USA And Australia Without Historical Protectionism

Hi! It's this is my first post on Alternate History.

In the mid-19th century in the USA and early 20th century in Australia, both nations established highly protectionist trade policies, based on a belief that these predominately agrarian nations had to industrialise to become self-sufficient and the belief that any nation reliant on agricultural and extractive (mining) sectors of the economy, would be in a permanent state of dependence on industralised nations (sort of like any version of Third World Dependency Theory, I would guess).

With a POD no later than say 1880's in the USA and 1910 in Australia (this thread is before 1900, but the trade debate wasn't settled in Australia until 1907 after Federation), can anyone think of an Alternate History where protectionist policies never get off the ground. Perhaps a political culture where rather than self-sufficieny being promoted, the notion of interdepenency and comparative advantage theory is seem as the ideal. Rather than diversification in the economy, concentration of specific export-oriented sectors are seen as a way of increasing the global power of the respective nations.

Also apart from just the economic implications, what would be the social and political implications, i.e. industrial societies have tended to produce differing levels of support for certain political ideologies vis-a-vis agricultural societies.

BTW Was going to write this post just about Australia as I'm Australian so I know the situation about there better, but decided to include the USA to encourage a wider discussion.
 
Firstly, welcome to the forum.

You raise an interesting question but one that is rather hard to address. I'll confine myself to the US, since I'm not knowledgeable about the Australian case.

The desire to cultivate "infant industry" can be traced back to colonial days, during which the salutary neglect of British enforcement of the Navigation Acts led to the start of native shipping industry--those that later bore the brunt of the taxation. Hence, to complete gut the USA of the idea that led to the protection of industry will be quite difficult.

It might be easier to have it suffer political defeat. Tariffs were vary controversial in early American history since Southern planters (who bought refined goods) had to pay them while Northern industrialists benefited from them. A POD might be that the early Tariff policies are defeated--perhaps Alexander Hamilton is sick or dies even earlier. Perhaps the Democratic-Republicans are more successful against the measures in the 1830s. The downside however is that all of the angst that historically went to criticize big business will still exist, and it will now have the pleasure of deriding foreign interests as well. Certainly the first time America tries to fight a war and finds itself reliant on other nations for bare necessities of warfare will engender concern. Also, I'm not sure what the economic results of the tariffs might be. Without tariff protection, British manufacturers will have an easier time competing in the US, but transportation costs will come to impose a natural tariff at some point, so US industry will still develop.

However, will there still be capital to fund it? OTL British capital underlay a surprising amount of American economic activity in the 19th century: most of the cowboy ranches of the American West were ultimately financed and sometimes even owned by British bankers and financiers. Such returns still exist to be sure, but if British companies are even more competitive in the US, then surely some of the capital that OTL funded American industry might fund other ventures. Might a consequence of the political concern about big business and foreign competition and the need to supply war efforts lead to greater state-funded, state-run manufactures? Perhaps.

At bottom, the problem is that much of the policies of the 19th century find their inspiration in the 18th and hence a mercantile frame of mind. Furthermore, I would have to say that the economic advantages of free trade are hard to defend from the bottom of the totem pole: witness the widespread aversion that still exists today, despite the experience of the Great Depression (and its links to protectionism, among other things).
 
Firstly, welcome to the forum.

You raise an interesting question but one that is rather hard to address. I'll confine myself to the US, since I'm not knowledgeable about the Australian case.

The desire to cultivate "infant industry" can be traced back to colonial days, during which the salutary neglect of British enforcement of the Navigation Acts led to the start of native shipping industry--those that later bore the brunt of the taxation. Hence, to complete gut the USA of the idea that led to the protection of industry will be quite difficult.

It might be easier to have it suffer political defeat. Tariffs were vary controversial in early American history since Southern planters (who bought refined goods) had to pay them while Northern industrialists benefited from them. A POD might be that the early Tariff policies are defeated--perhaps Alexander Hamilton is sick or dies even earlier. Perhaps the Democratic-Republicans are more successful against the measures in the 1830s. The downside however is that all of the angst that historically went to criticize big business will still exist, and it will now have the pleasure of deriding foreign interests as well. Certainly the first time America tries to fight a war and finds itself reliant on other nations for bare necessities of warfare will engender concern. Also, I'm not sure what the economic results of the tariffs might be. Without tariff protection, British manufacturers will have an easier time competing in the US, but transportation costs will come to impose a natural tariff at some point, so US industry will still develop.

