Why didnt allies try to get into Baltic in WW1?
- Thread starter Reene
- Start date
The Royal Navy steams into the Baltic, and is summarily ripped apart by a mixture of mines, U-Boats, and the High Seas Fleet. After fleeing with its head in the sand, the High Seas Fleet sails out and stomps the Royal Navy a second time, now in open waters, and secures naval dominance for the Central Powers.
Hos is that not worse?
NoMommsen
Kicked
I assume there were several schemes of getting into the Baltic sea. Some of these were the reason for the original plans for the 'Courageous'-class "Large Light cruisers", plans for 'Furiuos' goung to 45,7 cm calibre, their 'follow-ups', called 'Incomparable'-class even going vor 50.8 cm calibre.
However, such plans for somehow seizing the Baltic sea, for naval action only or for a landing, were hindered by how to get them there :
1st : Denmark, declared, that it will close the Great Belt for military ships (the germans didn't get bothered by that, they have the Kiel-channel)
2nd : the Great Belt, as stated above, narrow and shallow waters at the entrance, ideal for mine-warfare as well as torpedoboat-attacks
3rd : well, there was still a quite impressive HSF, easily and quickly transferred from North Sea to Baltic Sea, that would have made any troop convoi, that might have been able to slip through a sooo easy prey.
(damn, Alternator was faster
)As Alternator said.
It is much easier and quicker to raise, train, and equip more infantry than it is to build a new battleship crewed with trained sailors. Severe damage to a fleet's capital ships is not easily repaired, and it would allow the German High Seas fleet to leave their port and raid British commerce.
It is much easier and quicker to raise, train, and equip more infantry than it is to build a new battleship crewed with trained sailors. Severe damage to a fleet's capital ships is not easily repaired, and it would allow the German High Seas fleet to leave their port and raid British commerce.
Reene
Banned
Ah thank you. So problem was neutral Denmark.I assume there were several schemes of getting into the Baltic sea. Some of these were the reason for the original plans for the 'Courageous'-class "Large Light cruisers", plans for 'Furiuos' goung to 45,7 cm calibre, their 'follow-ups', called 'Incomparable'-class even going vor 50.8 cm calibre.
However, such plans for somehow seizing the Baltic sea, for naval action only or for a landing, were hindered by how to get them there :
1st : Denmark, declared, that it will close the Great Belt for military ships (the germans didn't get bothered by that, they have the Kiel-channel)
2nd : the Great Belt, as stated above, narrow and shallow waters at the entrance, ideal for mine-warfare as well as torpedoboat-attacks
3rd : well, there was still a quite impressive HSF, easily and quickly transferred from North Sea to Baltic Sea, that would have made any troop convoi, that might have been able to slip through a sooo easy prey.
(damn, Alternator was faster
How hard or easy would it be to go slowly and remove German mines with minesweepers covered by Royal navy and French navy..
And if Baltic was off the limits, why not try to go for North coast of Germany on the other side, where Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven are at?
NoMommsen
Kicked
It would be ... slowly
. and give the HSF all it was waiting and praying for :The RN as a sitting duck (covering mine sweepers and perhaps the invasion force transports).
The conditions were very similar to the Belt ... only including additional tideal problems for any landing force and its covering navy assets.
Also the germans had set up a coastal defense, that the wallies were very eager after WW I to get removed.
And as above : with the HSF at hand a very likely very costly action - in terms of ship- and man-losses.
Reene
Banned
It would be ... slowly
The RN as a sitting duck (covering mine sweepers and perhaps the invasion force transports).
The conditions were very similar to the Belt ... only including additional tideal problems for any landing force and its covering navy assets.
Also the germans had set up a coastal defense, that the wallies were very eager after WW I to get removed.
And as above : with the HSF at hand a very likely very costly action - in terms of ship- and man-losses.
I really enjoy reading your responses. If you wouldnt mind I would ask you a few more questions.
1.
What I imagined was not a quick steam into Baltics blindly, but rather a slow and organised series of operations intended to push German navy deeper into the Baltics while simultaneously clearing any gains with mines and placing minefields of their own to secure it, with intent than by 1916 or 1917 Baltics could become the allied playground, and at least force Germans into third front, to at least guard the coast against invasion, all while focusing on deffensive actions
2. Is there any chance of Japanese, Australian and NZ navy leaving the Pacific to join Brittish in the Atlantic to help out with the aforementioned operation?
3. What did Japanese navy and Army do once they took German colonies? Did they just sit it out or did they get themselves involved in other places?
4.
Why did the Danes sit it out? Was there any hope to get then in Allied camp to opet up a new front? Maybe promise them Holstein?
5. How close were allies and Germans? If Germans did crush the brittish in this theoretical battle, could the allies that remain contain them with their navy?
6. And in the end how closely did the navies cooperate? Did they have a unifies command, or did every country pursue its own set of goals?
Raunchel
Banned
The thing is, the HSF could sortie at any moment of their choosing to seriously wreck stuff. And it is hard to get into the Baltic when there are such perfect chokepoints available at the entrance. This would just be a recipe for immense casualties without much in the way of gain. The Entente simply doesn't have the capability to force the Baltic, it would be playing the game of the HSF.
They are still needed there, to deal with raiders and the like. So, they can't really leave.
They sat it out, aside from sending a few ships in support. They had little reason to really do much more than that, considering their position. And supplying actual forces on the other side of the World is hard.
