Japan Dodges The Bubble

Japan Dodges The Bubble (rough draft)

It is 1980. In 6 years Japan will enter the Bubble, the tail end of a sustained period of economic growth from the 1960s to the present, accelerating from 1986 onwards in soaring stock and land prices. This will end badly.

For over thirty years the various factions of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)[1] have ruled the country fairly well, despite endemic corruption, and this practice looks set to continue (and will, for all but 1993).

The Japanese economic growth (miracle) has turned the world into an economically tri-polar system with the United States and Western Europe. Much thought has been given to the Japanese form of government intervention[2] as it regards economic growth.

The Japanese military remains one of the world's most formidable (after the superpowers) despite spending roughly a third as much per capita as the United Kingdom[2].

The Bubble will end in the middle of 1990. With it will come the lost decade, years over which the Japanese economy will stagnate and contract. Japanese firms will lose their global technological edge[4] and many will turn their sights towards home. Roughly 20 trillion USD will vanish with the collapse of the stock and real estate markets.

The underlying economic reasons for the Bubble Crash are reasonably well understood[5] but changing them is harder, especially due to government reluctance to acknowledge structural problems.

Even today with a reforming government Japan remains politically unable to conduct structural reforms needed to balance the budget and reduce massive government and corporate debt. Sales tax, deregulation, financial sector reform, privatization, and the like remain difficult and the government was forced to conduct an election so it could privatize the Post Office—which in fact can be considered the world's largest bank by assets (three trillion USD) and was a prime source of government corruption and pork-barreling, not to mention covering well over a trillion USD (one fifth) of government debt.

Government intervention (i.e. the Ministry of Finance, MITI, and others) is good policy for developing economies, it is bad policy for developed economies. The Japanese failed to realize this for various reasons including historically successful government intervention, and the nature of the electoral system which over-represented rural areas in the Diet (equivalent to a parliamentary House of Commons), and a suspicion of the free market.

Thus we need a POD well before the Bubble. Once the Bubble begins the government will be politically unable to change economic policy, and post-Bubble is arguably too late for anything more then a moderately faster recovery.

My POD is simple. In 1980 let's say Japanese banks suffer something along the lines of the US Savings and Loan scandal. i.e. they are revealed to have a great deal of non-preforming loans (NPL) which supports a large amount of corporate debt, and have covered this up via accountancy. Furthermore it's shown that this was supported by the Ministry of Finance.

A number of large Japanese corporations are badly hurt by this, and other corporations now become concerned about their debt levels. Furthermore banks will now move to a more normal system of loans.

Following the Lockheed scandal of 1976[6] this deals another major blow to the LDP's political fortunes, so we posit a reformer break of the LDP, advocating banking reform to prevent more scandals.

The Reformers bring down the government and we head into an election. The LDP vote drops lower, the clear Reformer option sucking the right of centre votes, while the various opposition parties get their usual votes on the left & urban side.

When the dust clears the Reformers hold the balance of power. They can ally with the opposition parties and form government, or they can ally with the LDP and form government.

Being ex-LDPers they prefer the LDP, but when the LDP fails to agree to their demands they go the left-wing parties. Obviously they generally disagree on policy, but can agree on the need for reform.

In return for banking and financial sector reform, the Reformers agree to the opposition parties pet reform: electoral.

In 1977 the Rainbow Coalition type government passes electoral and banking sector reform: the voting system will follow an Australian model. The Diet will be elected purely by Instant Run-Off[7] and the House of Councillors will be elected by Single-Transferable Vote[8]. Further all seats will be apportioned to be roughly equal, at a quarter million per electoral district—eliminating the massive urban disadvantage.

This will virtually eliminate the LDP's rural dominance, weaken the LDP faction system (which flourished because of the old electoral system), shift towards a two-party system in the Diet, and strengthen the House of Councillors as well as keeping proportional representation in the system.

The only other major legislation passed before the inevitable collapse of the Rainbow Coalition is financial sector reform. The Ministry of Finance is removed from the decision making loop, banks (and corporations) are required to have open accounting standards, banks must keep reserves to deal with bad loans, and thus debt and low-accountability loans are discouraged.

Furthermore the banks bad loans that prompted this are rapidly taken care by forcing asset sales and their merger into other banks, this will introduce a major (though somewhat unintended) shake-up of the keiretsu system—forcing the involved parties to re-evalute their current role.

With the collapse of the Rainbow Coalition the LDP regains power, but under the new electoral system is unable to sustain a majority in both houses, and faces defect by factions on some issues.

Over the next five years the Japanese economy will experience moderate disruptions and will not grow as fast as OTL.

This (relative) economic under-performance leads to a Big Bang type deregulation in 1985. Following on the American and British models the LDP (reborn into a more financially conservative party/socially liberal party to better win the newly enlarged urban vote) privatizes the Post Office (to make them look good on the corruption issue), deregulates the economy, introduces tighter inflation policies with a newly independent Bank of Japan, loosens general trade barriers to improve foreign relations (notably the United States), and conducts a (popular) reform of the healthcare system[9].

The healthcare reform isn't quite enough to save them from electoral defeat (the economic reforms are moderately unpopular as they haven't had an impact yet) and the Renewal Party of Japan takes office. The Renewal Party of Japan is the old Socialist Party gone more moderate and with a influx of new people from the electoral reform.

The Renewal Party has a very narrow majority mandate, and has problems getting stuff through the Upper House. This leads them to concentrate on public sector reform rather then changing economic policy (they can't get it through). The government and private sector are surgically separated (the left doesn't mind government owning stuff, it does minds the government colluding with business—since it can't nationalize stuff it goes for the second, also it hurts the LDP's party financing : ) and the Iron Triangle is weakened notably.

They also kick the Americans out of Japan, which leads to their electoral defeat.

The LDP resumes power with economic reforms now bearing fruit—low inflation is popular, increasing foreign direct investment brings other countries experience into Japan, increased competition via deregulation is also helping. One major difference against the American/British model is that the banks continue to guide "their" companies, and have a new-found intolerance for screwing up (they have a huge problem with government interference, since the last time fundamentally changed their previously comfortable life) and so banks exert a private sector influence on corporations to not do anything to invite government down on their heads. However with transparent accounting standards preventing financial sleight of hand and cheating this means corporations are forced to actually obey the law, not just by the government but also by the banks—whose support they need.

Think of it as deregulation with a conscious, Enron type incidents are going to be (as much as possible) slapped down by the banks.

The LDP continue their economic policies, balancing the budget most notably, and begin to pay down debt. This strengthens their hand in talking with corporations about debt levels and will prevent the massive debt ratios of OTL.

Although there has been no Bubble Japanese economic growth rates have remained good, and are once again increasing.

By 1988 the Japanese economy is roughly 12 trillion USD behind OTL Japan, however it's operating on a much much sounder base and will not be facing the Bubble.

Although the LDP regained power over the Renewal Party's kicking the Americans out they are still facing Communism and China and perhaps North Korea, and alliance with the USA or not they're worried about it.