However, will there still be capital to fund it? OTL British capital underlay a surprising amount of American economic activity in the 19th century: most of the cowboy ranches of the American West were ultimately financed and sometimes even owned by British bankers and financiers. Such returns still exist to be sure, but if British companies are even more competitive in the US, then surely some of the capital that OTL funded American industry might fund other ventures. Might a consequence of the political concern about big business and foreign competition and the need to supply war efforts lead to greater state-funded, state-run manufactures? Perhaps.

At bottom, the problem is that much of the policies of the 19th century find their inspiration in the 18th and hence a mercantile frame of mind. Furthermore, I would have to say that the economic advantages of free trade are hard to defend from the bottom of the totem pole: witness the widespread aversion that still exists today, despite the experience of the Great Depression (and its links to protectionism, among other things).


Thanks for your reply nichmacheus. Some interesting issues you raise will give you my thoughts on most of them.

In Australia, like the USA, the tariff was a controversial political issue when first introduced in fact it was the political issue in the period 1900-1910. Predominately industrial areas in south-eastern Australia, in particular Victoria were highly protectionist in leaning, whereas agricultural areas such as Queensland, Western Australia and to a lesser extent New South Wales were more free trade (although prior to Federation only the New South Wales government was avowedly free-trade). This distinction continues to this day with the move towards free trade since the 1970's being most controversial in Victoria and most welcomed in Queensland and Western Australia.

Basically the reason is for similar reasons as in the USA, tariffs raised the cost of manafactured good, which therefore raised the cost of agricultural production. However as agriculture was export-driven they had to accept world prices. In Australia, this led to a system of agricultural subsidies and price supports to farmers and I assume similar in the USA. Without a system of protectionist tariffs I presume that these subsidies may never have existed? Or could a significantly revised form of economic interventionism instead of being aimed at supporting struggling industries ( tariffs for manafacturing) be aimed at further enhancing export-led sectors (subsidies for agriculture? Note that Australia even after the conversion among all governments to free trade in the 1970's and 1980's, maintains statutory single-desk marketing for some agricultural exports (Australian Wheat Board, etc).

Back to the USA, the increased economic dominance of the agricultural sector would presumably dramatically alter the political balance in the USA. How would this alter the general animosity between the North and South leading to the American Civil War? Of course moral repulsion towards slavery and the desire of the North to stop the secession of the South led to the Civil War, but (at least accoring to my university history lecturer) one of the main causes of the growing anti-slavery sentiment in the decades prior was the shift in economic power from agricultural slave-owing areas (South) to industrial abolitionist areas (North). In other words, as their economic power waned, the South faced an increasingly difficult task to push their political agenda.

Taken as given, that the USA without protectionism would still have a predominately agricultural base how would this effect the political balance of power? My theory is that with the economic base still in the South, it would be impossible for abolitionists to turn the obvious moral case against slavery into an effective political case. I assume that there would be no Civil War and that slavery would last a decade or two longer. Probably no longer than that, as the international pressure to abolish slavery would become unbearable. Possibly threats by primarily the British to boycott American products in favour of non-slave nations (Australia, Canada, etc) would lead to abolition. It would be interesting to see the implications of this, perhaps less historical animosity between North and South and more suspicion especially in the South of other nations.

In regards to the question of British finance of American business I agree with your point. One of the main reasons for British investment in American manafacturing was of course to get past high American tariffs. With this gone I can't see British financiers investing in most American sectors, except for agriculture. Unless, of course the US were with domestic capital to develop some highly efficient niche manafacturing industries, which the British might then find profitable to further in invest in. Same for all above points with Australia, in fact due to its much smaller population base Australia would find it extremely hard to find the domestic capital to invest in its industries until much later that the USA.

