AFAIK, nothing. The whole thing seemingly belongs to the age of political caricatures, which in Russia started rather late. What were self-symbols of the German Empire and AH or many other European states?
So Evident a Danger: The Consequences of War between Britain, Prussia and Russia in 1791
- Thread starter Gwrtheyrn Annwn
- Start date
It is not a loss. It is a cabinet conflict which had little to do with the national interests on either side and ended up with a gentleman-style arrangement. Even the RN could not control the storms and the ships were returned in a courteous manner with the guns and colors. Everybody is cheerful and friendly and nobody’s pride is hurt except for the 1st Lord of Admiralty who started the whole foolish schema.
BTW, after the battle of Chesma the Russian Navy was not something to sneer upon and in OTL Sidney Smith few years later participated in two expeditions which resulted in the British defeats by the Ottomans and one of which, when “inherited” by the Russians, ended up by the Ottoman defeat. Anyway, TTL is pre-Nelsonian so the legend of invulnerability was not there, yet.
Ah yes, the good old Russian bear. We will have to see if that develops ITTL or not!
Russia reappropriating it as a bear cub is quite wholesome though...everything else about modern Russia aside.
You could bet £100 that they won't admit it was a loss, merely an unsatisfactory showing. After all, they didn't technically lose any battles.
Quite a good explanation of it as well. Pitt will take a personal hit in cabinet and Parliament but there's no great national shame really. On top of that, Britain will probably blame Prussia for the whole thing.
Its possible, but probably only after the reign of Frederick William II, who had little interest in that sort of thing.
Yes, I agree with that sentiment. I probably should have said 'sad conflict' as I didn't mean to bemoan the lack of a glorious battle so much as comment on the pathetic nature of the whole conflict as it doesn't really seem to have accomplished much of anything for either side.
But this is quite logical within framework of TTL: the whole thing started as a purely cerebral schema not based upon the realistic national interests or even a serious knowledge of the related economic, logistical and geographic realities. If anything, it is going against the interests of both Russia and Britain and the only trigger is Pitt’s desire to confirm the British position as a dominant trade power, which nobody actually contested, by extending it all the way to plain arrogance. Russian side has nothing to “accomplish” beyond what it already accomplished: getting a piece of the important territory from the Ottomans, which is something Britain can’t seriously contest because it does not have a needed land power or the allies possessing such a power and the naval supremacy does not help against a country not engaged in a maritime trade of its own. And taking into an account that both sides are interested in the trade and an alternative exists only in the Pitt’s head, this conflict is doomed to dwindle to nothing “by the natural causes”.
What could be an alternative? The Ottomans continuing to fight a war they already lost risking to lose more territory. Prussia risking defeat and Russian invasion or, in the best case scenario, gaining little to nothing just by the geographic reasons. PLC entering the war as a completely wild card with the only (questionable) chance to accomplish something in the direction that has nothing to do with Pitt’s plans because on the South there is the main Russian army of a proven quality and with the leadership more experienced than what the PLC army has. What’s the reason for any of these participants to stick out his neck just for a fantastic plan to make Ochakov the main British trade outpost?
I'm really not arguing for a continuation of the war. It was only intended as simple innocuous comment, I'm not trying to debate the logic of the conflict in this timeline or suggest that it should have played out in a different way. I'm enjoying this timeline and obviously there's a lot of interest in it which is great.
Quite agree regarding TL. Don’t take my comment as a criticism: I’m just expressing my thoughts regarding the TL content.
Chapter 1 - Part 14 - "Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God." Matthew 5:9
Part 14 - "Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called the children of God." Matthew 5:9
Heinrich Friedrich von Diez and Prince Platon Zubov
As we have seen, the Battle of Wenden had ended the original plan of campaign conceived in late 1790 and early 1791. The defeat of their scheme had dampened Prussian spirits and been a blow to the confidence of a King, Frederick William II, who preferred an easy life to any kind of serious campaigning. Thus, Prussia had been largely quiet since Möllendorf's advance had been halted. Perhaps they had realised the folly of military intervention. Whatever the reason, Prussia had focussed on diplomatic efforts through the summer and autumn of 1791. Unfortunately for Berlin, these had been no more successful than their military campaigns. Hertzberg's grand plan, at once absurdly brilliant and brilliant absurd, had collapsed under its own weight after relying on too many factions at too many courts. Out with his eponymous scheme had gone Hertzberg himself, his position entirely discredited and his influence with Frederick William II entirely spent.
