AHC Preserve Tang borders

As we know, the Tang were the largest *Chinese* dynasty. Is there any way to preserve it borders? I can imagine one possible way as to have scattered Chinese warlord-states in the Tang frontiers who manage to scinify the "wild, wild west". What is ah.com's thoughts on this?
 
One could technically argue that the Tang Imperial family was actually fairly foreign as well,but the difference between them and the Qing was that they fully sinicized and regarded themselves as Chinese.Regardless,I think it would help if more immigrants were sent to the western regions and that the Tang rule there was more centralised and far longer.An Lushan's rebellion was quite unfortunate and I personally think is more of Li Longji's own personal problems than the military governor system itself.You do need to grant a lot of powers to military governors if you are to maintain control over vast territories.
 
1. You forgot the Ming as the last *Chinese* Empire (which is true in the most literal sense)

2. I think a key to actually preserve the Tang border and actually *expand* it (culturally or politically) would be the stability of the central government, so no, warlordism is not going to do it.

I mean take the example of the several border Jiedushi after the An Lushan Rebellion, or even the Guyi Jiedushi (occupied the approximate same location as the Protectorate to Pacify the West), all of them were interested in building existing powers and moving closer to central authority (or even usurp it), they had no interest in sinicizing neighbouring barbarians.

So I suppose a possible way to preserve or even further the Tang border (which is possible given the Li family's expansionist attitude), is to

a) have a Tang suppressing of An Lushan's rebellion using the Imperial Central army quickly and efficiently (either employing more generals under direct Imperial influences OR relying upon Commandaries in the control of Imperial Princes)

b) Butterfly away the An Lushan Rebellion

c) A successful Battle of Talas between the Protectorate and the Abbasids.

All of the above would technically result in a strengthened or roughly undamaged Protectorate to Pacify the West that could handle the Abbasids and sway the tide of local tributaries.

I understand that the Battle of Talas was NOT the key point in diminishing Tang influence in Central Asia, but it certainly contributed greatly to it. Now if the An Lushan rebellion did not take up so much of the Protectorate's resources, they still would've had a chance to push back upon the Abbasids, but due to the retreating Protectorate into a defensive stance as they sent the majority of their crack troops to quell the Rebellion, the tributaries saw no more need to bow to the Tang and bounced with the Abbasids to take bite out of the Tang.

If that was avoided, then we would possibly see a more expansionist Protectorate, and by extension, Tang empire in all directions.
 
1. You forgot the Ming as the last *Chinese* Empire (which is true in the most literal sense)
But were they actually the largest?
2. I think a key to actually preserve the Tang border and actually *expand* it (culturally or politically) would be the stability of the central government, so no, warlordism is not going to do it.

I mean take the example of the several border Jiedushi after the An Lushan Rebellion, or even the Guyi Jiedushi (occupied the approximate same location as the Protectorate to Pacify the West), all of them were interested in building existing powers and moving closer to central authority (or even usurp it), they had no interest in sinicizing neighbouring barbarians.

So I suppose a possible way to preserve or even further the Tang border (which is possible given the Li family's expansionist attitude), is to

a) have a Tang suppressing of An Lushan's rebellion using the Imperial Central army quickly and efficiently (either employing more generals under direct Imperial influences OR relying upon Commandaries in the control of Imperial Princes)

b) Butterfly away the An Lushan Rebellion

c) A successful Battle of Talas between the Protectorate and the Abbasids.

All of the above would technically result in a strengthened or roughly undamaged Protectorate to Pacify the West that could handle the Abbasids and sway the tide of local tributaries.

I understand that the Battle of Talas was NOT the key point in diminishing Tang influence in Central Asia, but it certainly contributed greatly to it. Now if the An Lushan rebellion did not take up so much of the Protectorate's resources, they still would've had a chance to push back upon the Abbasids, but due to the retreating Protectorate into a defensive stance as they sent the majority of their crack troops to quell the Rebellion, the tributaries saw no more need to bow to the Tang and bounced with the Abbasids to take bite out of the Tang.

If that was avoided, then we would possibly see a more expansionist Protectorate, and by extension, Tang empire in all directions.
I think the Tang dynasty's bound to fall at one point or another,but the key to making it's legacy more lasting would be to fully sinicize it's conquered subjects.As for crushing the Anshi rebellion,it should have been pretty easy or at the very least not as severe as it was if not for the fact that Li Longji made a series of ridiculous mistakes.

