invade a neighboor during the Middle-Ages.

Furthermore both christian and islamic states in Iberic peninsula justified their own existance (and critically the one of their leaders) by their capacity to conquer new lands and to raid ennemies. Scottish kings didn't have to periodically raid England to be considered as rightful kings. Caliphes and Kings had.

 

[MNP]

Well, i think that Abd al-Rahman III maneged to keep into one piece Al-Andalus as far he could. I mean, he conquerred and "pacified" troubled and revolted regions, and i'm not sure about the capacity of some of his supporters or foes to revolt themselves if he tried to change the social and institutional background of the Caliphate more than he did.

Well this was why I suggested another century of Rulers after him might have had more progress. He was so strong he overshadowed to a point the lesser loyalties to a particular sub-group. A line of rulers could create a situation like the Ottomans where rebellions were about different people getting power under the Sultan and only a very very few actually wanted to conquer the dynasty.

And of you're right about Almanzor, but didn't that really get started after Simancas?

ED: Excellent point about the warfare - legitimacy.

Could you elaborate on that? How that relates to the issue at hand, that is.

Under Islam every Muslim is equal to every other Muslim, and that means that the only difference between you and your group and a ruler is that they happen to be in charge. If you take over, as long as you rule according to the proper precepts of Islam (whatever they may be) it's legitimate. Under Christianity you're equal before God (after death) but while it says that the oppressed are virtuous, it doesn't go into legitimacy of earthly rulers very much. That means that the "pray, farm, fight" orders are more justified. And again, because the tribal bonds were stronger in Islamic states, a chief that became king was somewhat different than the Germanic chieftains that evolved into kings in Europe.

 

[LSCatilina]

And of you're right about Almanzor, but didn't that really get started after Simancas?

Mmm...I'm not sure. It could be only a a-posteriori analysis, and if things would have turned in another direction, it could have been seen as a christian victory as many before : without great changes and with gain likely to be reverted during another battle...And to be regained in another christian victory.
And, in fact, Al-Hakam managed to defeat christian and to take back some places.

Now, it shows that the Christians, once united as at Simancas, could defeat the Umayyad forces. It's what you said about a really militarized elite among the Christians, when it was relativly less among the Islamic ones (slightly less, it was still a duty to show Christians that they could stand against them).

But nothing really decisive at Simancas, as far I can see.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Islam the religion actually *did* grow immensely during the High Middle Ages. It went on so far in terms of growth to the point that the Mughals and Ottomans led to a glory day of Muslim empires. However if we're talking about preserving the territorial strength and power of the Muslim Middle East, this is rather more difficult to do. Even the Ottomans viewed the region as a backwater and based their actual power out of controlling the Balkans.

To keep Islamic humanism going requires at the bare minimum the rulers of the big Muslim Empires to pursue different policies than they did historically. Humanism in its Classical variant didn't exactly go well with early modern absolutism in any of its forms.

 

[Snake Featherston]

Break the tribal structures.

I think that's all the Muslims can do on their own. Other factors are actually beyond their control and have more to do with geography and climate than anything else. When you think about it, the ME is actually sited poorly in civilizational sense and it makes the Caliphate even more impressive and stronger when you consider what they did achieve.

The problem with the Middle Eastern states was more that their political unity was never fully broken until the sacking of Baghdad, not tribal structures in themselves. Middle Eastern politics resembled a multiplicity of Shogunates with the only truly distinct claims to power being the Ummayyad splinter states and the Fatimids.

 

[Delvestius]

Preserving : maintaining an existing situation.


Keep : maintaining something in said situation.

Both of these were true in the very early years of the Caliphate of Cordoba...

 

[LSCatilina]

Both of these were true in the very early years of the Caliphate of Cordoba...

Basically, no.

Even if the threat of a relativly unlikely Fatimid invasion helped greatly Abd al-Rahman III to gather support around him, much more than his predecessors, you have still to much divergent and opposed interests among the andalucian nobles to say the Caliphate created an unity among the Muslims.

After the creation of the Caliphate (I suppose you don't talk about the beggining of the reign of ABR, so sorry if i misunderstood), you have still people like Muhammad ibn-Hakim that preferred help the Christians rather than the Caliphe because of their own familial and local policy.

By the way, you'll notice that ABR didn't tale any hajib, probably because the muslims nobles that formed his base weren't really to be trusted. In fact, he was so cautious that many of his close councellors weren't even Muslims, and therefore not tied with the inner rivalries and relative disunity within Al-Andalus.

For the centralization, no again. Admitedly, the Al-Zahira is thanks to the presence of the Caliphe and a strengthening of administrations a more important place concerning institutions than it existed before or after regarding Al-Andalus.
The fact the Caliphe never took a real hajib shows a certain concentration of power within his hands.

