Significance of WWI Allied Success at Gallipoli

Anaxagoras

Banned
Assuming that the Allies had succeeded at Gallipoli in 1915, a scenario for which there are any number of PODs, how significant to the course of the war would the result have been?

By victory, assume we have a best case scenario - the straits cleared, Constantinople occupied by Allied forces, and the Turkish government surrendering to the Allies.
 
Assuming that the Allies had succeeded at Gallipoli in 1915, a scenario for which there are any number of PODs, how significant to the course of the war would the result have been?

By victory, assume we have a best case scenario - the straits cleared, Constantinople occupied by Allied forces, and the Turkish government surrendering to the Allies.

Churchill's own account - it was his idea after all - claims that there were two objectives of the campaign.

1) To knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war.
2) To open up trade routes with Russia, to supply arms and ammunition to them.

He specifically claimed that Russia burned through a years Artillery ammo in a month, leading to virtually no artillery being available to support the army. That Britain was also low on such - 2 million Arty rounds produced Vs 6 million ordered - and would therefore not have spare ammo to ship is not usually brought up.

So if the campaign succeeds, at a minimum the trade route through the Black Sea would be open again. This has to help Russia, if only to keep the civilian economy alive and prevent the mass unemployment that is supposed to have been a major factor in the Russian Revolution. Preventing that, or at least delaying it until the war is over would not be an entirely trivial achievement.

Knocking the Turks out of the war - if that happens - would in Churchill's estimate taken the million men they had out of the war, while allowing the Balkans 750,000 men to come in on the Entente side. The idea was they were sandwhiched between the Austrian's and Turks who they hated and who wanted to conquor them. Take the Turks out and they would turn on the Austro-hungarian empire. Difference of 1,750,000 men in favour of the Entente.

If it worked - IF it worked - that would have been worth doing.

IF. An interesting word.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
Assuming that this works-

1) The Russians can add three very powerful dreadnoughts to the British at Jutland

2)The trade routes to Russia are opened. This would have spared their rail industry the need to make large use of the Trans-Siberian and Archangel. Relieving some of the pressure on the Russian rail system

3) hopefully, from the Allies point of view, the Bulgarians will think second of joining the war. Th Ottomans and Bulgarians contribute about 20% of the manpower for the Central Powers. It would be a huge loss

4) the Russians no longer have to deal with the Southern front- which would free up huge forces. They had 13 infantry divisions in the Caucasus Mountains and another 6 guarding the Black Sea in May, 1915
 
Well with not only extra men on the frontlines, The Entente might also be able to open the Adriatic. There Italy could lend its Navy to attack coastal parts of AH and maybe start a new front to take pressure off Italy.
 
He specifically claimed that Russia burned through a years Artillery ammo in a month, leading to virtually no artillery being available to support the army. That Britain was also low on such - 2 million Arty rounds produced Vs 6 million ordered - and would therefore not have spare ammo to ship is not usually brought up.
True. They did however have their grain harvests sitting at the docks waiting for a chance to be exported, that could have provided the funds necessary to approach countries like the US about potentially supplying arms and materiel. The other major benefit of course is the ability to import railway engines and rolling stock which Russia was desperately short of, IIRC they enough food to supply the cities but due to lack of equipment moving it and military supplies from where it was to where it needed to be was difficult.
 
1) Success at Gallipoli does not translate to success for the Russians, at least not in the way the Allies predict. The Tsar's forces maybe able to penetrate deeper into Western Armenia since the Ottoman forces are going to be in really terrible shape and desperate to get as many troops into Western Anatolia to stave off the Allied Expeditionary force. Turkey is in serious danger of being partitioned after the war if Ataturk or another leader does not manage to score a military reversal to convince the British and the French to think twice about it..

The more pressing issue of supplying the Russians against the Germans is moot. Even when the Russians had local superiority of shells against the Germans they often hesitated to attack. It was a question of initiative and command confidence, and the Russians lacked both in this conflict.

