The Whale has Wings

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1935 (cont)

In order to try and keep the German naval buildup under some sort of limitation, the Anglo-German naval agreement was signed on the 18th June. This limited Germany to 35% of Britains tonnage, 45% of submarine tonnage. While seeming to give Germany the opportunities to build a considerable fleet, The Admiralty were quite happy with it for two main reasons; first, they thought that allowing Germany to build up prestigeous capital units would stop them building the 'freak fleet' of fast cruisers and submarines that was their biggest worry, and second that while Germany could in theory build up a carrier force, it had taken them, the USA and Japan well over 10 years to work out many of the problems, so any early German carriers would have to go through a similar timewasting learning curve.

While this was going on, the arguments over next years carrier construction program went on. The government understood that Germany could easily build up into a major threat, and that this meant that they could no longer ignore the need for increased defence spending. While they didn't see the German army as a threat at the moment, the Luftwaffe was clearly able to attack Britain, if not immediately then in the near future. British air defences had to be improved, and work on strengthening the RAF was speeded up. The air defences were also planned for major improvements, although delays in the 3.7" AA gun meant this would take time before it could become implemented.

The Navy argued that the air threat extended to them as well, and since it was not certain that the RAF would be available except in obvious cases like the coastal waters off the UK, the obvious way of increasing the defences of the fleet was to build more carriers. In addition, the carriers based at Scapa could also help defend the base (and if necessary Scotland), thus freeing up RAF fighters for other use. While the government agreed that this was logical in principle, there were issues over the cost and the tonnage availability under the London treaty. The navy did point out that at the moment there were ample large building slips available (while they were reserving 5 for the battleships they hoped to start in 1937, they still had ample capability to build carriers). These arguments were still ongoing when international relations again took a step closer to war.

At the same time, the DCN continued to finish its design for the next carrier. This was to be a slightly improved Ark Royal class, slightly heavier but with better facilities and somewhat better protection; studies since the design of the Ark Royal had made Admiral Chatfield concerned that the level of protection of the ships should be improved. They would also have a heavier close in AA armament of 8 x 8 2pdrs.
The other obvious difference was the length of the stern rounddown. In the first 2 ships, this had been quite large, as aerodynamic studies showed this improved the airflow over the deck for landings. However it also reduced the space available for spotting aircraft prior to a strike. This hadn't been considered important before, as the RAF had insisted that only small strikes were possible. After taking to the Americans, and after some experiments, this was shown to be completely false. As a result, the rounddown, while not eliminated completely, was shortened considerably, allowing another 100' of deck spotting area. The ships were also slightly longer, making them a little faster. This made it more difficult to dock, but the advantages of a longer ship (with a correspondingly bigger flight deck and upper hanger) were considered worth it by the FAA. In fact the new ships would carry 68 planes rather than the 64 of the original class. This was actually eggagerated to 85 (the Ark Royal had been stated publically to hold 80; not exactly untrue as this was quite feasible with a deck park) in order to hide the amount of armour used for protection of the lower spaces in the ship.
A number of studies had looked at the concept of putting the armour on the flight deck rather than the lower hanger, but the FAA had pointed out that in the event of heavy attacks the carrier would still be put out of action as a carrier, and that the damage, while probably less severe, would be more difficult to repair as in order to achieve any sort of feasible weight the armour would have to be worked structurally. The extra weight so high up in the ship would mean the ship would be single hanger only, and that some of the space would be further reduced by facilities originally lower in the ship having to be at flight deck level - indeed, the internal capacity of the ship would be halved. Showing their calculations and based on exercises, they were able to show that with the new fighters they would be getting (and with the assumption that at least a prototype version of RDF would be available in a few years), the average damage taken to the carrier (and to the ships in company) would be less with more fighters than with heavier armour.


In October Italy, with intentions of being a great power in the Mediterranean and in Northern Africa, invaded Abyssinia(Ethiopia). The Mediterranean fleet was put on alert, however the only diplomatic steps taken was that the League of Nations imposed economic sanctions against Italy. This was actually a relief to the Navy, as the air defence of the fleet was seen as inadequate against Italian air power, and there was concern that while victory against Italy at sea was highly likely, this would involve losses that would take time to recover from, and in view of the steady deterioration of the international situation this might not be possible.

In view of the area to monitor, and its remoteness, it was decided to use air power, in particular carriers, to enforce the LoN sanctions. The navy was actually very happy with this, as while it did impose wear and tear on the ships and crews involved, the experience gained in intense carrier operations in near-war conditions turned out to be invaluable. As the first pilots from the enlarged training scheme were now available, the patrols were also used to give them more intense training.