They therefore purpose an absolute ceiling of 1.5% of GDP on the military (OTL 1%, but TTL has no more American bases to support the Japanese and the mutual defence pact between them is marginally less close) and reforms. Furthermore Japanese defence companies now face much loosened export restrictions—this will lower prices for a good chunk of Japanese military spending (unit costs for domestic Japanese equipment ranges from 3 to 10 times that of European/American equipment and Russian equipment is roughly 30% cheaper then American). Also note that paying for American bases consumed as much as 10% of the Defence budget. In real terms (counting for the smaller economy) the Japanese military will be roughly 30% better off in the short term and as much as 100% better off in the longer term. We're looking at 80 billion USD or more by 2006 compared to OTL 44 billion USD, and that money will buy 3-10 times more of the indigenous Japanese equipment.

Other reforms include elevating the Japanese Defense Agency to the Ministry of Defense (OTL, 2006), and stressing qualitative improvements (continuing on from 1976) that can now be somewhat supported by increased overall funding.

Constitutional talks about the following amendment are also begun (OTL 2005), and meet surprising approval ratings apparently prompted by the loss of American bases. "In order to secure peace and the independence of our country as well as the security of the state and the people, military forces for self-defense shall be maintained with the prime minister of the cabinet as the supreme commander."
Military, is the key word above as the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have never been referred to in those terms.

Close contact with the USA (fully supportive) and South Korea (mixed, but the countries are natural allies and face similar security concerns) is maintained throughout.

In return for unambiguous apologies (as viewed by other countries, not Japan's own people who believe they have atoned enough) South Korea withdraws their objections. Making the apologies, however, knock the LDP out of power again.

The Renewal Party is unable to form a government however, as it's members split into the Democratic Party of Japan and the (reborn) Socialist Party of Japan. The LDP offers a coalition to the DPJ and resumes government.

It is now 1991. In 1990 just before the Bubble collapsed in OTL the Japanese of TTL had an economy roughly 15 trillion USD behind OTL. In 1991 they are now 6 trillion USD ahead, and will not be facing the negative economic growth of OTL.




[1] A rural based, mildly right of centre political organization, rife with factions due to the nature of the electoral system.

[2] The Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) practised a sophisticated form of economic intervention. Essentially it provided support services to industry, sheltered infant industries from being strangled on the competitive global market, and eased the transition from heavy industry (such as ship-building) into a more technological and services oriented economy.

[3] Strictly speaking the high price of indigenous Japanese military equipment makes the lower per capita military spending buy even less then it would if they bought more equipment from American or Europeans defence companies.

[4] For an OTL example, see Apple's iPhone. Japanese consumer electronic technology could have developed a similar product several years earlier (and current Japanese mobile technology is well in advance of the world) but were unable to translate that edge into software and disruptive hardware—choosing to focus on incremental hardware improvements. Only recently with the advent of mobile wallet and location services has major software innovations been made, and they have nothing to do with usability which is the iPhone forte.

[5] The Japapense banks overpaid to borrow money on the Euro-dollar markets, they lent vast amounts of money with little assurance of it being repaid if anything bad happened, they lent too much money on the peak of the American real estate boom (and when it collapsed, they lost most of it), the banks relied on the Ministry of Finance overmuch, and Japanese banks are not required to hold reserves to counter bad loans.

[6] (Wiki) In 1976, Lockheed was involved in a major scandal involving the Japanese Marubeni Corporation and several high ranking members of Japanese political, business and underworld circles. Lockheed had hired underworld figure Yoshio Kodama as a consultant in order to influence Japanese airlines, including the Japanese All Nippon Airways, to purchase the L-1011 aircraft instead of the DC-10.

It was revealed that Lockheed had paid approximately $3 million in bribes to the office of Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka for aid in the matter. The resulting judicial process carried on for a decade, and led to the arrest of Tanaka (after his resignation due to another scandal), among others. In the United States, Lockheed chairman of the board Daniel Haughton resigned from his position.

[7] (Wiki) Instant runoff voting (IRV) is a voting system used for single winner elections in which voters rank candidates in order of preference. In an IRV election, if no candidate receives an overall majority of first preferences, the candidates with fewest votes are eliminated one by one, and their votes transferred according to their second and third preferences (and so on) and all votes retallied, until one candidate achieves a majority. The term 'instant runoff voting' is used because this process resembles a series of run-off elections.

[8] (Wiki) Single transferable vote (STV) is a preferential voting system designed to minimise wasted votes and provide proportional representation while ensuring that votes are explicitly for candidates rather than party lists. It achieves this by using multi-seat constituencies (districts) and by transferring votes that would otherwise be wasted. STV initially allocates an individual's vote to their most preferred candidate, and then subsequently transfers unneeded or unused votes after candidates are either elected or eliminated, according to the voter's stated preferences.

[9] The many insurers are merged to form a half-dozen large ones: creating much larger risk pools and reducing rates. Co-payment rates are increased to match income which allows for the creation of more doctors and more time spent per patient as well as reducing the amount of public funding share of the system. A gatekeeper system is introduced to balance the greater use of doctor time. Drug prescribing and dispensing is separated, and drug costs for people who can afford it are increased to the market rate—this will reduce over-reliance and high use of drugs. The reform is popular among people who don't usually vote for the LDP (urban poor, for example), strengthens their position among elderly people, and most additional costs are born by people who don't vote for the LDP anyway. Government spin emphasis is on more doctors/more time with doctors consulting which is uniformly popular.

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While that's my economic/political part of the timeline to avoid the Bubble in Japan and place them on a better footing for the 90s and beyond. This should encourage a general technological speed-up in the world as well.

With a healthy Japan accepting foreign investment China will likely suffer a little. Likewise the economic weight of the region will remain more towards Japan/ASEAN instead of China.

This may (may, I say) avert the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997/8 as well. Avoiding that would also help avoid the 1998 global recession, the 1998 Russian Financial Crisis (and, perhaps, save them for real democracy).

I'm still working on it and do want to move beyond the political/economic focus so comments and hole-poking would be nice. I also owe a debt of gratitude to (the languishing unfinished) timeline Without an Eclipse: Higher Goes The Rising Sun for giving me the idea.
 
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yep. looks interesting, i like the idea of Japan avoiding the lost decade.

glad you liked darkest's amd my TL:)
 
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Thank you for the kind words.

I'm working to replace the timeline above with a series of articles, reports, and so forth about it and regulate the comparisons to OTL purely into footnotes.
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The Short-Term Economic Consequences of the Mitsubishi/Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Scandal
©1991 Tokyo University
Tokyo University Economics Department
Original Edition: Tokyo University Press, Tokyo: 1991
English Translation: Wallflower Press, New York: 1992

In early 1980 one of the major banks in Japan (Mitsubishi Bank Ltd.), was undergoing a routine examination by a low level government employee of the Ministry of Finance. Usually this is no cause for concern [for the banks], merely the Ministry of Finance fulfilling it's regulatory role. At the time, however, The Ministry of Finance operated in a friendly regulatory manner and typically maintained very close relationships with banks. Therefore anything odd that might be discovered had a very high chance of being lost.

Normally a junior employee of the Ministry of Finance would report to his immediate supervisor any irregularities, however this did not happen in this case. Instead a filed report wound up in the Ministry of Justice (current forensic accounting indicates that the report went sideways because the supervisor was on vacation, and something on the report flagged an internal mailing system somewhere) who were somewhat more inclined to follow up.

