Serbian Counteroffensive in 1915

Is a counteroffensive by the Serbs against the Austrians possible during mid 1915? The Austrians had transferred an army [or the best portion], their 5th, from the Serbian front to the Italian border after the Italian declaration of war. The Allies were tying up the Ottomans at Gallipoli and Bulgaria was watching events on the Eastern and Gallipoli fronts with interest. Also, the German and Austrian counteroffensive that was taking place at Gorlice hadn 't gained much territory to make danger significant enough for Russia, especially with the temporary potential threat of Romania joining the Entente. The typhus epidemic that affected Serbia seemed to have subsided by May 1915.
With this in mind, would it be possible for the Serbians to counterattack the Austrians and tie up as many Austrian troops or divert them from the Italian and Eastern fronts? Would the offensive succeed? What if the attack eventually stopped somewhere in Hungary or Bosnia and the Austrians drove the Serbian Army afterwards? Would the Serbian Army be annihilated and the Bulgarians join earlier after facing weaker opposition? And, would the Germans continue the offensive against Russia? Also, would Italy do better against the Austrians and take parts of the Isonzo defence line?
As for Russia, would they transfer troops to counterattack the Germans in Poland and East Prussia and suffer badly with the withdrawal of an Austrian army to the Balkans or Isonzo? Would the German 11th Army take Riga in 1915? And, what would be the impacts of no Salonika Front if the Serbian Army was destroyed completely and the Central Powers did better in Russia?

Just for your information, the Austro Hungarian defences on the Isonzo included its 5th Army, which was transferred from the Serbian front to the Isonzo as a result of the Italian declaration of war. Were the Austro Hungarians outnumbered enough for a successful Serbian counter offensive in June-July 1915 without the 5th Army? Or were the Serbs too broken, defensive and weak in military terms to launch a major offensive in support of Italy and Russia? The Austrian 5th Army contained 9 divisions, which could be used in support of operations against Serbia, when the troops were transferred to Italy.
Here are the sources that could be used.
https://books.google.com.my/books?id=6ZeIBwAAQBAJ&pg=PA37&dq=serbia+austria+hungary+isonzo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CBoQ6AEwADgKahUKEwjR84fCwKrHAhWCU44KHSuwDdw#v=snippet&q=serbian%20army%20offensive&f=false
https://books.google.com.my/books?i...epage&q=serbia austria hungary isonzo&f=false
https://books.google.com.my/books?i...redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=kuk 5th Armee&f=false
https://books.google.com.my/books?i...ZCOCh3oWAEV#v=onepage&q=kuk 5th Armee&f=false
https://books.google.com.my/books?i...epage&q=serbia austria hungary isonzo&f=false

Also, any thoughts as to whether the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Austro Hungarian territory would resist the Serbian offensive or desert to the Serbs? And, wasn't the liberation of the southern Slavs to form a Yugoslavian state an objective of the Serbian war aims?

No, the Serbs were effectively immobilized by a Typhus epidemic over the winter of 1914-15 that ravaged the entire country and military; they were in no shape to attack and had no desire after their failed 1914 invasion of A-H failed miserably.

wiking said:

No, the Serbs were effectively immobilized by a Typhus epidemic over the winter of 1914-15 that ravaged the entire country and military; they were in no shape to attack and had no desire after their failed 1914 invasion of A-H failed miserably.

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Wasn't the typhus epidemic over by June 1915? And, the attack doesn't need to succeed. Now, what if they launched an offensive in June 1915 and the attack stopped while in Hungary, Croatia or Bosnia and the Austrians counterattacked and destroyed the Serbian Army?

ghappy1000 said:

Wasn't the typhus epidemic over by June 1915? And, the attack doesn't need to succeed. Now, what if they launched an offensive in June 1915 and the attack stopped while in Hungary, Croatia or Bosnia and the Austrians counterattacked and destroyed the Serbian Army?

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Sure, but the health effects weren't. A Serb attack would actually help the A-Hs who had developed a massive fire superiority over the Serbs once their limited munition stocks ran out in 1914-15.

In mid-1915 the Serbian forces were too decimated by previous battles, and the epidemic, to try such a counteroffensive. IIRC the typhus did subside before the summer, but the casualties it inflicted couldn't be replaced even remotely soon enough.

I'd say the counteroffensive was possible only with a PoD that makes some major changes to the earlier parts of the war; for example if the typhus is avoided, or the A-H invasions of 1914 crushed with much fewer Serbian casualties.

Also, when thinking about Serbian offensives, in mid 1915 the Bulgarians were sitting on the fence. Any Serbian defeat while attacking Austria could have brought them into the war earlier than OTL.

fishingfred said:

Also, when thinking about Serbian offensives, in mid 1915 the Bulgarians were sitting on the fence. Any Serbian defeat while attacking Austria could have brought them into the war earlier than OTL.

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Would Romania and Greece stay neutral if the Serbian Army was crushed decisively in 1915 by the Austrians and Bulgarians and there was no Salonika Front? And, what about the Western and Eastern fronts?

Preparations for the Serbian 1915 Offensive

In May 1915, the situation for the Central Powers wasn't at optimum for their victory. The Austrians had just lost hundred thousands of troops during the year's beginning winter and although the Russians suffered heavy casualties for similar reasons to the Austrians, the heartland of Hungary was threatened that a German counteroffensive at Gorlice was undertaken to threaten the Russians and prevent their advance from penetrating Hungary. Meanwhile, Italy was making preparations for entering the war on the Entente side and even with the rugged mountains surrounding the Isonzo and border, an entire army had to be sent to the new front, as it seemed.
The Western Front had just stabilized, but wasn't totally in Germany's favour, especially with the need to transfer troops to the east. By the time German relief came, the Allies were taking the offensive at Gallipoli and endangering the Ottomans, who recently came on the Central Powers' side. Bulgarian and Romanian entrance to the war on the Entente side would destroy the Ottomans by the year's end and form a threat to the southern flank for Austria Hungary, once the Ottomans lose the war.
Back in Serbia itself, two Austro Hungarian offensives were defeated with heavy cost to Austro Hungarian troops in the theatre, especially with the imminent Russian threat and Balkan support. The Ottomans were defeated during their Caucasus and Suez offensives and were weak in ammunition simultaneously.
The good news about Italian relief seemed to be in the spotlight for a successful Serbian counteroffensive. Although Italy was a member of Austria Hungary and Germany's Triple Alliance, it remained neutral after the declaration of neutrality on 3 August 1914, stating that the alliance was for defensive purposes and not even a justified offensive against Serbia would qualify as such, especially in light of the deteriorating relationships between Italy and Austria Hungary. While the majority of politicians were for Austria, neutrality or intervention on the Central Powers' side, several preferred intervention on the Entente. Examples of the politicians who belonged to the former included Giolitti and Sonnino [who would later change his mind], while those who belonged to the latter included the present prime minister Salandra and ironically, several socialists such as Bissolati and Mussolini, who would die in an Isonzo Offensive during 1917 in this scenario. A London Pact was signed between Italy and the Entente powers for their support.
When the London Pact was signed between Italy and the Entente countries on 26 April 1915, which received the approval of the Italian parliament and politicians, Italy was expected to receive the Trentino, southern Tyrol, the Austrian Littorial, western Slovenia and the Croatian coastline with the ports of Fiume and Rijeka, plus Dalmatia. Colonies were contemplated in Albania, Turkey and German East Africa. Germany and Austria Hungary only gave Trentino and parts of the Littorial as concessions and offers of southern France, Mediterranean islands and North Africa were unsatisfactory for the more Entente leaning Italian government. The pact effectively made neutral Italy a member of the Entente, although the declaration of war would take place only in 4 weeks' time. Italy revoked its supposed participation on 3 May and despite opposition from politicians such as Giolitti, crowds of nationalists; liberals; pro-war socialists and irredentists demonstrated for war in the public and private areas. Then, Salandra offered his resignation to the Italian king, Vittorio Emmanuele III, but Giolitti, fearful of nationalist chaos that might break into open rebellion and war, declined to succeed as prime minister and Salandra's resignation was rejected. On 23 May, Italy declared war on Austria-Hungary and plans for the Serbian counteroffensive were put into motion.
Back at Serbia following the Battle of Kolubara, the Serbian Parliament adopted the Niš Declaration (7 December 1914) on the war goals of Serbia: "Convinced that the entire Serbian nation is determined to persevere in the holy struggle for the defense of their homesteads and their freedom, the government of the Kingdom (of Serbia) considers that, in these fateful times, its main and only task is to ensure the successful completion of this great warfare which, at the moment when it started, also became a struggle for the liberation and unification of all our unliberated Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian brothers. The great success which is to crown this warfare will make up for the extremely bloody sacrifices which this generation of Serbs is making". The Serbian counteroffensive to support the war aims were planned, despite the limited ammunition stocks available.
The Serbian offensive was contemplated as the following. The Serbian 1st Army would distract the Austrian 6th Army while the Serbian 3rd and Montenegrin Armies would conduct a flanking manueuvre. The Serbian 2nd Army would complete the permanent encirclement and destruction of the Austro Hungarian 6th Army, then threaten the northern flank of the Serbian Front by attacking Hungary or northern Croatia and Bosnia. The former would threaten the 6th Army while the latter would divert reinforcements from the Eastern Front [and Romania, if it remained safely neutral,] to stop the advance on the Hungarian homeland and pride. Hopefully, the offensive could cause Romanian entrance into the war on the side of the Entente and cause the collapse of the Austro Hungarian Balkan Front and the Eastern Front's counteroffensive. Assistance by 'liberated' Serbs, Croats, Italians and even Bosnians, Slovenes and any Entente military aged men in Austro Hungarian territory was anticipated in the event it succeeded in obtaining its objectives and destruction of the 6th Army. The Austro Hungarians, to save the 6th Army, could only call on the navy and troops in Montenegro along with Bosnians and loyal Croats in their homelands.
[Typhus epidemic will be discussed in the next update.]

