How to avoid fall of Singapore and the after-effects
- Thread starter Ming777
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Realpolitik
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From my limited knowledge of this situation, this isn't going to be easy, not with Britain having to dedicate their resources to keeping Germany at bay. Singapore is at the end of a peninsula, and with the IJN controlling the shipping lanes...
Pretty hard to avoid Singapore's fall entirely, to be honest. The Washington Naval Treaty, while it hamstrung the Imperial Japanese Navy in terms of numbers compared to the US and Royal Navies, handed them local superiority solely because they did not have to split their fleet across several oceans (US had to divide between the Atlantic and Pacific, while the British had a lot more coast to cover). This hampered the British in any defence of the island, and their pre-war strategy was essentially summed up as bunching up their fleet in Britain and deploying them to meet any threat in Singapore when it comes up. Unfortunately, when said threat came to Singapore, the fleet was still stuck in the Atlantic and Mediterranean swatting U-boats.
IOTL, the Japanese invaded at the worst possible time, when the British were bogged down in fronts much closer to home (e.g. Britain, North Africa). In contrast, the Japanese could run the West Pacific virtually unopposed, especially after paralyzing the US Navy at Pearl Harbour. I'd say it's possible to delay them in Malaya and Singapore, but only for a few more weeks at best before IJA reinforcements overwhelm the island. Yamashita, IOTL, didn't have the numbers or supplies to take the island without resorting to urban close-quarters fighting (which would have cost the Japanese even more lives), but he could have easily starved out the garrison or called for reinforcements at his leisure.
That said, avoiding the cost cutting by the Labour governments on fortifications construction in Singapore and keeping the Prince of Wales and Repulse under air cover and near Singapore as shore bombardment might make the Japanese bleed more and waste their time. It won't save the island, but every minute wasted is a few more gallons of Dutch East Indies oil pumped for the Allied effort in Asia than the Axis.
Riain
Banned
I hate to be so flippant, but training and good leadership in the theatre in the months leading up to Pearl Harbour would have probably saved Singapore in the short term. The forces in Malaya outnumbered the invading Japanese and were fighting on the defensive in close country, which should go a long way to ameliorate Japanese air and armour superiority with good leadership and training.
Part of this would also include not throwing away Force Z so that it is available to guard the theatre's sea flanks, most importantly opposing the invasion of Sumatra.
The British aren't racist and believe reports of the Japanese advance through Malaya at such a quick rate, so they actually prepare for a Japanese attack at Singapore
1. Have a commander more competent than Percival
2. Less racist British who don't think that the Japanese can't see at night
3. Follow the recommendations of the report that highlighted flaws in Singapore's defence. (sorry I can't remember its title)
2. Less racist British who don't think that the Japanese can't see at night
3. Follow the recommendations of the report that highlighted flaws in Singapore's defence. (sorry I can't remember its title)
Riain
Banned
I think the racist bit is overblown. Britain and Japan were allies until 1922, including joint naval operations in WW1 and RN observers in the Russo-Japanese War as well as the usual military attachés in both Japan itself and places where Japan operated. There was a lot of technical and tactical surprise at the start of the Pacific War, but this myopia bullshit is just that, bullshit!
Doubtful. There was already a substantial Australian contingent in Singapore at the time of the invasion, and AFAIK, London still called the shots in terms of Australian troop deployments then. Though if there were any commanders who wouldn't fuck up like Percival, I'm game.
The other problem is that until pretty late in the war the Australian government wanted the British to defend them, rather than the all-out effort in their own defence they made later. Unless you have a POD in Europe (Italy staying out of the war would do very nicely, since the RN was so tied up in the Med), that means the Australians getting serious about their own defence and hence the defence of Singapore in the 1930s.
The prewar British plan was that Singapore would be defended by the Main Fleet, plus large numbers of troops and aircraft sent from Europe at the start of hostilities. In OTL that wasn't possible as they were all busy elsewhere - and the only possible sources in the region of the troops and arms required are Australia and India. India is a far better fit for Burma than Singapore, so you need the Australians to take a very different attitude (which will probably suck in Indian troops with it).
There is also one major blunder the British never expected when defending Singapore; they expected a naval attack on the south. One of the things I remember from high school was that some of their most powerful guns were all trained to the sea or at least towards the south and southeast, expecting an attack from that direction. All in all, they never expected the Japanese to land on Malaya's northeastern coast, in northern Kelantan of all places! (it's the equivalent of Napoleon invading your nation through the absolute boonies).
Another, more important thing the Japanese did was that they already know just how weak the British defenses were months, even years before they planned their attack. Prior to the invasion, there was a great number of Japanese shopkeepers, barbers, dentists, and small-time businessmen scattered throughout all Malaya, relaying information from their job posts to Tokyo. They were so thinly scattered about that the British didn't even realize just how much they were leaking information to the enemy until it was too late.
Another, more important thing the Japanese did was that they already know just how weak the British defenses were months, even years before they planned their attack. Prior to the invasion, there was a great number of Japanese shopkeepers, barbers, dentists, and small-time businessmen scattered throughout all Malaya, relaying information from their job posts to Tokyo. They were so thinly scattered about that the British didn't even realize just how much they were leaking information to the enemy until it was too late.
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It wasn't like Britain did not have the equipment to send
A staggering amount of equipment was sent to Russia in the last 6 months of 1941 - Hurricanes, Valentines etc
If some of this made it to Singapore instead......
Perhaps Kieth Park can spend a couple of months bossing the Air Defence setup + some of that new fangled Radar stuff + revetments etc for the airfields.
The Hurricane is a good plane - so long as its not being bombed on the ground
A staggering amount of equipment was sent to Russia in the last 6 months of 1941 - Hurricanes, Valentines etc
If some of this made it to Singapore instead......
