WI: Nixon as President in 1960 at Bay of Pigs
- Thread starter LHB
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Basically, the question is whether he would use US troops. Regardless of the place of landing, regardless of whether there is US air support or not, there is no way an army of exiles, by themselves, could topple Castro's government.
As I said in a previous post here,
IMO overthrowing Castro in 1961 would require a massive commitment of US troops. (And if you're going to make such a commitment it's hard to see the point in starting out with an invasion by exiles in the first place. It would be like starting Operation Iraqi Freedom with a token invasion by Iraqi exiles.) It's very unlikely that Khrushchev would go to war as a result but it is likely that he would feel a need to do *something.* I once proposed a scenario in which his response is to do what in OTL he did a few months later anyway--build the Berlin Wall--and I noted that then people would be speculating "What if the US had never invaded Cuba? Would the Berlin Wall have been built?"
One may doubt, incidentally, that a "totally successful" invasion (in the sense of one which would actually overthrow Castro) would be a good idea for the US, even if there is no serious reaction from Khrushchev. It would entangle the US in an extremely messy Cuban political situation: (1) The anti-Castro factions would be struggling against each other for power, and the US would have a hard time being neutral; (2) the new regime would be seen as a puppet regime even by many Cubans who were not Castroites; and (3) there would likely be guerrilla warfare and terrorism by Castroites. Moreover, such an invasion would be extremely unpopular in Latin America, and anti-Yanqui feeling could grow tremendously, so that the US in destroying one Castro might create several new ones.
No doubt Clayton Fritchey, then an aide to Adlai Stevenson, had some of these things in mind when he told JFK, "Mr. President, it could have been worse." "How?," JFK asked. Fritchey replied, "It might have succeeded." (Jim Rasenberger, *The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs,* p. 395. http://books.google.com/books?id=0Ex08ZkkXEkC&pg=PA395) Or as the very anti-Castro Theodore Draper would write, "An invasion force that succeeded in overthrowing Castro without a demonstrative show of popular support could have ruled Cuba only in a state of perpetual civil war or as a thinly disguised American occupation. At best, it would have postponed another outbreak of 'Fidelismo' for a few months or years. At worst, it could have made Cuba into another Algeria."
As I said in a previous post here,
IMO overthrowing Castro in 1961 would require a massive commitment of US troops. (And if you're going to make such a commitment it's hard to see the point in starting out with an invasion by exiles in the first place. It would be like starting Operation Iraqi Freedom with a token invasion by Iraqi exiles.) It's very unlikely that Khrushchev would go to war as a result but it is likely that he would feel a need to do *something.* I once proposed a scenario in which his response is to do what in OTL he did a few months later anyway--build the Berlin Wall--and I noted that then people would be speculating "What if the US had never invaded Cuba? Would the Berlin Wall have been built?"
One may doubt, incidentally, that a "totally successful" invasion (in the sense of one which would actually overthrow Castro) would be a good idea for the US, even if there is no serious reaction from Khrushchev. It would entangle the US in an extremely messy Cuban political situation: (1) The anti-Castro factions would be struggling against each other for power, and the US would have a hard time being neutral; (2) the new regime would be seen as a puppet regime even by many Cubans who were not Castroites; and (3) there would likely be guerrilla warfare and terrorism by Castroites. Moreover, such an invasion would be extremely unpopular in Latin America, and anti-Yanqui feeling could grow tremendously, so that the US in destroying one Castro might create several new ones.
No doubt Clayton Fritchey, then an aide to Adlai Stevenson, had some of these things in mind when he told JFK, "Mr. President, it could have been worse." "How?," JFK asked. Fritchey replied, "It might have succeeded." (Jim Rasenberger, *The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs,* p. 395. http://books.google.com/books?id=0Ex08ZkkXEkC&pg=PA395) Or as the very anti-Castro Theodore Draper would write, "An invasion force that succeeded in overthrowing Castro without a demonstrative show of popular support could have ruled Cuba only in a state of perpetual civil war or as a thinly disguised American occupation. At best, it would have postponed another outbreak of 'Fidelismo' for a few months or years. At worst, it could have made Cuba into another Algeria."
