In retrospects, it seems like a ridicolus idea for Germany to attack American ships during WW1. Surely, they must have understood that this would mean that the United States would join the war, which would mean that Germany would lose. Would it not have been more sensible with a more restricted submarine warfare?
German unrestricted submarine warfare in WW1.
- Thread starter Eivind
- Start date
sharlin
Banned
The submarines of the time were not like those of WW2, they were basically a mobile minefield, in reality they relied greatly on someone coming to them rather than them going to their targets as they were too slow and short ranged until the really big designs like the U-Cruisers came about.
Cruiser warfare rules does not work, its a lovely idea but it does not work in practice, really the subs only choice was unrestricted warfare.
Cruiser warfare rules does not work, its a lovely idea but it does not work in practice, really the subs only choice was unrestricted warfare.
LordKalvert
Banned
The Germans tried to carry on their submarine warfare using the restricted cruiser rules. They succeeded in sinking very few merchant vessels.
USW was launched out of desperation. The German economy and military were collapsing in the winter of 1917. Only the Russian revolution saves the Germans from defeat. The Kaiser knew about the defeat facing him but not the Russian revolution
USW was launched out of desperation. The German economy and military were collapsing in the winter of 1917. Only the Russian revolution saves the Germans from defeat. The Kaiser knew about the defeat facing him but not the Russian revolution
That is not correct. Under the cruiser rules the U-boats were able to sink about 325,000 tons per month between October 1916 and January 1917,
http://www.uboat.net/history/wwi/part5.htm
This is also not correct. Neither the German army nor the German economy were collapsing in the winter of 1916-1917. However, the damage done to the Entente in the 1916 fighting was not known, so the German decision makers did not perceive how badly off their enemies were and did not realise that staying the course was a valid option..
Germany was actually sponsoring the Bolsheviks, as they were anti-war.
If it was impossible to engage in submarine warfare without risking to sink American ships, surely it would have been wiser not to engage in submarine warfare at all.
LordKalvert
Banned
And by your link the damage done to British shipping soared after USW was declared from 325,000 tons a month to over 850,000 by April. Not only that, but the British were forced to go to the convoy system that greatly reduced the capacity of their shipping- convoys move only at the speed of the slowest ship
In any event, it would have been obvious that continued cruiser rule warfare was not going to bring the British down
The German Army in the field peaks in January 1917 The casualties were mounting and the Russian revolution relieves a huge amount of pressure on not only them but there allies. They had no means to make good their losses against their opponents huge populations and colonial troops.
The Germans knew they were looking at defeat (the Turks were already seeking terms), the Austrains were worn out. The collapse of the Russian war effort is what lets Germany get through 1917 and the release of German and Austrian POWs is what lets them get through 1918
Then how would USW do any better?
Since the subs of that era could carry only a limited supply of torpedoes, the vast majority of sinkings still had to be done by gunfire or demolition charge - ie the same way as before USW.
The sensible course would have been to declare USW against armed ships only. Since most Allied vessels were by 1917 either already armed or in process of being, this would have provided more than enough targets to use up all of a sub's torpedoes - but would have avoided destruction without warning of American ships, since none of these were currently armed, and Wilson would almost certainly have swallowed it.
As to why the Garman Admiralty held out for total USW, this may have been just a temperamental dislike of "half measures" plus irritation with a neutral like Wilson continually poking his nose in (note the Kaiser's famous marginal comment). I suspect, however, that they were preparing their excuses in anticipation of defeat, and didn't want anyone saying "We'd have won if USW hadn't been watered down". The irony is that they would most likely have won if only it had been.
You stated that cruiser rules led to few Allied shipping losses. Really, you implied that it was almost no losses. This is factually incorrect. Submarines using cruiser rules were doing quite well - over 300,000 tons sunk per month - and Germany would have been much better served continuing with this strategy instead, because the US had no problem with cruiser rules and as you yourself suggest, at only 300,000 tons per month the British would not have adapted the convoy system in 1917.
You had stated that the German army was nearing collapse in 1917, which was not correct. Now, you clarify yourself to mean that it reached its numerical peak in 1917, as if somehow is to mean the same thing as what you first said.
Last edited:
The great WW1 counterfactual is what if Bethmann had won the 1917 showdown with Ludendorff and the USW crowd. It was Bethmann that perceived the Entente had been severely damaged in the 1916 fighting and was weakening. Had he won this debate, Germany would have re-engaged Wilson, kept with cruiser rules at sea, and Russia would have collapsed a few months later, but this time, no Americans to replace them.
The German military had a severe doctrinal problem when it came to balancing total warfare with political considerations. This was evident from the first day of the war with the invasion of Belgium.
Deleted member 1487
IIRC wasn't that the practice during 1916? I mean in USW against clearly armed merchant ships.
Visibly armed ships could be sunk on sight. Unarmed ships had to be stopped and inspected. There were some losses to "Q-ships" using this method, but nothing like the 1918 battles against stronger defences and convoys.