He was replaced, in stature and influence if not in actual role, by Johann Rudolf von Bischoffwerder, a major-general and the royal aide-du-camp. Bischoffwerder had long been a close friend of Frederick William II, having bonded with the King through their shared membership of the Rosicrucian Order, and had enjoyed rapid promotion after Frederick William II succeeded Frederick the Great. Now, he reached the top position in the land, unofficially at least. His chief advantage over Hertzberg, Hertzberg's failures aside, was that he understood that all the king really wanted. For all the grand talk and bluster that emanated out of the court at Berlin and his self-conscious desire to imitate the success of his uncle, Frederick William II actually loved nothing more than a peaceful life to enjoy his decadent past-times and explore the occult. In that context, the Ochakov War was a failed experiment. A bout of overconfidence induced by the success of 1787, and no small amount of ministerial pressure, had produced an utter conviction of an easy victory. It was not only Britain that had fallen for this trap. Everything in the campaign since had been an unending succession of disappointment. Disappointment in the war, disappointment in diplomacy and disappointment at the court of Berlin. The fall of Hertzberg at the start of November 1791 and his replacement by Bischoffwerder would hopefully change that pattern.
Frederick William II had been thoroughly chastened by the disappointing adventure of 1791 and now only wanted peace. He had refused to sanction substantial reinforcements to Möllendorf, sending only 10,000, and had been willing to throw the towel in even before the news of the Ottoman peace negotiations with Russia had reached him. The Second Black Sea Expedition had, like it had in Britain, briefly revitalised hopes for that all important major victory to salve everyone's pride and presage peace. This hope been cruelly shattered by the vagaries of the weather and the British fleet limping meekly back to Constantinople. Thus, by late November, Prussia was simultaneously the last major combatant still theoretically engaged in campaigning and rather keen to make peace. The rumours of the imminent arrival of around 20,000 Russian reinforcements under Suvorov, not to mention the feared Rumyantsev taking overall charge of the campaign, only increased Prussia's new found pacifistic tendencies. Talks about a joint Triple Alliance peace delegation to Russia began with the British envoy-extraordinary in Berlin in January 1792. By this stage, both parties had had enough of the an expensive, and now entirely futile, conflict. They could, if being particularly self-congratulatory, claim success in having prevented further Russian gains beyond Ochakov and, though it would only really benefit Pitt, could make a spurious argument for having saved Poland-Lithuania. These were hollow succour against the ambitions of late 1790 and early 1791.
Prussia had suffered the worst of the two, its reputation for a nearly invincible military had not been entirely disapproved in the Baltic spring rain but it had been badly tarnished. It would never recover. The similar reputation of Britain's Royal Navy had also been damaged but there were at least some more excuses for their failures, excuses that had been realised in January 1791 at the latest and really should have prevented British involvement in the war in the first place. Britain would recover in time and had learnt a number of valuable lessons, chief among them the perils of a lack of knowledge and a reminder of the perils of becoming involved in a European land war. Prussia, after the peace, would sink into an almost isolationist stance for the rest of Frederick William II's reign as he preferred indolence to risking anymore harsh military lesson. Britain would be more proactive in its response, especially in the Middle East, where the Smith brothers would enjoy notable careers, and in naval improvements. Similarly, though, they would have little interest in further wars for some years.