Over the next six months (February-July, 1980) the investigation widened to include, most notably, the Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, Limited. as well as a number of other banks. They were discovered to be holding roughly 10% of outstanding loans as non-preforming loans (NPL) or "bad debt" without holding reserves to counter them (as Japanese law did not require it at the time). This was in service to the rapidly increasing demands placed on them by their keiretsu who were entering the global market in force, albeit with little knowledge, and this was placing greater pressure both on their finances and their need for capital to counter foreign takeovers.
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To be continued…
 
thats an interesting POD:)

so if i'm correct, Japan has a better 1990-s/2000's becuase someone sent a file to the wrong place?

better then my original idea of just having reforms because i wanted them too.
 
Strictly speaking the POD is that the major keiretsu banks have a larger number of non-preforming loans earlier then IOTL as they are a little more eager to buy globally, a little earlier. As the Ministry of Finance "regulated" the banks and often told them what to do they usually had some people involved. A little butterfly interferes in an otherwise routine report (junior guy isn't used to the Ministry of Finance's ahem "impartiality" yet) and…

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The Short-Term Economic Consequences of the Mitsubishi/Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Scandal
©1991 Tokyo University
Tokyo University Economics Department
Original Edition: Tokyo University Press, Tokyo: 1991
English Translation: Wallflower Press, New York: 1992

[…]

Despite having uncovered nothing technically illegal the investigation continued because the size of the NPL's was unprecedented. In September a confidential memorandum was found (likely deliberately misfiled) that outlined a pattern of collusion between the banks and the Ministry of Finance to conceal the NPLs. Using this as a wedge additional corroborating data was soon found, and the scandal entered the public's conscious.

The investigation had been little noticed in the news medium but the Ministry of Finance links proved irresistible. Public outrage when the investigation and preliminary findings became public (despite government attempts to control the information) centred on two main facets: the level of corruption that must have been involved, and how much the banks cared about corporations and assets, rather then the retail market and direct customers as in most other developed countries.

Essentially the banks retail customers were angered by how little the banks cared about serving their needs, in favour of corporations, and by how much the banks (along with their corporate partners) and the Ministry of Finance had worked together for dubious reasons—the public refused to accept the rational for those actions. This is somewhat uncharacteristic of the Japanese public, however following the Lockheed Scandal of 1976 the tolerance for corruption of any sort was low.

In the spring of 1981 the Liberal Democrat Party lost a vote of confidence, and the nation went to the polls. The coalition government of all opposition parties passed a very large banking and financial sector reform law before collapsing.

The law instituted the following: the Ministry of Finance was removed from the decision making loop, banks (and corporations) were now required to have transparent accounting standards subject to random audit with large penalties for failure, banks must keep reserves on hand to deal with bad loans. The net effect of the law is to discourage debt and low-accountability loans, and return the (purged) Ministry of Finance to a regulatory role to supervise all of this.

Furthermore the banks NPLs that prompted this are rapidly taken care of by forcing asset sales and their merger into other banks, this will introduce a major (though unintended) shake-up of the keiretsu system which is outside the scope of this paper.

By 1983 the economy's growth rate had slowed noticeably from 1980 and projections pre-scandal. Corporations had been cut off from easy credit and the banks had been divorced from the Eurobond market as it was no longer worthwhile for them—this meant slower, albeit safer, growth rates. Economic disruptions had also set in, and the ambitious early wave of global Japanese companies were forced to re-entrench, bringing in outside (Western) consulting and concentrating on smaller and more strategic targets then before.

Positive signs included several times more foreign direct investment in Japanese corporations, although the keiretsu system continued to keep Japanese companies reasonably safe from the kind of hostile takeovers becoming more popular in the United States.

By 1985 continuing economic difficulties had lead the government to follow the Carter/Reagan US administrations lead in deregulation and a move to reduce the public portion of the GDP. Perhaps because the time had come the next several years saw governments in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Japan follow a similar path of liberalization, taken to a much greater extent (for survivals sake in New Zealand, for economic prosperity in Japan and the UK) then the US as parliamentary systems enjoyed greater freedom in that regard. High level talks between those three nations, in fact, quietly established somewhat harmonized efforts in taxes and regulation.

Subsidies were eliminated in many sectors, tariff walls were reduced, tax codes & rates were simplified and flattened (New Zealand brought in a 21% flat tax in fact, and the UK followed Hong Kong's lead in offering an option between graduated or flat taxes), taxes were shifted from income to consumption, and finally the three countries hammered out a free trade agreement that even included the importation of second hand autos (with a consequent massive drop in motorcycle fatalities in New Zealand).

The free trade deal was seen as a major blow against the Americans, who had chosen to not participate (formally) in these talks. This gave them greater impetus towards a free trade deal with Canada[1].

To be fair not all liberalization was entirely successful. The United Kingdom privatized railways in altogether the wrong fashion (but corrected their mistake at substantial cost with the heavy hand of government in 1991; time will see if the correction works) and there are other examples.

The draw-down of subsidies took several years for those dependant industries to adapt but once through the transition period thrived; New Zealand's agricultural sector being a prime example. In fact the reduction of subsidies, well marginally hurting the export market, have increased profitability in those industries and look likely to take back whatever lost ground on the world market soon enough.

Liberalization has not been without difficulties. Cultural forces in Japan impeded progress (the LDP government was forced to call an election on the issue of privatizing the post office) and transition periods continue today in some sectors, however the issue is certainly a qualified success as growth rates have exceeded expectations in all three countries and Japan in particular has seen major success in both the banking, keiretsu, and non-keiretsu sectors.

In short the reforms that begun because of scandal have led to a much healthier Japan, where keiretsu and banks are independent of each other—and much better for it—debt is under control, the neoliberal government has balanced the budget, and where economic growth continues at a sustained pace with limited inflation and looks set to continue.


[1] ITTL the Canadian-American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) will include the main Canadian concerns relating to American ability to play trade war—most notably over softwood lumber.

Basically IOTL the Canadians needed CAFTA more then the Americans, ITTL the Americans have lost quite a bit of face over their (non) free trade ways because of the Japan-UK-New Zealand deal and so need CAFTA to put themselves in a better global position to support free trade.

Further the Agreement would remain separate from the following Mexican-American Free Agreement. This will have interesting side effects down the road.
 
It is now 1991. In 1990 just before the Bubble collapsed in OTL the Japanese of TTL had an economy roughly 15 trillion USD behind OTL. In 1991 they are now 6 trillion USD ahead, and will not be facing the negative economic growth of OTL.

15 Trillion Dollars!? The economy of the US today is worth only 12.5 Trillion Dollars. Japan's nominal GDP today is only 4.9 Trillion Dollars. Are you sure you don't mean Yen?
 
I should have been more clear, the 20 trillion dollar figure comes from the collapse of the stock and real estate market.

in 1990 the aggregate value of all land in Japan was fifty percent greater than the value of all land in the rest of the world.

By 1999 the value of financial district property was 1/100 what it was in the bubble, and residential was 1/10 (1.5 million USD per square metre for the most expensive property in the bubble, with plenty not far behind).

The bubble artificially pushed stock and real estate prices way beyond their real value.