2) The Ottomans will not fold outright after the loss of Gallipoli. They still have reserves of men and a great deal of territory. I don't think they can last until 1918, but the Allies are in for a hell of a time if they try to push to deep into Anatolia before Palestine and Syria are secured. Any initial euphoria that the Allied leadership and public get from this victory will be quickly spent when they realize the war is not going to end any quicker on the Western Front because of it.

3) The Italian question. Does this allow Italy to act with more impunity on the Adriatic coast? If so that may turn out to be the most lasting impact of the campaign. That would put a lot of pressure on Austria-Hungary and could cause the Hapsburg monarchy to collapse sooner. There is a slim chance this saves Russia, but it could turn into outright chaos across Eastern Europe instead, leading to a much larger and more volatile Leftist revolt in Hungary and Galicia, which could infect the Russian Army.
 
The way I heard it, the 'shell shortage' of the Eastern Front was more an issue with Russian artillery tactics than actual supply; generals would stockpile shells for weeks or months, then blow through them all in a couple days in bombardments that just telegraphed the Russian attack plans and let the CP to shift reserves to the sector under attack.
 

LordKalvert

Banned
1)

2) The Ottomans will not fold outright after the loss of Gallipoli. They still have reserves of men and a great deal of territory. I don't think they can last until 1918, but the Allies are in for a hell of a time if they try to push to deep into Anatolia before Palestine and Syria are secured. Any initial euphoria that the Allied leadership and public get from this victory will be quickly spent when they realize the war is not going to end any quicker on the Western Front because of it.


The Entente would have no need to press the Ottomans anywhere. Once the Ottomans have been driven from the straits and Egypt, they cease to be a military factor. They can basically be ignored. Perhaps a sortie to burn an area if the Ottomans harass the lines but that would be it.

The improvement in Russia could in some places be dramatic. The pressure on the railways could be eased by not using distant ports and some of the more pressing Some of the more vital supplies could be imported and the troops diverted to the Ottomans could be sent to the German front
 
...

2) The Ottomans will not fold outright after the loss of Gallipoli. They still have reserves of men and a great deal of territory. I don't think they can last until 1918, but the Allies are in for a hell of a time if they try to push to deep into Anatolia before Palestine and Syria are secured. Any initial euphoria that the Allied leadership and public get from this victory will be quickly spent when they realize the war is not going to end any quicker on the Western Front because of it.

...

Fun fact: All Turkeys main armories, munitions factories, powdermills and supply depos were on the coast for easy transport (sensible given their infrastructure).

The turkish army soon will barely have supplies for defensive operations, maybe a few raids, but that's it.
The allies can simply give them a choice: surrender, and Istanbul stays in the empire, or fight on and the greeks and bulgars can take as much territory as they can handle.
 
Given that the Greeks had been cooperating with the Allies in letting the British use various islands to support Gallipoli, if this is successful I can see the Greeks declaring war and doing their best to get to Istanbul or very close by with the British. If they become part of the occupying force, they have a good claim to at least the European side of Istanbul. They make make claims in coastal Anatolia given the large Greek population there (as they did OTL).

Istanbul was the capital of the Ottoman Empire, in 1915 Ankara was a sleepy town in the center of the country. If the Turks lose Istanbul they are down for the count - the Istanbul area was their major industrial center, and they are now essentially cut off from any resupply from Germany/A-H. This happening in 1915 frees up a lot of resources for the Western Front, as well as making life better for the Russians. It is a blow to the Morale of the Central Powers, especially A-H who now faces a Balkans with more enemies and a much better overall situation for the Entente, as well as a Russia that is in better shape.