To make Tang influence more lasting in the Western regions,I think a direct takeover of territory instead of simply making local rulers vassals would have been ideal.If you look at it,the same deal happened to the Han dynasty.Whever the central power's weak and the government had to withdraw troops from the Western regions to solve internal problems,it's rule collapses rapidly.
 
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Could Talas potentially become a poiny where the Tang decides to start looking inward and solving its internal problems of Jiedaoshi and court factions?
 
Could Talas potentially become a poiny where the Tang decides to start looking inward and solving its internal problems of Jiedaoshi and court factions?
I don't think the Jiedushi system's necessarily bad.It was working up to that point,it was only due to Li Longji's mismanagement in his later years and after the Anshi Rebellion that the entire thing fell apart.What you really need to do is to get Li Longji killed ten or so years before the Anshi Rebellion.The man's over seventy at the time of the rebellion and is seriously not in his best form.
 
I don't think the Jiedushi system's necessarily bad.It was working up to that point,it was only due to Li Longji's mismanagement in his later years and after the Anshi Rebellion that the entire thing fell apart.What you really need to do is to get Li Longji killed ten or so years before the Anshi Rebellion.The man's over seventy at the time of the rebellion and is seriously not in his best form.
The problem with the Jiedaoshi system was Hu peoples dominating those roles. They, unlike the emperor did no identify as Chinese, and had no strong loyalty to the Empire, thus resulting in inevitable rebellion. What I think might be benificial to the Empire would be to stop and consolidate its gains, hopefully turning the protectorates into proper states, or at least intiating a purge of Hu jiedaoshi and replacing them with relatively loyal Han ones.
Edit: regarding Li longji. He moght have prevented, or at least delayed the rebellion by thinking twice before sacking the former chancellor who was Anlushan's political ally.
 
The problem with the Jiedaoshi system was Hu peoples dominating those roles. They, unlike the emperor did no identify as Chinese, and had no strong loyalty to the Empire, thus resulting in inevitable rebellion. What I think might be benificial to the Empire would be to stop and consolidate its gains, hopefully turning the protectorates into proper states, or at least intiating a purge of Hu jiedaoshi and replacing them with relatively loyal Han ones.
Edit: regarding Li longji. He moght have prevented, or at least delayed the rebellion by thinking twice before sacking the former chancellor who was Anlushan's political ally.
That's not the point.Point is that An Lushan didn't deserve the amount of promotion Li Longji gave him.Prior to the Anshi rebellion,he was largely a sycophant and had few actual military accomplishments whatsoever and was largely a failure of a commander.The old man simply just ain't up to the task.Given the amount of enemies An Lushan had,which includes the crown prince,I don't think he would have lasted long without Li Longji or actually rebelling.As for 'barbarian' generals,the Hu generals not under An Lushan's command mostly remained loyal to the Tang Dynasty.Han generals plainly weren't that much loyal than the 'barbarian ' generals,as a lot of them turned coat and joined An Lushan.
 
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The problem with the Jiedaoshi system was Hu peoples dominating those roles. They, unlike the emperor did no identify as Chinese, and had no strong loyalty to the Empire, thus resulting in inevitable rebellion. What I think might be benificial to the Empire would be to stop and consolidate its gains, hopefully turning the protectorates into proper states, or at least intiating a purge of Hu jiedaoshi and replacing them with relatively loyal Han ones.
Edit: regarding Li longji. He moght have prevented, or at least delayed the rebellion by thinking twice before sacking the former chancellor who was Anlushan's political ally.

I don't think the ethnic identity of the generals really would've affected their loyalty. The later half of the Tang were filled with Han Jiedushi wanting to carve their own kingdom, just look at Li Xilie, Wu Yuanheng and their likes.

Having said that, no, I don't think the Circuitry system would've worked in the long run anyways (contrary to what darthfanta believes). Any system that undermines central authority and places both military AND adminstrative AND legislative AND economic authority of one province, nevermind multiple provinces, are doomed to cause turmoil within the country. This is eerily similar to feudalism, just without the inheritance based on next-of-kin (well actually...it did happen later), we did see what Burgundy and Austria Bohemia did to France and the HRE right?

The Tang were just lucky in that Li Longji's political predecessors (Wu Zetian) was able to effectively inspire enough loyalty (which did not go without a hitch since there were still numerous rebellions due to her usurper status).

Speaking of An Lushan, his ability didn't matter in the grand scheme of things, if he was a loyal lapdog and a suck up to the Crown Prince as he was towards Li Longji, there wouldn't have been any issue, but the key point being OTL he wanted to lower Li Longji's defenses and allow him build enough power to instigate an usurping movement.