In fact, he created more post (a lot more) into his administration, being cautious to not putting within nobles Arabs but muladi. So, yes, you have a more important bureaucratisation but considering how these posts were about power delegation, how the attention of the Caliphe was diverted by African and Christian matters, forcing him to move regulary (and avoiding to make Al-Zahira a centralised capital)...

To resume, thanks to both external situation (Christian and Fatimid threat) and to his own skills of command and organisation, Abd al Rahman concentrated powers, delegate many of them and never to the Arabs.
The laters ones shutted up as long this threat was consistent, not because they felt themselves tied to an united Al-Andalus.

You can see how much long lasted a local autonomous power during the reign of Al-Hakem II with rival councellors...

The Caliphate, if you want a comparison, had the same feeling of unity than Carolingian Empire and the same level of centralisation : at close range you have an high concentration but more you goes to the periphery, more it's autonomous.

I'll talk about Almanzor, but again, i think it's maybe the one that concentrated the more power on himself, and for that he had to crush every resitance by force and employ of foreign mercenaries, something that ABR couldn't do.

 

[Faeelin]

Well, litteraly tribal structures.

Arabs (and many islamized people) relied on clanic ties to their policies and administrations. It caused many disorder, crossing interest and conflicts that were at the Arabo-Islamic states disadvantages.

The problem I'm having is that this doesn't look that different from OTL Europe. I mean, compare the Christian states in Iberia during this period, or France during the Hundred Years War.

 

[Faeelin]

By the way, you'll notice that ABR didn't tale any hajib, probably because the muslims nobles that formed his base weren't really to be trusted.

And when Richard I went on crusade, his brother went WEEE POWER and almost destroyed the kingdom.

 

[MNP]

The problem with the Middle Eastern states was more that their political unity was never fully broken until the sacking of Baghdad, not tribal structures in themselves. Middle Eastern politics resembled a multiplicity of Shogunates with the only truly distinct claims to power being the Ummayyad splinter states and the Fatimids.

I can buy that as the situation. But how much would greater political disunity help them here? I am missing your point, sorry.

But nothing really decisive at Simancas, as far I can see.

IIRC AAR-3 purged his army after Simancas (in part to shift blame) and then started replacing them with Saqaliba and other slaves at a faster clip.

 

[LSCatilina]

The problem I'm having is that this doesn't look that different from OTL Europe. I mean, compare the Christian states in Iberia during this period, or France during the Hundred Years War.

It's really, really different.

Hundred Years war by exemple : you have basically three political factions. They were formed not because of the origin, not because of the family (you have many split families because of that, by exemple...the Valois) but because of political interest and changing side became a sport.

In Arabo-Islamic world, while you have too the existence of political factions, they're more numerically important and often unable to unite themselves. Furthermore they played a secondary role in comparison of tribal interests even within a larger tribal situation.
By exemple, in the fight between Qais and Kalbit in early Al-Andalus, you have even inner fights whitin each factions while the civil war is still flaming. And it's only for the Arabs here.

If you search a comparison in western christianity, i would suggest you to employ the exemple of post-carolingian feudality. Here you have too the struggle of families (it's still different from tribal structure that is less open) against other ones for the domination on ONE territory.
Though, it's still different, as the king have a moral power within the said territory, with a capacity to help one side (by giving it legitimacy, "honors"). In Al-Andalus, the emir/caliphe couldn't reasonably do that, except if he lead an army there.

Don't get me wrong, christian king and islamic amir/caliphe have both a capacity of concentrating powers, and a moral ascendent. But while the king was sacred, almost impossible to overthrow if not with the help of another king or serious pretender and being the source of feudal legitimacy by giving the honors; the Caliphe didn't have that.
Depsite his religious title, and even if this one grant him to have his name mentionned during prayers in lands he don't control, his opponents and his rivals don't see him as the source of their power : what they have, it's thanks to them. If the amir/caliphe want to take it back, he could always try.

You'll say me that Al-Andalus is quite a particular situation and you'll be right. The tribal structures disappeared relativly quickly here, in comparison of Arabo-Islamic world, and it was "replaced" by a "originalist" (sorry, don't find a proper word, as it's not "nationalism" nor "racism" stricto sensu) policy.

Depending on how much you was arabized, you had a better place in society. (The amirs and the Caliphes often used it for overthrow their arab rivals, and used mainly muladi, jews, berbers and even christians as councellors and administrations).
In the same time, in Western Europe, at the notable exception of the mediterranean lands (Spain, Occitania, Italy) the minorities didn't participate even to the local scale. And even there, they didn't have an acess to the power itself.Having lands less diverse than Al-Andalus, forming an island of Islamity, the christian lords couldn't play on "origins".

