Exactly when is important. Is there still a Sunni/Muslim Brotherhood insurgency ongoing, or has Assad killed them all at Hama in 1982? A careful Israeli campaign which includes a very very swift withdrawal could trigger the collapse of the Alawite Ba'ath regime.
I don't think Israel really wants to be policiing a country with two and and a half times its population; Damascus alone has a greater population than the West Bank does, and involves a 50km drive to get supplies to an occupying force.
But yes, Israel can probably win air superiority as they did in June 82 in Lebanon, though at a higher cost in planes and pilots (OTL claims of 80 kills without loss, even if exaggerated, are so unequal that it's pretty accepted that there was something systemically wrong with the Syrian Air Force) as more of the engagements will happen inside Syria proper with concomitantly greater air defences (though OTL there were some in Lebanon which were pretty much all destroyed, IIRC). And then they can probably outmanoeuvre the Syrian armoured formations. The Israeli goal in an offensive war however must not be to capture Damascus, but rather to concentrate on the destruction of the Syrian army - Sichelschnitt, not Schlieffen - they have to be able to respond to Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon as well, and want to get the reservists back into the labour force as quickly as possible, which means no extended deployment of large numbers of troops, particularly not as a garrison force.