My mistake is not making it clear what I was talking about, GDP does not include assets like land value—I meant to portray that land values and the stock market were much lower relative to OTL bubble economy and the stability that they didn't have IOTL will help keep overall economic growth rates stay at 3-4%, instead of collapsing to 1% or even negative as they did when the bubble ended IOTL.
 
Here's a question, what do the people reading (although most of you haven't commented :) along want to see?

I'm working on the economy, the military, and the politics of Japan itself (plus a few other little things) but what else would be interesting?

These are the current titles I'm working on (you can probably guess which are further along), if y'all want to choose any in particular you'd like to, or anything else that you might want to know about the world feel free to ask:

Case Study: The Negative Income Tax in Japan
©1997 Adam Smith Institute

Excerpted:
Swain, Jonathan "Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia"
©2003 Parameters US Army War College Quarterly
Spring 2003. pp 44-57

Network Centric Warfare in the Japanese Context
Written by Major Shinji Takeda, Japanese Self-Defense Forces
Winter 2007-2008, pages 19-32.
©2008 Journal of Asian Military Affairs.

The End of The 1955 System: The 1980 Transition

The Big Bang Model in Neoliberal Japan

Modern Political History of Japan, A Primer
Political Science 412: Japanese Political Economy
University of British Columbia, Canada

American Healthcare Reform: Lessons From Japan

No More Safety Net: The Modern Keiretsu

The Changing Public Opinion of Japan in Asia
 
Vote

This TL so far has been excellent. This is one I will keep my eye on from now on. My vote for the next discussion is for this:

Excerpted:
Swain, Jonathan "Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia"
©2003 Parameters US Army War College Quarterly
Spring 2003. pp 44-57
 
This is one of the more unique TL's out there and shows a lot of research. You might want to consider cultural impact--eg. does more affluence have any impact on the very low Japanese birth rate.
 
Birth rate is certainly one of the things I want to look at, as well as immigration reform.

Yeah the "Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia" is one of my favourites, and is probably the farthest along, but it may have to wait for some other background material.


As relates to this:

Subsidies were eliminated in many sectors, tariff walls were reduced, tax codes & rates were simplified and flattened (New Zealand brought in a 21% flat tax in fact, and the UK followed Hong Kong's lead in offering an option between graduated or flat taxes[1]), taxes were shifted from income to consumption, and finally the three countries hammered out a free trade agreement that even included the importation of second hand autos (with a consequent massive drop in motorcycle fatalities in New Zealand).


I'm adding a footnote:

[1] In our timeline Roger Douglas, finance minister of the reforming Fourth Labour government of New Zealand, was forced out by the Prime Minister before he could continue his reforms. The Labour government then lost the following election for various reasons that could have been avoided and despite the National government carrying on reform it too was ousted. One of the butterflies in TTL means David Lange (NZ PM) doesn't force Roger Douglas out, and hence New Zealand gets the flat tax they were considering as well as a further period of sustained reform along the lines Roger Douglas was working on (see his his various books for more detail).

As regards the United Kingdom they are looking a little more towards the Hong Kong because of deeper ties with Japan, this leads to adopting the steadily popular and successful Hong Kong optional flat tax model.

Japan will wind up a little more radical…
 
To add to Electric Monk's great piece, I will add on the possibility of a deal between Japan/New Zealand/UK (which would probably soon include Australia, Thailand and South Korea) and CAFTA.

Let me drop another possibility onto this. As Japan's economy continues to grow (and undoubtedly the other nations do the same), what about them using free trade deals as a weapon or reward for political change? The biggest world political issues of the late 80s were Apartheid in South Africa and the Israeli/Palestinian Intifada, how about the deal between the Asians and British gets expanded to include Israel post-Camp David and South Africa post-Apartheid? This may create better economic growth in both nations, and that would certainly do wonders not only for SA but also most of Africa.
 
Add-ons to that idea (if Electric Monk has no issue with it)

Long-Term Consequences of the Japan, New Zealand and Great Britain Free Trade Deal and its successors
© 2007 Macquarie University Press
Macquarie University Economics Department (assisted by the Economics Department of the University of Western Sydney)

In 1992, The Japan/New Zealand/Great Britain is expanded to include Australia, which has long been Japan's biggest supplier of raw materials, as well as fellow Asian dynamos South Korea and Taiwan. British PM John Major at the same time recommends its use as a carrot to influence politics of other nations. Japanese PM Kiichi Miyazawa and New Zealand PM Jim Bolger agree with Major, thinking that it could be a strong tool to push for changes in politics. The first places that the three nations target are Israel, which is embroiled in the Intifada with the Palestinians, and South Africa, which after more than 40 years is finally in the process of scrapping apartheid.

The deal had resulted in the flat tax system's growing popularity in the three nations, and it also had spawned all sorts of agreements between the three nations, and these deals made such sense that other nations in the same economic arena went looking to join the deals. Australia, South Korea and Taiwan had largely adopted many of the efforts by 1993, when the three formally joined the free trade deals.

Japan welcomed this as it resulted in both Korean, Australian and Taiwanese capital helping to keep Japan running, but it also gave Japan new markets to export to (Australia had been relatively open for a long time in 1993, but Korea and Taiwan weren't - SK in particular was really protectionist and had deep government/corporation collusion up until the IMF got into the act in the late 90s), but it resulted in much more help for corporations in their particular fields.

Japan's relatively low debts and strong currency (which is not blown out of porportion here by the bubble) gave it the capital to develop their own infrastructure and also engage in building relationships with other nations - something which dramatically helped their image in their Asian neighbours. Japan Post for example wound up being one of the world's biggest investment banks, spending billions on development projects worldwide.

In November 1992, Major announced that if South Africa wanted to join the deal post-apartheid, they could. This was quickly used as a tool by the ANC, which was downright eager to see Japanese and Australian Capital start to rebuild its apartheid-warped economy. A final deal on the post-apartheid government was reached on March 25, 1993 and set the elections in South Africa - the first ever multi-racial ones in that nation - for October 25-28, 1993. They went off without a hitch and ended in a dramatic victory for the African National Congress, led by Nelson Mandela. South Africa formally joined the bloc on February 1, 1994 and had enacted most of the same laws by February 1995. The flat tax system resulted in somewhat greater tax revenue in South Africa, and between 1993 and 1998 the economy swelled more than 40%. The laws on import of vehicles and electronics resulted in a massive growth of the car count in South Africa.

South Africa's inclusion resulted in more competition for Australian natural resources, but growing industrial output in Korea and Taiwan gave new markets for SA resources. Japanese companies also found new markets, while several South African companies (South African Breweries, which became SAB Miller in 1998, and Nashua in particular) also made inroads into the Asian and British markets.

Britain's flat or graduated tax system resulted in economic growth in Britain the likes of which they hadn't seen in ages. By the time Tony Blair came to power in 1997, Britain's economy was almost inextricably linked to that of Japan and Australia/NZ, as well as being increasingly tied to South African resources.

