10 June 1942. London, England.
General Alan Brooke had prepared a statement to be made at an interview with the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhaylovich Molotov who was on his way through back from the USA to Moscow. The demand for a second front from Moscow were getting deafening. Brooke had finally managed to convince Churchill that Allied forces should not land in France in strength except to stay there, not just to raid the coast. Secondly, unless German morale is deteriorating, then an invasion of France is considered impossible. (1)
What could be done perhaps, at the risk of once again playing the part of perfidious Albion, would be to get Weygand to follow the Syrian example and come over to the Allies. Eden and the Foreign Office were supporters of De Gaulle, but Brooke argued that if Weygand became the voice of Free France, firstly the Germans would need to occupy the whole of France. That would take forces that might overwise be committed to Russia.
The successes in the Mediterranean also provided a possibility of returning onto the European Continent either in Greece (the Prime Minister’s preference) or Sicily (Brooke’s preference). If Hitler could be convinced that an allied invasion of southern Europe was possible, he would again have to consider moving forces from Russia. It was becoming more and more likely that Mussolini would be sidelined. In that case the Germans would be likely to occupy the whole of Italy, again pulling troops away from the eastern front.
The Royal Navy were calling for a halt of the convoys to Russia. In addition to aircraft and U-boats, the Germans now had "Tirpitz", "Admiral Scheer", "Lutzow", "Hipper" and nearly a dozen big destroyers at Narvik and Trondheim. With continual daylight, the previous convoy (PQ 16) had lost six merchantmen to aircraft and one to U-boat attack. Already Home Fleet had lost the cruisers HMS Edinburgh and Trinidad, and HMS King George V had been damaged after ramming and sinking the destroyer HMS Punjabi. If the German fleet sailed to attack the convoy the Royal Navy would be hard pressed to protect the vulnerable merchant ships. (2)
Politically it was impossible for Churchill to stop the next convoy due to leave Iceland at the end of June. He had requested that a full review of the losses in previous PQ convoys be made and suggestions for improvements made. The close escort of the merchantmen was to be increased. The next convoy was to be accompanied by the longer-range destroyers of the Home Fleet. Along with the close escort force of anti-submarine and anti-aircraft ships, the fleet destroyers would be able to confront a sortie by German ships with the threat of a massed torpedo attack. A strong force of cruisers would be shadowing the convoy, ready to intervene and help the destroyers. HMS Victorious, with HMS Duke of York and HMS Renown would be the main covering force. As there was expected to be a large number of American flagged merchant ships in the convoy, Task Force 39, including the carrier USS Wasp and the battleship USS Washington, would join the distant covering force.
The two carriers would be in a position to support the convoy from a distance and HMS Archer, which had been undergoing repairs on the Clyde, would join the convoy itself. It was expected that the presence of the escort carrier with ASV radar equipped Swordfish and Martlet fighters would make life for the Germans harder.
Air Chief Marshall Philip Joubert, AOC Coastal Command, having looked at the problems of PQ 16 had offered to send eight Catalinas and two Squadrons of Hampden torpedo bombers to the Soviet base at Vaenga, along with some photoreconnaissance assets to offer some kind of coverage in addition to the limited Soviet help. This offer was accepted, and the planning for it was expedited.
The Free Norwegians had attempted to put a landing force onto Spitsbergen in May, but it had been attacked by the Luftwaffe and therefore partly failed in its mission. Under the cover of PQ 17 a second attempt would be made to land a force to occupy Spitsbergen and evict the German weather station. The possibility of using the area during the summer months to support the convoys had been considered. Although basing patrol aircraft was rejected as impractical, it was decided to try to place a couple of Royal Fleet Auxiliary tankers to refuel the short-legged escort ships there.
This was one of the first joint operations between the Royal Navy and the US Navy, with American ships under British command. Brooke noted that Admiral Pound had been persuaded to delegate overall command to Admiral Tovey who had been working with TF 39 and built up a good relationship with the American officers.
When Molotov left for Moscow, he had taken with him the assurance that Allied support would not be lacking, the 200000 tons of aid coming on the next convoy was an expression of that. While Stalin might not appreciate it, the sheer scale of naval power employed to protect the convoy was no small matter.
(1) Alan Brooke war diary 10 & 11 June 1942
(2) There is no Pedestal Convoy TTL.