The post-war results of a swifter Soviet victory in WW2

So, I read this AAR recently, and got to wondering what the post-war world would look like if the Great Patriotic war had looked like this player's game.

The things that I find particularly interesting:

Berlin is taken on the week of 25 November 1943 - which in the game ends the war (you may argue that the Germans would continue to fight, given most of Germany still isn't occupied and nor is France liberated. But still, it's a much quicker war and Germany is something like 18 months ahead of time. That's going to change all sorts of things in how Europe is settled post-war (for example, is Tito strong enough in late '43 that he can liberate Yugoslavia before the Soviets do it for him?)

It also gives the Soviets alot more time to get involved in the war against Japan. The entry of the Soviets into the Pacific war is often given as one of the big, if not the biggest, reason for the Japanese surrender. Might we see Japan surrender without the a-bomb being used? And if not, how might the struggles for control of Japanese policy go? Might a Soviet entry into the Pacific war in later '43 mean that the Soviets and Americans share occupation zones in Japan itself?

The Soviets lose less men in the AAR-world than they did in the real world - just 2.24 million military deaths verses OTL's 8.7-13.85 million military deaths. That's fairly huge - what effects does an extra 6.5-11.5 million military age men have on the post war Soviet Union?

What sort of civilian death toll do people think the Soviets would have endured in this world? I am guessing that with the Germans being driven back more quickly, that will mean less civilian deaths, but I don't think the civilian death toll would be reduced as much as the military death toll - OTL it was 10-14 million, with 6 million of that total being lost to famine. Less of a need to call up EVERY able bodied man into the red army would mean the famines during the war would be less severe (more men to work the farms) but would they be much less severe? Disruption to transport links will still be severe and there will still be the need to get as many people as possible working in factories to turn out weapons and ammunition. Might we see the civilian death toll halved? More than halved? Less than halved?

Also, in the AAR, the Germans penetrated deeper into North Russia, much less deeply into the Ukraine (they never even reached Crimea in the AAR), never cut Leningrad off (though the battles around Lenningrad were still bad enough that the city would be made hell - just less of a hell than OTL's Lenningrad became). What sort of effects would that have? Would the deeper penetration around the North of the front damage Soviet industry badly? Would the much shallower progress in the South change the food situation by much?

Certainly the Soviets will be much stronger in the post war world.

fasquardon
 
Is that any possible pod for this? Don't just make what ifs and conclusions to hypothethical scenarios based on computer games. Is the pod the encirclement of Army Group Center in 1941 for some reason?
By the way, congratulations! You've saved at least two million Jews and millions of other people from Nazi hands and extermination and suffering. Problem is that the Germans will react with the army group's destruction and the Soviets got stronger, but Communism, for its flaws, is still better than Nazi and fascist genocide and mass murder. Also, while the Soviets got stronger, besides the fact they're better than the Nazis, they can present a more effective counter to Fascism [and imperialism] in any form and even with its evils, there are more potential Soviet dissidents and anti communists. Bad thing is the strengthening of Stalinism. Of course, a Nazi surrender faster than otl means war in the Pacific over in 1944, so no atomic bombs dropped also reduces the nuclear bombs created. Of course, people may not get sufficient information about nuclear bombs and anti nuclear advocates may get less support, plus any butterflies may result in World War 3 and more nuclear weapons used.
 
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sharlin

Banned
I guess with a non-purged and more rationally and better re-armed and re-supplied soviet army it might be possible, but thats many many many flaps of the butterflies. With the Soviet army as it was in 41 - 43, simply not possible unless the Germans drove their tanks into the sea.
 
never cut Leningrad off (though the battles around Lenningrad were still bad enough that the city would be made hell - just less of a hell than OTL's Lenningrad became).

Actually, they did cut-off Leningrad, just a few month later (which would give the Soviets more time to stockpile food for a siege) and the Soviets were able to break the blockade in January 1942.

With the Soviet army as it was in 41 - 43, simply not possible unless the Germans drove their tanks into the sea.

Hardly. The Soviets really did not make the best of a bad situation and even then they came within a hairs-breadth of cutting off a few German armies in the winter offensive of 1941.
 

Realist01

Banned
The Soviet Union has been rearming since 1929 - so the Soviets cannot have more or better equipment then OTL.

The only area they can do better in is if Stalin does not purge the army of the best officers it had - and/or if the Red army is better prepared in June 1941.

Aside from that they did the best they could OTL - they won Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk after all.

The best they could possibly do is reaching Berlin in November 1944.
November 1943 is out of the question.

Advancing the clock by half a year saves the USSR some 3 Million lives and some destruction - since the Germans would have to retreat more rapidly with no time for their scorched earth policy.
 