But what was the Peace of Ochakov to look like? It did not take long for the British and the Prussians to agree to make their peace with Russia before another years' campaigning could begin and cost them vast sums more. The Dutch, glorified observers to the end, also agreed in short order and so thus a combined Triple Alliance delegation was dispatched in late February to St Petersburg to sue for peace. Comprised of Sir Charles Whitworth, the former British envoy-extraordinary to Russia, Heinrich Friedrich von Diez, former Prussian chargé d'affaires in Constantinople, and the former Dutch ambassador to St Petersburg, the delegation arrived on the 22nd March and formally offered an immediate armistice and the opening of peace talks. This was a humiliating climbdown, especially for Whitworth who had been such a vocal critic of Catherine II and Russia. The peace negotiations themselves would take some weeks, not because of any major disagreements but because no-one really knew what could be demanded or offered by either party. Britain and Prussia offered a status quo ante bellum peace but the Russian court, especially Catherine II and her new favourite Platon Zubov, were not so inclined at first. It seem far too little to make up for the trouble that the Triple Alliance had caused the Empress. But if it was too little, then it was far from clear at court what enough would be.
Potemkin would make a final bid to target Poland-Lithuania as part of Russia's price for peace but he was now so far disgraced that his association with the scheme hindered rather than helped the idea. He would then die in early May, his ill-health having caught up with him, and so bring that particular scheme to an end for the time being. There was also no Prussian, and certainly no British, territory to be demanded even if there had been a desire to do so and, by their bilateral peace with the Ottomans, Russia had already gained what Catherine II had been aiming for. The only real possibility, financial reparations, were eventually raised by Zubov. Never one to let a clever idea not be followed by a foolish one, he initially proposed the immense sum of £2 million. This naturally antagonised the Triple Alliance ambassadors, who were hardly disposed to be favourable to him in the first place. By way of a counter-stroke, Whitworth somewhat snidely suggested, possibly at the urging of Daniel Hailes the British envoy to Poland, that this might be a good opportunity for everyone to show their mutual commitment to peace by a joint guarantee. After further back and forth, both parties settled on reparations of £500,000 between the Triple Alliance and an agreement to 'discuss' the guarantee of Poland-Lithuania. The latter would never come to pass, as everyone involved probably anticipated, but in the short-term it didn't matter. The Treaty of St Petersburg would be signed on the 16th April 1792, ending the Ochakov War with status quo ante bellum, a cash payment and an empty promise.
Heinrich Friedrich von Diez and Prince Platon Zubov
As we have seen, the Battle of Wenden had ended the original plan of campaign conceived in late 1790 and early 1791. The defeat of their scheme had dampened Prussian spirits and been a blow to the confidence of a King, Frederick William II, who preferred an easy life to any kind of serious campaigning. Thus, Prussia had been largely quiet since Möllendorf's advance had been halted. Perhaps they had realised the folly of military intervention. Whatever the reason, Prussia had focussed on diplomatic efforts through the summer and autumn of 1791. Unfortunately for Berlin, these had been no more successful than their military campaigns. Hertzberg's grand plan, at once absurdly brilliant and brilliant absurd, had collapsed under its own weight after relying on too many factions at too many courts. Out with his eponymous scheme had gone Hertzberg himself, his position entirely discredited and his influence with Frederick William II entirely spent.
He was replaced, in stature and influence if not in actual role, by Johann Rudolf von Bischoffwerder, a major-general and the royal aide-du-camp. Bischoffwerder had long been a close friend of Frederick William II, having bonded with the King through their shared membership of the Rosicrucian Order, and had enjoyed rapid promotion after Frederick William II succeeded Frederick the Great. Now, he reached the top position in the land, unofficially at least. His chief advantage over Hertzberg, Hertzberg's failures aside, was that he understood that all the king really wanted. For all the grand talk and bluster that emanated out of the court at Berlin and his self-conscious desire to imitate the success of his uncle, Frederick William II actually loved nothing more than a peaceful life to enjoy his decadent past-times and explore the occult. In that context, the Ochakov War was a failed experiment. A bout of overconfidence induced by the success of 1787, and no small amount of ministerial pressure, had produced an utter conviction of an easy victory. It was not only Britain that had fallen for this trap. Everything in the campaign since had been an unending succession of disappointment. Disappointment in the war, disappointment in diplomacy and disappointment at the court of Berlin. The fall of Hertzberg at the start of November 1791 and his replacement by Bischoffwerder would hopefully change that pattern.