The Sykes-Picot agreement dividing up the Ottoman Empire was in spring 1916, and the Balfour Declaration not until 1917 so the political developments in the Ottoman remnants may be quite different. Kemal Attaturk was a hero of Gallipoli on the Turkish side, so here his star is not so bright and he may have even died. This probably means that the remnant Turkey you see by 1925 is smaller with losses to Greece (and perhaps elsewhere) aqnd may have very different politics (including continuing use of the Arabic alphabet for Turkish). If the war ends earlier as it very well might no US entry, and no Bolshevik takeover in Russia.
 
1) Success at Gallipoli does not translate to success for the Russians, at least not in the way the Allies predict. The Tsar's forces maybe able to penetrate deeper into Western Armenia since the Ottoman forces are going to be in really terrible shape and desperate to get as many troops into Western Anatolia to stave off the Allied Expeditionary force. Turkey is in serious danger of being partitioned after the war if Ataturk or another leader does not manage to score a military reversal to convince the British and the French to think twice about it..

The more pressing issue of supplying the Russians against the Germans is moot. Even when the Russians had local superiority of shells against the Germans they often hesitated to attack. It was a question of initiative and command confidence, and the Russians lacked both in this conflict.

2) The Ottomans will not fold outright after the loss of Gallipoli. They still have reserves of men and a great deal of territory. I don't think they can last until 1918, but the Allies are in for a hell of a time if they try to push to deep into Anatolia before Palestine and Syria are secured. Any initial euphoria that the Allied leadership and public get from this victory will be quickly spent when they realize the war is not going to end any quicker on the Western Front because of it.
Even with a failure in Gallipoli OTL, it was still enough for Russia to capture Erzurum, Trabzon, Erzincan, and Bitlis, and reduce 3rd and 2nd armies to ineffectual fighting forces. With Istanbul in danger, Russia's timetable could probably accelerate to a breakout onto the Anatolian plains or Mesopotamia. Twin blows on both the west and the east (and an unfavorable situation in the south) might be enough to convince the Ottomans to seek terms.

But if they call the Entente's bluff then everything falls apart because the revolution will cause the Caucasus Army to disintegrate.

The way I heard it, the 'shell shortage' of the Eastern Front was more an issue with Russian artillery tactics than actual supply; generals would stockpile shells for weeks or months, then blow through them all in a couple days in bombardments that just telegraphed the Russian attack plans and let the CP to shift reserves to the sector under attack.
But that doesn't explain battles where Russia was on the defensive, yet still ran out of shells and had to retreat.

But generally it would seem that mostly occurred during 1914 and 1915, the early years of the war, and by 1916 they had greatly increased domestic production of shells to be sufficient (at the cost of breaking nearly every other sector of the economy).
 
There was only a single set of circumstances that would have allowed the Entente to force the Dardanelles: a surprise landing of a large number of troops (100-150,000 was the general consensus) on the peninsula to secure it. Once Gallipoli was secured, fast minesweepers would have cleared the minefields and allowed the battleships to reach the sea of Marmara with minimal losses. More importantly, the successful capture of the peninsula would have tipped the balance and it's most likely that both Bulgaria and Greece would have entered the war on the Entente side (or the danger of this intervention would have forced the Ottomans to sue for peace).

Unfortunately, none of the conditions were feasible: the element of surprise was lost in February by the untimely announcement of the operation, the fast minesweepers were never dispatched to the Aegean and (most importantly) there was not a single possibility that the British and French army commanders would have considered moving such a large number of troops away from the western front (Kitchener grudgingly considered a single division, the 29th).

The way the Gallipoli madness was carried out IOTL certainly precluded any possibility of success (fun fact: the telegram of Grand Duke Nicholas on January 2, 1915 asked for a "naval demonstration" against the Dardanelles as opposed to the grand strategy concocted by Churchill to win singlehandedly the war by a naval operation only). Even if Entente battleships had managed to reach the sea of Marmara (the most optimistic assessment was that no more than 4 BBs could succeed),what could have they done? These old BBs would have been low on coal and ammunition, and anyway Hankey noted that they could not have sustained a long bombardment due to the wear and tear in their main guns, not to mention that they would be without screening ships to manage the attacks of Turkish torpedo boats much less a sortie of the Goeben.
Gallipoli was Churchill's third brainchild (after Antwerp and Coronel) and a last desperate attempt to salvage his battered reputation as First Lord of the Admiralty.

