Alternate Hun Strategy?

Okay, most of us know that Attila was at the further end of his range by the time he had reached Gaul and was suffering more attrition the farther West he went. At the Battle of Cattalunian Plains a coalition was gathered to repulse the Hunnic advance, there was a huge battle: women swooned, men cried, and everyone got laid.

But was the huge allied force necessary for the repelling of the Huns from Gaul, the longer they stay the more loot and dead bodies they acquire and that weakness is all the better for manpower sensitive Rome?

Secondly, would it have been better to let Attila thrash the barbarians in occupied Gault and let Rome pick up the pieces following any battles?

Or am I underestimating the psychological element to Attila being in Gaul that throws all this under the bus regardless of the any more intelligent and less costly measures that could be taken?
 
You're probably right. But Aetius is looking out for himself as much as the empire. He cannot let Attila wreck Gaul for any period, especially after losing North Africa. He's a dead man walking if that happens, because he's ripe for being kicked out of power.
 
But was the huge allied force necessary for the repelling of the Huns from Gaul, the longer they stay the more loot and dead bodies they acquire and that weakness is all the better for manpower sensitive Rome?
But the battle outcome didn't implied massive causalities : Attila and Huns were convinced they were going to die, slaughtered by the Roman-Barbarian coalition.
Aetius had to talk Thorismond out of doing this (mainly using the fact his four brothers were still in Toulouse and keeping much of Visigothic ressources), in order to let Attilla flee the battlefield with his forces not being crushed in order to keep Huns as a counter-weight for Barbarian regional hegemonies in Romania.

The campaign in Italy one year later points that Huns didn't loose too much ressources during the battle.

Or am I underestimating the psychological element to Attila being in Gaul that throws all this under the bus regardless of the any more intelligent and less costly measures that could be taken?
I think you may misunderstanding the geopolitical situation in Gaul and the context of the battle itself.
Basically, Aetius plays a dangerous game, trying to balance the power situation and to plays Barbarians against each others.

That said, yes. We're talking of huges armies that Gaul didn't saw since Cesarian conquests : 25 000 men for each side being a plausible estimation. It makes Aetius game, especially in the light of his coalition being almost entierly Barbarian, even harder (and points its skills when he partially win this game).
 
Out of curiosity, if OTL was a partial victory for Aetius in his dangerous political game, what would a total victory look like?
 
Out of curiosity, if OTL was a partial victory for Aetius in his dangerous political game, what would a total victory look like?

I'm not sure it would have been possible for Aetius to obtain a total victory that would truly be his own.

He simply didn't have enough forces of his own to really won the decision of the battle : his own troops aren't Comitatenses but German/Sarmatic auxiliaries (the bulk of roman forces being busy in Italy and Danubian regions).

In order to face Attila, he had to compromise a lot with Barbarians already present in Gaul : "Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricans, Litians, Burgondians, Saxons, Ripuarians, Ibriones, and some other Celtic or Germanic nations" (according to Jordanès).

And that is not even enough, hence why having to deal with Theodoric I, and that wasn't without troubles (Attila having tried to build a "non-agression treaty").

Aetius' room for manoeuvre is therefore extremely limited : a total victory against Attila would have ended being a Visigothic victory, not a Roman one.

(Not that Atilla's army was any less heterogenous. But Huns had still an relativly more important domination over the others components of their armies).
 
But the battle outcome didn't implied massive causalities : Attila and Huns were convinced they were going to die, slaughtered by the Roman-Barbarian coalition.
The campaign in Italy one year later points that Huns didn't loose too much ressources during the battle.
.

When I said dead bodies I meant any outbreaks of disease in the camp, I think that was a problem on that very campaign you mentioned. Basically what I'm getting at is why not allow the Huns to bleed out more while in Gaul and burn themselves out before you make battle, but that question has been answered.
 
I'm not sure it would have been possible for Aetius to obtain a total victory that would truly be his own.

He simply didn't have enough forces of his own to really won the decision of the battle : his own troops aren't Comitatenses but German/Sarmatic auxiliaries (the bulk of roman forces being busy in Italy and Danubian regions).

In order to face Attila, he had to compromise a lot with Barbarians already present in Gaul : "Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricans, Litians, Burgondians, Saxons, Ripuarians, Ibriones, and some other Celtic or Germanic nations" (according to Jordanès).

And that is not even enough, hence why having to deal with Theodoric I, and that wasn't without troubles (Attila having tried to build a "non-agression treaty").

Aetius' room for manoeuvre is therefore extremely limited : a total victory against Attila would have ended being a Visigothic victory, not a Roman one.

(Not that Atilla's army was any less heterogenous. But Huns had still an relativly more important domination over the others components of their armies).

So basically Aetius did the best he possibly could given the situation? That sounds like Aetius alright.

While we're on the topic of an alternate strategy to fight the Huns, given that Aetius' relationship with the Huns was somewhat unique and the source of his power early on in his career, and then taking into account his later conflicts with Attila, what is the best strategy he could have adopted with regards to the Huns from the time he (Aetius) takes power and on?
 