Aside from that they did the best they could OTL - they won Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk after all.

In 1941, no they did not. As many historians have observed: the Soviets made a hash of an already bad situation. If the Soviets did as good as they could in 1941 then the results would pretty much be what the Soviets experience in that Let's Play: they manage to conduct an orderly fighting withdrawal, preserving most of their forces (and their equipment) so they can utterly decimate the Germans in the winter of '41-42. Then they take the offensive in summer '42 and successfully push the Germans out of the USSR by the end of the year. They spend the winter of '42-43 and summer of '43 steamrolling across Poland and the Balkans before taking Berlin in the winter of '43-44.

The best they could possibly do is reaching Berlin in November 1944.
November 1943 is out of the question.

Hardly. It is all dependent on how 1941-1942 goes. Although I would say early-1944 is more realistic then late-1943.
 
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The obvious POD would be no purges.
A more limited POD would be planets working.
Uranus goes as OTL, but Mars is also a success. Then Jupiter and Saturn follow and both Army Group North and Army Group Centre are gone.
This would require the Germans to do a lot worst, and the Soviets to perform flawlessly.
Alternatively, Mars really is a secondary attack, Uranus goes as OTL, and Saturn goes as planned (Rostov is taken and Army group A is trapped)
This might not be enough to make it to Berlin in 43, though.
 
I think people need to actually read the link in the first post, thoroughly and in it's entirety, before posting in this thread.
 

Realist01

Banned
In 1941, no they did not. As many historians have observed: the Soviets made a hash of an already bad situation. If the Soviets did as good as they could in 1941 then the results would pretty much be what the Soviets experience in that Let's Play.

Hardly - even if the Soviets get the best possible outcome in 1941 - then the Germans advance as far as the September 41 frontline OTL.

With their supply lines shortened by 1/3 the Soviet counteroffensive is less successful then OTL.

In 1942 they manage to get as far as Stalingrad - gains in the Caucasus region would be minimal though. Still a soviet counteroffensive would be less successful.

By mid 1943 therefore the frontline would be at best some 100 to 200 kilometers more westward then OTL. With better Soviet commanders and greater German losses due to a better prepared Red Army in June 1941 -they might reach Berlin before the end of 1944 - perhaps autumn if we stretch it - everything before that is plain ASB.
 
Hardly - even if the Soviets get the best possible outcome in 1941 - then the Germans advance as far as the September 41 frontline OTL.

So not the front line as reached in that let's play.

With their supply lines shortened by 1/3 the Soviet counteroffensive is less successful then OTL.

First off, the early-Setpember 1941 frontline is 1/2 as far as they got IOTL (assuming we mean early-September), not 1/3rd. Secondly, that still leaves the Germans without the ability to get their winter weather gear forward in time. And finally the Soviet counter-offensive will be 2 million men and thousands of tanks, planes, and artillery pieces more powerful then IOTL, as well as far better planned and executed by better trained troops since the Soviets can use the fall of 1941 to plan and train instead of having to replace the forces they lost IOTL at Kiev and Vyazma-Bryansk. So the Germans are going to be suffering just as badly, if not worse.

In 1942 they manage to get as far as Stalingrad - gains in the Caucasus region would be minimal though.

How are the Germans going to manage an advance twice as far as they advanced IOTL against a Soviet army nearly 3 million men larger, dug into a massive defense-in-depth all along the front akin to Kursk, which are far better equipped and supplied thanks to all of the extra industry the Soviets have been able to exploit intact, and are far better led and trained thanks to being able to spend the fall of 1941 and spring of 1942 focusing on training and improving their forces instead of just being re-established?
 
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Realist01

Banned
First off, the early-Setpember 1941 frontline is 1/2 as far as they got IOTL, not 1/3rd.

First off, incorrect:

http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b8/Eastern_Front_1941-06_to_1941-12.png


Secondly, the Soviet counter-offensive will be 2 million men and thousands of tanks and artillery pieces more powerful then IOTL, as well as far better planned and executed by better trained troops since the Soviets can use the fall of 1941 to plan and train instead of having to replace the forces they lost IOTL at Kiev and Vyazma-Bryansk. So the Germans are going to be suffering just as badly, if not worse.

Secondly, the Germans will be far less exhausted, with better defence lines and better supply lines. Additionally the Soviets lack the motor vehicles to transport an additional 2 million men - and the Soviet BT and T-26 tanks are easily destroyed by the 3.7 cm Pak.

So the Soviet offensive will push the Germans back - but it will be far less devastating then the one OTL.