So their society, less tolerant, less open, less socially dynamic were more stables rather than Al-Andalus where the continual bascule play between communauties avoided the creation of a united andalucian. In fact, during the Fitna, you'll have many pogroms, expellation of Christians, mass killing of Berbers...Because Arab and arabized thought their natural legitimacy to rule the country was overthrowed by them wit h the assistance of the Caliphat (which was quickly deleted).

For northern Spain, you've partially right : the familial (i insist, familial isn't tribal) disputes were quite important in the X/XI centuries and degenerated in civil wars. But here, i would think that the regular interventions of the Caliphe, blowing hot and cold. Still, it wasn't as damagable for christian structures, as it was always resolved on a familial base and the pretext (if not the reason) of the civil war often disappeared with the disappearence of the pretender.

The dissenssions in Islamic spain were more lasting (or even permanants) and when the Christian could unite (admitedly, it didn't happened often in the first centuries, but just one time was needed to strike badly the Caliphate or its remnants) they could play easily on it, critically when they were familialy tied with northern families (converted or Arabs).

 

[LSCatilina]

And when Richard I went on crusade, his brother went WEEE POWER and almost destroyed the kingdom.

It's *a bit*...No , it's *far* more complicated than that.
Richard was more a duke of Aquitaine than an english king, even after its accession to the throne. He didn't cared for England, and his continual speding of english ressources for Aquitaine, Normandy, Crusade were really annoying for the great nobles of England.

But Richard was liked and supported by the french and occitan nobles of Plantagenet desmene, so it wasn't easy to overthrow it. Besides, the needed a legitimacy.

At this point, if it happened in an Arabo-Islamic situation, Richard would have likely been emprisonned, killed, at least overthrowed.

John was the natural heir, and english nobles had many hopes that he would change things. When the natural jackassery of Richard made him jailed, John aceeded to power thanks to this support.

But far from being king, he just tried to calm the nobles by deleting some heavy taxes rised for the Crusades. I mean, his regency was so "ruining" that when Richard came back, he made John his heir. Nah, the problem came that, during his regency, he tried to respect his brother interest too, and didn't overthrowed all his decisions. It would cost him the support of the nobility in 1199.

After the death of his brother, in an ultimate mucnhkin move, John have then some legitimacy issues. Long sroty short, after many defeats, John need MONEY. But his brother wasted too much ressources to his own need, and John had little choice but raise again taxes at the nobility power cost.

It bothered the nobles...In fact, these guys PROPOSED and HELPED the french kings to invade England. I'm pretty sure than allowing the island to be invaded from the first time since 1066 was more ruining that raising taxes.

Now, i'm not saying that John was skilled, but prevented to reign. No. He was maybe good-intending, but simply not able to do it. Maybe one of the first anglo-normand king willing to really secure England and seeing it otherly than a giant treasure chest for french domains.

 

[Malta]

Prevent the Turkics from paying back the Arab invasion of Central Asia by immigrating into Persia, Turkey, Levant, and Egypt.

 

[Snake Featherston]

I can buy that as the situation. But how much would greater political disunity help them here? I am missing your point, sorry.

Being able to act as actual states with raison d'etat instead of having to adhere to a political pretense that due to the actual survival of the state's institutions in the late Abbasid Caliphate was more of a hindrance than a help. Middle Eastern states as separate institutions aren't fully present until after the sacking of Baghdad, before that the Caliphs still had meaningful actual power due to continuity of institutions, handicapping freedom of action on the part of elites (and for peasants none of this meant any more than the nuances of elites in Christian societies).

 

[Elfwine]

Being able to act as actual states with raison d'etat instead of having to adhere to a political pretense that due to the actual survival of the state's institutions in the late Abbasid Caliphate was more of a hindrance than a help. Middle Eastern states as separate institutions aren't fully present until after the sacking of Baghdad, before that the Caliphs still had meaningful actual power due to continuity of institutions, handicapping freedom of action on the part of elites (and for peasants none of this meant any more than the nuances of elites in Christian societies).

How exactly is that problematic? That is, what is the caliph really doing more than the Emperor of Japan did?

 

[Faeelin]

At this point, if it happened in an Arabo-Islamic situation, Richard would have likely been emprisonned, killed, at least overthrowed.

What makes you think that?

Hundred Years war by exemple : you have basically three political factions. They were formed not because of the origin, not because of the family (you have many split families because of that, by exemple...the Valois) but because of political interest and changing side became a sport.

