WI Neuve Chapelle succeeded.

[Riain]

A very sophisticated plan and good execution for early 1915. The aim was to capture Neuve Chapelle, dive along Aubers Ridge and cut the nth-sth rail lines to German supply centres in Lille and Douai. Robbed of these supply centres hopefully would result in a general withdrawal without vast bloodshed.

Unfortunately alongside great success came fiasco and the Brits were pushed back to their start lines, virtually. But WI the Brits had been able to hold onto their successes? And even more, WI these successes had, as a result of the disruption of the rail lines making supply of forces untennable, resulted in a general German withdrawal in the area without huge casulaties?

How many other places on the Western front would this sort of attack be practical.

[Douglas]

I posted something like this several months back...let me see if I can dig it back up.

EDIT: Aha! Here you go...it seems like you commented on it!

http://www.alternatehistory.com/disc...ad.php?t=76044

[Riain]

Yes, I see.
Not many people comment on a WW1 thread that's not Schlieffen plan or March 1918 offensive.

[Douglas]

Just some thoughts of my own:

1. Joffre is going to stay in command for longer.

2. 1916 is, of course, guaranteed to be different. What happens probably depends on how far the Germans withdraw. No Verdun, or evidence that an offensive is automatically doomed to failure, so no reason for such an attack. What does happen? Do the Germans launch an offensive somewhere else in the west? Or do they fortify, and try to do something big in the East.

3. What do the Allies do? Where is their offensive?

[Riain]

I wonder if the Brits would learn more from a success than they did from their OTL failure. I'd define success as holding their early successes, rather than the complete attainment of all objectives, which is a rare thing in battle. Perhaps they'd learn more finesse and coordination between arms is what's needed, rather than millions of shells expended over a fortnight.

I think NC could be seen as a model operation for the entente for the next year or 2. Pushing the Germans back in a series of operations rather than lusting for a breakthrough and exploitation style battle/campaign.

[MrP]

Originally Posted by Riain

I wonder if the Brits would learn more from a success than they did from their OTL failure. I'd define success as holding their early successes, rather than the complete attainment of all objectives, which is a rare thing in battle. Perhaps they'd learn more finesse and coordination between arms is what's needed, rather than millions of shells expended over a fortnight.

I think NC could be seen as a model operation for the entente for the next year or 2. Pushing the Germans back in a series of operations rather than lusting for a breakthrough and exploitation style battle/campaign.

Nothing particularly wrong with using millions of shells in a fortnight. Problem is that at the Somme, for instance, they had a low concentration of guns/line compared to the French, say. So while they fired a large absolute amount of ammunition, but it was relatively low. Never comes up in school for some reason. *insert P-rant about British History curriculum*

[Riain]

If the millions of shells are used to support the troops and suppress/destroy the enemy then that is great, if they are used simple to bombard deep and hard-to-destroy trenches that's bad.

The problem at NC was that once the troops reached forward objectives successfully they couldn't get artillery support becuase they couldn't communicate with the artillery, who didn't have enough shells anyway. Perhaps with success would come the conclusion that it is follow-up support to surprise attacks which is the key rather than the methodical destruction of entrenchments prior to an attack.

[MrP]

Originally Posted by Riain

If the millions of shells are used to support the troops and suppress/destroy the enemy then that is great, if they are used simple to bombard deep and hard-to-destroy trenches that's bad.

The problem at NC was that once the troops reached forward objectives successfully they couldn't get artillery support becuase they couldn't communicate with the artillery, who didn't have enough shells anyway.

I agree completely. It's a problem that recurs throughout the war across theatres - communication's a mess in the period. I was just researching Gumbinnen earlier, and part of the reason for the German failure was that two corps weren't ready to launch the attack until 4-8 hours after it had begun. Dire comms is clearly a part of this.

Originally Posted by Riain

Perhaps with success would come the conclusion that it is follow-up support to surprise attacks which is the key rather than the methodical destruction of entrenchments prior to an attack.

Possibly, old boy. Part of the problem for the Brits was that they didn't really trust the New Army that replaced the BEF, since it wasn't filled with experienced long-term soldiers at all levels, but with volunteers. So they were a bit disinclined to risk them doing something wrong.

[Riain]

There's a WI in itself. WI the Brit mass armies were raised differently, perhaps through the Territorial Army systems which was already in place?

[bigfan79]

If the British mass armies come from the territorial system (which I don't remember from my WW1 studies) I would imagine that this would change the colonial situation in a insane way possibly with a more expansive Commonwealth encompassing more than just the White Dominions (Rhodesia, Australia, SA, Etc) but this would have changed the african colonial situation for the benefit of Germans and in asia to the Japanese