How are the Germans going to manage an advance twice as far as they advanced IOTL against a Soviet army nearly 3 million men larger, dug into a massive defense-in-depth all along the front akin to Kursk, which are far better equipped and supplied thanks to all of the extra industry the Soviets have been able to exploit intact, and are far better led and trained thanks to being able to spend the fall of 1941 and spring of 1942 focusing on training instead of just being re-established?

1. German losses would have been smaller - thus adding to their strenght

2. They would conquer roughly the same territory as OTL - instead of the Caucasus region it would have been in the Ukraine

3. There will be no Kursk like defences along the entire front - not enough manpower or time to build it.

Additionally in 1942 the Germans would be strong enough to push through

So the fact that the Soviets cannot possibly reach Berlin before the autumn of 1944 - at the very earliest - using the best scenario they could possibly get - still stands
 

Nothing on that map contradicts my statement. Indeed, if anything it indicates that the Germans are even further along by early-September then even I supposed. Looks like the distance is only shortened by 1/3rd, not 1/2 or 2/3rds.

Secondly, the Germans will be far less exhausted, with better defence lines and better supply lines.
Which is insufficient to offset greater Soviet strength. Indeed, in the ATL posited by the OP, the Germans actually do have more men then they did by 1942 IOTL (3.1 million instead of 2.9). Though they only have around half as many tanks.

Additionally the Soviets lack the motor vehicles to transport an additional 2 million men
Because obviously the Soviets have not also suffered fewer losses in motor transport along with everything else as a result of the stalled German advance. Also, the Soviets don't have railroads, horses, or even feet. :rolleyes:

and the Soviet BT and T-26 tanks are easily destroyed by the 3.7 cm Pak.
Only if they can avoid detection and destruction as a result of greater Soviet reconnaissance, planning, training, and artillery power. And I guess ATL Nazi magic prevents the fact that the PaKs were rendered largely non-functional by the extreme colds of the Soviet winter.

So the Soviet offensive will push the Germans back
And inflict heavy casualties.

1. German losses would have been smaller - thus adding to their strenght
Insufficient to offset much greater Soviet strength.

2. They would conquer roughly the same territory as OTL - instead of the Caucasus region it would have been in the Ukraine
Because the additional Soviet forces, equipment, and skill obviously count for nothing. The Soviets are obviously incapable untermenschen who do not benefit from greater improvements in skill and equipment like the Germans ubermenschen do. :rolleyes:

For such a self-proclaimed indeterminist, you are being very deterministic in this.

3. There will be no Kursk like defences along the entire front - not enough manpower or time to build it.
The Soviets are incapable of assembling a Kursk-like defense with 8-8.5 million men and several months despite being capable of assembling a Kursk-like defense with 6.5 million men and several months IOTL. :rolleyes:

So the fact that the Soviets cannot possibly reach Berlin before the autumn of 1944 - at the very earliest - using the best scenario they could possibly get - still stands
A lot of this is just you reiterating previous statements while failing to address my own points. Kind of like the last time we had this discussion, actually.
 
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Additionally the Soviets lack the motor vehicles to transport an additional 2 million men
Its worth noting that this IOTL was due to the massive casualties taken by motorized/tank divisions in the eve of the invasion (the few remaining motorized divisions were then converted into infantry divisions, freeing up their trucks for logistical use.) As the PoD supposes a better Soviet husbanding of forces and fighting retreat rather than counterattack, the point is utterly invalid for 1941.

- and the Soviet BT and T-26 tanks are easily destroyed by the 3.7 cm Pak.
At the start of Barbarossa, the Soviets had about 1500 KV-1s and T-34s (roughly 1/2 ratio between the two.) By the end of 1941, they had produced a total of ~1,200 KV-1s and ~3,000 T-34s, which together outnumber the German tank force significantly (which at the start of Barbarossa was 1/3 obsolete tanks such as the Panzer 2.) As tanks are mobile forces, one presumes that with a strategy of husbanding forces for a counteroffensive, casualties among them would be disproportionately small.

The rest of your points I consider not to be worth my time responding to.

Anyways, a weakness in the War in the East series is that it presumes historical deployments everywhere except the Eastern front. In reality, ITTL, the Nazis would be frantically stripping France of troops to send east. A realistic portrayal would assume something like that, with the war ending in say March 1944, with Soviet troops linking up with Wallies in mid-Germany (let's say around Hannover-Stuttgart-etc), with a hasty Wallied landing in France in 1943 to take advantage of the German withdrawal.