The Serbian typhus epidemic was peaking in Apr-1915 with 10K daily infections, with a greater than 50% fatality rate. POD in May-1915 simply not plausible.

By the way, how effective would the Serbian counteroffensive be without the typhus epidemic after the Austrian withdrawal of the 5th Army? Would one Austrian Army be able to survive an offensive by 3 Serbian Armies even when lacking ammunition without being encircled as well as suffering a defeat and retreating? And, could the Serbians transfer guns and troops from Macedonia if possible? Finally, would it be possible for the Serbian typhus epidemic to be averted with a pod in November 1914 or be cured completely by May 1915?

Serbian Counteroffensive

In response to the transfer of the 5th Austro Hungarian Army from Serbia to the Isonzo frontline, the Serbian Army prepared its promised counter-offensive in support of Italy. Ammunition was moved from Macedonia to assist in the offensive and the Austro Hungarian 6th Army was placed on alert after a Serbian artillery bombardment shelled the frontlines during the closing days of June. It might be a Serbian offensive, but who ever knows the truth would find it a mystery until the offensive began.
[The pod used is no typhus epidemic in Serbia over winter 1915.]
The offensive began on 1 July 1915 and took the Austro Hungarian 6th Army by surprise as they didn't expect the Serbian Army to interrupt the decisive blow intended on Russia. After the Isonzo battles, an army corps was needed for the Isonzo and the Serbian offensive, with the attackers outnumbering the defenders by a ratio of 2:1 took an entire Austrian division away from the Bosniak front as it was sacrificed for the retreat of a few days. Another division was also sacrificed to enable the retreat, along with several artillery shells being launched at the Serbian Army, despite inflicting heavy casualties on the Serbs themselves. For one thing, it seemed like it would succeed in the liberation of fellow "Slav[ic Brother]s" and there were cheers in ethnic Croat and Serbian cities. Even demonstrations in Slovenia and Bosnia would be likely despite the heavier pro Austro Hungarian sentiment and anti Serbian and Italian sentiment. In fact, there were parades stating that: "The arrival of our Russian and Serbian liberators would defeat you Austrians [, Germans] and Hungarians besides preventing Italian intrusions!" ,with Austro Hungarian troops and military forces being worried about the imminent nationalist revolts for a week. The corps en route to the Isonzo was diverted to crush the revolts before continuing its journey to the new Serbian frontline, except for the desperately needed heavy artillery. Bulgarian intervention on the Central Powers' side was considered unlikely in the face of a successful Serbian offensive, which would reduce fears about neutral Bulgaria backstabbing Serbia and capturing its army and territory with Austria Hungary as well as intervening to harm the Gallipoli advance. In fact, the newly planned landings on the Dardenelles front at Sulva Bay might succeed with at least an entire corps tied up watching for possible Bulgarian intervention on the Entente side and who knows, they might, although very unlikely given the successes in the east and Bulgarian government attitude in regards to the Balkan countries and Russia compared to the Ottomans and their allies, especially with the Italian and Serbian offensives and the tying up of German and Austro Hungarian troops on the major Western and Eastern Fronts.
Meanwhile, the Austrian Chief of General Staff, Conrad Von Hotzendorf, blamed the Italian entrance into the war on the Entente side for the offensive. However, Italy, his 'major' enemy after their hostilities began, as considered since his earlier days in the Austro Hungarian Army's staff in the event Italy betrayed its supposed Austro Hungarian ally from 1882, was his chief enemy and even with the strongly rugged Isonzo mountain and river defences; experienced elderly and defensive troops; enthusiastic Slavic soldiers who would refuse fighting against Russia or even Serbia and high morale against Italy, there was an urgent need to reinforce the newly created Isonzo front with its outnumbered defenders before the Italians could capture several defences or even launch a breakthrough to the city of Trieste after bypassing or capturing the defences and outflank the front, link up with the Serbs in Croatia, capture the navy and encourage Balkan participation on the[ir] [Italians'] side.
After sacrificing the towns of Zvonik and Orshova to sieges, the Austrian troops had to counterattack. The Serbian Army nearly caused the Romanian government to join the Entente when the 7th Army arrived on the scene and began its desperately needed counteroffensive. En route, a corps was left on the Romanian border and another had its presence revealed to the Romanians, who stopped their imminent offensive just a week before launching. With Lvov under Austrian control, the decision to transfer the 7th Austrian Army was made before the Romanians would attack as if the success at Gorlice Tarnow and the western stalemate were nothing to the country with Gallipoli, active Balkan participation and some stability left on the fronts the Central Powers were doing well against, even if the most important for their survival. Anyway, the offensive had to be defeated at all costs and halted before disaster occurred. And that could only be achieved by a Tannenberg-style encirclement manueuvre.

Megállj, megállj, kutya Szerbia [Stop The Serbian Offensive]!