CthulhuFhtagn
Banned
It would take an all-out invasion to topple Castro. Air support wasn't going to cut it. So the question is would Nixon be willing to use combat troops in Cuba? It's tough to say, but I think he would have. The United States had a chance to establish friendly relations with Castro in 1959, but Eisenhower fucked it up by being openly hostile and refusing to even meet with the man (I'm sure Nixon played a part in that too, but still). And although Nixon has solid anti-commie credentials from his time in Congress, he's not going to waste them on something so minor.
I think Nixon would order a full-scale invasion of Cuba. The US could take Havana in a month or two tops, but rooting out pro-Castro forces in the mountains could take years. In the long run, this could either help the US avoid Vietnam ("We're already in one war, we don't need two" or something along those lines) or it could make the US that much more confident that an intervention in Vietnam could work. Oh, and the Cuban people will hate America forever. So there's that.
I think Nixon would order a full-scale invasion of Cuba. The US could take Havana in a month or two tops, but rooting out pro-Castro forces in the mountains could take years. In the long run, this could either help the US avoid Vietnam ("We're already in one war, we don't need two" or something along those lines) or it could make the US that much more confident that an intervention in Vietnam could work. Oh, and the Cuban people will hate America forever. So there's that.
Realpolitik
Banned
Very tough to say. Nixon was notorious for being careful of saying the right things at the right times, but it seems that unlike most American right-wing anti-Communists, he would not underestimate Castro as a simple Latino who would cower in fear of some lightly armed aristocrats backed by the new Rome. "Dangerous man, incredibly naive or under Communist discipline... The one fact we can be sure of, is that he has those indefinable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever we may think of him, he is going to be a great factor in the development of Cuba and very possibly in the development of Latin American affairs generally. He has definite views, but we should try to orient him in the right direction." So, he is probably either going to try to deal with him or he is going to flat out invade-especially since the Soviets are probably going to be less likely to underestimate Nixon like Kennedy. No Bay of Pigs nonsense.
I've always wondered if part Nixon and Castro's mutual antipathy to each other stemmed in part from the fact that in 1959, they recognized someone of equal political intelligence trying to manipulate him and a personality that REALLY bugged him(formal cold introvert and casual warm extrovert). Aka, a big threat. Castro was arguably one of the best politicians in terms of personal contact and conversation that I've ever seen, if you look at interviews with him.
It should be stated that if we need to do a war, better Cuba in 1961 than Vietnam in 1968. The USA has a far simpler internal situation with pre counterculture parameters very much in effect, and Castro and Company don't have a Ho Chi Minh trail to ship supplies to them like the VC did. It's going to be very ugly, but I can't quite see it turning into an earlier Vietnam.
Let me be clear an Invasion of Cuba in 1961 is not going to be Vietnam. There will be no sanctuaries for the enemy to hide in. The US will control the sea and thus there will be no supplies getting in for Castro. Would it be easy no. Would the Cuban people hate us-I would say no. Sure there would be some but if conditions improved for the people then there is a good chance that the people of Cuba would be as friendly as before the revolution.
The destruction of Castro would probably mean that there would be no Sandinista Country in Central America. It is also possible that both China and Russia would suggest that the government of North Vietnam not do what they did.
The destruction of Castro would probably mean that there would be no Sandinista Country in Central America. It is also possible that both China and Russia would suggest that the government of North Vietnam not do what they did.
You totally misjudge Cuban popular opinion--as the CIA did:
"...of the CIA's disastrous assumption that Operation Zapata would spark a mass popular uprising against the Castro government; the CIA apparently assumed that Castro was as unpopular at home as he was in the Cuban exile community in the United States. In fact, in 1961 the Cuban Revolution and Castro were still immensely popular on the island. Cuban communism's appeal...rested first and foremost on its nationalist credentials, and Castro was swift to exploit the Bay of Pigs as yet another Yankee bid to reenslave Cuba to American capitalism...." http://books.google.com/books?id=VRekjjSA5uIC&pg=PA171
As for the rest of Latin America, overthrowing Castro would no more prevent further revolutions in Latin America than overthrowing Arbenz did.
However, if you want to think that other countries would not resent US invasion, fine. After all, it worked out so well in Iraq...