And his rebellion both severely crippled the Tang authority over the remaining Fanzhen, and showed an example of the devastating capabilities of individual Jiedushi, causing his successors to reject Tang authority in order to carve their own realm.

Essentially, as long as there is one ambitious individual who takes control of so much power in one province, the system will fail.

This is why we don't see the neutered-adminstrative systems of the Song (which lacked an effective military system) and the separated provincial bureaucracy in the Ming to cause any significant uprisings.
 
I don't think the ethnic identity of the generals really would've affected their loyalty. The later half of the Tang were filled with Han Jiedushi wanting to carve their own kingdom, just look at Li Xilie, Wu Yuanheng and their likes.

Having said that, no, I don't think the Circuitry system would've worked in the long run anyways (contrary to what darthfanta believes). Any system that undermines central authority and places both military AND adminstrative AND legislative AND economic authority of one province, nevermind multiple provinces, are doomed to cause turmoil within the country. This is eerily similar to feudalism, just without the inheritance based on next-of-kin (well actually...it did happen later), we did see what Burgundy and Austria Bohemia did to France and the HRE right?

The Tang were just lucky in that Li Longji's political predecessors (Wu Zetian) was able to effectively inspire enough loyalty (which did not go without a hitch since there were still numerous rebellions due to her usurper status).

Speaking of An Lushan, his ability didn't matter in the grand scheme of things, if he was a loyal lapdog and a suck up to the Crown Prince as he was towards Li Longji, there wouldn't have been any issue, but the key point being OTL he wanted to lower Li Longji's defenses and allow him build enough power to instigate an usurping movement.

And his rebellion both severely crippled the Tang authority over the remaining Fanzhen, and showed an example of the devastating capabilities of individual Jiedushi, causing his successors to reject Tang authority in order to carve their own realm.

Essentially, as long as there is one ambitious individual who takes control of so much power in one province, the system will fail.

This is why we don't see the neutered-adminstrative systems of the Song (which lacked an effective military system) and the separated provincial bureaucracy in the Ming to cause any significant uprisings.
The problem is that the Tang military was only powerful because of the powers granted to the military governors ,especially in a massive empire like the Tang.You need a degree of flexibility in pre-modern era where communication's slow.What shouldn't have happened though was the establishment of circuits in the interior regions.The Roman Empire have provinces and themes structured similar to the circuits but never became feudal.There should also be a strong central army like the Divine Strategy army which Tang established during and after the rebellion.
 
The problem is that the Tang military was only powerful because of the powers granted to the military governors ,especially in a massive empire like the Tang.You need a degree of flexibility in pre-modern era where communication's slow.What shouldn't have happened though was the establishment of circuits in the interior regions.The Roman Empire have provinces and themes structured similar to the circuits but never became feudal.There should also be a strong central army like the Divine Strategy army which Tang established during and after the rebellion.
But the first military governors largely were established along the periphery, in areas either under tenuous Chinese control or in the Chinese cities closest to the borders. It wasn't until after the An Lushan rebellion that the military governors were established in the interior itself. An Lushan's forces were the soldiers meant to be guarding the frontier. It would be difficult to give An Lushan or any other military governor flexibility yet hope they remain absolutely loyal. Without the An Lushan rebellion to teach the Tang about the dangers of consolidating power in a single prime minister like Li Linfu or Yang Guozhong, it's quite likely that another similar polarizing figure might arise. In that situation, border rebellion becomes much more likely.

An Lushan had an advantage over the other military governors in that he was the military governor for multiple regions. What the Tang must do is prevent any military governor from holding posts for multiple border regions. However, this has the drawback that border defense might become uncoordinated.
 
But the first military governors largely were established along the periphery, in areas either under tenuous Chinese control or in the Chinese cities closest to the borders. It wasn't until after the An Lushan rebellion that the military governors were established in the interior itself. An Lushan's forces were the soldiers meant to be guarding the frontier. It would be difficult to give An Lushan or any other military governor flexibility yet hope they remain absolutely loyal. Without the An Lushan rebellion to teach the Tang about the dangers of consolidating power in a single prime minister like Li Linfu or Yang Guozhong, it's quite likely that another similar polarizing figure might arise. In that situation, border rebellion becomes much more likely.

An Lushan had an advantage over the other military governors in that he was the military governor for multiple regions. What the Tang must do is prevent any military governor from holding posts for multiple border regions. However, this has the drawback that border defense might become uncoordinated.

