Ernst Udet was a key figure in developing CAS bombers like the Ju 87 for the Germans, Walther Wever was trying to promote strategic bombers like the He 177 and Ju 89. Suppose Udet is killed on 3 June 1936 instead of Wever. What effect does this have on the Luftwaffe, if any?
Got a source on that? I've read a lot about the Luftwaffe and have never come across this.What people tend to forget about Udet is his influence on bomber escorts during his time as inspector of fighters. He increased the ratio of fighters to bombers considerably. Whilst the Luftwaffe didn't win the Battle of Britain imagine how different it would have been without Udet and without the extra 400-500 fighters he insisted were added.
Ernst Udet was a key figure in developing CAS bombers like the Ju 87 for the Germans, Walther Wever was trying to promote strategic bombers like the He 177 and Ju 89. Suppose Udet is killed on 3 June 1936 instead of Wever. What effect does this have on the Luftwaffe, if any?
The Stuka (or whatever) and associated medium bombers providing CAS was near inevitable. Germany is a land power, the Heer was the senior service and the only war it could win was a short mobile one relying on quality. Using aircraft as a force multiplier and an artillery weapon was a no brainer even Goering understood this.
If the Luftwaffe say screw CAS the Heer revolt and bitch to Hitler (including those in his inner circle who he actually listened to) until Goering slaps down the idiot in charge of such an illsuited doctrine.
The Luftwaffe was a tactical force with dreams of being a strategic one that they tried to make a reality in face of all odds. But only after it had developed a strong CAS arm because that is what Hitler and the Heer wanted from it.
Got a source on that? I've read a lot about the Luftwaffe and have never come across this.
Also Udet did not develop the Ju87, Stukas as a special class of aircraft would have existed without him, its just a question of whether it would be the Ju87 or not. Have Udet die testing the He118 then you get the Ju87 and all the benefits of Wever.
http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v07/v07p133_Oppenheimer.html#ftn25Therefore, the prescription for aircraft production prior to the Spanish War, based on the assumption that fighters were not required for homeland defense, was three bombers to every fighter. When, as a result of the Spanish War, Colonel Ernst Udet, head of the Luftwaffe's technical department and Office of Air Armament, decided to change the Luftwaffe's force structure from a three bomber to one fighter ratio to two bomber to one fighter ratio, it was for purely offensive reasons.
That was based on combat experience; why would Udet be the only guy to learn from the SCW? IOTL Wever was dead by then and Udet in charge of production.http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v07/v07p133_Oppenheimer.html
There is also a mention of it in Bekker's 'Luftwaffe War Diaries' I think but unfortunately I don't have my copy to hand to confirm this.
This is a pretty poor response, especially from you Wiking.That was based on combat experience; why would Udet be the only guy to learn from the SCW? IOTL Wever was dead by then and Udet in charge of production.
I get you were seeking out butterflies, but you don't have to force differences just for the sake of having them; its extremely unlikely that Wever and his staff wouldn't take the same lessons to heart if not even more.Udet is considered responsible for the misguided German air defense during the first years of the war, who suffered mainly due to their tremendous inefficiency and the fact that the policy targets and the actual course of the war were completely contrary. Goering gave him on 1 February 1939, the new office of Generalluftzeugmeister master. Udet in this function to the Secretary of the Air Ministry, and was Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe Erhard Milch assumed. Thus, the competence of the now-led Udet Technical Office, which was now responsible not only for the entire aircraft development and production, but also for procurement, supply and supply extended. Was it a mistake to let Udet lead this office, so this was now more so because Udet had indeed been earlier efforts to fill the post. . Henceforth He oversaw 26 departments with 4,000 officers, officials and engineers, while in charge of everything, but were responsible for nothing itself [3] The Office of Generalluftzeugmeister Master meant another competence circumcision for Erhard Milch, who noted with resignation: "is in Udet's hands everything to dust. " [3]
Udet, art and airshow aviator, filmmaker and propaganda figure of the Nazi state, though possessed excellent flying experience, but no technical or organizational skills. Although he acknowledged these weaknesses themselves, Goering prevailed and told him all the necessary human help for the administration to. Udet's real mission was einzuschwören aircraft manufacturers on a common line, synergies to produce and to avoid redundancies in the development, so as to optimize the air armament. Instead, he was at the mercy of the particular interests of Messerschmitt , Heinkel and Junkers , who succeeded again and again, to inspire him regardless of the actual benefits and the costs of their projects so that Udet its specific task nachkam inadequately.