Just because we're talking Cuba doesn't mean it's going to be that easy. There is no Ho Chi Minh Trail but on the flip side Cuba has hundreds of miles of coastline that would need regular, constant patrols. That's a situation absolutely perfect for smugglers and gun-runners who will be popping up all over if nothing else to get a piece of the action. Castro had support from folks in Mexico and other parts of the region during his prep before returning and mounting his campaign against Bautista so it isn't unreasonable to assume there would be friendly agents who could build up the necessary support networks. The KGB wouldn't have much trouble getting hooked in and when you've got launching points in Mexico, Haiti, and other parts of the Caribbean that's a lot of ocean that needs regular patrolling.
It won't be Vietnam but it won't be as easy as you'd think just because Cuba is in America's backyard. Throw in how widespread opposition to such an invasion would be and you'd be seeing a scenario that'd be akin to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank but larger, more sustained, and bloodier.
It won't be Vietnam but it won't be as easy as you'd think just because Cuba is in America's backyard. Throw in how widespread opposition to such an invasion would be and you'd be seeing a scenario that'd be akin to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank but larger, more sustained, and bloodier.
CthulhuFhtagn
Banned
I don't think he would try to deal with Castro, because Castro had already sided with the Soviets at that point. Didn't Nixon come under a lot of criticism in OTL for China?
But yeah, it wouldn't be another Vietnam, mainly because there's no way for the Soviets to ship supplies to Cuba.
Realpolitik
Banned
Easy there. I said it would be very ugly. The only thing I said in that is that Castro has no hope of turning this into a Vietnam level quagmire. He'll need another plan. Castro is a very wily, smart dude. He will think of something. My guess is he hides in the hills and really tries to go for the propaganda effect among America's allies, downplay being aligned with the Soviets and accentuating his support among the people, especially if the Soviets decide that consolidating their hold on Berlin is more important than helping him. However, unlike most of the right wing in the US, Nixon will know that he is tough, and that he can't go through with a half assed plan or try to put someone like Batista back in power if he does. America will eventually win this fight militarily, but it's going to be long, hard, and probably stop dead any plans for other military operations against Communism. It could also be quite the Pyrrhic victory.
The majority of the US is going to support it, if Nixon opts for it. In 1959, public sympathy was with Castro. That had long evaporated by 1961. The media is still rather submissive at that point.
I wonder how this would play in with the simultaneous Berlin crisis and Soviet American relations. Again, K knows Nixon personally from 1959, knows he is no pushover, and there is going to be no Vienna disaster. Nixon has a reputation as a hardliner, but had by then evolved from his McCarthy days into the realist we've come to know and love/hate. I wonder if they will establish a tacit sphere of influence "understanding".
No, not from the populace as a whole or even the GOP, because no one would possibly think that Nixon was doing this for any other reason than American interest. The far-right did complain about it, but Nixon could safely ignore them. The people on the far left who tried to find something to complain about and thus complained that it worsen relations with the Soviets would probably hate Nixon if he brought down the Ten Commandments from God, and he knows that(and revels in it). 1972 America was also a very different place than 1961.
That's Nixon's BIG advantage-he CAN do that, should he please. Whether he would is different. Nixon had no qualms in ignoring the John Birch types and dealing with actual Communists even at that point, but Castro is not Khrushchev. Nixon did not like or trust the CIA sans Dulles, and loved doing the opposite of what people expected and "confounding his enemies". But that being said, Castro and Nixon simply did not like or trust each other from day 1. Their relationship OTL was the international version of Bobby and Lyndon.
I really don't know. I could see Nixon going either way, depending on what mood he is in and what he feels like doing-which impulse will he go for, to shock his enemies at home, or to maul them abroad? The reaction of his "enemies" in the US will be a key factor. Stevenson is not going to chew out the Soviets at the UN, he will be protesting in front of the White House. And as always, with Nixon, it's crucial to distinguish between what he says and what he thinks/does in the end.