A large part of Gaul,especially the northern parts that were more vulnerable to Attila was still part of the Empire....
 

RousseauX

Donor
I'm not sure it would have been possible for Aetius to obtain a total victory that would truly be his own.

He simply didn't have enough forces of his own to really won the decision of the battle : his own troops aren't Comitatenses but German/Sarmatic auxiliaries (the bulk of roman forces being busy in Italy and Danubian regions).

In order to face Attila, he had to compromise a lot with Barbarians already present in Gaul : "Franks, Sarmatians, Armoricans, Litians, Burgondians, Saxons, Ripuarians, Ibriones, and some other Celtic or Germanic nations" (according to Jordanès).

And that is not even enough, hence why having to deal with Theodoric I, and that wasn't without troubles (Attila having tried to build a "non-agression treaty").

Aetius' room for manoeuvre is therefore extremely limited : a total victory against Attila would have ended being a Visigothic victory, not a Roman one.

(Not that Atilla's army was any less heterogenous. But Huns had still an relativly more important domination over the others components of their armies).

Do you have any other insights about the late Roman Empire?

I mean this is pretty interesting stuff.
 
Basically,the Huns would have to ravage much of Rome's lands in northern Gaul before they can ravage Visigothic Aquitaine or Burgundy.
 
When I said dead bodies I meant any outbreaks of disease in the camp, I think that was a problem on that very campaign you mentioned.

Basically what I'm getting at is why not allow the Huns to bleed out more while in Gaul and burn themselves out before you make battle, but that question has been answered.
As slydessertfox said, Aetius positions would have been extremly perillous if he let Roman Gaul, or what remained of it, being plundered by Attilla.
Basically everything happening in Gaul since the early 440's, is based on Aetius alliance with Huns, and letting the region to them (even temporarily) would be both disobeying Ravenna's orders and appear as responsible of the whole situation.

In a Roman court where anti-barbarism was on the rise, with an Aetius possibly seen as an half-Barbarian (far less than Stilicho, arguably), and considered as responsible to the loss of Gaul...That would probably involve Aetius' head and a plate, eventually.

Stalling would have been tactically unwise as well : we know that Alans tried to switch sides, only to be stopped by Theodoric and Aetius. An unopposed Hunnic force would have probably managed to at least buy the neutrality of most federates, Aetius potential allies' numbers being reduced as much.

That said, I don't remember mentions of an epidemic outbreak among Hunnic armies, but that wouldn't be improbable. Can I ask where did you saw that?
EDIT : Wouldn't you confuse with Atilla's campaign in Italy?

what is the best strategy he could have adopted with regards to the Huns from the time he (Aetius) takes power and on?
Well, the easy answer (too easy?) is : what he did.
The main problem of the first half of Vth century was the Barbarian presence in Romania, that grew more and more important and more and more powerful.
Aetius basically played Huns against peoples such as Franks, Burgundians, Goths.

It's to be noted that his links with Huns (and the fact they were the only Barbarians without regional hegemony within Romania, so less of a political threat) didn't played only against Barbarians, but against Romans themselves : under Iohannes, he used Huns auxiliaries against Valentian's supporters; under Valentian, he used them against Bonifacius, etc.

Now, I think it's possible, if you manage to divide more important Huns, to have a slightly different policy : being more aware of the danger Huns could represent, having a less important dependency to them.
Basically, maintaining Hunnic kingship divided as long as possible, having a PoD increasing inner fights, ending with some Huns as foederati in Gaul or Norica, and a lesser danger using them and divided Huns as military force.

But, frankly, I'd think Aetius' policy was mostly sound when it come to these matters.

Do you have any other insights about the late Roman Empire?
Erm...That's a really dense subject, and I don't want to derail the thread more than it could support. Maybe send me a PM about what you search (or that I could advise you some interesting sources about the period) or create a thread if it's more about a precise topic? (Would it be because I'm far from being infallible, and I wouldn't want to mislead you : more members on it would be a better thing IMO)

Basically,the Huns would have to ravage much of Rome's lands in northern Gaul before they can ravage Visigothic Aquitaine or Burgundy.
That's not that obvious.

Atilla was wary of the Gothic power in southern Gaul, and it's why he tried to make an agreement in 451 with Theodoric. Would have he attempted that, Theodoric would have an easy time leading a comparable confederation than IOTL (except it wouldn't be a "Roman" led one, but a Gothic one) with Burgundians, Armoricans, possibly Franks and Gallo-Roman forces (such as Avitus, but not only).
Not that it wouldn't be possible, but in this case, I wouldn't see an earlier Gothic hegemony in Gaul à la Euric as unthinkable.

That said, Atilla did, IOTL, plundered most of Northern Gaul between Rhine and Seine. It's just that Aetius made him abandon the results of his plundering.
 
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