In North America, the CAFTA deal of 1989 and the MAFTA of 1994 resulted in new resources being used to fuel US businesses, but Canada made it very clear they did not want to rely sorely on the United States. This didn't bother President Clinton, but it did bother the Republican Congress, which by 1996 was consumed by a leadership battle and wanted the US to cry foul towards new deals with the Asia-Pacific/UK/South Africa bloc. The Republicans called for the US to call foul on the Canadian deals. Clinton attempted to put a stop to it in 1995 by vetoing a bill to force the issue, but enough Democrats voted with the Republicans over-rule the veto. Other than infuriating Clinton, this incensed Canadian PM Jean Chretien and smooth-operator finance minister Paul Martin. Canada claimed that its deals were totally separate from CAFTA and that the Americans were unjustified in crying foul.

South Africa's VP, Thabo Mbeki, proposed a solution where the CAFTA would be brought in line with the APUKSA agreement. Japan's Ryutaro Hasimoto and Britain's John Major agreed to Canada's entry, which became official on January 1, 1997. The vote for this on June 18, 1996 brought a rare near-unanimous vote in Canada's House of Commons, with even the hard-right Reform Party voting in favor. Canada had passed the laws necessary to be in compliance by November 1997, despite their June 1997 election. The only exception was the used car law, as Canada's roads are left-hand drive.

Clinton hoped to use this as a pusher to make for more trade between the United States and the Pacific Bloc, but the Republicans were intent on using it to take him down and force a more protectionist trade policy. Clinton countered this by saying that America's markets demanded customers. The problem of a protectionist USA set in rapidly for Hasimoto and Chretien, who both made the unusual step of publicly hoping to Clinton's success. Chretien made a big point when he commented "The Americans of course want to protect their own industries. But can they support all of their output themselves? I know Canada can't. That's why we trade. Of course we want more jobs for our people, but this deal gives us access to 250 million potential customers. Can the US deny the appeal of that prospect?"

Clinton overwhelmingly claimed the Presidency over rival Bob Dole, but the Democrats also took back the Senate, though Congress stayed in Republican hands. This didn't please Clinton, as the Republican congress was no less virulent than the one that had proceeded.

But political change had shifted policies in several nations. John Major was replaced on May 2, 1997 by Tony Blair, while Hasimoto resigned in October 1998. Australian PM Paul Keating was replaced by rival John Howard in March 1996 and Mandela resigned after just one term, though his successor Thabo Mbeki coasted to election in November 1998. In New Zealand, Jim Bolger fell to Jenny Shipley and then two years later to Helen Clark.

In 2000, Clinton asked for a meeting with the national leaders of the bloc. The meeting in Seattle, Washington was marked by violent protests between panicking Seattle PD and protesters in what became known as the "Battle of Seattle II". Even beyond that, Japan's PM, Yoshiro Mori, did not come off well - among other things, his comments to Clinton were run over and over again for weeks in both countries' medias. Most of the others however found Clinton a willing partner, and most expressed an interest in expanding the free trade deal to America.

This meeting also got more media attention when General Motors' President Rick Wagoner made a public statement that if a deal was made that GM would be active in all the markets full force by 2005, and challenged other major companies to do the same. Wagoner's challenge was met wholeheartedly by the Japanese, South Africans and Australians. The support for the idea grew fast, and Clinton agreed in principle for a free trade deal, but everyone involved knew that he did not have the time in office to pull it off - and everybody hoped that the Democrats would stay in power.

The presidential battle in America turned out to be hardly a contest - the prospect of a deal with the bloc gave them wings, and the people hadn ot forgotten Bob Dole's position on the matter in 1996. The November 2000 elections saw Clinton's VP, Al Gore, easily beat former Texas governor George W. Bush, son of the first President Bush - and return both houses to the Democrats. Gore was inaugurated on January 20, 2001, and the first bill of the USA's 107th Congress was the trade deal, which passed within weeks and was signed into law by Gore on March 14, 2001.

Mori politically shot himself in the head when he continued a golf game after an accident where a US Navy submarine hit and sunk a fishing ship in February 2001, and he was forced to resign two months later. Gore was faster on the draw, offering compensation to families of the six fatalities of the incident. The submarine's commander also made a public apology and took full responsibility for the accident.

Mori's successor, Junichiro Koizumi, turned out to be a very good spokesman for Japan and the bloc. The members of the bloc got along very well by this point - and there were few tax or trade differences between the nations. South Africa had a bigger social safety net, but by 2003 unemployment there had fallen below 15% and the country had a bigger GNP than New Zealand, and was rapidly catching Australia.

Wagoner made good on his 2000 promise - by 2005, all of the bloc nations had GM involved selling cars. GM bought South Africa's Delta Motors and Japan's Isuzu Automobiles, to go with their British (Vauxhall) and Australian (Holden) subsidiaries.

The used car laws allowed large numbers of Japanese cars to migrate to Britain and Australia, but also allowed the reverse. After the inclusion of CAFTA into the bloc, American cars showed up in greater numbers as well, helped along by Wagoner - Koizumi made a stir in itself when he forgave his limousine in favor of an American-built Dodge Viper sports car in 2005.

Japanese culture also began to shift out of its homogenous nature by this time, too. Foreign objects had always been objects lusted for by the Japanese in many cases, and now they were becoming more accessible. Korean television shows made major inroads, while Japanese programming made waves in Canada and Australia. South Africa's Soul City TV program became known worldwide, and several other hits from the various nations also made for interesting shifts in culture.

The Bloc meeting in Cape Town in July 2005 brought one of the surprises of the decade. The day before the meeting's opening was the series of massive concerts which were part of Geldof's Live 8. These concerts, held in Tokyo, Toronto, San Francisco, Seattle, Philadelphia, Seoul, London, Paris, Berlin, Auckland, Taipei, Sydney, Melbourne, Rome, Tel Aviv and Cape Town, through satellite linkups and the global media wound being a 25-hour long simultaneous concert. Mandela opened the Cape Town bash on Robben Island, which turned out to be one of the biggest parties in South African history, with almost 250,000 jamming the Island for a massive concert crowned by the Rolling Stones. In a moment of inspiration, South African President Mbeki made an unscheduled appearance, but he was not alone - he asked the other Bloc leaders to join him, and they all did. The sight of the concert intermission seeing the leaders - Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Tony Blair of Britain, John Howard of Australia, Helen Clark of New Zealand, Paul Martin of Canada, Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea, Frank Hsieh of Taiwan and Al Gore of the United States - was a sight that nobody at Robben Island forgot. The leaders stayed to watch the concert, an act which Gore called one of the best moments of his life, though Howard and Martin commented jokingly that their ears rang for weeks.
 
I don't mind if you do a spin-off of the timeline in a new thread, but too many things are still in flux to jump that far in the future for my actual timeline… and it's still my timeline :)

The below is background material for the upcoming Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia post which will also require a naval background piece before I get to it.

It is heavily based off of OTL, but posits a world where stealth at the fighter role was not carried out. This still leaves the USA with a handful of B-2s and F-117s, but no stealth F-22s or F-35s.

Among other things this means fighters are cheaper ITTL, fifth generation fighters are more widely bought having come out sooner, and the market for incremental upgrades of 4th generation fighters (basically the evolved F-15Es and F-16s the US still sells while waiting for the Joint Strike Fighter) is much smaller. Likewise the market for Super Flankers is bigger, and the aftermarket upgrade market for regular Flankers is thriving due to easy after-the-fact upgrades that remain much cheaper then any comparable Western efforts—especially with a smaller evolved F-15E/F-16 market.

