A larger British Army versus Napoleon

Barry Curran · Sep 24, 2007

The Napoleonic wars dragged on for years. What if Britain had at some point in the late 1790s or early 1800s fielded a larger army by introducing conscription? One downside would be a reduction in the subsidies available to keeping our allies in the field against Boney. But would have a more direct approach to defeating him shortened the war?

seraphim74 · Sep 24, 2007

OTOH, direct confrontation between British and French army might have ended with total British defeat (on the scale of Austerlitz or Waterloo). It depends on when such clash would have happened. If Napoleon was in his top form, with Grande Armee realtively untouched, I doubt if British army would have been able to defeat him. Consider also the fact that British conscription army probably wouldn't have been as good as British professionals IOTL.
Napoleon would have been overjoyed if he had an opportunity to meet with large British army. Finally he would have been able to face the British in his own game. And as far as land warfare goes, he was one of the best players ever.
So what would have happened, if large British army faced Grande Armee and suffered crushing defeat? What would have been reaction of the British? This time, Britain lost not only some (OK, a lot of) money and prestige, but thousands of men killed or in captivity. And what would have been reaction of other countries? Major British defeat could have been crushing to their morale. Napoleon would have defeated litterally every power in Europe. He would have been seen as absolutely invincible.

carlton_bach · Sep 24, 2007

Another problem I can see is that Britain already *had* conscription. The Naval Impress might not react too well to competition from the Army.

Roberto · Sep 24, 2007

That was.... (sob) ....beautiful!

67th Tigers · Sep 24, 2007

The British had a higher military participation ratio than any other combatant country:

Britain: 1 in 5 of male military population
France: 1 in 14
Austria: 1 in 14
Russia: 1 in 14
Prussia: 1 in 10

It's difficult to see Britain fielding a larger force, it's just that
much of it is required to defend Britain itself.

67th Tigers · Sep 24, 2007

seraphim74 said:
OTOH, direct confrontation between British and French army might have ended with total British defeat (on the scale of Austerlitz or Waterloo). It depends on when such clash would have happened. If Napoleon was in his top form, with Grande Armee realtively untouched, I doubt if British army would have been able to defeat him. Consider also the fact that British conscription army probably wouldn't have been as good as British professionals IOTL.
Napoleon would have been overjoyed if he had an opportunity to meet with large British army. Finally he would have been able to face the British in his own game. And as far as land warfare goes, he was one of the best players ever.
So what would have happened, if large British army faced Grande Armee and suffered crushing defeat? What would have been reaction of the British? This time, Britain lost not only some (OK, a lot of) money and prestige, but thousands of men killed or in captivity. And what would have been reaction of other countries? Major British defeat could have been crushing to their morale. Napoleon would have defeated litterally every power in Europe. He would have been seen as absolutely invincible.

Nope. It wasn't the fact that the French were conscripts that reduced their combat effectiveness, it was the difference in levels of training. A Frenchman normally had 3 weeks training before being posted to the field army. The British had 6 months training, and 2 years was considered the minimum before assignment to the continent.

If the British had released the 600,000 men kept in the British Isles to fight Napoleon, he'd have been in real trouble. They might not have been as good as Peninsula veterans, but they'd have been better than the French.

The Dean · Sep 24, 2007

67th Tigers said:
Nope. It wasn't the fact that the French were conscripts that reduced their combat effectiveness, it was the difference in levels of training. A Frenchman normally had 3 weeks training before being posted to the field army. The British had 6 months training, and 2 years was considered the minimum before assignment to the continent.

If the British had released the 600,000 men kept in the British Isles to fight Napoleon, he'd have been in real trouble. They might not have been as good as Peninsula veterans, but they'd have been better than the French.

If Wellington had been in command he was used to fighting with an army of mixed levels of training right back to his service in India. Given a force comprising of the experienced veterans with a larger contingent of less experienced but nevertheless trained men he would have had a force better than he possessed in most of his battles.

seraphim74 · Sep 24, 2007

Originaly posted by 67th Tigers

Nope. It wasn't the fact that the French were conscripts that reduced their combat effectiveness, it was the difference in levels of training. A Frenchman normally had 3 weeks training before being posted to the field army. The British had 6 months training, and 2 years was considered the minimum before assignment to the continent.
If the British had released the 600,000 men kept in the British Isles to fight Napoleon, he'd have been in real trouble. They might not have been as good as Peninsula veterans, but they'd have been better than the French.

