No Passchendaele, earlier Cambrai instead
- Thread starter MrP
- Start date
Thoughts, opinions and so forth, please, chaps.
My first thought is that you're going to need to change things up a bit more significantly than simply saying the offensive will move further south, simply because of what the 1917 offensive was about. Then I look at the map and see that's not the case at all.
I think this has the opportunity to be a success, as defined on the Western Front, but I think Griffith's optimism is a bit much, for a few reasons.
The Germans were nearly always able to see a build-up of forces ahead of time and plan accordingly: Cambrai, as Griffiths says, was more of a raid. They will see a big offensive, and probably not get surprised.
The artillery barrage necessary to attack such a heavily fortified position is going to churn up the ground, if it hasn't yet. Maybe not so much, though.
Defense in depth has been implemented, especially if Arras occurs on schedule earlier. Ludendorff will ensure that any general in command at Cambrai is prepared for a defense in depth.
It's still going to rain in August. The tanks are going to get stuck in the mud...not looking particularly good, especially since the German pillboxes that survived at Passchendaele will survive at Cambrai.
All-in-all, I suspect it will be a bit more of a success than Passchendaele, however you want to take that.
MrP
I think the two points of chief importance might be:
a) Would the armour that caused so much disruption be available earlier or are you contemplating a more conventional attack?
b) Could Haig control his greed? From what I have read about Passchendaele much of the problem was that while Plummer especially have a coherent plan for taking small bites out of the German position he insisted on each stage of the battle gaining more ground. This meant trying to advance beyond the range of the supporting artillery, into positions where the Germans were prepared and with the advancing troops more tired and disorganised. In trying to achieve the more ambitious targets was were the bulk of the casualties occurred. If Plummer’s original plan had been followed it would still have been a bloody campaign but with markedly lower British and higher German losses.
Possibly one option might have been to have a short raid, with a brief but intense artillery bombardment, occurring in the Cambrai region, immediately after the Viney Ridge mining. Keeping actions to a minimum the Germans might assume that anything they heard about an attack there would be a feint after the mines go off at Viney. Without the logistical support you won't make a deep incursion but don't think its possible to do so effectively at this time, at least without armour in more quality and quantity than we had at the time. However two small but significant successes like that would have a useful effect on moral on both sides and also mean that the Germans would have concerns that no-where on the British front would be secure. Which would achieve what was initially the main purpose of the 1917 campaign, to draw German attention north and away from the French army while it recovered from the mutiny.
Steve
I think the two points of chief importance might be:
a) Would the armour that caused so much disruption be available earlier or are you contemplating a more conventional attack?
b) Could Haig control his greed? From what I have read about Passchendaele much of the problem was that while Plummer especially have a coherent plan for taking small bites out of the German position he insisted on each stage of the battle gaining more ground. This meant trying to advance beyond the range of the supporting artillery, into positions where the Germans were prepared and with the advancing troops more tired and disorganised. In trying to achieve the more ambitious targets was were the bulk of the casualties occurred. If Plummer’s original plan had been followed it would still have been a bloody campaign but with markedly lower British and higher German losses.
Possibly one option might have been to have a short raid, with a brief but intense artillery bombardment, occurring in the Cambrai region, immediately after the Viney Ridge mining. Keeping actions to a minimum the Germans might assume that anything they heard about an attack there would be a feint after the mines go off at Viney. Without the logistical support you won't make a deep incursion but don't think its possible to do so effectively at this time, at least without armour in more quality and quantity than we had at the time. However two small but significant successes like that would have a useful effect on moral on both sides and also mean that the Germans would have concerns that no-where on the British front would be secure. Which would achieve what was initially the main purpose of the 1917 campaign, to draw German attention north and away from the French army while it recovered from the mutiny.
Steve
Would it also help the other reason - the need as far as the War Cabinet and the Admiralty were concerned to take the Belgium coast and stop the U-boats form operating from there?
MrP
Banned
My first thought is that you're going to need to change things up a bit more significantly than simply saying the offensive will move further south, simply because of what the 1917 offensive was about. Then I look at the map and see that's not the case at all.
I think this has the opportunity to be a success, as defined on the Western Front, but I think Griffith's optimism is a bit much, for a few reasons.
The Germans were nearly always able to see a build-up of forces ahead of time and plan accordingly: Cambrai, as Griffiths says, was more of a raid. They will see a big offensive, and probably not get surprised.
The artillery barrage necessary to attack such a heavily fortified position is going to churn up the ground, if it hasn't yet. Maybe not so much, though.
Defense in depth has been implemented, especially if Arras occurs on schedule earlier. Ludendorff will ensure that any general in command at Cambrai is prepared for a defense in depth.
It's still going to rain in August. The tanks are going to get stuck in the mud...not looking particularly good, especially since the German pillboxes that survived at Passchendaele will survive at Cambrai.
All-in-all, I suspect it will be a bit more of a success than Passchendaele, however you want to take that.
Well, the bit of Griffith I left out was that he felt Haig had psychological reasons for choosing Ypres - as he personally associated it with success. I dunno how to get around that, since if accurate it puts the kibosh on the whole idea! I agree about the Germans knowing the location of the offensive, defence on depth and that the German high command will respond in its customary style to the offensive. I'm not envisaging a tank-component in this Cambrai* - they were an after-thought, as I understand it, in the OTL one, and this ATL offensive's several months earlier.
a) I think not - see above.
b) Aye, it'd be nice to have a bite-and-hold man at the helm, but I agree it's unlikely we'll get Plumer short of messing about with politics in London.
I rather like the idea of a twin offensive, even if it does wander away from my original idea somewhat. As you say, distracting the Germans from the problems the French were having is the paramount consideration.
While an important consideration, I think it's really only secondary to distracting the Germans from the French mess. Of course, my opinion there is undermined by the fact that the politicians of the time disagreed with me!
Still, given Lloyd George's overwhelming desire to bring Haig to heel, I can envisage Haig ignoring Lloyd George if he felt the PM was acting unwisely.PMN1
That is rather an odd one as I remember reading once that until shortly before the crucial meeting which decided on the campaign the navy was generally opposing it and then suddenly came out with a 'we must clear out the Flander ports'. Especially since the small short ranged subs operating from the region were not really playing any part in the massed MS sinkings. [Can't remember where I read that I'm afraid
]Steve