MarshalBraginsky
Banned
One other thing in mind: did the Japanese actually encountered Jurchen raiders while they occupied Korea, and how did they perform against nomadic horsemen?
WI: Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea succeeds
- Thread starter Lord General Mihalic
- Start date
Some info here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamgyo...and field fortications nullified this threat.
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A thought I had as I logged on and read all this. What if the Japanese had a better naval force?
As I understand the Koreans under Admiral Yi lolstomped the Japanese naval forces time and time again (especially in the third naval campaign). So what might the Japanese have done in order to have a better navy to not defeat the Koreans per-say but perhaps make it more even on the high seas.
As I understand the Koreans under Admiral Yi lolstomped the Japanese naval forces time and time again (especially in the third naval campaign). So what might the Japanese have done in order to have a better navy to not defeat the Koreans per-say but perhaps make it more even on the high seas.
They would have to probably have a radical change in naval doctrine which was mostly using boarding actions on wooden ships that might not have been seaworthy with muskets and cannons as support. In Contrast I believe the Koreans had not also some armored ships but largely kept away from Japanese ships.
The Jurchen did not raid the peninsula when the Japanese temporarily occupied it, and although Kato Kiyomasa did manage to briefly head into Manchuria after passing through Hamgyeong, he was soon defeated and forced to retreat. However, even if the Japanese had scored victories, they would have been moot, as Hamgyeong was located far away from any major supply lines, which were mostly located in the west, and would have been virtually impossible to effectively supply from the sea due to the mountainous terrain.
In addition, the Jurchen did offer aid to Joseon in order to counter the Japanese invasion, but this was rebuffed because the latter viewed the nomads as "barbarians."
It was more complicated than that. The Japanese did deploy a significant number of muskets and arquebuses, although they had far shorter ranges than the Korean composite bows, and also applied tactics that had been used during the Sengoku Period. On the other hand, the Koreans employed hwacha, inspired by Chinese fire arrows, in which up to 200 arrows could be fired simultaneously, not to mention the Chinese weapons, such as firearms and proto-hand granades that were distributed to the Ming army. Although hwacha were mostly used for defensive purposes, they often proved useful against the Japanese, as they typically advanced in a massed formation. Cavalry also became disadvantageous for both sides in the long run due to the mountainous terrain involved. In addition, in terms of the ships involved, the Korean panokseon were much more maneuverable along the coast than the Japanese atakebune due to their hull structures, not to mention that the former could carry much more cannons (25-50 vs. 3-4). Turtle ships, which were revived by Yi Sun-shin from prior designs, were also covered with iron spikes on the deck in order to prevent the Japanese from utilizing grappling tactics.
If the Japanese had invested significantly more in the navy, it would have had less to spare for the army, making it much more difficult for the latter to conduct operations due to lower initial supplies. In any case, the Japanese lost all but one naval battle because the Koreans aimed to cut their supply lines, instead of directly confronting them, and both sides utilized technology that had been consolidated through centuries of tradition, which would have been virtually impossible to significantly alter within just a few decades.
This too.
Yes, but Firearms used en masse from behind rice bags gave the Japanese an edge over cavalry with composite bows at least at Haejungchang. I'm sure terrain considerations limited cavalry as you said. I'm also sure that hwacha were not used by Korean cavalry. I brought up Korean cavalry more as a surrogate force to begin to have an idea of how the Japanese might have fared against Jurchen cavalry in a pitched battle (which really didn't happen--there was the recorded retreat in the face of superior numbers and risk of encirclement) to try to answer MarshalB's question.
A Japanese propensity for accepting heavy casualties if necessary and their use of more adept tactics generally won the day for the Japanese on land, no matter what innovations the Koreans and Ming employed in the land battles. Although of course, we saw how far this got the invasion force in the end.
I decided to do some research, and found out that there were seven main reasons contributing to Hideyoshi's decision to invade Korea:
1) Weaken the influence of the influential daimyo by realizing his ambitions and portraying himself as a hero (Max Sinister alluded to this).
2) Vent his frustrations over the early death of Tsurumatsu, his first son.
3) Secure control over major maritime trade routes.
4) Influenced by Oda Nobugana's prior aspirations to expand into Mainland Asia.
