WI : The Russians refused sea battles during the Russo-Japanese War?

The idea is simple, what if the Russian Headquarters focused on land battles during the Russo-Japanese War and avoided to fight any sea battles?

- the battleship Petropavlovsk doesn't sink with Admiral Stepan Makarov
- no sortie from Port Arthur and thus no Battle of the Yellow Sea
- no foolish redeployment of the Baltic Fleet to Asia

In naval warfare, a "fleet in being" is a naval force that extends a controlling influence without ever leaving port. Were the fleet to leave port and face the enemy, it might lose in battle and no longer influence the enemy's actions, but while it remains safely in port, the enemy is forced to continually deploy forces to guard against it. A "fleet in being" can be part of a sea denial doctrine, but not one of sea control.

The term was first used in 1690 when Lord Torrington, commander of the Royal Navy forces in the English Channel, found himself facing a stronger French fleet. He proposed avoiding a sea battle, except under very favourable conditions, until he could be reinforced. By thus keeping his "fleet in being", he could maintain an active threat which would force the enemy to remain in the area and prevent them from taking the initiative elsewhere.

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The idea is to consider that an intact fleet is more useful than a sunk one. It's able to tie the enemy fleet, detering any amphibious assaults or further moves. This long stand-off happened until the sortie from Port Arthur and Battle of the Yellow Sea.

The Japanese army still reach Port Arthur by land, begin the siege and set up siege cannons that will sink the russian fleet at anchor in the harbour.

War ends much the same, Russian armies destroyed in the east at the battle of Mukden, with no chance of retaking the lost territory, peace is signed, though the russian baltic fleet is spared, but obsolete anyway within a year.

Tsushima isn't held up by the Japanese navy as the ultimate decisive battle, and might dampen the naval officers enthusiasm for the doctrine.

Russian Pacific Fleet is bombarded from the landward side and destroyed. Japanese buildup is slightly easier for them.

The point of the Fleet in Being is to be an active threat. If it is behaving passively its no threat. If it maneuvers to appear to be a threat it runs the risk of being brought to action.

Now keeping Makarov alive may invigorate the defence of Port A which could make a difference.

I think that Port Arthur could have lasted longer. Look at the insane level of ammunition and food they still had :

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19050509-1.2.54.aspx

In my understanding, both the Pacific Fleet and the Baltic Fleet acted as "fleets in being". Pacific Fleet was acting as sea denial, as it would have been able to go out of the harbor and to act directly against the Japanese fleet or against any amphibious operations. The Baltic Fleet was more a risk for sea control, as it would have been able to enter into the war theater and to dispute the control of the sea. Japanese couldn't fight against the Baltic Fleet, if the Pacific Fleet wasn't sunk. They had to sink both fleets in order to gain definitive sea control. Even after the sinking of the Pacific Fleet (in or outside of the harbor), the Japanese still had to sink or to disable the Baltic Fleet. That hindered their moves.

In my opinion, the Pacific Fleet staying in Port Arthur will be destroyed, but it will until this destruction potentially annoy the Japanese Navy. It would be destroyed around December 1904 and January 1905, instead of 10 August 1904. More importantly without the Battle off Ulsan, Vladisvostok would also have the intact Vladivostok Cruiser Squadron, another potential threat for the Japanese Navy.

The Battle of Tsushima isn't how the Russians wanted to fight the Imperial Japanese Navy. The Baltic Fleet/Second Pacific Squadron was originally planned to join with forces at Port Arthur, but the port and naval forces there were lost to the Japanese. The fleet was then ordered to move to Vladivostok at was intercepted at Tsushima. While there were design flaws on the Russian ships, they might have done better if they had been able to dock and undergo some basic maintenence after their voyage of 18,000 miles, especially since they used reciprocating engines.

Neirdak said:

I think that Port Arthur could have lasted longer. Look at the insane level of ammunition and food they still had :

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19050509-1.2.54.aspx

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Both yes and no. While Port Arthur itself and the city was still in Russian hands, both were at this point within range of shelling by Japanese heavy artillery. At the time of surrender, practically all forts and defensive works had already been destroyed. At considerable cost to both Japanese attackers and Russian defenders, but it was clear that they would be unable to actually stop the Japanese from taking the city once the high ground had been taken.

While they did have the ability to continue fighting, by this point they had been pushed off the fortified surrounding high ground and back into the actual Port Arthur. So they could continue fighting and inflict more casualties on the Japanese in urban combat, but once the defensive line outside the city had been shattered, there was no chance to actually stop the IJA from taking the city. Especially since the Japanese army had demonstrated a willingness to continue attacking until they succeeded.

In the best case scenarios, butterflies might have an effect at Mukden.

Neirdak said:

I think that Port Arthur could have lasted longer. Look at the insane level of ammunition and food they still had :

http://eresources.nlb.gov.sg/newspapers/Digitised/Article/straitstimes19050509-1.2.54.aspx

Click to expand...

Interesting link - by my interpretation they had less than a months supply of flour remaining (i.e. 690,000 days / 40,000+ men).

I'll raise a few more questions:

What if Port Arthur remained a secondary naval base? (i.e. a base for couple of obsolete capital ships and a few lighter vessels). I understand the accommodations at Port Arthur remained somewhat cramped for an extended battle fleet (even after extensive works).

• Can Russian naval vessels winter in a white water ports? (Vladivostok)
• What naval defences and accommodations did Vladivostok have at that time?
• To what extent were naval units and personnel crucial to the defence of Port Arthur?
• To what extent did the Russian naval failures fuel revolutionaries in Europe?

Clearly Vladivostok is not as strategically placed as Port Arthur, but this is balanced against keeping a fleet in being.

What if Imperial Russia had been able to use Rason as a naval base? It's a warm water port and was used by the Soviet Navy as an alternative to Vladivostok.