The 2nd Army was thinking that it would win after Romania joined and its fellow armies destroyed the 6th Austro Hungarian Army. It would provoke Romanian entry to divert reinforcements from the Eastern Front and to enable its flanking attack or invasion of Hungary to succeed. There was minimal resistance in Vojvodina, which was nearly undefended to free up Austrian and Hungarian troops for the southern attack. The port of Cattaro was also threatened and the Italian Navy sortied in support of the Montenegrin advance, to capture some Croatian islands and destroy the Austro Hungarian Navy by luring them into a minefield, torpedo and submarine ambush covered by the Italian fleet before the French Navy arrived to complete its wrecking.
Suddenly, on 10 July, the advance of the 2nd Serbian Army was repulsed by two corps of the 7th Austro Hungarian Army. The Russians were counterattacking on the southern flank on the Eastern Front despite the retreat and the temporary reorganization of the German and Austrian armies on the Eastern Front would permit a temporary recapture of Lvov city, a major morale dropper to the newly victorious Central Powers' armies there. Any continuation of the advance could result in heavy casualties to the Austro Hungarians again and the mere withdrawal of an Austrian Army, especially on the southern flank, would not only permit a threatening Russian advance on Hungary, but also encourage Romanian intervention either through Russian support or the loss of Austro Hungarian troops in encirclements, counterattacks, territorial loss or displacements of troops in reorganization of the army until the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army returned from the Serbian Front. Even with the triumphant destruction of a Serbian Army for minimal losses and providing another victorious Tannenberg, it wasn't adequate with the expected rout in the east, possible [albeit postponed] Romanian intervention and the incomplete destruction of Serbia and its army without Bulgarian help, which seemed likely in the circumstances surrounding the moment.
However, the destruction of the triumphant Serbian army, which had just taken Ujdivek 2 days ago, seemed imminent. After the capture of the city, the fight against Hungarian insurgents took several days and a division was tied up fighting the insurgents and another was struggling with supply line issues. The Austro Hungarian army took advantage of the fact to isolate and destroy the 2nd Serbian Army piecemeal. A corps recaptured Szadbadka and another advanced in support of the Hungarian defenders of Ujdivek, routing the Serbian troops and encircling them in the surroundings of the town. Then, Serbian breakout attempts were destroyed by Austro Hungarian artillery bombardments, which forced the surrender of the 2nd Serbian Army itself when the two corps linked up and encircled the army itself. After the 'heroic Battle for Ujdivek', the 7th Army came to encircle the 1st Serbian Army's flank and threatened, it withdrew, losing troops in the process. Romania stayed on the sidelines in shock despite the opportunity to wreck the 7th Army's remaining corps on the border and save Serbia even without saving the Serbian 2nd Army and taking the cherished province of Transylvania with minimal casualties. The 7th Army was recalled to the Russian front to save rethreatened Galicia except for one corps of the 7th Army. Then, the corps of the same army left on the Serbian front and assigned to the 6th Army was to continue the offensive and tell Romania that joining the Entente wouldn't pay off with a Serbian defeat and the resurgence of the Bulgarian Army's threat to Serbia and Romania.
The advance of the corps continued and the 3rd Serbian Army was trapped by 20 July, with its annihillation being a matter of a few days. It was sudden for the slow, but steadily progressing army at risk of capturing Sarajevo if the Austro Hungarian 6th Army refused to retreat and avoid the imminent encirclement. Also, the loss of Sarajevo would be another morale boost to the Serbs and effectively incapitate the 6th Army without destroying or encircling it itself and causing heavy casualties. In fact, the city, where Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination took place and started the war outright, was supposed to be in Serbian hands by 15 July, but treacherous and mountainous surroundings for supplies and Austro Hungarian artillery shells delayed its expected fall by at least a week. Despite being encircled while its fellow armies were triumphant, it was now too late for the 1st Serbian Army to escape and the only hope for Serbia was the retreat of its 1st Army and the resistance of Montenegro, having its offensive role delayed by naval ship and army artillery shells from the seawards flank, fortress defences and mountains. The 1st Army had to defend Belgrade from an Austro Hungarian invasion and losing the capital would result in Bulgaria striking Serbia. Also, the loss of further national pride following the loss of an entire army from the country itself had to be averted.
Italian naval support for the Montenegrin role in the 'Serbian Offensive' was minimal, but helpful. However, disaster struck on 18 July, when 2 Italian cruisers were sunk by Austrian submarines. One battleship was sunk by an Austrian destroyer, contributing to the decision to retreat, and torpedoes from a disguised German submarine sank its escorts while picking up survivors. Another cruiser struck a mine and foundered after its scuttling. Overall, the Italian naval losses in support of the Montenegrin Offensive were a battleship, 3 cruisers and 2 destroyers while the Austrians lost a destroyer. The losses and withdrawal enabled the Austrians to halt the Montenegrin Offensive itself and retake Cattaro, as well as preventing the Montenegrin Army from encircling the Austro Hungarian 6th Army or reinforcing the Serbian Army after troops from Austria Hungary were withdrawn from the Montenegrin frontier to counter the Serbian Offensive, preventing a threat to Austria-Hungary's southern flank in the Balkan theatre. The Italian Navy was criticized for failing to assist its Balkan allies with its superiority over the Austrians, but when the statement was rebuked by an admiral, who stated that both combatant navies were numerically similar and he needed to preserve his ships for a future battle with the Austrians, blame was laid on the French ships at Corfu which refused to support the offensive adequately and ensure total naval superiority over the Austrians, which would wreck its navy and encourage the Italians to continue supporting the advance with bombardments and continue the Austrian retreat as troops had to be sent for coastal defence purposes or dealing with the Montenegrins.

Continuing the Austro Hungarian Counter Offensive

The feared Austro-Hungarian counter offensive that seemed like a reality now manifested itself after the destruction of Serbia's 1st Army to be lost. Meanwhile, the Bulgarian Army, which was hated and under watch by Serbia since the Second Balkan War, was preparing to attack. After the loss of the Serbian 2nd Army, negotiations were underway for a transfer of Macedonia, but the anti Serbian and Russian prime minister, Radoslavov, prepared an offensive should the Serbs lose more troops. During the first year of war, the Entente and Central Powers sought Bulgarian participation on their respective sides, but the long term hostilities between these two countries since the 35 years after their independence from the Ottomans [actually 37] that caused two wars over the last 30 years [one in 1885 and another in 1913, mentioned above].
The result was that the Bulgarian government and people felt that Serbia was in possession of lands to which Bulgaria was entitled, and when the Central Powers offered to give them what they claimed, the Bulgarians entered the war on their side. Although the Bulgarian government tilted towards the Entente or neutrality in April 1915, by July, the turn subsided towards a pro-German sentiment, as evidenced by the anti-Serb and Russian attitudes of Radoslavov and Tsar Ferdinand. The Entente defeat in the east and pro-German stalemates at the west, Gallipoli and Italy contributed to the final decision to attack a weakened Serbia with only its vulnerable Macedonian Army defending the frontier.
The Austro Hungarians did halt the attack after taking Belgrade, but the withdrawal of the 3rd and 1st Serbian Armies left isolated Montenegrin and Serbian 1st Army units under threat and it was soon encircled. After 1 August, the army started surrendering in isolated portions over the proceeding few days, with the last soldier rising the white flag by 7 August. The Bulgarian Army was mobilized in Sofia waiting for the destruction of the 1st Army, but the long awaited news of a flanking landing on the Ottomans' Sulva Bay coastline delayed the news by a week. After a division and some artillery were moved to Suvla from Thrace and Constantinople, the landings were contested on the 10th and halted after 2 days. A counteroffensive would push the troops back to the original positions over the next few days, when the bad news came from the Macedonian Front.
Montenegro was threatened by Austria Hungary, but the Italian Navy, after losing another ship to submarine torpedoes, returned to base. The withdrawal of the naval support was a concern for the Entente, which thought that the encirclement of the 6th Austrian Army could've been finished had it been supported sufficiently by Entente naval superiority as mentioned in earlier reports, although these might be exaggerated. The 6th Austrian Army held the 1st Serbian Army's desperate counterattack until Bulgaria declared war on 14/15 August and advanced onto Macedonia. The Bulgarian 1st Army destroyed the small Timok Army holding the frontier just as the Serbian retreat was about to turn into a counterattack against the Austro Hungarians. Upon receiving the news of the Austro-Hungarian and Bulgarian offensive on the Eastern Front, the Germans were ordered to launch a continued blow against Russia and ensure its crippling by the end of the year, with its surrender or destruction contemplated for 1916.
The advance was surprising for the Macedonian Army and the Bulgarian 2nd Army was ordered to annihilate it at all costs as well as take control of the Berlin-Baghdad railway and the city of Nish, plus southern Serbia and Macedonia. The fall of Nish; capture of the railroad and destruction of the Serbian 1st Army were Bulgaria's main objectives though, and nearly conflicted with the Bulgarian General Zhekov, who wanted to take Macedonia and accomplish a bigger encirclement of the Serbian Army. After countless requests, Entente help was refused. The performance on the Gallipoli front was well, albeit stalled and withdrawing from Suvla would only encourage an Ottoman counteroffensive on Gallipoli. Austro-Hungarian support during the offensive tied down the 1st Serbian Army's remnants and prevented it from reinforcing the Bulgarian frontier. What had very nearly brought Romania on the Entente side now turned into a national catastrophe for Serbia as the army suffered its biggest defeat and retreated to the Albanian ports, but without much of its equipment and 2 armies initiating from the disaster of Vojvodina, plus the total sacrifice of Montenegro for the retreat. A third army was badly mauled and forced to surrender in the Macedonian pocket, the Macedonian Army itself.
The retreat itself was a disaster for Serbia, with the king nearly captured by an isolated platoon. By September, Skopje, Nish and Macedonia were in Bulgarian hands while a last ditch attempt to assist Serbia through the Gallipoli campaign failed. With the Bulgarian breakthrough, the Serbian position became untenable; the main army in the north (around Belgrade) could either retreat, or be surrounded and forced to surrender. After the Battle of Kosovo, the Serbs made a last and desperate attempt to join the two heavily mauled Serbian divisions that made a limited advance from the south, but were unable to gather enough forces, due to the pressure from the north and east and and had to pull back after they were repulsed by the Bulgarians under Georgi Todorov, the general of the Bulgarian 2nd Army.
The Serbian Field Marshal Radomir Putnik ordered a complete retreat southwards and westwards towards Montenegro. Without Entente troops facing the Serbian southern border at Macedonia, the Bulgarian 2nd Army was able to concentrate its efforts on the Serbs. It was only after the loss of the Macedonian Army that that Entente was willing to assist with an assault on Salonika, but it was too late. Without the Serbian troops covering the flank, the Bulgarians could go on the offensive and the covering French Corps was under attack by the Bulgarian 2nd Army, although it was halted at the Greek frontier with minor casualties. Why the second failed phrase of the Gallipoli Campaign was continued despite the Bulgarian danger was beyond answering, but enough was enough. The Serbs faced great difficulties: terrible weather, poor roads and the need for the army to help the tens of thousands of civilians who retreated with them. Only c. 100,000 Serbian soldiers reached the Adriatic coast and embarked on Italian transport ships that carried the army to Corfu and other Greek islands before it travelled on to Thessaloniki. Marshal Putnik had to be carried during the whole retreat; he died just over a year later in a French hospital.