And were all of those 600,000 men in Britain after 6 months of training and two years of service? I seriously doubt it. IIRC, a big part of them was local militia, ot its British equivalent - no chance against French. IOTL British sent to the continent relatively small force, so they could send chosen elite. It is quite easy to create a small, professional, perfectly trained army. A great army of 600,000 men would have consisted in big part of raw recruits. OTOH Napoleon would have had hardened in battle veterans, even if they were conscripts (of course it depend when that clash of titans happens).

67th Tigers · Sep 24, 2007

seraphim74 said:
Originaly posted by 67th Tigers

And were all of those 600,000 men in Britain after 6 months of training and two years of service? I seriously doubt it. IIRC, a big part of them was local militia, ot its British equivalent - no chance against French. IOTL British sent to the continent relatively small force, so they could send chosen elite. It is quite easy to create a small, professional, perfectly trained army. A great army of 600,000 men would have consisted in big part of raw recruits. OTOH Napoleon would have had hardened in battle veterans, even if they were conscripts (of course it depend when that clash of titans happens).

See: The British Armed Nation 1793-1815 (preview at http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...+Search&meta=&sa=X&oi=print&ct=title#PPA67,M1 )

The British in 1805 have:

Army: 266,621 Regulars and 385,151 "Landwehr" (of the regulars 170,574 are in the UK, this figure being fairly constant until at least 1810)
Navy: 120,000 Regulars and 30,000 Sea Fencibles

As to whether they were the elite, Wellington got a lot of the 2nd battalions, which were relatively newly raised and whose qualities most considered questionable. While by 1812 Wellington certainly was getting the best, earlier the best tended to go the the armies in Germany, Holland etc.

The thing with Napoleon is that he was very free with "spending" his troops, so the average experience was actually pretty poor. As I've said, throughout the Napoleonic Wars, a considerable portion of the French army were the levys of that years class. In the early phase (prior to 1807), the French only managed to conscript 50-60,000 men a year. Much of the great armies of the later phase of the war were had up by Napoleons satellites. Only (roughly) half the men Napoleon invaded Russia with were French for example.

Empror Mike · Sep 24, 2007

Exactly. Many of Napoleon's men were Germans (for example) who had a good militant legacy and culture from back home.

67th Tigers · Sep 24, 2007

Quite a bit, there are entire formed German Army Corps in the Grande Armee:

non-French include:

Imperial Guard: 1 Polish Division, 1 Italian Brigade, 1 Spanish Bn (the cavalry are roughly half French, and include a Regiment each from Poland, Holland, Portugal and Egypt), the artillery and train are largely drawn from Mecklenburg and Poland

I Corps: 1 Baden Regiment, 1 Mecklenburg Bn, 1 Polish Cav Rgt

II Corps: 1 Swiss Division, 1 Portuguese Rgt

III Corps: 1 Wurtemburg Division, 2 Portuguese Rgts, 3 Wurtemburg Cav Rgts

IV Corps: 1 Italian Division, 1 Croatian Rgt, 1 Polish Cav Rgts and 3 Italian Cav Rgts

V (Polish) Corps: entirely Polish (3 Divs and Cav etc.)

VI (Bavarian) Corps: entirely Bavarian (2 Divs and Cav etc.)

VII (Saxon) Corps: entirely Saxon (2 Divs and Cav etc.)

VIII (Westphalian) Corps: entirely Westphalian (2 Divs and Cav etc.)

IX Corps: 1 Berg-Baden-Hessian Division, 1 Polish-Baden Division, Cav is entirely German (1 Rgt from Hesse, Saxony, Baden and Burg ea) (1 French Div)

X (Prussian) Corps: 1 Polish Division, 1 Prussian Division, Cav is Prussian (another Corps with no French units)

XI Corps: 1 Wurtzburg Division, 1 Neopolitan Division, 1 Rhinbund Division, Cav is German

Austrian Corps: all Austrian

I Cav Corps: 1 Polish Brigade
II Cav Corps: 1 Prussian Brigade
III Cav Corps: 1 Bavarian Brigade
IV Cav Corps: 2 Polish Brigades, 1 Saxon Brigade, 1 Westphalian Brigade (No French units)

Barry Curran · Sep 24, 2007

I personally believe Britain's war against Napoleon would have been shortened if its leaders had transformed the war by increasing the size of the British Army. After Trafalgar, the French Navy was a busted flush and Britain could have put a larger army in the field. Wellington had already proved himself in India and so would have been a contender to command an enlarged army. And I am talking about a field army of around 100,000, most of whom would be British, with the rest being Irish and Germans.