The patrol of course only strengthened the navies case for more carriers, and the treasury finally released more money for the 1936 vote as the year ended. It was looking more and more as if the new treaty would allow (at worst) more carrier tonnage, and given the worst case possibility of using new carriers to replace the inefficient older ships, the 1936 estimates would include 2 more fleet carriers to the improved design

HMS Formidable would be laid down in May 1936 to commission in May 1939

HMS Victorious would be laid down in May 1936 to commission in July 1939

It was noted that although enhancements in the supply or armour plate had been made, and that more increases were planned, the need to reserve capability for the battleships planned for 1937 meant that there was going to be a shortfall. Accordingly a foreign supplier of armour was looked for (in the event, 20,000t of armour would be supplied from the Czechs)
 
[...] Also how about Hermes or Eagle going to the RAN or RCN so they can begin to develop their own carrier arms?

There'd be treaty issues with that- during the original WNT negotiations, the US insisted that either the dominion navies be counted as part of the RN totals for purposes of tonnage limits, or be allowed a bigger fleet to compensate, out of fears that to have things set up otherwise would create a loophole the British Empire could exploit to have a fleet larger than they were supposed to have, so if Britain tried flogging those two off to Canada or Australia while continuining their construction program, they could find themselves in violation of the treaties.
 
Bit of a cheeky way around this, that with war looming MIGHT work.
Britain sells the two carriers as scrap, 1 to Australia and one to Canada. As soon as they reach territorial waters they get impounded by the respective navies just to study of course;)
 
There'd be treaty issues with that- during the original WNT negotiations, the US insisted that either the dominion navies be counted as part of the RN totals for purposes of tonnage limits, or be allowed a bigger fleet to compensate, out of fears that to have things set up otherwise would create a loophole the British Empire could exploit to have a fleet larger than they were supposed to have, so if Britain tried flogging those two off to Canada or Australia while continuining their construction program, they could find themselves in violation of the treaties.

i was thinking amore of this occuring in 1937/1938 when the new carriers begin to enter service, weren't the treaties void by this time?
 
How does the FAA's adoption of a 50 cal type gun affect procurement elsewhere? Defensive armament for bombers?
Phasing out of the Vickers 303?
 
On a related note, has anyone attempted a TL where say Australia sets up an equivalent Commonwealth Aircraft Company earlier than 1936?
 
How does the FAA's adoption of a 50 cal type gun affect procurement elsewhere? Defensive armament for bombers?
Phasing out of the Vickers 303?

It might do, bomber command wanted 0.5" guns later in the war from the US, but the guns werent available.
However I'm not going to be bothering much about what the RAF gets up to except where it affects the navy.

There will be some upcoming butterflies on the armament front soon, though :)
 
i was thinking amore of this occuring in 1937/1938 when the new carriers begin to enter service, weren't the treaties void by this time?

Not exactly, but the 2nd London treaty removed limits on carrier total tonnage, and limited an individual ship to 23,000t. Something similiar is going to happen here (there is no reason to change the unlimited tonnage, in fact the drivers are if anything stronger), so once that is agreed expect to see the FAA hammering on the door clutching carrier blueprints :)
There will also be a butterfly or two heading the way of Australia....
 
How does the FAA's adoption of a 50 cal type gun affect procurement elsewhere? Defensive armament for bombers?
Phasing out of the Vickers 303?
As I understand it the RAF wanted to phase our the .303, however they thought .50 cal was not enough of an improvement over the .303 to be worth the bother, so instead wanted to jump straight to cannon.

Of course they then royally cocked up the cannon procurement and it was delayed badly, but that was the way thinking was going. I do wonder why TTL's FAA didn't decide to go for cannon as well, it's not like there weren't cannon available for testing.
 
As I understand it the RAF wanted to phase our the .303, however they thought .50 cal was not enough of an improvement over the .303 to be worth the bother, so instead wanted to jump straight to cannon.

Of course they then royally cocked up the cannon procurement and it was delayed badly, but that was the way thinking was going. I do wonder why TTL's FAA didn't decide to go for cannon as well, it's not like there weren't cannon available for testing.

