The question was asked and answered in the 1980s by the Naval War College's Global Wargame Series (I & II).
Before then everybody assumed it would nuclear. Further, the Europeans demanded (and used as an excuse for low conventional defence budgets in the 70s) the nuclear "tripwire". Although the war wouldn't stay conventional, from around 1970 to 1980 Warsaw Pact would have won assuming, magically, everybody didn't go nuclear. Post 1980 the next generation of equipment and higher Western defence budgets means NATO wins on the ground unless the war is very short.
Global Wargames 1979-1983 established that the conventional warfare worked to Blue's advantage and that Red was better served by a short-to-medium term conflict. Longer conflicts resulted in Western industrial superiority winning the war.
Horizontal escalation also worked to Blue's advantage.
The summary was thus:
• Blue/NATO appeared unlikely to win a short, conventional war in the central region, and
• There was a strong possibility that nuclear escalation would be disadvantageous to all involved.
• Therefore, a strategy that provided a better chance for Blue/NATO success was that of protracted, conventional war.
Issues of particular focus included the following:
• The absolute necessity for the prompt use of strategic warning.
• The requirement to examine military strategies for protracted, conventional war.
• The need to explore the longer term effects of horizontal escalation.
• The central importance of preplanning for resource management and industrial mobilization.
• The benefits of early identification of technological needs and the organization of the scientific community to support initiatives of “Manhattan Project” stature.
Global Wargames 1984-89:
Principal findings of the series can be summarized as follows:
• A NATO/Warsaw Pact war would be difficult to start but virtually impossible to conclude on a negotiated basis.
• What constitutes “victory” and “defeat” can be perceived very differently by Blue and by Red.
• Although contemplation of nuclear use tends to change for both sides with time and circumstance, early escalation by Blue is probably unnecessary and unwise.
• The huge material expenditures involved in waging modern, conventional war require pre-planning of resource management and industrial mobilization.
• Offensive use of military forces is critical in throwing Red off timeline and, at sea, creating strategic options and protecting SLOCs.
• Although maritime success is critical to Blue conduct of the war, translation of that success into negotiating leverage is elusive.
• Regardless of Blue policy preference/strategy, a NATO/Warsaw Pact war in which alliances remain firm and nuclear weapons are not used will probably become protracted.
Assuming continued domestic support and alliance cohesion, the validity of the Blue strategy of protracted, conventional war rested on two conditions that these games called into question:
• The ability of Blue to generate or to accure from other sources the equipment necessary to sustain the conflict until industrial mobilization occurred was problematic.
• There was a distinct possibility that the very success of the Blue strategy would drive Red to some form of nuclear escalation.
Rapidshare link to the papers
, Bundeswehr soldiers I worked with how they felt about the prospect of fighting the GDR. Mostly they didn't believe it would happen as they were in more communication with relatives in the GDR than was generally known at the time and did not think the Landstreitkrafte would obey orders to attack Bundeswehr units.