Now imagine if this force was in Portugal in 1809. The Peninsula war would have ended much more quickly that it did in our time and, perhaps, Wellington would have confronted Napoleon somewhere near the Franco-Spanish border. The reasoning here is that Napoleon would have been forced to deal with a more potent threat posed by Wellington, whilst holding off the allied armies encouraged by Britain's decision to become more involved on land.

I believe such a confrontation would have been won by Wellington and thus would have brought about an earlier end to the war.

Redbeard · Sep 24, 2007

There was nothing magic about the British Army of the Napoleonic wars. It was a professional force of limited size and in doctrines, training and methods was very close to the Prussian and Austrian armies from before 1806.

This would also indicate how a campign would end where Napoleon and the Grande Armee in their prime was confronted in a major battle.

But in OTL the British Army never had a size where it would be realistic to alone confront Napoleon - the British should really appreciate that.

Had they tried for a larger army, or committing more of the garrison and militia forces stationed on the British Isles, they would just have had a larger force, but not a better one. Next I seriously doubt if any British commander, let alone the British staff system, would have been able to handle field forces well beyond 150.000 men, as would have been necessary. Very few were, apart from Napoleon himself and one or two French Marshalls I guess Scharnhorst/Gneisenau, Archduke Charles and Schwarzenberg/Radetzky were the proven ones. Wellington was a splendid Army commander and tactician, but so were a lot of other commanders, and most, when given the opportunity to command the big thing on their own proved to have risen above their capacity.

BTW the figures on the British Army that 67th Tiger posts above are very similar to those of the Austrian Army of 1813 incl. the ratio between regulars and militia. The Austrian army had been bigger before, but after land losses in 1809 a large number of regiments were discontinued.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

seraphim74 · Sep 24, 2007

I'm still a little sceptical about large British army fighting Napoleon. Judging by numbers supplied by 67th Tiger (thanks) British could realistically send to battle an army of about 200,000 men (half regulars, half Landwehr) with pretty much the same level of professionalism on both sides. I'm not sure about logistics for bigger force. The battle would have been interesting, to say the least. True, Napoleon could loose, and that would have been it. But according to me his chances in such battle would have been bigger than British had. That was his speciality, after all, and in his prime never had a problem with fighting against more numerous foe.
May I also remind you, that Wellington didn't exactly win Peninsular War by himself. There was Spanish army, the French had also to deal with national uprising and guerilla war fought with extreme cruelty on both sides. And many of French forces in Spain were far from first class troops. Spain was something like Napoleon's Eastern Front, and service there was often a punishment.
But I still waiting for an answer to my question. What would have happened, if British Army did clash with Grande Armee and was crushed? Say, about 1811?

Barry Curran · Sep 24, 2007

Redbeard said:
There was nothing magic about the British Army of the Napoleonic wars. It was a professional force of limited size and in doctrines, training and methods was very close to the Prussian and Austrian armies from before 1806.

One major advantage of the British Army was that it training centered on the importance of rapid musket fire. No European army could match British infantry in this regard. And British conscripts would have been drilled in the same way. An army of 100,000 men led by Wellington would have posed a serious threat to Napoleon, who would have been unable to mass all his forces against it due to the threat posed by other allied armies.

As for magic, well, we British are good at winning wars. The only one we have lost was against the Americans, many of whom had regarded themselves as Britons before the Declaration of Independence. And ,of course, there is the fact that Britain was fighting elsewhere at the time.

67th Tigers · Sep 24, 2007

The British Army of 1793 was a shell, with a strength of only 40,390, and of those only 14,722 were in the British Isles. The English Militia was barely 30,000 on paper. There wasn't a lot there to build upon, but the British were fortunate in that their officers were very experienced, and the French overwhelmed their Army with conscripts.

The question of could anyone handle a body of 150,000? Napoleon could only because his Corps commanders were effectively independent, even with Battalion Carre. The problem is that only 30,000 men can march down a road in a single day at the best of times, in normal battalion carre you had 4 Corps arranged in a diamond, arranged one days march apart.