What do you think of this course of battle so far, Wiking? And, is the typhus epidemic preventable for this to occur?

ghappy1000 said:

By the way, how effective would the Serbian counteroffensive be without the typhus epidemic after the Austrian withdrawal of the 5th Army? Would one Austrian Army be able to survive an offensive by 3 Serbian Armies even when lacking ammunition without being encircled as well as suffering a defeat and retreating? And, could the Serbians transfer guns and troops from Macedonia if possible? Finally, would it be possible for the Serbian typhus epidemic to be averted with a pod in November 1914 or be cured completely by May 1915?

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Montenegrin Campaign, Entente assistance and Serbian retreat

source:https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Montenegrin_Campaign_(World_War_I)
In the aftermath of the joint Serbian-Montenegrin counteroffensive's crushing, the Austrians continued to annihilate the Montenegrins. It was hoped that the capture of Montenegro would speed up the need for a Serbian retreat, resulting in the total destruction of the Serbian Army and its surrender, with everyone alive going to prisoner of war camps. This was in contrast to a mere attack on the retreating Serbs, which would enable parts of the army to retreat. However, General Sarkotic warned the General pursuing Serbia's Army, Hermann Kovess, that allowing even a small portion of these troops would not only boost morale, but enable the opening of a new front against Austria Hungary to be opened and lead to a heavier burden on the Bulgarians, if they didn't want to tie up their troops on a secondary front just as if an entire army of Entente troops was also detained simultaneously in Salonika preparing for an offensive against Bulgaria that would never come. On the other hand, the Montenegrin Army would never resist or evacuate once the Serbs leave their homeland and surrender. The counter-response was that an offensive into Montenegro would be worse for Entente morale, trap and destroy more Serbian troops and prevent Bulgarian ambitions on the Adriatic coast from coming into fruition.
By November 1915, the Serbian Army had been defeated by an Austrian-Hungarian, German and Bulgarian invasion. The remnants of the Serbian army had withdrawn through Montenegro and Albania, and were being evacuated by allied ships since 12 October, first to Italy and later to Corfu. To exploit the success, the Austro-Hungarian High Command in Teschen ordered the destruction of Montenegro's military, once and for all. Montenegro was virtually undefended after most of the inland army was lost in a pocket and the Serbs were counterattacking only to defend their evacuation. The only troops left in Montenegro itself were those not sacrificed in the earlier Serbian-Montenegrin attack. Furthermore, Hotzendorf wanted the Albanian ports and deprivation of Albania as a base for Serb and Italian ambitions and operations. Help from disgruntled Albanians was expected.
Sarkotic later relented when the Serbs approached the Montenegrin border. His operational plan was to consist of the following. One army division, taken from coastal and mountain defence troops nearby under his command would attack Trebinje and Kotor, while the other division from his corps, composed of the XIX. Armeekorps, reinforced with troops from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Dalmatia. They had to attack the main force of the Montenegrin army and retreating Serbs, gathered around Mount Lovcen, and a second attack was planned from Trebinje towards the east. In the east and north, the VIII. Armeekorps under command the command of Hermann Kovess was to bind the Montenegrin troops there present. XIX Corps had to converge with the VIII Corps at Podgorica and encircle the Serbs, since no Montenegrins would be expected in the sector.
The retreating Serbian 1st Division's troops had entrenched themselves around the village of Mojkovac. Austro-Hungarian forces attacked the army's positions early that day along with heavy artillery bombardment on Mojkovac itself. By noon, the Austro-Hungarian attack was repulsed, suffering heavy casualties. Fighting resumed from then on, until the Austro-Hungarian forces left the battlefield, leaving more than 2,000 of their soldiers dead. By the end of the day, Serbian and Montenegrin forces were able to repulse multiple attacks made by Austro-Hungarian forces, taking back control of Mojkovac and its surroundings. Lots of heavy fighting was done closely with fixed bayonets and knives. On 7 November, Austro-Hungarian launched a second attack on Montenegrin positions. The attack again failed, inflicting heavy losses on both sides. Despite having a much stronger, larger, and better-equipped army, Austro-Hungarian forces abandoned their positions in Mojkovac on the 7th and preformed a retreat.
There was heavy Serbian and Montenegrin dispute as to the course of the battle. Despite the defeat of a numerically superior enemy, the objective of the battle was to permit extra time for the Serbian Army to retreat. It was expected that the Serbs would hold the Albanian mountains and counterattack, then retreat all the way to Durrazo and Scutari for evacuation to Corfu and Salonika by Italian and French ships. The Montenegrin and Serbian army remnants continued to hold the Berane-Andrijevica-Mojkovac-Tara River line until withdrawing on 20 November. The Austrians then continued pushing their offensive southwards to enforce Montenegrin surrender. Berane and Pec were in Austro Hungarian hands by the 13th anyway and Montenegro's demise was coming. The previous day, the key defensive position of Montenegro, Mount Lovcen, was in Austro Hungarian hands with the Montenegrin Army and it was caused by Austro-Hungarian mountain and ship artillery near captured Kotor. On 9 November, the attack began with a massive artillery bombardment. The Montenegrins lacked everything: guns, ammunition, food and shelter. On 11 November, Mount Lovcen was in Austrian hands. In the meantime, two independent brigades under Feldmarschalleutnant Braun advanced towards Niksic covering the left flank and threatening to cut off the Montenegrins from the north-east. On 15 November, the vanguard of the Austrian army entered Cetinje and captured it after a few days with a battle between them and city dwellers. Braun had encountered stiff resistance and advanced only 10 km in the direction of Nikšić until the city fell on 18 November.
Negotiations for an armistice were underway on 18 November, when Montenegro's capital city was about to fall to the enemy.The king, Nicholas I, refused the harsh unconditional surrender and annexation of his country, but fled to Albania and later Italy after a failed counterattack and insurrection by irregulars on the 25th. From there, he issued an order to Count and General Janko Vukotic to persevere with the national struggle. The remaining government ministers and politicians demanded the surrender of the Montenegrin Army's retreating and miserable remnants after laying down their ammunition by 30 November, which was accepted as winter was coming and to uselessly burden their national and Serbian forces while tying up only a corps of the Austrian Army at maximum was futile. The Montenegrin Army surrendered that date.
General Kövess was awarded the Silver Merit Medal (Signum Laudis) with war-ribbon on the 12th of December 1915 and promoted to Generaloberst on the 26th of February 1916. During the following weeks, the troops of the 3rd Austrian Hungarian army occupied the rest of Montenegro and invaded Albania, taking Scutari and finally Durazzo at the end of December. The evacuation of the Serbian army had been completed on 30 December, after which the Austrians occupied the city the next day and prepared for a victorious 1 January celebration with the soldiers and several Serbian prisoners in captivity. On 1 January 1916, during the New Year honorary celebrations, a provisional military government was established under Viktor Weber Edler Von Windelau, he was replaced by Heinrich Clam-Martinic on 10 July 1917, who filled this position until the end of the war. Towards the end of the year [1915], the useless sacrifice of a Serbian army for a failed offensive that resulted in defeat until the end of the year was reflected in Balkan media, especially in Montenegro.
During the Bulgarian First Army's advance onto Serbia, Morava and Kosovo were invaded as part of the strategic offensive against Serbia. The Serbs suffered their second Kosovan defeat in the battles for Morava and Kosovo. Under the leadership of Bulgarian Lieutenant General Kliment Boyadzhiev, the Serbian 1st Army of Field Marshal Stepa Stephanovic was defeated and forced to retreat, with the smaller Timok Army destroyed while covering the retreat. The retreating Serbian Armies were about to counterattack the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army with expected help from Macedonian reinforcements the second time after it was stretched, but Bulgarian intervention disrupted the plans as the counterattack force was ordered to reinforce the routed division covering their sector and protect the southern flank and anticipated retreat. The battle continued for 30 days, 16 August to 14 September, and the Bulgarians penetrated up to 90 km deep into the Serbia's territory. The Serbs lost 10,000 men; 60 guns and a huge amount of military equipment in the battle and had to retreat further from the scene. This was because despite the harsh morale and terrain along with the weather that assisted resistance, the Bulgarians finally broke through at Pivok on 5 September and encircled several Serbian battalions, resulting in the effective loss of a division when the next battle began on 15 September.
To the south, the 2nd Bulgarian Army overwhelmed the 2 divisions from the Macedonian Army and a hastilly raised third at Ovce Pole, which gave the battle the name. In the battle, the Bulgarian army encircled the Macedonian Army and despite desperate attempts to breakout, plus reinforcements by a division to the south, the army was destroyed except for the remnants of two Serbian divisions which retreated northwards. Skopje, Macedonia's capital, was also captured, along with Vardar Macedonia, and the railway and retreat routes to Greece were severed from contact with the Serbian Army. The main blow was at Kumanovo where the Bulgarian 3rd and 7th divisions easily defeated the Serbian army. On the third day the Bulgarian Cavalry Division also advanced, defeating the Serbian counter-attack and reaching Veles and the Vardar. Without the southern flank threat by Entente troops, the Bulgarians were able to permanently seal the Macedonian Army from contact with the outside.
In the Kosovo Offensive portion of the invasion, the third major historical battle to be fought in the sector, from 16 September to 10 October, the Serbs suffered an even crushing defeat in the battle, with 45,000 troops lost and 5,000 stragglers that later became casualties. The 1915 Kosovan Battle began with the Bulgarian 1st Army's forcing of southern Morava, where the Nis-Pristina junction was held and later lost. A short counterattack and resistance attempt at Prokuplije resulted in further losses on the Serbs' side. Heavily outnumbered, the Serbs made a futile stand at Gijilane before retreating even more and Pristina was captured by 1 October. The Serbs tried a desperate counteroffensive to join their beleaguered forces in Macedonia, but failed, leaving only the two battered divisions which took part in the relief attempt to escape from the Macedonian Pocket. When Debar was captured on 10 October, the battle ended with vast quantities of military equipment such as 200 guns and 200 cars in addition to the troops lost.
The battles of Krivolak and Kosturino, the same battles that led to the destruction of Serbia's Macedonian Army, led to requests for help by the Entente from the Serbs. However, the Entente troops nearby were busy dealing with the Gallipoli Campaign. As a result, no divisions could be sent to the Serbian and Macedonian front, weakening Serbian morale; increasing Serbian losses and leading to the postwar "great Entente betrayal", with the counter-response being that success at Gallipoli and Suvla Bay would be of better assistance to them; Russia and Serbia by capturing Constantinople; forcing Ottoman surrender; enabling the passage of necessary supplies and threatening Bulgaria with invasion or neutrality.
Very little fighting occurred on the southern frontier until October 4, when it became clear that the Bulgarians had received reinforcements as their artillery fire became better directed and more concentrated. On October 6 and 7 they attacked and took Rocky Peak, taking 50 Serbian prisoners. From here they had a good position to shell the British lines. On October 8, the Bulgarian Army launched an all-out attack. General Jurisic-Sturm tried to coordinate his defensive operations with the retreating Serbian 1st Army to his left, but the enemy forces were too strong, about 4 times the size of the Serbs. As newly arrived forces in Saloniki could not reach the front soon, because of bad roads, there was no alternative but to withdrawal. The Serbian division was destroyed in the withdrawal. Their casualties were about 10,500 men and tens of guns.
[Serbian retreat and Entente support would be covered next update.]