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Excerpt from:
Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Aircraft Programmes
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London

There are a multitude of American and non-American fifth generation fighters operational[1], flying in all the world's trouble spots and for every conceivable side of a mid-sized war. All of the fighters are operated by more then one country (some by many), and all air forces that hope to remain competitive have been phasing in 5th generation fighters over the last decade and a half, to the point where used 4th generation fighters can be had very cheaply.

This article offers a quick overview and reference for the current crop of 5th generation fighters, this and more is available to you if you subscribe to any of the Jane's Information Group's affordable packages.

The American models are the F-22 Raptor and FB-22 Strike Raptor, the two F-25 Viper models, and the F-24 Kestrel[2], heavily based off the F-22. The United States follows a hi-lo / strike fighter mix like below, with older fighters in brackets:
USAF / USN
hi: F-22 (F-15) / F-24 (F-14)
lo: F-25 (F-16) / F25 (F/A-18)
strike: FB-22 (F-15E)

The non-American 5th generation fighters are the BAE Typhoon, the Dassault Rafale (including naval version), the SAAB Gripen, the Sukhoi Su-37 Super Flanker (and its naval cousin, the Su-33 Flanker-D), and the Sukhoi Su-34 Fullback (although that is more of a dedicated strike aircraft then a fighter, along the lines the of the FB-22).

The Typhoon is the most capable of all non-American 5th generation fighters—it can roughly be considered equal to the F-22. Although the Typhoon had originally been intended to match up against the F/A-18 the program eventually proceeded towards a straight F-15 replacement, in a mix of co-operation and competition with the Rafale (somewhere between the F-25 and the F-22/Typhoon) and the Gripen (F-16 or F/A-18 sized, smaller then any other 5th generation fighter). This larger then originally envisioned Typhoon means that even evolved F-15s cannot match its capabilities. However the Typhoon is also very expensive, slightly more than the F-22, a third more than the Rafale and well over three times the price of a Super Flanker without being three times as good. This was accepted as a consequence to keep the European aerospace industrial base alive and well.


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The Dassault Rafale is comparable to the Typhoon in many respects as the split from the Eurofighter project by the French came fairly late in the development process. The Rafale is smaller and carries less payload but has equivalent electronics and is somewhat stealthier. It has moderately less range, and is on par or better in agility. However, unlike the Typhoon it comes in a navalised version. One major difference is that the Rafale has only marginal supercruise ability, while the Typhoon can sustain mach 1.5 in a clean configuration. It is quite a bit cheaper, though.

The SAAB JAS-39 Gripen is much smaller and lighter and is designed to be a competitor with the F-16 in size, rather then bracketing the F-15 like all other fifth generation fighters. Despite this is actually offers capabilities on par with a current F-15C (albeit with less payload) and to do so it relies on excellent avionics, like other 5th generation fighters, but also because the Gripen is very easy to maintain and in addition to it's low cost to buy, it costs around half per hour to operate of any of the above aircraft. It is somewhat limited by short range, but can mount large external tanks.

The two Sukhoi models remain inferior in electronics to the other 5th generation aircraft (export models can equip more advanced European avionics however). With the latest Russian engines both the Su-37 Super Flanker and the Su-34 Fullback now have supercruise, and although both aircraft are still mostly made of metal this means there are easy performance gains to be made (in a fighter that already has similar to or better flying performance to Western fighters) in the future by switching to advanced composites. Further most operational Flankers from the older Su-27s to all but the newest Su-37s have a variety of options for upgrades from new wings, better radar, replacement engines, and more—all at a much cheaper cost then Western fighters.

The Sukhoi's are large aircraft and generally carry a little more in the way of weaponry then Western fighters. This reflects the historic superiority of Western missiles and electronics, but modern Russian missiles are considered as good as the latest Western gear at short and long ranges, though still behind in the medium range. The Su-37 carries the distinction of being the longest ranged of any fighter in operation.

One other model is the Maritime Patrol Su-37FN which, unlike the Western planes, utilizes a fighter in the ASW and Patrol roles which allows for much faster response times as well as reduced escorts—albeit with less loiter time.

The usual ranking of pure performance in air combat goes like this (ignoring cost):

F-22
F-24 / Typhoon
Su-37 (with European avionics, it ties with the Typhoon)
Rafale
Su-33
F-25
Gripen

In the strike role the FB-22 retains better electronics then the Su-34, but the Su-34 has an excellent flight deck for longer missions, as well as greater range.

FB-22
Su-34

Jane's hopes that this has been of some us to you, and would like to offer a special 10% discount on Jane's Fighting Aircraft.

[1] Without stealth as a feature Fifth Generation fighters will be different from fourth generation fighters in: airframe lessons learned, electronics, ease of upgradability, supercruise (on the bigger fighters), data link, low observability, and the like.

ITTL the United States will develop the F-22 without stealth due to the various proposals involving stealth being objected to by the USAF because of the downtime required (as 80s stealth technology was very time intensive to keep operational, this would limit the sortie rate—obviously technology advances, but it is at least plausible that the USAF would demand a higher sortie rate). This will result in rather different aircraft development in the USA (more below) and slightly different elsewhere—a bigger Eurofighter Typhoon, most notably.

[2] The F-22 can best be thought of as OTL F-22 sans internal bays (so it carries more hardware) and low observable, instead of full stealth. The F-25 is roughly similar to the OTL F-16Agile Falcon project (Japan's F2s) and replaces the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter as it might have IOTL—it comes in regular (F-25A) and naval (F-25B) versions (sort of merging the F-16 and F/A-18 into one larger but better base model). The F-24 is the swing-wing navalised F-22 that was cancelled IOTL—due to major differences from the baseline F-22 the USN gave it a new designation. As for names I've kept the Raptor name as it seems to have easily beaten the alternatives, the Viper was the unofficial name of the F-16 so I made it official for its successor, and Kestrel was a leading contender for the name of the Joint Strike Fighter and sounds like something the USN would like. I figure they're as likely as any :).
 
given the reforms in the UK and subsequent greater prosperity sooner, do we see an earlier 'Cool Britannia'?

like the TL btw:)
 
Although the UK will be doing better in the mid-to-long term, the short term disruptions are somewhat worse ITTL. One difference will centre around the fact that Thatcher once commented to Reagan that she wished she had done everything all at once, and dared people to stop it rather the multiple reforms over the years that she actually did.

Thus in this timeline watching Japan's massive financial reform in 1981 she decides to follow a big bang approach. Despite the Conservative majority her reform package remains stalled until the Falklands War (roughly the same as OTL, although the British do not quite enjoy the same level of success—it will however have rather different naval butterflies) when she is able to force it through.

As Roger Douglas (NZ finance minister) slammed through much of his program in 3 years IOTL anyway (voters dislike change, and he was afraid he wouldn't have a second term), this will not act as inspiration for the speed of that reform program—it may however be one of the things that keeps David Lange (NZ PM, who wussed out at the end) more confident as he sees that Thatcher and Reagan survived radical and fast reform.