I agree that after its initial early stage of development, that at least some form of industry would develop in both the USA and Australia, as transportation costs would be un unofficial tariff. So you would basically see all sectors of the economy still going as they were in reality it's just their share of the economy that would substantially alter. I think the notion that either proctectionism or free trade would absolutelylay waste to and eliminate certain industries is something of a myth. Of course this all changed in the 1960s(?), with the containerisation of freight eliminating a lot of the transportation cost.

The point you make about the effects of a war are quite valid and would certainly have influenced protectionist pressures. The 'What will we do if trade's blocked off or other nations refuse to trade with us in a war' argument is one of the most commonly used arguments against free trade and specialisation in trade (in fact I have heard similar fears used against Australia's current reliance on China for cheap manafactured goods!). The counter-argument is of course that no nation in history has had trade boycotts by every other nation in the world (if America in the 19th century went to war against one European nation, then there would certainly be other European nations eager to trade in its place and supply the US with materials). The biggest threat would be if the US found itself in a war against Britain (after 1812), due to the Royal Navy's maritime supremacy, there would be the realistic threat of an effective naval blockade. Perhaps the US would early on find the need to build up a very strong US Navy, much earlier than in reality, in order to counter this possibility as well as to protect trade routes in the Atlantic and Pacific. Not much of the above applies to Australia, owing to our reliance (rightly or wrongly) at the time on British 'Imperial Benevolence' to protect us against external threats.

I do certainly see the quite sensible and realistically unavoidable need for both nations to build up a self-reliant military industry, so your idea that most manafacturing could be state-owned or at least state-subsidised and furthermore geared towards military production. This would exist between wars but would get periodic boosts at the outbreak of war. Perhaps this sort of 'War Socialism' would give a ideological boost to more interventionist governments in peactime, especially in the USA, where of course there is a strong historical feeling against this.

Finally, I do agree that free trade is rather a hard thing to argue from the bottom of the totem pole, seeing as all current free-trade nations (including USA, Australia, etc) have been protectionist at some stage. As a free-trade supporter myself, I know from talking to other people how deeply held some people's almost instinctive belief in protectionism is. It is seemingly easier to argue the merits of self-sufficiency and even autarky than it is to explain the merits of compartive advantage and specialisation. Perhaps a turning point could have been an aggressive trade war by the UK against the USA in the mid-19th century, which made the USA feel that it's natural self-interest was better served by specialising in certain products for the British and other markets?
 
I think that Argentina would be a good case to see what would have to Australia at least.

I can see your point. In fact the vastly different economic trajectories taken by Australia and Argentina over the course of the 20th century are often quoted in analyses of economic history here in Australia where I am.

The extent to which I agree with you depends on what particular issues you are referring too. For instance, throughout the 20th century Argentina and most other Latin American nations had extensive import-subsitution protectionist policies to little avail.

I agree with you to the extent that nations like Argentina (which of course remained primarily reliant on primary industries) that are very export-import dependent will always be more susceptible to international crises and downturns.

I still don't fully see this as a particular negative point as many small European nations such as Netherlands and the Nordic nations are very export-import dependent both now and historically and they are among the world's richest and most developed nations. I'm not sure of the details but I believe that these nations although adopting protectionist policies as such in the past were relatively free trade nations (compared to more protectionist nations such as France and Germany). You might be able to tell me more info about this. Of course the differences are irrelevant now with the EU's uniform trade policies.

I would theorise that the main reason for Argentina's poor performance was it's lack of development of domestic consumer demand. Unlike in Australia, USA and the aforementioned European nations, there was never the development of large stable middle class and worker's rights which would have shifted the domestic economy from one of saving by elites to spending by the masses. This combined with more effective public expenditure and welfare state policies may have had a stabilising effect.
 
What you must address is why protectionism and free trade were such dominant political ideologies at the time.

Australia’s reputation as a ‘Working Man’s Paradise’ was made before the early twentieth century. Clearly the idea that Australia should be self sufficient in essential manufactured items grew from our relative isolation. This idea was reinforced by the continual spate of war scares throughout the nineteenth century. So a combination of a working class held in high regard within society and the requirement to be less vulnerable to a blockade by the Russians, Germans, Americans, French etc etc etc, meant that protectionism was inevitable.