continuation of post 16

During the Bulgarian First Army's advance onto Serbia, Morava and Kosovo were invaded as part of the strategic offensive against Serbia. The Serbs suffered their second Kosovan defeat in the battles for Morava and Kosovo. Under the leadership of Bulgarian Lieutenant General Kliment Boyadzhiev, the Serbian 1st Army of Field Marshal Stepa Stephanovic was defeated and forced to retreat, with the smaller Timok Army destroyed while covering the retreat. The retreating Serbian Armies were about to counterattack the 7th Austro-Hungarian Army with expected help from Macedonian reinforcements the second time after it was stretched, but Bulgarian intervention disrupted the plans as the counterattack force was ordered to reinforce the routed division covering their sector and protect the southern flank and anticipated retreat. The battle continued for 30 days, 16 August to 14 September, and the Bulgarians penetrated up to 90 km deep into the Serbia's territory. The Serbs lost 10,000 men; 60 guns and a huge amount of military equipment in the battle and had to retreat further from the scene. This was because despite the harsh morale and terrain along with the weather that assisted resistance, the Bulgarians finally broke through at Pivok on 5 September and encircled several Serbian battalions, resulting in the effective loss of a division when the next battle began on 15 September.
To the south, the 2nd Bulgarian Army overwhelmed the 2 divisions from the Macedonian Army and a hastilly raised third at Ovce Pole, which gave the battle the name. In the battle, the Bulgarian army encircled the Macedonian Army and despite desperate attempts to breakout, plus reinforcements by a division to the south, the army was destroyed except for the remnants of two Serbian divisions which retreated northwards. Skopje, Macedonia's capital, was also captured, along with Vardar Macedonia, and the railway and retreat routes to Greece were severed from contact with the Serbian Army. The main blow was at Kumanovo where the Bulgarian 3rd and 7th divisions easily defeated the Serbian army. On the third day the Bulgarian Cavalry Division also advanced, defeating the Serbian counter-attack and reaching Veles and the Vardar. Without the southern flank threat by Entente troops, the Bulgarians were able to permanently seal the Macedonian Army from contact with the outside.
In the Kosovo Offensive portion of the invasion, the third major historical battle to be fought in the sector, from 16 September to 10 October, the Serbs suffered an even crushing defeat in the battle, with 45,000 troops lost and 5,000 stragglers that later became casualties. The 1915 Kosovan Battle began with the Bulgarian 1st Army's forcing of southern Morava, where the Nis-Pristina junction was held and later lost. A short counterattack and resistance attempt at Prokuplije resulted in further losses on the Serbs' side. Heavily outnumbered, the Serbs made a futile stand at Gijilane before retreating even more and Pristina was captured by 1 October. The Serbs tried a desperate counteroffensive to join their beleaguered forces in Macedonia, but failed, leaving only the two battered divisions which took part in the relief attempt to escape from the Macedonian Pocket. When Debar was captured on 10 October, the battle ended with vast quantities of military equipment such as 200 guns and 200 cars in addition to the troops lost.
The battles of Krivolak and Kosturino, the same battles that led to the destruction of Serbia's Macedonian Army, led to requests for help by the Entente from the Serbs. However, the Entente troops nearby were busy dealing with the Gallipoli Campaign. As a result, no divisions could be sent to the Serbian and Macedonian front, weakening Serbian morale; increasing Serbian losses and leading to the postwar "great Entente betrayal", with the counter-response being that success at Gallipoli and Suvla Bay would be of better assistance to them; Russia and Serbia by capturing Constantinople; forcing Ottoman surrender; enabling the passage of necessary supplies and threatening Bulgaria with invasion or neutrality.
Very little fighting occurred on the southern frontier until October 4, when it became clear that the Bulgarians had received reinforcements as their artillery fire became better directed and more concentrated. On October 6 and 7 they attacked and took Rocky Peak, taking 50 Serbian prisoners. From here they had a good position to shell the British lines. On October 8, the Bulgarian Army launched an all-out attack. General Jurisic-Sturm tried to coordinate his defensive operations with the retreating Serbian 1st Army to his left, but the enemy forces were too strong, about 4 times the size of the Serbs. As newly arrived forces in Saloniki could not reach the front soon, because of bad roads, there was no alternative but to withdrawal. The Serbian division was destroyed in the withdrawal. Their casualties were about 10,500 men and tens of guns.