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Stopping seaborne raids is a totally different ballgame from stopping smugglers and Cuba has far more miles of coastline than South Vietnam does. A seaborne infiltration and raiding force is more distinctive in terms of what's coming, how you transport it, and optimal conditions. A smuggler could be anyone from a guy in an inflatable raft and outboard motor making a run for it at midnight to a fishing trawler that hides ammo clips in the fish stores to a pleasure yacht full of Mexican tourists. When you're talking small arms and simple explosives there's a lot of ways to sneak that stuff through. What makes it worse is Cuba had quite a bit of maritime traffic going to and from along with brown water shipping between Cuban cities. Stopping a raiding force is nothing like locking down an entire island whose economy is founded on exporting sugar and sugar products and importing everything else by ship.
I know, that was more aimed at the folks arguing it would be over pretty quick. My apologies for the confusion
. It wouldn't reach 'Nam levels but I wouldn't be surprised if it makes every intifada look like kids playing jacks on the playground. He'd have all the elements he would need to make a really ugly insurgency last a long time.And succeed in souring most of Latin America at the bare minimum. This kind of war would make the furor over Arbenz look like a passing summer squall and probably lead to a Latin American drift away from the US. I don't think you'd end up with it going Communist but I could easily see some of the nations in the region signing on with the Non-Aligned Movement.
I'm not so sure that's doable. On one hand Khruschev might be more cautious but on the other he might be a lot bolder with the US tied down in Cuba. I don't think he'd be as overt as he was with Kennedy but that doesn't preclude stepping up aid to the Cuban rebels, doing more in the Third World, and looking for opportunities to extend Soviet influence. Khruschev was something of a gambler and of all the Soviet leaders during the Cold War the most prone to brinksmanship. If anyone was going to kick off World War III it was most likely going to be him and probably unintentionally.
Realpolitik
Banned
None taken, of course!I know, that was more aimed at the folks arguing it would be over pretty quick. My apologies for the confusion
Yes. Also, add in the Escambray Mountains. Great arena for a defender.Which is part of why I'm wondering whether Nixon does this in the first place or not. Again, his quote on Castro to Eisenhower is revealing-he knows damn well that this isn't going to be "limited action" thing, and I find it hard to believe that after the Venezuela incident, Nixon will be naive enough to think that the Latin Americans will greet this with cheer. And unlike Kennedy, he had the luxury of not having to worry about being called "soft on Communism." If anything, he needs to prove the opposite, that he is not some warmongering McCarthyite.
Interesting part is that one of the big motivations for the juntas taking power in the 60s/70s throughout Latin America was Castro-specifically, the fear of another one. If there is no Bay of Pigs or Missile Crisis, or alternatively, no Castro in power, we could see some very interesting butterflies in Latin America. Very different power incentives. So back to the invasion POD. Communism isn't happening-there is simply no way that the entrenched states who control Latin America will ever tolerate that. What will happen however, is that they can't gain the same momentum that they did OTL.
Africa is just gaining independence. There is a possible one. And again, I'm REALLY interested to see how Berlin would play in with this-it will be virtually at the same time.
Neither is he dumb, though. He was a "poker player"-not unlike Nixon. He is not going to sacrifice Berlin for Cuba unless he really thinks he can get both, especially since he won't be able to put the missiles there in the first place. I'm not saying he won't aid the Cuban rebels, but it'll be tough to do so given logistical and battlefield realities. There are plenty of other of beckoning opportunities that might grab his attention(not to mention his ambitious domestic programs), and furthermore, will go against what I predict would be Castro's preferred propaganda line, that he is a Cuban nationalist being overthrown by corporate greed. Also, Castro is not a puppet. Remember, anti-Communism is really, really sharp still in 1961 in the West, Cuba is 90 miles from the USA, and Castro is very politically perceptive. He will go with being openly Soviet aligned if it is really safe to do so.
All this is assuming of course that Nixon invades or tries to assassinate Castro (we haven't discussed that, though I'm personally doubtful given Castro's incredible luck and the CIA's ineptness with assassination attempts) or something. There is nothing precluding him from trying something else first-after all, he can always do this later if things don't work out. Not the other way around.