5) Desire to rule "everything under heaven," which theoretically included Japan, Korea, China, India, and Southeast Asia (I mentioned this earlier). His hubris was to the point where even after his troops suffered numerous defeats in the first invasion, he demanded a Ming princess as his consort, along with control over half of Korea's eight provinces.
6) He had no direct justification to rule, unlike the emperor, and it was becoming extremely difficult to administrate the archipelago by acting as the regent, as numerous regions retained a certain degree of autonomy. As a result, an overseas invasion was viewed as a reasonable method of indirectly consolidating political influence within the country.
7) Redirect internal tensions by focusing on external issues (I also mentioned this).
Of these, 1, 6, and 7 are closely related, while 3 and 5 were probably heavily influenced by 4. It's also worth noting that despite strong opposition from various daimyo, among them Tokugawa Ieyasu, Hideyoshi decided to carry on with his plans, although he was forced to remain within Japan for the duration of the Imjin War for fear that he might be usurped during his absence. He also appointed five regents to advise Hideyori, his underage son, shortly before his death, although due to political instability and a severely depleted treasury stemming from the war in Korea, the officials quickly turned on each other, though in 1600, the Battle of Sekigahara firmly established Ieyasu as shogun.
As a result, as long as the PoD occurs after 1580 or so, when Nobunaga managed to defeat most of his major rivals and firmly consolidate his influence within Japan, a Japanese invasion of Korea is essentially inevitable, after which the archipelago's resources would be depleted after devastating losses, along with potentially severe political instability.
Oh okay, you were just focusing on the northeastern campaign, although I was talking about general conditions throughout the peninsula. I see what you mean.
1) Weaken the influence of the influential daimyo by realizing his ambitions and portraying himself as a hero (Max Sinister alluded to this).
2) Vent his frustrations over the early death of Tsurumatsu, his first son.
3) Secure control over major maritime trade routes.
4) Influenced by Oda Nobugana's prior aspirations to expand into Mainland Asia.
5) Desire to rule "everything under heaven," which theoretically included Japan, Korea, China, India, and Southeast Asia (I mentioned this earlier). His hubris was to the point where even after his troops suffered numerous defeats in the first invasion, he demanded a Ming princess as his consort, along with control over half of Korea's eight provinces.
6) He had no direct justification to rule, unlike the emperor, and it was becoming extremely difficult to administrate the archipelago by acting as the regent, as numerous regions retained a certain degree of autonomy. As a result, an overseas invasion was viewed as a reasonable method of indirectly consolidating political influence within the country.
7) Redirect internal tensions by focusing on external issues (I also mentioned this).
Of these, 1, 6, and 7 are closely related, while 3 and 5 were probably heavily influenced by 4. It's also worth noting that despite strong opposition from various daimyo, among them Tokugawa Ieyasu, Hideyoshi decided to carry on with his plans, although he was forced to remain within Japan for the duration of the Imjin War for fear that he might be usurped during his absence. He also appointed five regents to advise Hideyori, his underage son, shortly before his death, although due to political instability and a severely depleted treasury stemming from the war in Korea, the officials quickly turned on each other, though in 1600, the Battle of Sekigahara firmly established Ieyasu as shogun.
As a result, as long as the PoD occurs after 1580 or so, when Nobunaga managed to defeat most of his major rivals and firmly consolidate his influence within Japan, a Japanese invasion of Korea is essentially inevitable, after which the archipelago's resources would be depleted after devastating losses, along with potentially severe political instability.
Oh okay, you were just focusing on the northeastern campaign, although I was talking about general conditions throughout the peninsula. I see what you mean.
Heqin (和親) did occur with foreign entities during the Han, Sui, and Tang, and also occasionally took place among Chinese states during political fragmentation from 304-589. However, this process involved marrying various princesses for decades in order to continuously maintain the fragile order, and only occurred when there was a military stalemate among the sides involved (such as the situation with the Xiongnu), or to placate various far-flung "barbarian" states that had continuously raided China beforehand.
As a result, this system would not work in this scenario, as the Japanese sued for peace precisely because they were facing severe logistical issues, meaning that the Ming viewed Japan as "inferior," not to mention that the invaders never directly ventured into Chinese territory, so there were no "raids" to speak of. Even if Japan somehow managed to take Korea in an impossible scenario, it would then attempt to invade China, which would result in a devastating counter-invasion that would utterly destroy the country.