Aftermath of the Serbian disaster

In the aftermath of the 'Serbian National Disaster', the survivors had little intention of continuing the fight, as it seemed. A German order to cancel the planned Bulgarian invasion of Salonika with only the French Oriental Expeditionary Corps in its defence to avert Greek participation on the side of the Entente was ignored as the Bulgarians felt they had the strength to brush aside any French division fighting with Greeks and demoralised Serbs after defeat. The Serbian disaster opened the railroad line from Berlin to Constantinople and isolated parts of the Serbian Army, although heavily battered, seriously decimated and virtually devoid of ammunition, escaped total annihilationand after reorganizing, were supposed to resume operations in a few months. The most serious flaw for the Central Powers was letting the Allies to remain at Salonika, where, using the moral excuse of saving the Serbian Army, they managed to substitute the impossible Serbian front with a more viable one established in Macedonia (albeit by violating the territory of an officially neutral country, Greece] for supply and assistance. It was hoped that the Bulgarians wouldn't invade and if they did, Greece would join the Entente despite the pro-German King Constantine intermeddling with political affairs. Prime Minister Venizelos was pro-Entente and contemplated Greek operations with the armies once his country joined the Entente. In the meantime, Austro-Hungarian troops pushed further into Albania and nearly destroyed the Italian presence.
Unfortunately, the French presence wasn't to be long. With the Germans taking Riga, destroying a Russian Army and threatening Petrograd, the British and French couldn't spare any more troops from the Western and Gallipoli Fronts. A second division en route to Salonika had to be diverted for support of the Suvla beachhead defence and counteroffensive should the Ottomans attack or the need to retreat become a necessity. The Bulgarians were elated at the role it took in destroying a Serbian Army and Austria-Hungary two armies, plus total devastation of Montenegro. The Bulgarian and Austro-Hungarian counteroffensive took place on 15 March 1916 and despite the resistance of the Serbs and French, the troops were forced to withdraw. The Bulgarians took pleasure at destroying the Serbs despite the bigger threat being the French and the Austrians, who constituted one division, tied up the French. After the destruction of the reformed Serbian 1st Army, made up of reorganizing, unprepared and demoralized soldiers with some of them being weaponless, the French Corps was destroyed simultaneously in the 'Salonika pocket'. Greek Army troops within the sector were surprised and surrendered, some in anger at the king's betrayal and lack of sympathy for Serbia and the national army. At this point, with the war in the Balkans almost lost, the British General Staff wanted to withdraw any British troops from Greece, which totalled only a division's worth of strength in isolated regiments, but the French government protested strongly and the troops remained, leading to the loss of the Oriental Corps.
Said offensive mentioned above was the 'Struma Offensive', which began at Kosturino and crossed the Greek frontier. During the offensive, the Serbs were actually seen to be resisting fiercely, but Bulgarian aggressive attacks and lack of ammunition doomed them and they were cut off when Salonika fell into Bulgarian 1st Army hands on 25 March after facing little opposition. Later, it was found that only 200 guns could be found in the reduced Serbian Army and there had used the artillery. The offensive was launched by the general Kliment Boyadzhiev and after initiating, took Florina and Banista while Serbs and French were tied up defending the eastern flank. Bulgarian 2nd and 4th Armies tied up the bulk of the Serbian Army and Frenchmen on the Chegin mountain range and village. After the defeat of the minor Serbian units stationed there as in an act of negligence, the Serbs were doomed. The plan on the eastern flank was to seize the railroad from Drama to Komotini and this objective was given to the second Bulgarian Army, with the heaviest burden placed on the 10th Aegean Division. For the operation, General Georgi Todorov could rely on 58 battalions, 116 machine guns, 57 artillery batteries and 5 cavalry squadrons in his army and an additional 25 battalions, 24 machine guns, 31 batteries and 5 squadrons in the 10th Division.
The Struma Offensive had the 7th Rila, 11th Macedonian Division and the 3/2 Infantry Brigade and 10th Division of the Bulgarian 1st Army advancing to sever a 230 kilometer long front. For six days the Bulgarian forces achieved all their objectives in the face of weak Greek and French resistance: following the ouster of pro-Entente Venizelos, the royal government in Athens had disarmed it forces, and selected a course of neutrality at all costs, even demanding the local Greek troops to not resist the Bulgarian invasion. The depth of the advance reached 80-90 kilometers and an area of 4,000 square kilometers was occupied. Most importantly however, the Macedonian Front was shortened drastically with the surrender of the Serb, French and Greek troops in the 'Salonika Pocket'. In addition, the demobilized Greek IV Army Corps, numbering 464 officers and 6373 soldiers, that was positioned in the area but wasn't allowed by the Greek government to resist, was disbanded and its troops and armament were interned by the Germans in Gorlitz for the rest of the war. The cities of Kavala, Serres, Drama and Komotini were taken before the city of Salonika on 22 March and after surrounding chaos in Greek defences, took the city in 3 days.
A second evacuation was considered necessary, but Serbian insistance that the army remnants shouldn't retreat a second time and refight in Italy in return for Italian claims to Slovenia and Croatia, considered as Serbian irredentist territories despite the better chance of success. Fighting the Ottomans was the last thing the army wanted after losing battles to Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary. A long and perilous sea voyage or anti-Ottoman campaign to Russia followed by exhausting limited logistics and railways were impossible. More importantly, the Greeks should fight for their homeland and lack of shipping, along with Bulgarian strength, made views of a retreat pessimistic.
The offensive, after it took Salonika, changed the views of the neutral Greek and Romanian governments. Without the captured national and Entente troops, the Greeks couldn't resist a Bulgarian invasion and Romania didn't want to fight only Bulgaria alone while facing defeat. However, an emphasis on Bulgaria would keep Austria-Hungary's southern flank safe and lack enthusiasism among even the pro-Entente politicians, who preferred an offensive on Austria despite Romanian numerical superiority against Bulgaria causing a threat to not only the country, but the Ottomans and Greek neutrality with Russian support.