What would probably happen post-war would depend deeply on the Pacific Front, with a much earlier Soviet entry into the war. IOTL, Japanese surrender was heavily predicated upon the twin shocks of the Soviet invasion and the atomic bomb; as such, it's quite likely that Japan would fight to the bitter end with even more Wallied and Japanese casualties. Regardless, the military realities mean that you'd end up with a divided China (with the Soviets taking the North China Plain and coast in addition to Manchuria, while the Nationalists retake the rest) and Soviet occupation of Japan (Hokkaido in particular is vulnerable and weakly defended IOTL.)

If we assume the 'few butterflies' route, then the Soviets will invade westward as soon as the Wanna Go Home riots conclude in TTL's 1946 analogue, with the US Army stripped bare to three and a half divisions. They will win.
 
Anyways, a weakness in the War in the East series is that it presumes historical deployments everywhere except the Eastern front. In reality, ITTL, the Nazis would be frantically stripping France of troops to send east. A realistic portrayal would assume something like that, with the war ending in say March 1944, with Soviet troops linking up with Wallies in mid-Germany (let's say around Hannover-Stuttgart-etc), with a hasty Wallied landing in France in 1943 to take advantage of the German withdrawal.

This is one of it's weaknesses, yes. Another is that stuff like organization and national morale* is pretty hardcoded. German national morale will fall to 55 and the Soviets raise to 60 in 1945 even if the Germans still are holding their mid-1942 frontlines and avoid the death-spiral caused by the losses of 1941-1945.

Similarly the Germans won't switch over to their more streamlined and leaner Order of Battles for their infantry and panzer forces until 1944 even if the Wehrmacht has taken catastrophic losses in 1941-1942.

Your prediction on where the frontlines end also seems reasonable.

*A quick note that the word "morale" in the context of War in the East means a lot more then actual morale. It also includes stuff like how realistic and thorough training is, the ability of junior officers... in other words, it represents the composition of the militaries overall skill and it's espirit de corps.

If we assume the 'few butterflies' route, then the Soviets will invade westward as soon as the Wanna Go Home riots conclude in TTL's 1946 analogue, with the US Army stripped bare to three and a half divisions. They will win.

I don't see this happening. Stalin isn't interested in risking what he has acquired in a war with the WAllies. He is going to concentrate on consolidating his gains and moving to acquire the atom bomb as as possible.
 
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Is that any possible pod for this? Don't just make what ifs and conclusions to hypothethical scenarios based on computer games. Is the pod the encirclement of Army Group Center in 1941 for some reason?

Let's say that Stalin takes the warnings he got of the immanent Barbarossa seriously and decides the way to deal with it is to order the army to stage a fighting retreat in an attempt to beat Hitler the way the Tsars beat Napoleon.

I guess with a non-purged and more rationally and better re-armed and re-supplied soviet army it might be possible, but thats many many many flaps of the butterflies. With the Soviet army as it was in 41 - 43, simply not possible unless the Germans drove their tanks into the sea.

I take it that you think the Soviet army of 1941 wasn't capable of a fighting retreat like the one of the game, or is it that you think that it could not implement the retreat as well as the player in the AAR did?

If we assume the 'few butterflies' route, then the Soviets will invade westward as soon as the Wanna Go Home riots conclude in TTL's 1946 analogue, with the US Army stripped bare to three and a half divisions. They will win.

But if Stalin is anything like OTL's Stalin, he is likely to believe he can win Europe through democracy or revolution, and bide his time for a couple years (until the Marshall plan and the failures of the Communists to do as well as expected in elections make him change tack again).

What do people think the post-war occupation zones/spheres of influence would be? Personally, I think that the Iron Curtain wouldn't deviate very far from OTL's Iron Curtain. The division of Germany was based more on political factors than military factors OTL. Maybe Austria and Greece would end up entirely in the Soviet sphere in this TL? Finland might end up inside the Iron Curtain as well.

In Asia, I think that China is unlikely to look too different immediately post-war. Stalin would still have a good motive to give Mao any equipment and territory taken in Manchuria. Korea I reckon would end up being a unitary Communist state, and Japan, well, Hokkaido would surely end up in the Soviet sphere post war, but would the Soviets get any more of Japan to occupy? And is there any chance that Japan might end up a divided country like Germany did? My feeling is that like Austria OTL, the Soviets would allow Japan to re-unify. That said, such a reunified Japan would be less a part of the American camp. Might it end up a neutral state with a more considerable military in TTL?

No Korean war would certainly change Japan alot, whatever the Soviet occupation zones might be.

So I see little in the way of changes on the map. The big changes I see would be in the larger Soviet population and the different levels of economic damage the Soviets had endured. What do people think the total population and industrial/infrastructure losses would end up being in TTL?

fasquardon
 
Maybe Austria and Greece would end up entirely in the Soviet sphere in this TL? Finland might end up inside the Iron Curtain as well.