Wait and see....:D
 
Wait and see....:D

Easy for you to say!
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1936

At the beginning of the year the FAA were looking forward to the first results of the new aircraft development program. As had been half expected, there had been some small delay in getting a flight-certified version of the Hercules in the middle of 1935, and in fact the first one received its certification in November of that year. As intended, Gloster had flown the first of their two prototypes with the Bristol Perseus engine, and even with the considerably lower power available, the Admiralty was most impressed with the reports on the plane. When the Hercules version flew in March 36, they fully expected to get a plane as good as any current land based fighter. The Bristol plane was expected to fly in April, as they were waiting for a Hercules engine.

The progress of the dive bomber prototypes was causing a little more concern. Hawker were very busy with the development of the Hurricane fighter, and as a result the Henly development had been slowed. As this had been rather a fall-back design, they weren't too concerned, but the Blackburn aircraft was only coming along slowly - indeed, the Martin-Baker machine, which has been started later, had almost caught up and was expected to finish its trials earlier. At the moment both aircraft were expected to begin trials in May-June.

A requirement had been sent out late in 1935 for the Swordfish replacement. While the FAA was happier than they originally expected with the general performance of the Swordfish, its slow speed and lack of any protection was worrying. Accordingly (and bearing in mind the flights of the American Douglas Devastator) a monoplane TBR aircraft using the Hercules was specified,. With this engine, it was hoped to get a speed of around 200kt, while carrying either an 18" torpedo or 2,000lb of bombs. Fairy, Bolton-Paul and Vickers had put in proposals, and a decision to fund the two most promising would be made before February.

While they had been waiting for the new single-crew fighter, the FAA had 'borrowed' a few modified Gladiator s for trials. The big problem, of course, was how to get a plane back to a carrier with a single pilot. In fact they had two problems; first the retrieval of a CAP patrol, and second the recovery of strike escort fighters. The Americans had showed that this was possible, if difficult, using a better design of beacon and radio, aided by better navigational training, but it was still very worrying - the current beacon and radio system was only really usable by one man up to 10 miles away.

The Admiralty had originally approached the Pye corporation with a view to them developing the US system under license. After examining it and its performance, they came back and announced that they could make one, better and cheaper, and it wouldn't need any license fee. The FAA thought about this, and decided to let them try. The need wouldn't be urgent until the new planes were operational, and they could always buy American if needed. In fact, Pye were as good as their word; they delivered a prototype early in the year that was indeed lighter and had better performance (in fact, a more developed version was later licensed back to the USN!). This still hadn't really solved the problem, but a range of 15 miles was a start. In peacetime, they could pull in planes using direction finding, but this wasn't thought practical in wartime as it was, well, rather obvious! At the moment, the FAA were carrying on training while keeping a close and increasingly interested eye on radar, which on paper looked like solving the problem for them.
 
Some secret drawings of the early MB machines. It is indeed fortunate that the FAA heeded Roy Fedden's advice and demanded the incorporation of rear-facing exhaust and blended wing leading edge engine air intake and oil cooler.

MB2BristolnavalSMALL.png
 
If the MB-2 had come equipped with a Sea Fury engine, which was Bristol Centaurus, it would look like that. Under the skin, it is chrome-moly tubing with easily detachable panels, hinged panels for service access with non-removable fasteners (so they don't fall into the sea), and the exclusive upholstered seat built on the gun-servicing access door. Rich Corinthian leather.
 
What's your view on the Bristol Type 133 and it's odd little sort of retractable but sort of non-retractable undercarriage?

G3369.jpg


12Type133.jpg

James Goulding suggests in 'Interceptor' if it hadn't been for the unfortunate crash then it could have been the first monoplane in RAF service.
 
You avoided showing the ugly views. From profile. it's hideous. From planform, the engine/fuselage blend area is poorly done. A real undercarriage would have required paying patent fees. I assume they got that one for free. Although the wings are Corsair-like, which is partly good, their general finish is poor, and the wing is mounted too low on the fuselage to benefit from the Corsair's good aerodynamics at the joint. You'll notice it still requires filleting and the rear edge is draggy. While the wing tapers slightly in thickness, the chord tapers only by generously rounded tips. If the Bristol had the stall characteristics of the Corsair, it would be in deep trouble. As it was, it did enter a non-recoverable spin, a bad trait by itself. I hope Frank Barnwell was out the day this was designed, because it was an embarassment. At least the Vickers was cute. While the Gloster was far from perfect, it had good proportions, and looked like a Zero.

Ugly as it was but given the changes that occurred to designs after that...and the original Corsair prototype wasn't exactly much to look at.
 
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