As for Cool Britannia I've always been interested in the way Japan and Britain intersect… there may be some interesting things going on there :)

I'm no naval expert (neither am I an aircraft expert, but I do pay more attention to that field :), so if anything that needs to be fiddled with, please let me know.

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Jane's Defence Forecasts – Military Vessel Programmes
A Look at the Common European Platforms
©2012 Jane's Information Group
London

The Falklands War brought to light the Royal Navy's limitations in stark light. The carriers were too small. The escorts were quite simply inadequate. The Harriers, while excellent support planes, simply did not belong in the realm of air superiority. The UK was determined to fix all of the issues, but balked at shouldering the cost for all of them. It was decided that NATO would seek to build common defence systems as much as possible, with the understanding that the Americans would likely go it alone.

Out of that began three major projects. The first was the Future Carrier project (CVF) which would seek the middle ground between the American Nimitz goliaths and the light carriers that the Royal Navy currently possessed. The second was the NATO Frigate Replacement Program (NFR-90), and the third was the NATO Destroyer Replacement Program (NDR-90)—both were to seek a common platform for 1990s frigates and destroyers[1].

The goals of making an acceptable ship for all NATO powers was impossible. However the goals of a common hull, common electronics, and some shared weapon systems was entirely possible. Therefore both the NFR and NDR were deliberately designed only to a point. As with the American Spruance class destroyer space was left not only for the various projected weapons outfits but also for the possibility of larger weapons, and other items that might take up more space then was originally allowed for; in essence a very modular design with space left over for the future.

The United States commissioned the first NDR-90 as the lead ship in their Arleigh Burke class in 1990, although they declined to sign onto any other large NATO common platform development following that. The British followed with the Daring, a stretched helicopter hanger including version of the NDR-90 as the lead ship in their Type 44 class destroyers (Flight II of the Arleigh Burke class, in the United States). Both were biased towards the anti-air role, but remained large enough for a full range of missions.

The first NFR-90 was built by France as an air defence frigate in 1989, the second by Germany as an ASW frigate in that same year—soundly demonstrating the principles of modular design and varying weapons outfits. Those two were followed by a number more, and Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and other countries soon followed.

The great success of the NFR-90 project comes not only from the many European nations that ended up buying or license building them but from the wide acceptance in the global community. The NFR-90 is in fact the most popular large ship in the export world, with many navies buying them to replace their entire older fleets of WW2 era or 1960s era designs. The modularity and the high degree of easy and cheap customization available to buyers means that an entire force of NFR-90s customized for various tasks can replace the multiple ship classes of old.

Although the NDR-90 is less popular—due both to its cost and export restrictions on its Aegis (or the European Principal Air Defence Systems, PADS, which is of equivalent capability) air defence system—it does represent a powerful flagship for smaller navies, and even with reduced air defence ability an excellent bubble air defence for medium sized navies unable to afford aircraft carriers.

These two projects proved that Europe could indeed develop weapons systems on time, within expected budget overruns, and have electronic and weapons technology as good as the Americans—as the Arleigh Burke used entirely different weapons, and mostly different electronics from the various European NDR-90s. Different enough that the Americans declined to join any further NATO/European projects on that scale.

In fact they were both successful enough that they were followed by the EDR-21 and EFR-21 projects, the common European platforms for the new century—the very first EDR-21 will be laid down next year in France.

As for the CVF project this too proved successful. Although only the French and British were involved in the intial stages as they were the only two powers likely to pay for a 60,000+ ton vessel enough interest was shown in the project to spin it off into two: the CVF project carried forward, while the CVLF project went with a ~30,000 ton carrier as a helicopter and VTOL ship along the lines of the then-current UK Invincible class light carriers.

As the French needed a carrier fairly soon the CVF project went quite fast, and the Richelieu was laid down in 1989 as a 60,000 ton ship. Although the French had originally pressed for nuclear power the British gas turbine model prevailed—being both cheaper and making export sales more likely. Given the difficulties experienced by French nuclear powered submarines this seems a wise choice.

The second and third CVFs were laid down in 1998 and 1999 as the British Queen Victoria and the French Charles De Gaulle respectively; both used lessons learned from the Richelieu and hence massed some 70,000 tons. The fourth was the British Queen Elizabeth laid down in 2006.

The first (and so far only) two export sales are the Japanese Edo, after the former capital, and the Fuji after the tallest mountan in Japan. They represent the Sun class variant of the CVF, massing 75,000 tons, and are the largest and most powerful non-American warships afloat—directly aimed at China in support of their Taiwanese ally.

The much smaller CVLFs are operational in Spain, India (2, notably operating Russian planes instead of Western models), Italy (2), and Britain—they are generally used both as helicopter/marine carriers and as S/VTOL carriers. Brazil, Australia, and a number of other countries remain interested in the CVLF or follow-on project but remain constrained by budget.

No naval look at Europe could be complete without mentioning submarines, despite lacking common platforms as seen in the surface ships. Nuclear submarines have remained single-nation projects with the French, British, Americans, Chinese, and Russians continuing entirely separate development of nuclear attack submarines (ballistic missile submarines have seen no follow-on classes post-Cold War in any nation except China).

However the field of building modern conventional submarines narrowed in by the mid 1990s to only three nations with the advent of Air Independent Propulsion. They are the fuel cell German designs (Type 212 onwards), the Russian Project 677 Lada class using closed-cycle diesel, and the French/Spanish/Swedish Stirling engine designs (Gotland/Scorpéne class).

Relatively modern submarines can be upgraded to either Stirling engine by Swedish or French companies, or German fuel cell or closed-cycle diesel upgrades.

Nations currently operating new-build AIP submarines include the Netherlands, Israel, Italy, Australia, China, Canada, Greece, Germany, Brazil, Sweden, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Japan, Pakistan. A number of other nations have upgraded older submarines, and quite a few nations continue to express interest in AIP submarines.



[1] IOTL the NATO Frigate Replacement Program went for an single-purpose anti-air frigate that was simply not acceptable for enough nations. The US withdrew in favour of the Arleigh Burke multi-purpose Aegis destroyers and so the project went on to the Horizon frigate which also failed as the UK wanted something more like an Arleigh Burke destroyer to replace its Type 42 destroyers, and France/Italy wanted a smaller ship. Likewise Germany/Spain/Netherlands went on to do their own side deal for an air defence frigate.

TTL strives to save all that duplicated effort.

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Next up a look at Russian made ships as they are the main export competitor to the Europeans—the Americans have generally enacted export control laws ITTL, and the European ships have been very similar in capability.

As China and India favour Russian ships (and aircraft) I need to do more research.

After that, finally, I hope to get to the Strategic Balance of Power In East Asia.
 
Economics I can write off the top of my head, so you get the below post.

Two in a day, some gratitude? :)

Anything else people want to hear about?

Upcoming (eventually) are the titles I posted, immigration/birth rates in Japan, possible use of economics as a political tool, and Britain/Japan 'cool' so if you have a preference for something in there, or something else entirely speak up and I'll see what I can do.

If I really like it you'll get a post soon-ish :), otherwise it'll be added to the queue.

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The Consequences of Reform in the European Economic Community
Written by Richard Moore
©2000 Richard Moore
European Liberalism Institute
Continental Press. Amsterdam: 2001.