For his invasion of Russia, Napoleon divided his forces into several seperate armies:

1st Army (Napoleon commanding in person, Berthier in his absence): Imperial Guard Corps, I Corps, II Corps, III Corps, I Cav Corps and II Cav Corps

2nd Army (Junot): V (Polish) Corps, VII (Saxon) Corps, VIII (Westphalian) Corps and IV Cavalry Corps

Army of Italy (Eugene): IV (Italian) Corps, VI (Bavarian) Corps and III Cav Corps

X Corps (Macdonald): Guarding the Northern Flank of the Army Group

Austrian Corps (Schwartzenburg): Guarding the Southern Flank of the Army Group

IX Corps (Victor) and XI Corps (Augereau) Guarding the rear and the supply lines

The British had a few commanders who were extremely capable, apart from Wellington there was Bentinck, Picton, Beresford, Spencer, Edward Paget, Lord Paget, Sherbrooke, John Moore, Ronald Hill, Graham, Dalohousie etc.

67th Tigers · Sep 24, 2007

Barry Curran said:
Redbeard said:

There was nothing magic about the British Army of the Napoleonic wars. It was a professional force of limited size and in doctrines, training and methods was very close to the Prussian and Austrian armies from before 1806.

One major advantage of the British Army was that it training centered on the importance of rapid musket fire. No European army could match British infantry in this regard. And British conscripts would have been drilled in the same way. An army of 100,000 men led by Wellington would have posed a serious threat to Napoleon, who would have been unable to mass all his forces against it due to the threat posed by other allied armies.

As for magic, well, we British are good at winning wars. The only one we have lost was against the Americans, many of whom had regarded themselves as Britons before the Declaration of Independence. And ,of course, there is the fact that Britain was fighting elsewhere at the time.

Click to expand...

Although trained as such, in practice the British reverted to the Dutch school and conducted their attacks A Prest, rather than the Prussian school of firefighting (which Frederick der Grosser took from older British tactics)

Redbeard · Sep 25, 2007

67th Tigers said:
Barry Curran said:

Although trained as such, in practice the British reverted to the Dutch school and conducted their attacks A Prest, rather than the Prussian school of firefighting (which Frederick der Grosser took from older British tactics)

Click to expand...

I'm not quite sure what you mean by "A Prest" or "Dutch School" in this context, but anyway both Austrian, Prussian and British doctrines remained linear for longer than elsewhere. The Austrians started their transformation after 1805, the Prussians after 1807 and the British didn't really start it. Linear doctrines were not as obsolete as is often described, but required highly skilled (drilled) professional troops. Against uncoordinated frontal attacks by less skilled troops (conscripts) it would usually have the upper hand.

The line got into serious trouble however when meeting equally professional troops not only capable of fighting in line, but also of deploying swiftly in column. Combined with a skilled commander, like Davout and his III Armycorps 1805-1809, the steady professional line would often find itself outmanoeuvred, outflanked and/or outfired - no matter if on the offensive or the defensive.

The Prussians at Auerstedt attacked ferociously in line, but uncordinated after their commander fell. At Wagram the Austrian left flank defended the plateau with great skill and determination, incl. effective use of skirmishers, and from a backslope position not unlike those preferred by Wellington. But against Davout and III AC that wasn't enough and only the Archduke's leadership prevented the Austrians from suffering a fate like the Prussians in 1806.

I'll claim that the Prussian Army almost anihilated at Jena/Auerstedt in 1806 was as professional and skilled as the contemporary British and Austrian ones. Had it instead of being caught on the wrong leg in front of Napoleon and the Grande Armee (incl. Davout and III AC) survided, and fought lesser French commanders having the habit of uncoordinated frontal attacks in collumn, that Prussian Army would have produced results very similar to those of the famed British Army. The service times of the early Prussian and Austrian armies were fully comparable to the British and especially the Prussians very focussed on firepower too.

The short French training times before being deployed to the units only had serious negative consequences when the recruits were marched directly from the depots to the battle, like in 1813. With a backbone of veterans a surprsingly high number of recruits can be included without reducing the unit's efficiency significantly. The French unit's coherrence and skills did not origin on the training ground but from campaigns and battles. Until 1809 successful campaigns and limited losses resulted in a practically invincible Grande Armee, but thereafter slowly degraded and collapsed in 1812. If the British should have had any chance of confronting Napoleon in major battle before 1814 it should have been in spring of 1813, when the French troops were very young and practically without cavalry. By autumn the surviving troops had alreday provided a core of regulars, but of poor comfort as the continental allies had improved even more and 500.000 + Austrians had joined the allied cause (of wich appr. 200.000 regulars/veterans in field armies).