Frederick William II had been thoroughly chastened by the disappointing adventure of 1791 and now only wanted peace. He had refused to sanction substantial reinforcements to Möllendorf, sending only 10,000, and had been willing to throw the towel in even before the news of the Ottoman peace negotiations with Russia had reached him. The Second Black Sea Expedition had, like it had in Britain, briefly revitalised hopes for that all important major victory to salve everyone's pride and presage peace. This hope been cruelly shattered by the vagaries of the weather and the British fleet limping meekly back to Constantinople. Thus, by late November, Prussia was simultaneously the last major combatant still theoretically engaged in campaigning and rather keen to make peace. The rumours of the imminent arrival of around 20,000 Russian reinforcements under Suvorov, not to mention the feared Rumyantsev taking overall charge of the campaign, only increased Prussia's new found pacifistic tendencies. Talks about a joint Triple Alliance peace delegation to Russia began with the British envoy-extraordinary in Berlin in January 1792. By this stage, both parties had had enough of the an expensive, and now entirely futile, conflict. They could, if being particularly self-congratulatory, claim success in having prevented further Russian gains beyond Ochakov and, though it would only really benefit Pitt, could make a spurious argument for having saved Poland-Lithuania. These were hollow succour against the ambitions of late 1790 and early 1791.
Prussia had suffered the worst of the two, its reputation for a nearly invincible military had not been entirely disapproved in the Baltic spring rain but it had been badly tarnished. It would never recover. The similar reputation of Britain's Royal Navy had also been damaged but there were at least some more excuses for their failures, excuses that had been realised in January 1791 at the latest and really should have prevented British involvement in the war in the first place. Britain would recover in time and had learnt a number of valuable lessons, chief among them the perils of a lack of knowledge and a reminder of the perils of becoming involved in a European land war. Prussia, after the peace, would sink into an almost isolationist stance for the rest of Frederick William II's reign as he preferred indolence to risking anymore harsh military lesson. Britain would be more proactive in its response, especially in the Middle East, where the Smith brothers would enjoy notable careers, and in naval improvements. Similarly, though, they would have little interest in further wars for some years.
But what was the Peace of Ochakov to look like? It did not take long for the British and the Prussians to agree to make their peace with Russia before another years' campaigning could begin and cost them vast sums more. The Dutch, glorified observers to the end, also agreed in short order and so thus a combined Triple Alliance delegation was dispatched in late February to St Petersburg to sue for peace. Comprised of Sir Charles Whitworth, the former British envoy-extraordinary to Russia, Heinrich Friedrich von Diez, former Prussian chargé d'affaires in Constantinople, and the former Dutch ambassador to St Petersburg, the delegation arrived on the 22nd March and formally offered an immediate armistice and the opening of peace talks. This was a humiliating climbdown, especially for Whitworth who had been such a vocal critic of Catherine II and Russia. The peace negotiations themselves would take some weeks, not because of any major disagreements but because no-one really knew what could be demanded or offered by either party. Britain and Prussia offered a status quo ante bellum peace but the Russian court, especially Catherine II and her new favourite Platon Zubov, were not so inclined at first. It seem far too little to make up for the trouble that the Triple Alliance had caused the Empress. But if it was too little, then it was far from clear at court what enough would be.
Potemkin would make a final bid to target Poland-Lithuania as part of Russia's price for peace but he was now so far disgraced that his association with the scheme hindered rather than helped the idea. He would then die in early May, his ill-health having caught up with him, and so bring that particular scheme to an end for the time being. There was also no Prussian, and certainly no British, territory to be demanded even if there had been a desire to do so and, by their bilateral peace with the Ottomans, Russia had already gained what Catherine II had been aiming for. The only real possibility, financial reparations, were eventually raised by Zubov. Never one to let a clever idea not be followed by a foolish one, he initially proposed the immense sum of £2 million. This naturally antagonised the Triple Alliance ambassadors, who were hardly disposed to be favourable to him in the first place. By way of a counter-stroke, Whitworth somewhat snidely suggested, possibly at the urging of Daniel Hailes the British envoy to Poland, that this might be a good opportunity for everyone to show their mutual commitment to peace by a joint guarantee. After further back and forth, both parties settled on reparations of £500,000 between the Triple Alliance and an agreement to 'discuss' the guarantee of Poland-Lithuania. The latter would never come to pass, as everyone involved probably anticipated, but in the short-term it didn't matter. The Treaty of St Petersburg would be signed on the 16th April 1792, ending the Ochakov War with status quo ante bellum, a cash payment and an empty promise.