At the end of the Cold War it looked likely that Europe would forge a new federalist state, perhaps Federal Europe or the European Union, or even the United States of Europe. This idea died on the cold hard rocks of self-interest, and fittingly so, but in dying it actually helped. A Federal Europe could be nothing less then a massive increase in government inquiring vast costs to operate and enforce. If Federal Europe also had a common currency and central bank it would face the same problems the US has, where economic policy good for Texas is bad for Northern California, where interest rates good for the Rust Belt harm Silicon Valley; continents are simply too vast and varied to shackle to that as America is finally having to face up to in a globalized world.

Instead what developed was a vast expansion and liberalization of the European Economic Community (EEC), providing for the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labour—and nothing else. Although with the dissolution of NATO in the late 1990s the EEC picked up the slack, forming the European Defence Community (EDC) which most EEC members joined. The various European militaries continued in English (it being the most widely used NATO language, as well as required for pilots and other groups, it was the obvious choice) and worked towards common platforms and complete interoperability as their navies had already done and NATO had gone a long way towards.

However it is the EEC we turn our attention to. It must be said that the vast reforms on classical liberal ground undertaken in the United Kingdom were one of the main reasons against a theoretical Federal Europe. By the early 1990s it was seen in France and Germany, not to mention the rest of the continent, how much is was paying off and instead of trying to form some vast Federal Europe with common regulations and thousands of pages of bureaucracy Europe followed the United Kingdoms lead. The recently free Eastern European countries were first, enacting flat taxes and rapidly selling of their state-owned economies as well as virtually copying the UK's regulations and the like. This did require major fine-tuning for local conditions by the end of the century, but as a ready-made model it proved quite capable.

France and Germany were more hesitant. Although a few Western European countries followed the UKs reforms in an altogether more cautious fashion, the Netherlands being the only Western European country to implement the "Big Bang" model, France and Germany were disinclined to follow as their generous (though both unaffordable, and in the long-term hurtful) social welfare nets were considered vitally important to both winning votes and to their identity as nations.

By 1996 a dozen countries in Europe had adopted flat taxes, notably including Iceland and the Netherlands as the rest were in Eastern Europe, and a number more had flattened their tax structure or moved to very low tax rates (such as Ireland). This economic pressure finally convinced Germany to act. Under a new Chancellor who made the reforms his sole legislative plan Germany followed the growing consensus towards liberalization and lower taxes. Naturally with Germany acting France could no longer hold out. Accompanied by several other nations France moved towards reform which consequently sparked the worst riots in the developed world, ever.

The riots in urban France marked the first real mass protest and denial of the operating realities of the last decade. They also marked the height of the anti-capalist activists. Both left and right wing parties had moved towards reform and liberalization throughout Europe—the difference resting mostly in how they went about it and who they bullied and supported, the natural ebb and flow of politics evened this out, more or less—but in France the left wing had always been more socialist then social democratic (who were able to accept the reform program as they saw the overall benefits) and with an urban populace far more prone to violence this proved a deadly combination.

Throughout the hot months of July and August 1997 France entered what could be characterized as a civil war. By the middle of July 1500 people were dead and the Army had moved into the urban centres, heavily regulating traffic.

The beginning of August saw a fresh wave of heavy violence, this time with a quite a lot of real military equipment and a smattering of advanced weaponry, on the side of what were now referred to as the rebels. A week into the month estimates put the dead at 15,000—the majority from the twelve million people of Paris and the surrounding metropolitan area—and tanks were now a common fixture on the streets. As were, sadly, the suicidal young men with homemade bombs attacking the tanks.

It's unknown who acquired the device. Presumably it was former governmental members of the left-wing as they were the most of the few people that have the contacts, but this remains unknown. Equally unknown is what their possible motives were, though blackmail is the likely answer. Regardless, on 17 August 1997 Marseilles vanished in a nuclear fireball.

The 1 megaton weapon was traced back to Russia, naturally, and corrupt officials at one of the bases where the weapons were stored. As the people who had bought the weapon and smuggled it into the country also died little could be found about them.

Radioactive fallout was non-dangerous at the 250 mile ring, although it would take two to three years to drop off to safe peacetime levels. The city itself was contaminated by fallout for a decade, and is only now being rebuilt. The death toll was staggering.

The nuclear destruction of Marseilles removed all support for the 'rebels' and urban warfare ended within the week. To this day conspiracy theorists surmise that the government of the day actually deployed the weapon, but have not offered any concrete proof to support this.

With the riots having ended France became a much more peaceful place and was soon enjoying the benefits of liberalization. One effect of this is that the French gave up their independent nuclear deterrent, and dedicated themselves and their intelligence agencies to the hunt for nuclear weapons. The other nuclear power of Europe, the British, declined to replace their ballistic missile submarines when the debate arose last year, although they will keep some nuclear weapons on hand.

As the new millennium dawns all of Europe belongs to the EEC (excluding the persistently troublesome issue of Turkey), and much of it to the EDC. The vast wave of reform in the 1990s had settled down to consolidation and clean-up, and the benefits of the reform were being enjoyed. A new wave of European corporations had sprung up in the aftermath, aggressively global and dedicated to competing in all field against the Americans and Japanese.

Despite teething pains most nations have adjusted to a far greater free market then had previously existed, and much pre-occupation continues over exactly how much restraint government should exercise over itself and over corporations.

Healthcare remains a concern as both private and public systems continue to cost more and more money, despite competition, but there are various ongoing reforms of both that have shown some success. The main problem with healthcare systems is that everybody needs to pay some form of insurance (private, public, through taxes) so as to keep the risk pool wide but neither governments nor the vaunted free market have managed to keep healthcare systems in great shape, regardless of funding.

Freed of restraint as they now operated in the free market education, at all levels, has shown marked improvement—if not always in test scores, nearly always in parental and student satisfaction. The move to a means-tested up to full cost voucher program has been possible with lower taxes and the free market has resulted in a host of specialized schools as well as improving the quality of education. Teacher's unions, along with many other unions, have been shifted to performance based criteria—instead of seniority—as measured by third parties and this too has helped.

Unions in general have been reduced in power, but in the countries which swung too far the other way saw corporate abuses and rapidly moved to strengthen their unions as a counter. By resting much of the authority in a free market union vs. corporation environment government has been able to step back and interfere less, acting only to ensure no strikes in vital services and preventing corporations from replacing all but essential staff if their workers go on strike.

Taxes are flat or nearly flat in most countries (although almost always with a deduction of some sort) and overall a gradual shift to consumption taxes has enabled further reduction of income and corporate taxes.

The recent Japanese tax reform has begun a great deal of discussion on both the left and the right as regards social services provided by the government and a second round of much milder reform could dramatically change the way government operates the social security, simplifying and/or reducing the current mix of means-tested, vouchers, and guaranteed income programs with a consequent savings in operational costs of the programs and a reduction in free market interference.
 
Awesome start! One of the most impressive TLs I've seen on here. This has the potential to rival DoD in its detail and complexity.

One thing I want to see in future, particularly, is how this affects Japan's nascent space program, NASDA-with a larger Japanese economy, this could be fascinating.
 
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