What you need to realise is that the term Protectionist can be misleading. Many protectionists were in favour of free trade between the colonies but not with the rest of the world. This was particularly true of the Labour Movement. The proponents of domestic protectionism tended to be mainly the large employers engaged in manufacturing.

It is difficult to see how free trade could have helped the development of a stable Australian economy. Violent fluctuations in the price of commodities would destabilise the trend towards a mixed economy particularly when the cost of domestic manufacture could be driven artificially higher by dumping or deliberate targeting of vulnerable industries.
 
What you must address is why protectionism and free trade were such dominant political ideologies at the time.

Australia’s reputation as a ‘Working Man’s Paradise’ was made before the early twentieth century. Clearly the idea that Australia should be self sufficient in essential manufactured items grew from our relative isolation. This idea was reinforced by the continual spate of war scares throughout the nineteenth century. So a combination of a working class held in high regard within society and the requirement to be less vulnerable to a blockade by the Russians, Germans, Americans, French etc etc etc, meant that protectionism was inevitable.

What you need to realise is that the term Protectionist can be misleading. Many protectionists were in favour of free trade between the colonies but not with the rest of the world. This was particularly true of the Labour Movement. The proponents of domestic protectionism tended to be mainly the large employers engaged in manufacturing.

It is difficult to see how free trade could have helped the development of a stable Australian economy. Violent fluctuations in the price of commodities would destabilise the trend towards a mixed economy particularly when the cost of domestic manufacture could be driven artificially higher by dumping or deliberate targeting of vulnerable industries.


Some good points there. I did think earlier of the notion of Imperial Preference as being a complicating factor in the Australian trade debate in the early 20th century.

Also, as you said it is hard to see how the notion of Australia as the 'Working Man's Paradise' and a strong support of free trade and markets would have fitted well together. Given the fact that the 'Australian Settlement' was basically a quid-pro-quo notion of fair wages for workers in return for protection for manafacturing.

That being said, not all members of the late 19th century and early 20th century Labour Movement would be against free trade. I suppose it would depend on which industry of workers the trade union belonged too. For instance, I would assume that unions representing agricultural and mining industry workers might be more favourably disposed to free trade.

Without tariffs would the fair wages part of the Settlement still come to the fore? Depends on how competitive Australia was in its various primary industries and the size of the sheltered sector (meaning sectors that are non-tradeable and not affected by foreign competition, not because of trade policies, but by their very nature) relative to the rest of the economy.

The inherent volatility of world commodities markets was indeed a major reason for protectionism and the development of manafacturing. I would suggest that in a free trade ATL there would need to be other forms of government intervention to smooth out market cycles.
 
Some good points there. I did think earlier of the notion of Imperial Preference as being a complicating factor in the Australian trade debate in the early 20th century.

Also, as you said it is hard to see how the notion of Australia as the 'Working Man's Paradise' and a strong support of free trade and markets would have fitted well together. Given the fact that the 'Australian Settlement' was basically a quid-pro-quo notion of fair wages for workers in return for protection for manafacturing.

That being said, not all members of the late 19th century and early 20th century Labour Movement would be against free trade. I suppose it would depend on which industry of workers the trade union belonged too. For instance, I would assume that unions representing agricultural and mining industry workers might be more favourably disposed to free trade.

Without tariffs would the fair wages part of the Settlement still come to the fore? Depends on how competitive Australia was in its various primary industries and the size of the sheltered sector (meaning sectors that are non-tradeable and not affected by foreign competition, not because of trade policies, but by their very nature) relative to the rest of the economy.

The inherent volatility of world commodities markets was indeed a major reason for protectionism and the development of manafacturing. I would suggest that in a free trade ATL there would need to be other forms of government intervention to smooth out market cycles.

In the late nineteenth century the unions representing agricultural and mining industry workers was in fact only one. The Australian Shearers Union which later changed its name to the Australian Workers Union. The other unions in these industries were very small and had no real political influence. The AWU was all powerful in both union and ALP politics. Its policies were for decades the policies of the ALP since the two bodies were in practice the same.