Apologies for such a delay between chapters! Life has been very busy so I couldn't manage my hope of weekly chapters, but hopefully a bit of a longer chapter will make up for it!
I wouldn't call it nothing, diplomatic standing and positions have certainly changed and Russia distrusts the Western powers even more, this will have severe consequences on the short term as well as the long run(aka Napoleon)
Oh, true. But the lines on the map vs the noise that was made was just asking for my remark, really...
This does not bode well for Prussia at all unless never is not really never but only the next years. If never is never I'm guessing that France will shatter Prussia completely.
Oh no!
Anyway...
Poland wins this shitshow by the virtue of not showing up; the best kind of victory, very 5D
There is a certain similarity between Hertzberg’s grand plan and earlier Panin’s idea of the Northern Accord: both had too many components and quite shaky underlying assumptions based much more upon the abstract ideas then the realities of life.
In OTL, the Old Fritz was sharply critical of Panin’s “system” and here, rather ironically, the next Prussian generation is doing the same but in a reverse. 😂
But did they, really? How about the following:
- Of course, the PLC did not participate directly but it allowed Prussians to march through its territory, was making the hostile sounds and increased size of its army, all of which can be considered as casus belli by Russia.
- Whoever is now in charge of the Prussian policies may make a well-founded claim that the PLC did not deliver on its part of a bargain thus dooming the Prussian military effort on its behalf and causing all kinds of the expenses. BTW, Prussia is looking for an easy way to redeem its military reputation.
- Now, as far as Britain is involved, the re-acquired friendship with Russia surely means restoration of the trade, which is much more important than the PLC constitution. Anyway, Britain did a valiant and expensive (few ships-of-the-line being lost and more needed repairs, all this costs money; plus the losses from a trade, which was interrupted exclusively out of desire to help the PLC) effort to help the Poles who clearly did not want to help themselves thus removing any moral obligations, etc.. To think about it, shouldn’t they suffer consequences of their perfidious behavior? Any self-respecting British politician would be able to make a multi-hour speech in the Parliament on this subject.
The bottom line, Britain washes its collective hands and Prussia and Russia may start discussing a way of compensating themselves at the expense of a guilty party, which caused the whole thing. Taking into an account that both countries have their armies in a field, wouldn’t it be reasonable to use them for something more productive than marching back to their quarters? The Brits were mentioning the guarantees, which is a very good idea, but what guarantees could be given to a clearly unstable country ruled by the extremists? First, its political stability must be re-established and the armed force must be cut to a size that will not present danger to its neighbors. Then Russia and Prussia have to compensate themselves for the services granted and then they’ll give the guarantees. 😜
BTW, presently I’m trying to invent the way of creating the OTL mess with the Bar Confederacy without “Repnin Sejm” and dissidents issue so the ideas are greatly appreciated.
I must say this has been a interesting timeline of a minor diplomatic spat turning into a major war, the fact that it over something so minor thankfully made fairly easy to come to peace once they could face the mirror.
Though that being said, it certainly does matter Prussia's if not broken from it leadership will be a lot more hesitant to act afraid of being humiliated once more and Russia's certainly proven itself worthy of being a great power. The PLC though, well it's going to be a rough couple of years after this given their moves has not really endeared themselves to either Russia or Prussia and that guarantee is dubious.
Though that being said, it certainly does matter Prussia's if not broken from it leadership will be a lot more hesitant to act afraid of being humiliated once more and Russia's certainly proven itself worthy of being a great power. The PLC though, well it's going to be a rough couple of years after this given their moves has not really endeared themselves to either Russia or Prussia and that guarantee is dubious.