For the fun of the thing, let's say that the set of conditions I outlined at the beginning are met, and the Entente secures the peninsula. It would be certainly a major coup: either the Ottomans sue for peace or Constantinople is taken by an army including Bulgarian and Greek troops. The Straits are open. I am not completely sure that it is enough to butterfly away the Russian revolution and subsequent collapse of the Czarist regime (it's certainly a boost of Russians capabilities, but not a get-out-of-jail card) but it is reasonable to believe that Russia will stay in the war at least until 1917.
OTOH there is quite a possibility that the Entente generals were in the right, and that by removing 100-150,000 seasoned troops from the Western front would allow the Germans to break through: it would not be a good bargain.

Overall, my gut feeling is that the CPs will be in a worse strategic position (for example, if Bulgaria is in the Entente, Serbia will not collapse in late 1915. A real offensive from the south Balkans may prove too much for A-H in 1916) and (assuming that the western front holds in 1915) a negotiated peace may be achieved in the same year. Maybe a whitish peace (Alsace Lorraine may have to be given away, and some colonies too) for Germany, but A-H will pay a much higher cost (although there is a chance that Charles might keep his crown, reigning over Austria, Slovenia, Bohemia and Hungary. Maybe Croatia too). The Pact of London should be upheld. The Ottomans will bled too (Thrace, Armenia and a good chunk of Eastern Anatolia may be lost) and the CUP will be disgraced, but the rest of the empire might be kept together, under some sort of protectorate.
IMHO it is quite likely they will keep Constantinople too, although it's not a given. Capitulations will not be rescinded.

A third Balkan war is however a given: Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia will find it difficult to stay away from it.

Shortening the war by a couple of years would be a big plus for anyone, and a negotiated peace treaty in 1916 would certainly be more sensible than the ones enforced in 1919.
 
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You make some good points. I agree that if the War could be ended sooner, it is a very good thing.

Just an aside, but if the War ends sooner, might the Spanish Flu Epidemic losses be lessened or even butterflied?

In early 1915 there are probably not enough available and seasoned troops to allocate to Gallipoli. These troops will become available toward the end of 1915, when the Salonika front is opened. Unfortunately by the end of 1915 Bulgaria has joined the CPs, and Serbia is toast. The Balkan front will remain a secondary theater until Bulgaria's surrender in 1918.

While the set of conditions I outlined in my former post are predicated on 20/20 hindsight, I think that the best possible strategy would have been a naval demonstration in front of Gallipoli (the outer forts can be silenced by naval guns, although in IOTL the Entente had to land marines to destroy them with explosives) coupled with increased pressure on Greece and Bulgaria. If Greece is strongarmed into joining the Entente at the same time as Italy, 4 or 5 divisions can be landed in Salonika (and at this stage the fact that they are probably green troops does not matter too much) and supplies can be routed to Serbia through Macedonia. If this happen, it is much more unlikely that Bulgaria enters the war on the CPs side, and they may even be convinced to join the Entente (for greed or for fear). Then in 1916 the Balkan front can become truly operative. Not as good as opening the Dardanelles early in 1915, but still a lot better than what happened IOTL.

As far as the Spanish flu, it is quite likely that with a shorter war the epidemic does not happen or at least is much less damaging.
 
If the attack had occurred when it did (when the troops were available), but without the previous abortive attempts at a strictly naval attack and with better security, the odds of success would have been much better. Even as it was had the attacks been properly staged and aggressively pushed they might have succeeded. A win at Gallipoli is not ASB, but would have required a good deal more common sense.
 
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