So the organizations that had the political power were in favour of protectionism in international trade and a free market internally. Unless you can suggest a plausible POD to change this, your suggestion seems unrealizable.
 
I suppose that anything is possible; I'm thinking your best bet is probably to off Alexander Hamilton in the USA some time in 1789-90, before he has a chance to do much as Secretary of the Treasury. Without strong leadership, the financial system of the US will remain fragmented. I'm thinking this means there's less initial capital to fund infant industries that will need protecting. Without this avenue of investment, US financiers rely on agriculture and commerce (shipping). If industry doesn't exist on the scale of OTL, then any immigrants to the USA will probably more quickly seek land to cultivate and hence disperse westward, lessening the rise of the North, but perhaps dilluting the dominance of the planter class.

If you really want to give a boon to an agricultural / commerce oriented America, then I might engineer a way for British North America to join the USA early on. My favortie way is probably to avoid the war of 1812 (no history of resisting the Yanks) and have the British horribly mis-manage colonial government. I know it's rather wankish, but the goal is to give the US a huge surfeit of arrable land (not hard since even within its OTL borders the US is thinly populated).

US industry probably lags, but eventually the settlement of the interior will increase the "natural tarrif" of transportation costs. This becomes a catalyst for foreign (read British) investment in railroads. An alternative is that a shift in US politics (spawned by earlier, more populous western settlement) supports internal improvements. The problem with that is that this US government is functioning without substantial tarrif income (the 19th century federal government's major source of income).

This is probably the status quo until the 1860s - 1870s when two developments will begin to encourage native industry. First, the growth of railroad companies will flame resentment of their large, corporate influence on farmer ability to ship produce. Second, an increasing number of inventions will grow to service agricultural tasks (irrigation drills, threshers, etc).

Essentially, this is a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian wank TL, with a highly agrarian economy that loathes any substantial concentration of wealth (except for slavery, and that for no good reason). Abolitionism probably becomes less the concern of free white industrial laborers and more the concern of small farmers about the concentration of wealth. This may create the seeds for homegrown abolition within the south earlier (by divorcing poor southerners from the politics of the planters). The 2nd Industrial Revolution is probably then much more revolutionary as new technologies allow for more industrial activity in the US. The lack of a US example will go a long way to steering the path for future extractice economies: for example, the idea of the American System OTL was very important to Freidrich List's economics. The biggest obstacle will be how the government raises money without an efficient financial system and without a tarrif; the easiest solution is that this US remains a backwater far longer than OTL.
 
I suppose that anything is possible; I'm thinking your best bet is probably to off Alexander Hamilton in the USA some time in 1789-90, before he has a chance to do much as Secretary of the Treasury. Without strong leadership, the financial system of the US will remain fragmented. I'm thinking this means there's less initial capital to fund infant industries that will need protecting. Without this avenue of investment, US financiers rely on agriculture and commerce (shipping). If industry doesn't exist on the scale of OTL, then any immigrants to the USA will probably more quickly seek land to cultivate and hence disperse westward, lessening the rise of the North, but perhaps dilluting the dominance of the planter class.

If you really want to give a boon to an agricultural / commerce oriented America, then I might engineer a way for British North America to join the USA early on. My favortie way is probably to avoid the war of 1812 (no history of resisting the Yanks) and have the British horribly mis-manage colonial government. I know it's rather wankish, but the goal is to give the US a huge surfeit of arrable land (not hard since even within its OTL borders the US is thinly populated).

US industry probably lags, but eventually the settlement of the interior will increase the "natural tarrif" of transportation costs. This becomes a catalyst for foreign (read British) investment in railroads. An alternative is that a shift in US politics (spawned by earlier, more populous western settlement) supports internal improvements. The problem with that is that this US government is functioning without substantial tarrif income (the 19th century federal government's major source of income).

This is probably the status quo until the 1860s - 1870s when two developments will begin to encourage native industry. First, the growth of railroad companies will flame resentment of their large, corporate influence on farmer ability to ship produce. Second, an increasing number of inventions will grow to service agricultural tasks (irrigation drills, threshers, etc).