Exactly. Both Russia and Prussia may (“may” or “may not” is up to @Gwrtheyrn Annwn to decide) look for a revenge and some “rehabilitation” of their militaries, none of which demonstrated too impressive performance, and if at least the Russian Navy can claim a tangible “glory”, the Prussians have nothing at all. A short, seemingly risk free, victorious campaign with some acquisition at the end (Danzig almost a “must” but perhaps more or even much more) would be just what the doctor ordered. On the Russian side the last Ottoman war just reconfirmed what was already known: logistics of these wars required either absolutely friendly PLC (never happened) or possession of the Right Bank Ukraine, especially the part laying between the RE and OE (lands between the Dnieper and Dniester as a minimum but perhaps all the way to the Priepet on the North).
So both parties have meaningful interests (not abstract Pitt’s schemas), the means (each has at least 50,000 at the theater and can move more) and the only thing needed is an excuse. Which is not a problem: (a) formally, the PLC can be blamed for triggering the whole thing, (b) its constitution is still in place so this is dealing with the “Jacobins” (a laudable thing to do) and (c) as Prince Repnin explained soon after Stanislaw’s election, “you have a right to do what you want but we have a power to prevent you from doing what we do not like”.
😉
In many ways, the inevitable result. At least for the war itself.
Precisely this. The consequences on a map are minimal, well asides from Poland-Lithuania surviving longer (not that this would necessarily occur to ITTL observers), but the consequences on diplomacy, attitudes and general policy will be considerable.
Equally true, and this picks up on one reason for why Britain and Prussia will be smarting from the war, whether or not it was 'officially' a defeat.
Clarifying would definitely be spoilers! All I'll say is that Frederick William II's already limited interest in the military has just shrunk to near zero.
Oh absolutely, it was a great success all round for Poland-Lithuania. The question is, can they sustain it going forwards and build on this reprieve.
As they say, history doesn't repeat but it does rhyme! Even if its rhyming the other way round.
'Spurious' was used advisedly! I will go into this in more detail when there is a chance to focus on British domestic politics for an update but that comment is hinting that Pitt will be attempting to use the claim of 'saving Poland-Lithuania' to justify the whole palaver. Ie. "Look, we set out to push back Russian aggression, they did lots of sabre-rattling at Poland and we stopped them, great success!" How convincing that is to either ITTL contemporaries or the reader is quite another question.
Now, as for the possibility of Poland getting invaded anyway. Its certainly possible in the future, but I would say not in the short-term, for reasons I was careful to mention in the last update. Firstly, Frederick William II has been so thoroughly chastened by the whole experience that he was not interest in another war. The chief proponent of more aggressive foreign policy, Hertzberg, has fallen and been effectively replaced by a royal favourite whose main concern is to keep the King happy. Since the King's favourite past-times are about as far removed from warfare as possible, they'll be entering a worse version of OTL's decline under Frederick William II. And in regards to Russia, well the idea of partitioning Poland-Lithuania has been associated with Potemkin as his personal project. And since he first fell from grace and then died, it has been put to one side for now. Furthermore, Catherine II herself is growing old and senile and may not, like Frederick William II, not be inclined to pursue another war.
I would also comment on the Jacobin point. The Polish-Lithuanian Constitution was, of course, not at all Jacobin. It was enlightened absolutism applied in an electoral monarchy. Of course, this didn't stop OTL propagandists calling it such, nor even its supporters celebrating it as being as momentous as the French Revolution (though crucially it's supporters tended to regard it as the French Revolution done right, ie. by the King). But ITTL, there is a question over how fitting that analogy would be...
And you're welcome!
Thank you!
A good summary I think. Though in fairness, the PLC hasn't really done anything...except refuse to become involved. You and @alexmilman both make fair comments that it is entirely possible for Prussia and Russia could twist this into justification but it would be spurious in the extreme. Especially after the crushing of the internal rebellion that was OTL's excuse to intervene.