And then there is Waterloo - in minds of the present time the archetypical Napoleonic battle - and with a few exceptions the only one known. But apart from the French army of 1815 being far from its zenith (IMO 1805-09) it was remarkably ill led from French side. Napoleon was ill and absent much of the time, and istead of great leadership like at Austerlitz or Wagram we saw Ney wasting the entire cavalry arm in an uncoordinated frontal attack, and next the same with the Guard's assault.

And still, had it not been for the timely arrival of Blücher and his Prussians on the French flank, Wellington probably would have been overwhelmed and chased from the battlefield. That wouldn't have changed one bit of how the various tactics, doctrines and armies worked but very much our contemporary views on them.

In short, we can't use the British sucesses in the Peninsula or at Waterloo to determine how a campaign involving a continental size British army vs. Napoleon and the Grande armee would have ended. For that the OTL confrontations between professional liniear armies and the Grande Armee are much more telling.

BTW 67th Tiger, I very much appreciate your posts. Not only for your facts and figures (always welcome) but your remarks about the troubles and challenges involved in marching several AC show a rare understanding of the basics of warfare. Have you been wargaming campaigns or is your engagement of a purely academic/scientific character?

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

67th Tigers · Sep 25, 2007

Redbeard said:
I'm not quite sure what you mean by "A Prest" or "Dutch School" in this context, but anyway both Austrian, Prussian and British doctrines remained linear for longer than elsewhere.

Attack a Prest is literally a "Pressed Attack", one that seeks shock action at bayonet point quickly rather than having a prolonged Prussian style firefight first.

"Dutch tactics" (from William III's tactics) involved a rolling fire by platoons (an early version of fire and movement) in the advance followed by (in British practice) a forming up to deliver a single volley and close range and a bayonet charge. Of course, in the defence (as practiced on the Peninsula), the platoon fire was prettymuch done away with. Unfortunately for most, these were some of the hardest tactics to master, and so were only really used by the British, who had time to train their troops far more thoroughly than the continental powers.

In fact, the British later (by the time of the Peninsula War) prettymuch dropped the platoon firing.

The Austrians started their transformation after 1805, the Prussians after 1807 and the British didn't really start it. Linear doctrines were not as obsolete as is often described, but required highly skilled (drilled) professional troops. Against uncoordinated frontal attacks by less skilled troops (conscripts) it would usually have the upper hand.

Absolutely, it should be remembered linear tactics hung around in some armies (i.e. Imperial Germany) for any century, with refinement. The ACW was largely fought as a linear war, being almost pre-Napoleonic (remember, Lee's great assault on day 3 of Gettysburg was made in a linear fashion). In fact, IMHO, prettymuch everything before May 1864 in that war was pre-Napoleonic (in fact, there are flashes of pre-Marlborough tactics in the very early war), then in May 64 (Spotsylvannia Court House etc.) we have a brief interlude of Napoleonic tactics, followed by everything settling down into siege warfare of a type the Black Prince would recognise.

The line got into serious trouble however when meeting equally professional troops not only capable of fighting in line, but also of deploying swiftly in column. Combined with a skilled commander, like Davout and his III Armycorps 1805-1809, the steady professional line would often find itself outmanoeuvred, outflanked and/or outfired - no matter if on the offensive or the defensive.

This is not an innovation of Napoleon, put it rather goes back to de Saxe's day as an attempted counter to Prussian tactics. Of course prior to this the column was a non-entity on the battlefield as a closed square formation hadn't been invented (by Frederick), and columns couldn't defend against cavalry prior to this point.

More to the point, some of the great "battering ram" columns were used in 1778, and found wanting, resulting in the Mixed Order of Guibert, who should really take credit for "Napoleonic" impulse warfare.

The Prussians at Auerstedt attacked ferociously in line, but uncordinated after their commander fell. At Wagram the Austrian left flank defended the plateau with great skill and determination, incl. effective use of skirmishers, and from a backslope position not unlike those preferred by Wellington. But against Davout and III AC that wasn't enough and only the Archduke's leadership prevented the Austrians from suffering a fate like the Prussians in 1806.

I'll claim that the Prussian Army almost anihilated at Jena/Auerstedt in 1806 was as professional and skilled as the contemporary British and Austrian ones. Had it instead of being caught on the wrong leg in front of Napoleon and the Grande Armee (incl. Davout and III AC) survided, and fought lesser French commanders having the habit of uncoordinated frontal attacks in collumn, that Prussian Army would have produced results very similar to those of the famed British Army. The service times of the early Prussian and Austrian armies were fully comparable to the British and especially the Prussians very focussed on firepower too.