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bguy
Donor
??? Operation Market Time was primarily focused on stopping the smuggling of troops and supplies into South Vietnam. It's the exact type of anti-smuggling operation that would have to be performed off of Cuba. And its not as though South Vietnam didn't have plenty of martime traffic off its coast either. Per the US Coast Guard's history on their role in Vietnam, there were over 60,000 junks and sampans operating in or near South Vietnamese waters when the operation began.
http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/h_tulichvietnam.asp
The Coast Guard and Navy were still able to make Market Time work, so obviously having legitimate maritime traffic in the area was not an insurmountable difficulty.
Now Cuba's coastline is longer than South Vietnam's, so it would require more vessels to properly blockade Cuba than what were used in Market Time. But that disadvantage seems like it would be off-set by the blockading forces operating very close to American home waters and with them having no worries about hostile naval or air forces operating in the area. So based on the success of Market Time, the US should be able to impose an equally effective net around Cuba sufficient to prevent any meaningful seaborne supply of Castroite forces.
Unlikely.
Cuba, unlike Vietnam, has a far larger volume of long distance blue water trade going on with lots of different nations, flags, sources, and ports of call involved. When you're doing brown water interdiction there's only so many places you can come from and go to in short-distance regional traffic. When you're looking at Cuba, which had a very healthy export economy plugged into global trade networks, it's a totally different ball game than handling coastal junks and fishing ships. Comparing interdiction efforts in Vietnam to Cuba is comparing apples to oranges.
What's going to make that an even messier situation is, unlike Vietnam, any US intervention in Cuba is going to be accompanied by Cuban exiles restarting the sugar industry and working to recoup lost profits. That means you'll won't be in a position where you can just lock down the island to traffic.
Knowing Nixon he might go for trying to flip Castro instead of topple him. Nixon won't have to worry about the "soft on Commies" angle and he had a very different frame of mind about politics compared to Kennedy making him amenable to such approaches.
The question is if Castro will bite after Eisenhower had essentially shown him the door and Nixon was Ike's VP. It also depends on if whatever Nixon offers is something Castro would agree to in the first place.
I think there will still be the attempts by the US but the main difference is the different Latin American governments will be more on guard. With Arbenz then an invasion of Cuba that'd be more than enough to get every single elected official south of the border paying attention and making sure the army is as loyal as they claim to be.
I think Khruschev is opportunistic enough to see a benefit in smuggling arms to Castro even if Castro doesn't openly declare himself for the Soviet Bloc. Africa would also be a very good play on Khruschev's part and if the US does invade that gives him good cover for defusing Berlin.
I also doubt assassination is likely considering some of the straight-up Looney Tunes stuff they tried like exploding cigars. Nixon would probably try other options before invading but if he does use force I doubt he'd do something half-assed like Bay of Pigs and hope a little army of exiles could actually do the job. He'd drop the hammer.
Realpolitik
Banned
And as I said, he has other things to prove.
Problem is, Castro and Nixon were like oil and water. As I said, both men tried to manipulate each other during their meeting and were annoyed that they failed. Nixon genuinely liked Brezhnev and Zhou Enlai. Not so here. And Nixon does have a temper, albeit he is nowhere near as bitter/paranoid if he wins in 1960. And BOTH of them have serious egos. But that being said, both of them were very intelligent and also pragmatic.
Knowing Nixon, I don't think he would care too much what Castro does domestically so long as he doesn't become too much of an irritant to the US. Nixon was aware from his time in Venezuela that there were grievances throughout the region(in 1958, he suggested some serious changes for regional policy, arguably one of the few times anybody in DC has seriously suggested it. Links provided on request), and will probably try to make it clear that he doesn't care how Castro rules at home as long as he doesn't "break the rules". He isn't going to go in on behalf of United Fruit like Truman/Eisenhower did-this is where his credentials help, the Cuban exiles can't complain against him and get anywhere.
It's international relations that Nixon cares about. It's his support for any prospective movements in the region and his relationship with Moscow, specifically, that he is interested in, and will be the cause of any "intervention". As well as, of course, showing that the US is not weak. Those were why he "squeezed" Allende, not the fact that he was helping the poor. The tapes are pretty interesting. Allende trying to show American sailors "true democracy" did not help, but what really seemed to turn Nixon against him was the greater world context as well as the US-Soviet rivalry. As far as nationalization went, he seemed to think that it would be a good cost waste for the Soviets.