Perhaps Kieth Park can spend a couple of months bossing the Air Defence setup + some of that new fangled Radar stuff + revetments etc for the airfields.
The Hurricane is a good plane - so long as its not being bombed on the ground
I was under the impression that the Zero heavily outclassed the Hurricane, honestly. At any rate, I figure that the commitments Britain had to make against Germany preclude a successful defense of Singapore at the same time. They may resist enough to allow the wheels to come off the Japanese war effort elsewhere, but so long as the will is there, the Japanese will take Singapore.
Replace Brooke-Popham with someone that was actually competent for the position as overall commander. Whilst he had to deal with being very much last in line for any kind of reinforcements and also potential political interference he does seem to have been completely out of his depth in the job. Just putting someone half-decent in place who does some proper reconnaissance of the territory they're expected to defend could discover, for the military leaders at least, the fact the impassable jungle in the northern parts of the country can be actually passed through.
The other thing that they need to do is sort out the organisational mess the Malayan command was in. When Duff Cooper was made Resident Cabinet Minister for Far Eastern Affairs and chair of the Far East War Council with the aim of allowing for quick political and financial decisions to be made when there wasn't time to contact London Shenton Thomas the governor of the Straits Settlement refused to co-operate as he still saw the Colonial Office as running things and Brooke-Popham likewise refused and insisted on only reporting to the Chiefs of Staff. In Burma local officials apparently didn't like defensive works or preparations being carried out as it competed for labour and risked raising local wage levels. In an ideal world a new commander with the force of personality and backing to be able to face down the local interests would have been able to make things much more difficult for the Japanese, but for various reasons that was unfortunately unlikely.
IIRC didn't the senior Australian commander on the ground in our timeline not exactly cover himself with glory? I'm sure I can remember someone mentioning that it caused something of a controversy in Australia.
As Riain has already said the British for the most part certainly didn't underestimate the Japanese. It was wasn't racism so much as the fact that senior officers didn't believe that anyone - be they European, American or Asian - would be able to travel through the territory as it was impassable.
The obvious choice for that in my opinion would be for the British to finish the Kota Tinggi defensive line in southern Johor that was going to run from Pontian Besar on the western coast up to Kulai and then on to Kota Tinggi at the mouth of the Johor river. It was apparently planned and funded but due to some bureaucratic screw-ups stopped only part of the way through construction. Considering that the Japanese were running rather low on supplies I think it would possibly be enough to see them stopped and potentially have to withdraw slightly to re-supply. It costs the Japanese time and resources to take the last of the peninsula and city but in the end Singapore is rendered useless as soon as the Japanese capture Sumatra.
Realpolitik
Banned
I also think the racist part is overblown. Britain just simply was not in a good situation.
They did drastically underestimate the capabilities of the Japanese for jungle transport, but that didn't lie in racism.
They did drastically underestimate the capabilities of the Japanese for jungle transport, but that didn't lie in racism.
Keith Park did make it to command of the Far East Air Command, May, 1945. However, at the relevant time, the Far East was where you placed the dead beats and losers, or those seen as such, and treated as such, self-fulfilling prophesy.
The Japanese also had a spy with peerage working at the Admiralty, delivering information from the highest levels. He was never arrested, but was distanced from some of the information.
Britain lost something like a 1000 pilots over Northern France in 1941 flying combat sweeps intended to attrite German Fighter strength and oblige the Germans to reinforce France from other regions (Russia and the Med etc) - which it failed to do.
I would far rather those Pilots were 'lost' fighting in North and East Africa and the Far East
And perhaps take some of their Spitfire's with them
Just 2 wings of Hurricanes (80+) and maybe some Spits and a Single Brigades worth of Armor (150 tanks) - hell a mix of AMC and Humber Armoured cars would have been a serious force multiplier - provided they were used properly.
I would also abandon Hong kong and any other non essential 'enclave' - and use those forces where it mattered.
You need more than just planes, you need infrastructure. I suggest reading this book - http://www.amazon.com/Fortnight-Inf...415719693&sr=8-1&keywords=fortnight+of+infamy
It's great but it is good and it does a nice job of pointing just underdeveloped Allied airbase infrastructure was in December 1941. They had airfields but a lot of those fields lacked revetments, parking aprons, proper anti-aircraft defenses, early warning radars, taxi ways, and all of the other things that separate an airfield from a proper air base.
Better infrastructure and raid warning (whether it is radar or some sort of coast watcher system) and the fighter squadrons whether they are equipped with Buffaloes, Hurricanes, or Spitfires will be able to take a pretty serious bite out of Japanese bomber formations.
WRT the comment about the Hurricane being outclassed by the Zero. The answer is no. The Hurricane, like the Wildcat, and like the P-40 when properly flown could match the Zero just fine and like the Wildcat and the P-40 it actually had some advantages over the Zero. The Hurricane could not match the Zero in a low speed turn but neither could anything else the Allies had - not the P-40, not the Wildcat, not even the vaunted Spitfire as British pilots deployed to Darwin discovered at some cost. Even the planes we supposedly mastered the Zero with like the Hellcat, the Corsair, and the P-38 could not match the Zero in a low speed turn. We just overpowered the damn thing.
Also keep in mind that a lot of times they were not flying against Zeroes, they were flying against Ki-27 Nates and Ki-43 Oscars.
It is also worth noting that the Dutch in the East Indies discovered that when they flew their Buffaloes with half loads of fuel and ammunition, the savings in weight allowed them to turn with both Zeroes and Oscars. Granted they were also flying the B-339 variants which did not have life rafts or arresting hooks or other "carrier" type gear so they were a little lighter to begin with.