Essentially, this is a Jeffersonian-Jacksonian wank TL, with a highly agrarian economy that loathes any substantial concentration of wealth (except for slavery, and that for no good reason). Abolitionism probably becomes less the concern of free white industrial laborers and more the concern of small farmers about the concentration of wealth. This may create the seeds for homegrown abolition within the south earlier (by divorcing poor southerners from the politics of the planters). The 2nd Industrial Revolution is probably then much more revolutionary as new technologies allow for more industrial activity in the US. The lack of a US example will go a long way to steering the path for future extractice economies: for example, the idea of the American System OTL was very important to Freidrich List's economics. The biggest obstacle will be how the government raises money without an efficient financial system and without a tarrif; the easiest solution is that this US remains a backwater far longer than OTL.


I agree with basically everything you say. In regards to how will the USA and Aust govt raise revenue, it must be remembered that even free traders are usually in favour of revenue tariffs (small tariffs of say no more than 5-10%) as opposed to protective tariffs (much higher tariffs which primarily raise littel revenue and are basically protective).

I'd like to start a discussion on the possible effects this would ATL would have on the development of party politics in both nations from the late 19th century onwards. This comparison is somewhat complicated by the fact that the US has no major social democratic party of labour (unlike Aust and most other Western nations).

However, in most places the left wing liberal progressive side of politics has had a base in urban blue collar industrial areas. If the economy is far more oriented toward agricultural how would this affect the political system? I suggest that in both nations a left wing agrarian based party of workers and small farmers would emerge. Perhaps American members can elaborate on this but I am aware that one of the US's only popular social democratic movements was the Populist movement in the north of the Mid-West, Minnesota, Wisconsin. Perhaps this could expand further.

Also I believe that there would in both nations be a more fundmental political cleavage between the City And Rural. In OTL Rural was Agriculture and City was Industrial and Commerce. In ATL City is only Commerce which would leave it open to the allegation (rightly or wrongly) that it is 'living off' the Rural areas.

The only thing that may stop the formation of social democratic parties is the different nature of class relations in rural areas both OTL and presumably also ATL. At least in Australia there has been a comparative lack of support for left wing parties in rural area, which many commentators place down to 'rural paternalism'. Basically, it is said that the rural elite take a more philanthropic noblesse oblige attitude to the poor and working class compared to the urban industrial elite (i.e. 19th century robber barons, etc). Would this hinder the development of left wing parties in ATL?
 
I'd like to start a discussion on the possible effects this would ATL would have on the development of party politics in both nations from the late 19th century onwards. This comparison is somewhat complicated by the fact that the US has no major social democratic party of labour (unlike Aust and most other Western nations).

However, in most places the left wing liberal progressive side of politics has had a base in urban blue collar industrial areas. If the economy is far more oriented toward agricultural how would this affect the political system? I suggest that in both nations a left wing agrarian based party of workers and small farmers would emerge. Perhaps American members can elaborate on this but I am aware that one of the US's only popular social democratic movements was the Populist movement in the north of the Mid-West, Minnesota, Wisconsin. Perhaps this could expand further.

Also I believe that there would in both nations be a more fundmental political cleavage between the City And Rural. In OTL Rural was Agriculture and City was Industrial and Commerce. In ATL City is only Commerce which would leave it open to the allegation (rightly or wrongly) that it is 'living off' the Rural areas.

The only thing that may stop the formation of social democratic parties is the different nature of class relations in rural areas both OTL and presumably also ATL. At least in Australia there has been a comparative lack of support for left wing parties in rural area, which many commentators place down to 'rural paternalism'. Basically, it is said that the rural elite take a more philanthropic noblesse oblige attitude to the poor and working class compared to the urban industrial elite (i.e. 19th century robber barons, etc). Would this hinder the development of left wing parties in ATL?

First, the Populist movement was more Western and Southern than Midwestern. The important Midwestern group was the Progressives (eg Robert LaFollette). The two groups blend into each other a bit, but the essential difference is that the Populists are agrarians. Hence they advocated bimetalism and other financial reforms in order to lessen the burden of debt farmers owed to banks. The Populists got their biggest boost from the Grange movement, which organized groups of farmers. Their biggest political hero is probably William Jennings Bryan.