To my understanding,there were jiedushis in the interior before AS rebellion as well.And yes,the main problem was that AL was made ridiculously powerful by Li Longji.
 
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Perhaps what the Tang has do is to further limit the power of the Jiedaoshi. While they were officially only allowed to have their say in military affairs, it is rather hard to maintain a military colony without certain... flexibility. What the Tang has to do is perhaps slow its expansion and focus on organizing a stronger beaurucratic system in the Western reigons to observe scinification.
 
I think it would help if the Tang Dynasty moved it's capital to either Kaifeng,Luoyang or Nanjing.Chang'an was becoming increasingly less relevant as the economic center of China due to it's isolatedness from the rest of the empire,environmental destruction of Guanzhong and the rise of the aforementioned regions in economic relevance.The central government would need to control economic centers firmly if it is to prevent the rise of semi-independent entities within the empire.
 
To my understanding,there were jiedushis in the interior before AS rebellion as well.And yes,the main problem was that AL was made ridiculously powerful by Li Longji.
At the time of the An Lushan rebellion, the ten jiedushi districts and their commanders were:

Longyou and Hexi: Geshu Han
Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong: An Lushan
Shuofang (Beiting? Anxi?): An Sishun
Jiannan: Yang Guozhong (through a local deputy)
Lingnan: technically not headed by a jiedushi but sometimes lumped under the "ten jiedushi"

Though the pre-An Lushan jiedushi all vary in terms of their distance from the Chinese heartland, none as centrally located as the later jiedushi.
 
At the time of the An Lushan rebellion, the ten jiedushi districts and their commanders were:

Longyou and Hexi: Geshu Han
Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong: An Lushan
Shuofang (Beiting? Anxi?): An Sishun
Jiannan: Yang Guozhong (through a local deputy)
Lingnan: technically not headed by a jiedushi but sometimes lumped under the "ten jiedushi"

Though the pre-An Lushan jiedushi all vary in terms of their distance from the Chinese heartland, none as centrally located as the later jiedushi.


I got the idea that they had multiple interior circuits through this map here,it's properly referenced as being before the AS rebellion:
600px-China%2C_742.svg.png


I have reasons to believe that it's pre-AS rebellion because after the AS rebellion,the number of circuits inflated heavily to something like this:

3_439_600.jpg
 
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I got the idea that they had multiple interior circuits through this map here,it's properly referenced as being before the AS rebellion:
600px-China%2C_742.svg.png
I believe those are the circuits (dao 道) established during the Zhenguan era which were either purely civil administrations or only geographical designations. The term military governors (jiedushi 節度使) refers to the governors who combined civil and military functions within those circuits, commanding armies based in certain cities as well as administrative functions in those cities.

An Lushan for example was jiedushi for Pinglu, Fanyang, and Hedong, but all those were in the Hedong circuit.
 
About capitals. I've always had a question on why the Zhou system of having a eastern and westerm capital was abolished. In this case, Nanjing or Kaifeng could be the "Eastern" capital concerning itself with provincial Affairs, which would also be the place the emperor would stay. Meanwhile, a loyalist yet Western city like Taiyuan could be the Western capital which concerned itself with Jiedaoshi affairs.
 
About capitals. I've always had a question on why the Zhou system of having a eastern and westerm capital was abolished. In this case, Nanjing or Kaifeng could be the "Eastern" capital concerning itself with provincial Affairs, which would also be the place the emperor would stay. Meanwhile, a loyalist yet Western city like Taiyuan could be the Western capital which concerned itself with Jiedaoshi affairs.
The Tang Dynasty did have multiple capitals.The three capitals were Chang'an,the national capital,Jingyang/Taiyuan the Northern capital and Luoyang,the eastern capital.Not sure why you would need to have a capital to deal with provincial affairs and jiedushi affairs separately.That goes completely against the point of having a capital.Taiyuan seems to be the northern capital because it's where the Li family's fortune first rose,it was subsequently abolished as a capital.Luoyang was the only city that remained a secondary capital,it wasn't abolished.In fact,Luoyang eventually became the final capital of the Tang Dynasty when Zhu Wen moved the entire court their just prior to him deposing the dynasty.The main purpose of Luoyang as a capital was easier supply.In times when there's a famine,the emperor's court would be much easier supplied if it was stationed in Luoyang instead.I don't know much about why the emperors travelled less to Luoyang after Li Longji,but I guess it's probably linked to decreased security?The emperors' authority outside of Chang'an waxed and waned over the years.
 
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