I think you are looking at things a bit optimistically here. This was a struggle for the throne of France which different parties viewed as property. That family members fought doesn't seem dispositive; this happened in Al-Andalus, or in the Ottoman Empire, too.

By exemple, in the fight between Qais and Kalbit in early Al-Andalus, you have even inner fights whitin each factions while the civil war is still flaming. And it's only for the Arabs here.

So, like in Scotland, where there was tension between the Norman lords and the old elite?

I mean, John the Fearless in Burgundy was killed by his son in law. This isn't a warm and fuzzy society either.

But while the king was sacred, almost impossible to overthrow if not with the help of another king or serious pretender and being the source of feudal legitimacy by giving the honors; the Caliphe didn't have that.

I'm not sure why this is a downside here, even if we grant that it's true. (And the reign of the French monarchs during the 14th century makes one skeptical)..

The dissenssions in Islamic spain were more lasting (or even permanants) and when the Christian could unite (admitedly, it didn't happened often in the first centuries, but just one time was needed to strike badly the Caliphate or its remnants) they could play easily on it, critically when they were familialy tied with northern families (converted or Arabs).

It really looks to me like both Christians and Muslims united and divided. Almovarids, Umayyads, Almohads; Sanchez the Fat, and then his heirs.

 

[Snake Featherston]

How exactly is that problematic? That is, what is the caliph really doing more than the Emperor of Japan did?

Simple: the only states in the region able to act with a full autonomy as states and thus able to augment both their own strength and with it that of Islamic states were ones which were for various reasons outside the norm. The Muslim principalities at this point saw themselves as more akin to the early post-Roman Germanic kingdoms that wanted to secure the favor of the Eastern Emperor than as rulers in their own right. It handicapped their freedom of action more than ultimately was perhaps good for those states as states.

 

[B_Munro]

Simple: the only states in the region able to act with a full autonomy as states and thus able to augment both their own strength and with it that of Islamic states were ones which were for various reasons outside the norm. The Muslim principalities at this point saw themselves as more akin to the early post-Roman Germanic kingdoms that wanted to secure the favor of the Eastern Emperor than as rulers in their own right. It handicapped their freedom of action more than ultimately was perhaps good for those states as states.

How often did the post-Roman Germanic kingdoms handicap themselves to gain the Emperor's favor? They weren't exactly reliable vassals at the best of times...

(Some examples would be most excellent)

Bruce

 

[Elfwine]

Simple: the only states in the region able to act with a full autonomy as states and thus able to augment both their own strength and with it that of Islamic states were ones which were for various reasons outside the norm. The Muslim principalities at this point saw themselves as more akin to the early post-Roman Germanic kingdoms that wanted to secure the favor of the Eastern Emperor than as rulers in their own right. It handicapped their freedom of action more than ultimately was perhaps good for those states as states.

But how is the (Abbasid) caliphate doing this?

I mean, when the Caliph of Baghdad is a puppet of whoever controls Mesopotamia, or at least more a vassal than an overlord in terms of who has secular power...

I'm not saying you're wrong here, but I'm not seeing it.

 

[Snake Featherston]

How often did the post-Roman Germanic kingdoms handicap themselves to gain the Emperor's favor? They weren't exactly reliable vassals at the best of times...

(Some examples would be most excellent)

Bruce

The most obvious example is the repeated attempts by the Ostrogoths in the Kingdom of Italy to secure the Emperor's recognition as vassal rulers of the Empire in the fashion of late-WRE Magistri Militatem but it didn't work, and instead Justinian sent Belisarius to do what he did best. The Ostrogoths would have done better to structure themselves as direct successors of the WRE without trying such appeals and to structure themselves as such.

But how is the (Abbasid) caliphate doing this?

I mean, when the Caliph of Baghdad is a puppet of whoever controls Mesopotamia, or at least more a vassal than an overlord in terms of who has secular power...

I'm not saying you're wrong here, but I'm not seeing it.

Toward the later phase of the Caliphate before the Mongols sacked Baghdad the Caliphate was actually starting to regain temporal power, which actually fits in with how Japanese Cloistered Emperors could and did act but still indicates they weren't just paper tigers. The Muslim rulers were legally speaking vassals of the Caliphs, and because the Middle Eastern state system did not disintegrate like the Western one, but instead degenerated into a less direct system, the bonds of state still existed to a degree they did not in the West.

The simplest way to put it is that in the early Middle Eastern Islamic era the Caliphs still had a legal claim to power that no Western rulers ever achieved until the Early Modern era, and had capability to enforce it, though the effectiveness of the enforcement could be as ineffectual as Madrid-in-Peru. In the West there was no equivalent continuing legal authority, bar the ERE itself.