The Progressives are an entirely different animal. They were a primarily middle class group concerned with political reform; things are slightly complicated because in the Old Northwest the two were very similar, particularly in Wisconsin. Their are hence responsible for the 16th and 17th Amendments (income tax and direct election of Senators). They are also concerned about big money groups, but primarily the power of industrialists and hence they advocated trust busting. Before the 1930s, their biggest hero was Teddy Roosevelt (followed closely by LaFollete himself in some circles). Franklin Roosevelt turned this bifurcation on its head with the New Deal Coalition, which saw an increase in Progressive Democratic policies. Note, however, that the agrarian reforms (farm subsidies and the Tennessee Valley Authority) attest to the enduring strength of the Populist wing. Progressive lingered in the Republican Party (i.e. Rockefeller Republicans) for quite some time, however.

In any case, if the USA avoids protectionism entirely and avoids it long enough to see industrialization take a different path, then both movements are probably butterflied away. However, to have any genuine idea of what politics are like, we need to pin down how the change takes place.

If as I suggest before, the Federalist party is still born, then there are a lot of issues to be dealt with first. An earlier War of 1812 might always result in a New England secession movement. More agrarian policies also play havoc with the course of US expansion. If so, then the Civil War is affected and hence the entirety of US industrialization.

To be honest, I don't find the city-country divide plausible for American politics. Maybe it'll take root in state politics, but I doubt it becomes national issue; even then, it's only really a big deal in a place like New York. There it has the potential to do interesting things, like provoke a split into two states, but that's a little extreme.

Also, it's very difficult to generalize about the ideological trend of American parties because American politics are not ideological and neither are American political parties. Even in the late 20th Century, the ideologicalicazation of American politics, IMHO, is subordinate to the personal nature of the parties and to the competition between the two large parties.

Even in the case of my proposed Jeffersonianism triumphant, I have a hard time seeing the debate stop there. Plus, it's hard to see how Jeffersonianism could have been more triumphant, short of a radical revolution that fundamentally alters the US system. Plus Jeffersonian politicians tended to act just like any others once they won (eg Madison and the 2nd Bank of the US).

If anything, without a rise of industry, the North probably doesn't gain population as fast as it did OTL. They biggest butterfly is likely whether Virginia (or any state in the South) begins to consider abandoning slavery. IIRC, the proponents of abolition were those who supported a more commercial / industrial future for Virginia and the South. If slavery sticks in the South and the North and West are populated by largely free labor small farmers, then something like a Civil War probably happens due the fear of Northern farmers being put out of work by slaves. Of course, without an industrial North, the South may (and probably does) win. Hence, there is no USA as we know it by the 2nd Industrial Revolution.

There is reason to think however that without feeling boxed in by the North, the South will begin gradual manumission supported by poor whites who fear the dominance of the planter class. In essence, this probably requires that Jackson and Jacksonian politicians oppose the planter class and ally with the small time farmers of the North, South, and West. This is in essence an earlier version of the Populists, but hardly a leftist movement. Indeed, its difficult to see how Jackson or poor Southern whites might be brought around to oppose slavery since both viewed eventual economic advancement as tied up in the peculiar institution. A poor Southern farmer wanted to be a rich Southern planter, supported by slavery.

In short, an anti-protectionist, anti-industry, agrarian USA will either produce a successful succession movement or the prolonged endurance of slavery (and the in former case, the latter is probably assured in the Southern country whether it's a DoD-style USA or a Confederacy).
 
Just been thinking about this ATL. Would be interested to know the percentage of GDP of agriculture and primary industries prior to Protection as opposed to afterward in Australia.

Australia has always been fairly dependent on primary exports for its wealth, so I'm not really sure that not having Protection would make the economy EXTREMELY unstable.

Also nowadays protection is basically looked on by both sides of the political spectrum as a historical mistake of Australia's. Of course people couldn't have known this at the time. But it certainly means that there is a lot of feeling that Australia would have been better off embracing Free Trade from the start. A lot of commentators say that Aust wasted a lot of effort on inefficient manafacturing when it could have been far better off concentrating on the products it was good at. Any thoughts on this?
 
Top