In fact the Prussians focused a lot more on firepower than the British, who focused on shock a lot more. The Prussians were trained to stay static and keep firing, resulting in some spectacular firefights. The British OTOH tended to deliver only the crushing first volley or so (for the reasons of smoke, clean barrels, proper levelling etc., the first volley is several times more effective than subsequent ones), then initiate a melee.

The short French training times before being deployed to the units only had serious negative consequences when the recruits were marched directly from the depots to the battle, like in 1813. With a backbone of veterans a surprsingly high number of recruits can be included without reducing the unit's efficiency significantly. The French unit's coherrence and skills did not origin on the training ground but from campaigns and battles. Until 1809 successful campaigns and limited losses resulted in a practically invincible Grande Armee, but thereafter slowly degraded and collapsed in 1812. If the British should have had any chance of confronting Napoleon in major battle before 1814 it should have been in spring of 1813, when the French troops were very young and practically without cavalry. By autumn the surviving troops had alreday provided a core of regulars, but of poor comfort as the continental allies had improved even more and 500.000 + Austrians had joined the allied cause (of wich appr. 200.000 regulars/veterans in field armies).

This backbone was why under the 1st Republic Regiments were converted into demi-brigades, with a Battalion of the old Royal Army (le Blancs) and the ca 3 of the new levies (le Bleus). It is a fairly effective way of stimulating the development of poor troops. The British tended to be a little more precious with their regular army, and there was strong opposition to any such integration (right up until the 1860's).

And then there is Waterloo - in minds of the present time the archetypical Napoleonic battle - and with a few exceptions the only one known. But apart from the French army of 1815 being far from its zenith (IMO 1805-09) it was remarkably ill led from French side. Napoleon was ill and absent much of the time, and istead of great leadership like at Austerlitz or Wagram we saw Ney wasting the entire cavalry arm in an uncoordinated frontal attack, and next the same with the Guard's assault.

Personally I think the problem at Waterloo (which I regard as a single multi-day battle covering everything from Quatre Bras/Ligny to the pursuit) is the bad disposition of Napoleons forces. He doesn't manage to concentrate an overwhelming force against any detachments, in fact having only half his available forces present at Waterloo against eventually 75% of the allied forces (remember, another allied Corps was also in theatre, but posted on the far right/ rear flank for fears that Napoleon wouldn't simply blunder head on into the allies, but go far left flanking).

And still, had it not been for the timely arrival of Blücher and his Prussians on the French flank, Wellington probably would have been overwhelmed and chased from the battlefield. That wouldn't have changed one bit of how the various tactics, doctrines and armies worked but very much our contemporary views on them.

Possibly, although Wellington can of course fall back on the Hanoveran Corps, link up with them and about another Corps worth of British reinforcements disembarking and keep his army "in the game".

In short, we can't use the British sucesses in the Peninsula or at Waterloo to determine how a campaign involving a continental size British army vs. Napoleon and the Grande armee would have ended. For that the OTL confrontations between professional liniear armies and the Grande Armee are much more telling.

Perhaps a more telling indictator would be the actions of the other British Armies, aside from the Peninsula Army? We British tend to ignore everything that isn't Wellington, but the earlier Dutch campaigns see a much more "linear" army than the Peninsula (I'd argue one very much like the Prussians) getting their butts handed too them.

BTW: Have a look at the orbat for the Anglo-Russian Army of Holland in 1799 and tell me if you see anything "un-British":

http://home.wanadoo.nl/g.vanuythoven/Anglo-Russian OOB 18-09-1799.htm

BTW 67th Tiger, I very much appreciate your posts. Not only for your facts and figures (always welcome) but your remarks about the troubles and challenges involved in marching several AC show a rare understanding of the basics of warfare. Have you been wargaming campaigns or is your engagement of a purely academic/scientific character?

Regards

Steffen Redbeard[/quote]

Has to be said, I haven't played any wargames in a fairly long time. Lack of time and opponents, although I've a long standing interest in the subject (as a subaltern I had a lot of negative comments along the "he reads too much" on my OJARs, usually accompanied by enquiries on whether I'd be happier in the artillery, my username is an indicator of my old regiment).

Tyr · Sep 25, 2007

Britain wasn't really in much of a hurry to beat France though.
As soon as they got rid of the naval threat the UK could take on France at its leisure- why waste a lot of your own strength charging head long into battle when by waiting you can considerably weaken both your enemy and other continental powers?