Greek and Bulgarian mobilization and involvement in WW1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greece_during_World_War_I
Following the Second Balkan War, Greece had been treaty obliged to support Serbia's defence and if it did, it was believed that Serbia's offensive would have been successful. If not, tying up or deterring the Bulgarian offensive against Serbia and reducing Bulgarian forces on the Romanian or Macedonian borders could have permitted Romanian entrance on the Entente side. After the respective Serbian and Bulgarian mobilizations from June to August 1915 for their respective offensives, Prime Minister Venizelos decided on mobilizing the Greek Army to defend Serbia and Greece from Bulgarian attacks. Pro-German King Constantine, who married Queen Sophia of Prussia; one of Kaiser Wilhelm's sisters, of German ancestry himself and who had undergone military training in Prussia, along with the anti-Venizelists (opponents of the Prime Minister) were opposed to joining the Allied side and argued that the Serbo-Greek Treaty was void with Austria-Hungary, Germany and the Ottomans supporting Bulgaria and causing concerns on Greek safety.
However, British and Commonwealth ships and troops were allowed to use the island of Lemnos as a base from which their attack on Gallipoli was mounted and the port of Salonika for their Macedonian Expedition. Venizelos was removed from office by the King on 5 September 1915, only to return to the political scene in April 1916, but was discouraged by the Greeks with the presence of the Bulgarian Army. From 3 November 1915, the Entente troops began arriving in Salonika. On 17 March 1916, the Greek government handled Fort Rupel to the Germans, which was considered betrayal by the Venizelist politicians and military officers despite the guise of neutrality, albeit pro-German, proclaimed by the king.
Nonetheless, the Allies still tried to swing the official Athens government to their side. From their positions in Greece, Allied forces [made of Serb, French and British troops) fought the war from Greek territory engaging Bulgarian forces when they launched the Entente's anticipated but long feared offensive on Salonika and without great resistance offered by Greek soldiers, the city and expeditionary force were lost. [The pocket of Entente troops in Salonika fell on 5 April after running out of supplies and morale.] After the following surrender of the Greek fortresses in the pocket, the anti-monarchist leaders took advantage of the discontent with Constantine's 'treason' to restore Venizelos as prime minister. Back in 1915, the prime minister had negotiated with Britain about gaining Turkish territories in Asia Minor after participating with the Entente to fulfill his wish a of restored Byzantine Empire with the Megali Idea in mind replacing Greece. Venizelos asked Constantine for permission to formalize a defense treaty with Serbia in the interests of protecting the Greek border from direct Bulgarian attack. Constantine consented, but only on the condition that Greece was actually invaded and threatened. After his failure to sway Constantine to act against Bulgaria, Venizelos took a new route by allowing French and British troops to enter Macedonia in preparation for a renewed offensive against either Gallipoli or Bulgaria. This caused disarray in the Greek government and Venizelos took advantage of this by forcing through a parliamentary motion (with a 37 vote margin) to declare war on Bulgaria. The dispute between the Greek Prime Minister and the King reached its height shortly after and the King invoked the Greek constitutional right that allowed him the right to dismiss a treasoneous government. In December 1915, Constantine forced Venizelos to resign for a second time and dissolved the Liberal-dominated parliament, calling a new election. Venizelos returned to Crete, his native island, from Athens.
In response, the Liberal Party boycotted this second election in support of their prime minister, which weakened the Royalists' position as it was seen as a government directly appointed by the King, disregarding popular opinion. The tension between the two parties grew gradually over the course of the following year with both sides taking a more radical and divisive approach to the situation. Public opinion was not nearly as clearly divided during this period. When Entente forces arrived at Salonika to Venizelos's request against Constantine's wishes, the Greek people supported the King's view that the Allies had violated the country's sovereignty. However, later on, when Bulgaria took eastern Macedonia and Salonika in May 1916, the public took similar outrage at the King's incompetence and failure to defend Greek territory. April 30, 1916, saw a coup against the Royalist government by the Ethniki Amyna(Εθνική Άμυνα, National Defence), a secret pro-Venizelist military organization based in Athens following the city's capture by Bulgaria. The coup succeeded to the extent that a second provisional government of Greece was formed by the group in Athens, causing some trouble with the Greek monarchy. With the backing of the Entente, Venizelos returned to the Greek mainland to lead the new provisional government at the head of a triumviate. He declared: "we are not against the King, but against the Bulgarians and Ottomans". [The Austro-Hungarians withdrew their forces in Salonika for the Trentino Offensive after the offensive.] Towards the middle of 1916, France and Britain, after failing to convince the royalist government to join their side, officially declared the Ethniki Amyna government as the only legitimate government of Greece, but another Bulgarian invasion was in the making in case it declared war and after the capture of Salonika, losing another battle with Bulgaria and getting the pro-Entente politicians and citizens in trouble was the last thing they wanted lest the king and his support returned to Greece, with them blaming Venizelos for the trouble they faced.
In retaliation against Ethniki Amyna, the "Reservists" (Επίστρατοι), a royalist paramilitarist unit, was formed. Led by Ioannis Metaxas (one of Constantine's closest aides and a future dictator of Greece), the group targeted Venizelist people in Athens and the surroundings, culminating in the defeat of Greece by a Bulgarian invasion during November in support of the pro-German government. The invasion was ignited by an armed confrontation between Greek reservists, Venizelists and French marines and amidst the civil war, the Greek Army suffered defeats in Macedonia and Ionia and the Battle of Ioannina was the final straw for the Venizelists, who were deposed in a coup d' etat on 30 November and who signed an armistice within a week. Although the terms were humiliating, the lack of an effective army to maintain national resistance against Bulgaria resulted in the king signing the peace treaty that followed in 1917, resulting in Greece staying neutral until the Ottoman defeats of 1918-1919 knocked the empire out of the war. Ιn retaliation, the Venizelos National Defence Government and the Entente instituted a naval blockade, seized the royalist fleet and demanded the partial disarmament of the royalist forces and their withdrawal to the Peloponnese. The blockade lasted 400 days in total, during which time no goods were allowed to enter or leave royalist-controlled ports that were under the control of the Athens government until the king returned and made his intentions clear following the Greek defeats by the Bulgarian invasion. This was to set a precedent for much of the future conflict in Greece after the war.