LordKalvert
Banned
300,000 tons a month wasn't doing enough damage to Britain to either bring it to her knees or even adopt the convoy system. Its obvious that the sinkings were insufficient hence my use of the term "few' You can quibble with that but the outcome of continued use of cruiser rule warfare would have been the continuation of the war while Britain continued to build up her strength. In other words, defeat
As to the German Army- it was spent. If the Russians had mounted an effort in 1917 equal to that of 1916 it is doubtful that the Germans would have survived the year. Certainly her allies were on the ropes and once they started to fall, then the collapse of Germany would have been inevitable.
The Turks were already seeking terms and the Austrians would soon follow. They were exhausted from the war and everyone was racing to collapse. The Russians fall first but the Germans don't know that
The German Army in the field peaks in January of 1917. If they wanted to win, they were going to have to end the war soon and they knew it
LordKalvert
Banned
That sinkings initally soared soared under USW rules shows that the Germans were right- if they could maintain that level of a year it would have done serious damage to the British.
That the Germans miscalculated the effects of American entry into the war is obvious. One of the often overlooked factors was the American seized all German merchant vessels interned in American ports
The Germans also needed many more subs before launching such a mad gamble.
But the fact that they resorted to such mad measures shows how desperate they were getting to end the war
LordKalvert
Banned
The Germans didn't know that the Bolsheviks were going to take power and sue for peace when they launched their USW. The Febuary Revolution does bring the grossly inept Kerensky regime that allows them to survive 1917
Yes, the Germans made a horrid mistake in pursuing USW. They made many others as well. It was a war losing move
But if the question is "why did they do it?" The answer is that they perceived their position as dire and getting worse. Continuing the restricted Submarine warfare wasn't doing anywhere near enough damage to Britain and the Germans knew it
Would they have done better by not going to USW? Probably not, They are likely to lose the war in either case
Your original statement concerning losses was factually incorrect. Cruiser rules were sinking many ships. Now you claim instead that the British could have sustained the losses from cruiser rules. Since the British survived USW, this seems a more reasonable supposition.
This statement is false.
To quote an old soc.history.what-if post of mine:
***
Of course they realized that it would bring America into the war.
But their argument was that this would make no real difference--that the US
was helping the Allies as much as a neutral as she would as a belligerent:
"Ludendorff on December 22 [1916] told the Foreign Office again that formal
American participation in the war would amount to nothing, and on the same
day Holtzendorff brought in an Admiralty report to much the same effect. It
dismissed the danger of American troops by showing how much time was needed
for their training and transport; it calculated that the American supply of
munitions--already at capacity--would be less rather than more available to
Germany's enemies because they would be reserved for America's use...The only
disadvantage conceded by the report was the possible increase in American
loans to the belligerents, but the amount of these was already so tremendous
a factor in the economic strength of the hostile coalition that little
additional danger from that source was to be anticipated. Bethmann had for
some time been yielding to the importunities of the military, and the
conference at Pless on January 9, 1917 sealed his defeat by the decision to
renew unrestricted submarine warfare." Paul Birdsall, "Neutrality and
Economic Pressures 1914-1917" in Carl N. Degler (ed) *Pivotal Interpretations
of American History, Volume II*, p. 201.
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/soc.history.what-if/Vstz0jJ8jns/u-FUk7rdH-4J
Garrison
Donor
No it is not, the Germans took a battering at the Somme and Verdun and were fully committed. Had Russia been in a position to mount an offensive, or had Roumania entered the war sooner, the German had no reserves available to respond. Germany had got itself into a mess whose ultimate consequences were only postponed by the collapse of Russia. Had Imperial Russia been able to stage the kind of recovery in 1916 that the USSR did in 1942 the Germans would have been dead meat. As it was they squandered the respite they were given with USW, the Zimmerman telegram, and the mad gamble of the Michael Offensive
LordKalvert
Banned
Oh please. Your attempting to quibble and are tying yourself into knots. Few is a relative term. The sinkings using the cruiser rules weren't accomplishing much of anything- just 300,000 tons a month. Nowhere near enough to affect the war and the Germans knew it. That's a "few" in my book and it is in reality. These people are killing tens of thousands at a crack. Its not making a difference
USW was much more effective. Sinkings triple under it. That's a difference between a "few" and "a lot" because if you can keep that up for a year, your really going to dent the British war effort. Especially as you get the big bonus of the British having to go to the convoy system- which is like sinking a fourth of their fleet right off the bat
The British might have survived USW with American help but they were going to survive cruiser rule warfare too
Or alternatively if he had given in a bit sooner.
According to Kitchen[1], Hindenburg telegraphed Bethmann on Dec 23 demanding USW against armed merchantmen. Had Bethmann acquiesced, H&L would have come to Pless with a "done" deal" in their pockets, and would most likely have prevailed. It is conceivable, I suppose, that Von Holtzendorff could have talked them around, but imho more likely that it would have been "What's good enough for us is good enough for you, mate".
That would effectively have been the same as USW, since the limited supply of torpedoes meant that not even all armed vessels could be sunk that way [2] let alone unarmed ones. But with one crucial difference. President Wilson, if his inaction over the sinking of the armed ships Marina and Arabia is anything to go by, would have accepted the "armed ships only" version, so that the Germans could have had USW and peace with the US as well.
[1] The Silent Dictatorship, Ch 5.
[2] By 1917 virtually all British merchant ships were either already armed or in process of being.