Denmark is another candidate.

So I see little in the way of changes on the map. The big changes I see would be in the larger Soviet population and the different levels of economic damage the Soviets had endured. What do people think the total population and industrial/infrastructure losses would end up being in TTL?
Well, militarily speaking the Soviets lost close to 700,000 captured (who probably would all die from German mistreatment) and 2.25 million men KIA/MIA. Not sure how to factor in the ~3.3 million disabled, as that category represents soldiers who were too badly wounded for military service, but incapacity for military service is not the same as incapacity for work. I'll use the "divide-by-three" rule and say 1.1 million were permanent removals from the Soviet work force. That gives us 4.05 million men.

That is compared to the 11-12 million who died both on the battlefield or in German prison camps IOTL and another estimated 4 million rendered incapable for a total of 15-16 million. So Soviet manpower losses in this category have basically been cut by 1/3rd. Given that the vast majority of these are young men, this is a huge boon for Soviet demographics.

Now, in civilian death tolls, the Soviets lost somewhere in the range of 15 million civilians dead. Given that significantly less of the population base was overrun to begin with and the Germans were in control of portions of the country for much shorter periods of time, I say cut it by 1/3rd as well: ~5 million.

Industrially, we are not looking at quite as big an improvement but major improvements nonetheless. The Soviets lost three major industrial regions in their entirety IOTL: the Donbass, Kharkov, and Kiev-Dnepropetrovsk region. ITTL, they still lose the Kiev-Dnepropetrovsk region in it's entirety (although the vast bulk of the moveable armaments and heavy industry is successfully evacuated, as per IOTL) but the Kharkov industrial region was only partially occupied and the Donbass industrial region escaped damage altogether!

Additionally, the following industrial regions were at least partially affected by the German invasion and occupation IOTL: Leningrad, Moscow, and Lower Volga-Caucasus. ITTL, only the Lower Volga-Caucasus Industrial Region escapes partial damage.

So out of the 31,500 industrial facilities the Germans successfully captured and/or destroyed, how many survived? I'm going to guess and say around half. Also quite importantly, the 40% of Soviet steel production that the Donbass region accounts for escaped occupation/destruction as did their major centers of copper and aluminum production.
 
But if Stalin is anything like OTL's Stalin, he is likely to believe he can win Europe through democracy or revolution, and bide his time for a couple years (until the Marshall plan and the failures of the Communists to do as well as expected in elections make him change tack again).

I'm not sure if I understand you. Stalin counting on revolution instead of brute Soviet force (or the threat of it)? In OTL when did Stalin count on democracy or revolution bringing about communism anywhere? Which Soviet gains in WWII and afterwards were obtained through democracy or revolution?
 
I'm not sure if I understand you. Stalin counting on revolution instead of brute Soviet force (or the threat of it)? In OTL when did Stalin count on democracy or revolution bringing about communism anywhere? Which Soviet gains in WWII and afterwards were obtained through democracy or revolution?

Off the top of my head, in Czechoslovakia and Poland, where Stalin allowed fairly free elections since he expected the Communists to win by large margins and give legitimacy to the Soviet military presence in those countries. Similar things may have been going on in the other Eastern Bloc nations.

I have read (though I am not sure how trustworthy the sources were) that Stalin hoped a revolution would also deliver the entirety of Germany to Soviet influence.

Of course, the West also feared that the Communists might end up leading coalitions in Italy and France in the post war years.

That this hope that Communist/Soviet influence might spread through Europe peacefully was dashed is often given as a major reason why the Soviets got more confrontational during the 50s. Of course, war exhaustion may be as great if not greater a factor in causing OTLs patterns.

So out of the 31,500 industrial facilities the Germans successfully captured and/or destroyed, how many survived? I'm going to guess and say around half. Also quite importantly, the 40% of Soviet steel production that the Donbass region accounts for escaped occupation/destruction as did their major centers of copper and aluminum production.

What is that? Like a 5-10 year lead in terms of postwar economic development?

And was Denmark's orientation towards east or west in question in OTL?

fasquardon
 
No. But that is because IOTL, the British got there first.

Interesting... A Soviet aligned Denmark would really change the strategic situation in the Baltic and North Sea - even moreso if the Soviet zone in Germany included the Kiel canal...

Mind you, if the Soviets were to advance on Berlin so far in '43, might the Germans start handing over occupied territory to the allies as fast as they can? That might see Denmark end up being reached by the British first anyway.

fasquardon
 
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