Well, the Danish weren't stupid, and wouldn't want to expose themselves, without much in the way of support, to the German Army and fleet, which would have overrun them quite quickly. They weren't suicidal.
Well, they would have lost a large part of their fleet, especially the more modern ships. This would bring down the government. The rest of the fleet might still be a match for the German one, but the blockade would be broken wide open, and the HSF would be able to truly move with much more freedom.
They mostly worked on their own, having divided their regions of responsibility.
NoMommsen
Kicked
As far as I am able to answer ... sure
But I will have to do it 'peacemeal' (not too much time atm).
@2. Actually they did. The HMS Australia and HMS New Zealand served in the Grand Fleet from summer 1915. Their destroyers and cruisers keeping eye on the few left german cruisers in the Caribbean and Africa. (For japanes see below)
@ 3.
They sent destroyers, which were used in the mediterreanian sea for convoi duties as well as in the indian ocean. But afaik the british didn't ... value them very high - to be polite.
... Well, as canonfodder ... maybe ...
@4.
All scandinavian countries declared their neutrality, even in a joined declaration to stay out of the BIG war to avoid being the small ones that always get stomped upon, when the big guys starts fighting.
In that case : best chances for the small ones to stay away as far as possible. Belgium might have served as an example what could happen, if you become - even unwanted - part of the game.
And don't forget : the HSF was - even if it was a close draw - rendered the 'winner' of the Batlle of Jütland (Skagerag-Schlacht).
@5.
Sry M8, in that I'm the wrong one to ask (I'm not good at such 'numbers'
). But I'm sure there are guys around here, that can answer that question.For questions @1. and @ 6. :
@1. needs some more time (I don't have atm)
@6. see above
but ... I'll be back
The problem here is that the Germans could transfer their ships pretty quickly from the north sea to the baltics and back via the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Channel. The Danish and Swedish were pretty pro German too and the Germans had the advantage of being close to their harbors.
Some did in OTL.
The Danes were actually pretty pro German and the chance to get them into the Entente camp were pretty low. They mined their coast and the passage in to the baltic in cooperation with the Germans.
No idea...
Reene
Banned
Curently reading on Dutch Spanish war of independence where dutch would use old ships and send them towards ports to block them. Could allies send old used up ships towards kiel canal with intent to block it
Raunchel
Banned
That would be difficult, because it would mean trying to sneak up on a well-defended position. They probably just get sunk on the way.And even then, the wrecks could be cleared quite easily.
During the Russo-Japanese war Japan tried to block Port Arthur's inlet with old ships. The result was lackluster. Mines and enemy ships made it hard to position the ships correctly. Further the transports needed to be covered by the fleet, and such action close to the shore was a risky adventure.
You realize that that's not a particular good plan on several levels?
1) it proposes to play a minelaying battle of attrition while at a significant logistical disadvantage
2) it proposes to seek that battle at a location at which the enemy can bring additional, cheaper, more quickly produced assets to bear
3) it commits to a long series of utterly predictable movements - sitting ducks is about correct
4) it has an unfavorable risk/benefit ratio between gambled strategic assets and potential strategic advantages (the all-important fleet vs. hopefully diverting more enemy resources than they are diverting themselves)
5) it assumes an uninterrupted string of successes with little room for failure (if parts of the fleet are out of action for repairs or possibly sunk, the plan quickly becomes unworkable)
6) it has a secondary objective required to shore up the weakness of the primary plan (opening a third front in Denmark - in order to make sure that the coastal fortress artillery stays in Entente hands - in order to keep the straits open) which will instantly eclipse the supposed primary objective (the push into the Baltic) in importance and resources consumed
7) it hopes for suicidal Danish cooperation even though it is more likely that they'd have to deal with bitter resistance
Because they had a basic self-preservation instinct? It probably told them that they'd not like being turned into a second Flanders by foreign armies.
In any case, Denmark is more likely to refuse and maybe even join the Central Powers for the same reason Belgium didn't appreciate the German request to please let them march their armies through their country.
In case of an Entente attempt to ignore their sovereignty and force a crossing anyway, expect their artillery to open fire. In case the Entente tries a landing in order to secure the fortresses, the Danish army was prepared to engage them at the beaches. In fact, Denmark deliberately left itself open everywhere else (such as at the German border) in order to defend the islands controlling the straits as well as possible.
Cause they were right next door to Germany, and didn't fancy getting what Belgium got. Also a blockaded Germany was willing to pay well for Danish bacon etc.
Not unless they go completely insane. They were far better off as neutrals.
Also the entire German naval battle plan revolved around the British losing their brains and sending their ships through submarines, mines, and other nasty stuff and then getting jumped by the HSF
TFSmith121
Banned
Given the failures at the Dardanelles
Given the failures at the Dardanelles, presumably even the British only needed to lose one once to figure out an amphibious campaign against heavy defenses was not a good idea?
Although after Tanga, they had a pretty solid example/test case that an amphibious campaign against light to moderate defenses was not a great idea, either.
Best,
Given the failures at the Dardanelles, presumably even the British only needed to lose one once to figure out an amphibious campaign against heavy defenses was not a good idea?
Although after Tanga, they had a pretty solid example/test case that an amphibious campaign against light to moderate defenses was not a great idea, either.
Best,