On Castro's side, he will realize that no matter how much he might despise Nixon and think that the Soviets have the future, the USA is not going away, and Castro is far more politically skilled-and also has far more a base-than say, Allende did OTL. So, I guess it depends on what he thinks he can get away with, and if he decides that his relationship with Moscow is solid enough to do so. That in large measure depends on what Nixon does.
Well, first off, most of these coups had serious internal and indigenous factors. In many cases, it was a bad economy and an alienated populace.
If the relationship with Cuba develops differently, it could lead to some serious butterflies. Brazil is a useful example here, from the coup in 1964 which the Johnson administration supported. Part of what led to Joao Goulert being taken down was the deteriorating economy, which in part was because he was not US or Soviet aligned. Goulart criticized both the US and Castro. If there is nothing to criticize, will the CIA support the Brazilian military as much, or more accurately, will the economy be as bad? As for the US, Castro, as well as Che running all over the continent, really gave everybody the jitters-it led to us supporting coups all over South America, and not "just" in places like Guatemala with economic interests. Latin America is not homogeneous. The US might act differently in some areas, same in others. The further north you go, the more involved and more active the USA will be.
They also have to make sure that the army is not completely alienated, as well. Let's not forget who really runs things in the hemisphere. Sad but true. There will inevitably be an Allende or two who forgets this.
http://nixontapes.org/chile.html
What one needs to remember of course is that the early 70s are very different from the early 60s, so this is to some extent a different situation. There have been far more anti-American movements around the world. Note his references to Castro-he definitely cast a shadow.
Oh, he will aid them. Especially if Nixon doesn't yield on Berlin. It's just a question of how much the Soviets can aid them, what good it would do, and whether Castro is going to want to be too high profile with the aid unless he decides that impressing Europe is futile.
Cuba also does not have internal conditions that allow easily for assassination, unlike certain other countries in the region. The people who were anti-Castro (in 1961) have left, and any attempt at him that fails will consolidate his power. A VERY key difference is that there isn't a "internal basis" to take down Castro, unlike many Latin American leftists.
So, a possibility is that Nixon tries carrot and stick methods-engage with Castro, but also slowly isolate (like he did Allende) if Castro "has an attitude", in tandem with dealing with the Soviets and their relationship with Castro. And if everything fails or Castro gets too pro-Moscow and Nixon sees red(figuratively in both ways), he "drops the hammer". That seems to be the most likely scenario.
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Realpolitik
Banned
I cannot stress how incompetent the CIA and other guys in Washington were at judging what people in places like Latin America actually thought circa 1961. Social economies really appealed to a lot of the developing world, in part because of the idea of Third World anti-imperialism. This will provoke an immense anti-American backlash that makes Guatemala look like a squall. Their analysis was not free of condescension for Latinos in general, of course-that they thought they wanted to be serfs... what really interested people in Castro and got him support was the Latin American nationalism and him standing up to the "Yanquis" , not all the Marxist theory, although ideas like land reform certainly helped.
Nixon could be pretty nasty and racist ("they need strong leadership to function") with the region-Chile, and but for Watergate kicking him out of office, he'd definitely be a huge supporter of Operation Condor-but I don't think he'd ever, ever be under the illusion in 1961 that Cuban exiles would somehow spark an internal uprising against Castro for the "liberators", and that Cubans would be begging to become a US satellite under aristocratic overlords again, unlike the CIA. Nixon just was not that stupid, for lack of a better word. And this is even more so after what happened in Caracas in 1958-the evidence is in his policy proposals for the region afterwards. Nixon in 1961 doesn't have the endemic anti-American movements and the same geopolitical situation that he did in 1970 OTL, and he has recognized that Castro is a potentially big issue for the region as a whole. He would not have a moral problem with force, but he would not be under the "spreading democracy" and "they will love us" illusion, and he would probably try something else first. Again-the US-Soviet relationship as a whole will be critical to watch. He is also aware of the fact that there will probably be no prospective caudillo that is disenchanted with Castro anytime soon-all the anti-Castro people are dead or in the USA, and Castro needs time to wreck the economy for any long term isolation.
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