Preparation for Bulgarian involvement and mobilization in WW1

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgaria_during_World_War_I [Actual events that occurred in reality are covered here, along with some modifications.] [This is about material that is counterfactual, except using the Wikipedia article as a source. Bulgarian mobilization is the same as reality except being approximately two months earlier and slightly faster with the Serbian defeat.]
The Bulgarian Summer of 1915
The summer [June to August] months were most critical for Bulgaria as the events that happened on the front changed drastically from the outcomes that were expected. In April-May, following the fall of Przemysl with the loss of 100000's of Austro-Hungarian troops, the Gallipoli Campaign and Italian intervention on the side of the Entente, Bulgarian negotiations with the Entente increased as it was believed there was little point in joining the losing side and getting threatened by the Entente and Russia from the Turkish border, coastline and Austro-Hungarian defeat.
The summer months of 1915 saw the decisive clash between the diplomacy of the Entente and the Central Powers take place. A young French historian, a reporter for the French press and witness of the critical events named Marcel Dunan summarized the importance of this period for the entire course of the war by simply naming it the "Bulgarian Summer" of 1915. Bulgaria's strategic geographic position and strong army now more than ever could provide a decisive advantage to the side that managed to win its support. For the Allies, Bulgaria could provide needed support to Serbia, shore up Russia’s defenses, and effectively neutralize the Ottoman Empire while for the Central Powers it could ensure the defeat of Serbia, cut off Russia from its allies and open the way to Constantinople, thus securing the continuous Ottoman war effort. Both sides had promised more or less the fulfillment of Bulgaria's national aspirations and the only problem facing the Bulgarian prime minister was how to secure maximum gains in exchange for minimum commitments.
During this time many Entente and Central Powers dignitaries were sent to Sofia in an effort to secure Bulgaria's friendship and support. Allied representatives met with the leaders of the Bulgarian opposition parties, they also provided generous financial support for opposition news papers and even attempted to bribe high ranking government officials. Berlin and Vienna were not willing to remain on the sidelines and dispatched to Bulgaria the Duke of Mecklenburg, the former ambassador to the Ottoman Empire Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim and the Prince Hohenlohe, who openly declared that after the defeat of Serbia, Bulgaria would take control of the Balkans and dominate the mainland of the peninsula. What kept the Bulgarian interest the most was indeed the balance of military power. The situation on the major European fronts was at that time developing markedly in favor of the Central Powers and while the Allied operation in Gallipoli turned into a costly stalemate the Russians were being driven out of Galicia and Poland. Under these circumstances, the Allies were hoping to finally secure Bulgaria, especially in the face of Italian entry and the imminent Serbian offensive.
Still, it took Entente diplomacy more than a month to give an answer to Radoslavov's questions and the reply proved far from satisfying. In reality it hardly differed from the offer the Allies presented in May. Once again the promises lacked a clear guarantee that Serbia would cede the desired lands and there was not even a mention of Southern Dobrudja. In the eyes of the Bulgarians this was a manifestation of the Entente helplessness in the face of the conflicting ambitions of it smaller Balkan allies. The diplomatic positions of the Central Powers in Sofia were strengthened immensely forcing the Bulgarian tsar and prime minister to assume a course towards a final alignment of the country to the side of the Central Powers. In August a Bulgarian military mission led by Colonel Petar Ganchev, a former military attaché in Berlin, was dispatched to Germany to work out the details for a military convention. Almost simultaneously,Lieutenant-General Ivan Finchev resigned as minister of war for his pro-Entente sympathies and was replaced as minister by the pro-German Major General Nikola Zhekov. Radoslavov had also entered talks with his country's despised enemy, the Ottoman Empire, trying to gain concessions in exchange for Bulgarian benevolent neutrality. In this situation Germany,unlike the Allies, was able to persuade its ally to at least seriously consider ceding some land to gain Bulgarian support. Still the Ottomans were willing to conclude the deal only after Bulgaria entered into an agreement with the Central Powers.
Throughout the month of July, the Allied diplomatic activity was growing more incoherent. British and French diplomats began to realize that in the face of the stubborn Serbian and Greek refusals of any immediate concessions the best they could hope for was to keep Bulgaria neutral. In the face of its diplomatic failure, the Entente even resorted toless conventional methods of keeping Bulgaria on the side lines, but it was hoped that the Serbian and Italian Offensives would suceed and encourage Romania to join the Entente, getting the Balkan Front full of activity against the Austrian southern flank and finally bringing Bulgaria on the Entente side. The Allies and their Bulgarian political sympathizers attempted to buy out the country's grain harvest and create a food crisis. This affair however was revealed to the Bulgarian government and the perpetrators were arrested. Entente diplomats continued to pressure the Serbian government, finally forcing it to assume a more yielding attitude. On 1st of August, in the face of defeat by Austria-Hungary, Serbian prime minister Nikola Pasic agreed to cede about half of the uncontested zone but he demanded that Serbia should keep most of the land to the west of the Vardar including the towns of Prilep, Ohrid and Veles. In return for these territorial concessions, the Allied Powers had to allow Serbia to absorb Croatia and Slovenia and demand Bulgaria to invade the Ottoman Empire, which it had just signed a treaty with in conjunction with the Suvla landings on 6 August. The Serbian offer was unacceptable and most of its demands were rejected. At the same time the Entente was unaware that the negotiations between Bulgaria and the Central Powers had passed a critical phase and caused more trouble than worth when Bulgaria declared war in 2 weeks' time.
The decision of Serbia to maintain control of Macedonia was controversial because it sealed its doom. As Marcel Denan later stated, not only did continued Serbian control of Macedonia deprive Bulgaria of its most wanted territory, but tied up almost an entire [albeit weak] army to be destroyed when it could have ensured the success of the Serbian offensive's aims and Romanian entry, further and probably totally securing Bulgarian neutrality or Entente participation against the Ottomans and leading to success in Gallipoli, followed by a triumphant march to Constantinople with a successful landing in Suvla.
Bulgaria enters the war
On 24 July 1915, Bulgaria formalized its affiliation with the Central Powers by concluding three separate documents of political and military character after the Serbian Offensive's defeat was confirmed. The first document was signed by prime minister Radoslavov and the German ambassador Michaheles in Sofia and constituted the Treaty of Amity and Alliance between the Kingdom of Bulgaria and the German Empire. It consisted of five articles that were to remain in force for five years. According to the treaty, each of the contracting sides agreed not to enter an alliance or agreement directed against the other. Germany was obliged to protect Bulgarian political independence and territorial integrity against all attack which could result without provocation on the side of Bulgaria's government. In exchange, Bulgaria was compelled to take action against any of its neighbouring states if they attacked Germany, the Ottoman Empire or Austria-Hungary such as Romania and Greece after Serbia and Entente expeditionary forces were dealt with.
The second important document the two men signed was a secret annex to the Treaty of Alliance. It specified the territorial acquisitions that Germany guaranteed to Bulgaria and included the whole of Vardar Macedonia, including the so-called contested and uncontested zones, plus the part of Old Serbia to the east of the Morava river. In case Romania or Greece attacked Bulgaria or its allies without provocation, Germany would agree to Bulgarian annexation of the lands lost to these countries by the Treaty of Bucharest, and to a rectification of the Bulgarian-Romanian border as delimited by the Treaty of Berlin. In addition, Germany and Austria-Hungary guaranteed the Bulgarian government a war loan of 200,000,000 francs and in case the war lasted longer than four months, they guaranteed an additional supplementary loan.
The third documented was concluded at the German Eastern military headquarters in Pless by the Chief of the German General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn, the Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff Count Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf and the delegate of the Bulgarian government Colonel Peter Ganchev. It was a military convention detailing the plan for the final defeat and conquest of Serbia. Germany and Austria-Hungary were obliged to act against Serbia within three weeks of the signing of the convention, while Bulgaria had to do the same within 25 days of that date. Germany and Austria-Hungary were to field at least six infantry divisions for the attack, and Bulgaria at least four infantry divisions according to their established tables and organization. All these forces were to be placed under the command of Generalfeldmarschall August von Mackensen, whose task wad defined as "to fight the Serbian Army wherever he finds it and to open and insure as soon as possible a land connection between Hungary and Bulgaria". Germany also pledged to assist with what ever war material Bulgaria needed unless it harmed Germany's own needs. Bulgaria was to mobilize the 4 divisions within 15 days of the signing of the convention and furnish at least one more division (outside of Mackensen's command and forces) that was to occupy Vardar Macedonia. Bulgaria also pledged to keep strict neutrality against Greece and Romania for the duration of the war operations against Serbia, as long as the two countries remained neutral themselves. The Ottoman Empire was given the right to adhere to all points of the military convention and von Falkenhayn was to open immediate negotiations with its representatives. On its part Bulgaria agreed to give full passage to all materials and soldiers sent from Germany and Austria-Hungary to the Ottoman Empire, as soon as a connection through Serbia, the Danube or Romania had been opened.
On the same day, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire concluded a separate agreement that granted Bulgaria the possession of the remaining Ottoman lands west of the river Maritsa including a 2-kilometer stretch on its eastern bank that ran along the entire length of the river. This placed the railway to the Aegean port of Dedeagach and some 2,587 square kilometers (999 square miles) under Bulgarian control.
The Allies were unaware of the treaty between Bulgaria and Germany and on August 6, made a new attempt to gain Bulgarian support by offering the occupation of the uncontested zone by Allied troops as a guarantee that Bulgaria would receive it after it had attacked the Ottoman Empire following the landings at Suvla. This offer was a sign of desperation, however, and even the British foreign minister criticized it as inadequate. Radoslavov decided to play along and asked for further clarification. When the landings commenced, the Bulgarians decided to wait for news at that sector, but when it was confirmed the Anzac troops were stalled, Bulgaria refused the offer on 10 August.
Back on July 22, Bulgaria declared general mobilization and Radoslavov stated that country would assume a state of "armed neutrality" which its neighbors should not perceive as a threat. This event was indicative of Bulgarian intentions and prompted the Serbians to ask the Entente to support them in a preemptive strike on Bulgaria, which was now impossible due to the Austro-Hungarian invasion of their homeland. The Allies were not yet ready to help Serbia in a military way and refused, focusing their efforts instead on finding ways to delay as much as possible the seemingly imminent Bulgarian attack. Sazonov, angered by this "Bulgarian betrayal", insisted that a clear ultimatum should be issued to the Balkan country. The French and the British resisted at first but eventually fell in line with the Russians and on 12 August, the Entente presented an ultimatum demanding all German officers attached to the Bulgarian army be sent back to home within 24 hours. Radoslavov did not reply and on 13 August, the Allied representatives asked for their passports and left Sofia.
On the following day, Bulgaria officially declared war on Serbia and the Bulgarian Army invaded Serbian territory. British Prime Minister H. H. Asquith concluded that "one of the most important chapters in the history of diplomacy" had ended. He blamed this heavy Allied diplomatic defeat on Russia and most of all on Serbia and its "obstinacy and cupidity". In military terms, Bulgaria's involvement also made the position of the Allies in Gallipoli untenable.