An old soc.history.what-if post of mine:
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"The plot of an old Spanish play is not more complicated with underplot."
--Fisher Ames on the 1800 presidential election
In both 1796 and 1800, the Federalists ran John Adams for president and a
Pinckney (from the well-known South Carolina family) for vice-president.
In 1796, it was Thomas Pinckney, popular for having recently negotiated a
favorable treaty with Spain
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomas_Pinckney
In 1800, it was Thomas's older brother, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, who
was famous for having rejected the French demand for a bribe with "No! No!
Not a sixpence!" Both elections demonstrated one of the problems of the
pre-Twelfth Amendment method of electing a president: there were in those
days no separate votes labeled "votes for president" and "votes for vice-
president"; rather, each elector voted for two persons, and the person
with the most electoral votes (if it was a majority) became president and
the one with the second most became vice-president. Thus, a person who
had really been thought by everyone to be the vice-presidential candidate
might instead--with an extra electoral vote or two--become president
instead. This fact almost made Burr president in 1800; and in both 1796
and 1800, it created the possibility that (with Alexander Hamilton's
support), a Pinckney could have become president. I have already
discussed Thomas Pinckney's presidential prospects in 1796 at
http://groups.google.com/group/soc.history.what-if/msg/fdb3f6a1af658d66
In this post I will discuss the possibility of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
becoming president in 1800, and how it was blocked by yet another
Pinckney.
By 1800, Alexander Hamilton, who had been lukewarm about Adams in 1796,
was totally alienated from him. (The feeling was of course mutual. Adams
denounced Hamilton as leader of a "British faction" and angrily told
Secretary of War McHenry that Hamilton was "the greatest intrigu[er] in
the World--a man devoid of every moral principle--a Bastard, and as much a
foreigner as Gallatin. Mr. Jefferson is an infinitely better man...You
are subservient to Hamilton, who ruled Washington, and would still rule if
he could." Elkins and McKitrick, *The Age of Federalism*, p. 736) As in
1796, he would have been happy to see a Pinckney become president instead.
His strategy was to urge Federalist electors to vote for both Adams and
Pinckney. The ostensible justification was to prevent a widespread
scattering of second votes which would benefit the opposition as it had
done by making Jefferson vice-president in 1796. Somewhere, the
Hamiltonians argued, one or two electors would drop Pinckney, and this
would be enough to permit Adams' re-election and still ensure against a
repeat of an opposition vice-president. This was the exact argument the
Republicans would adopt in urging *their* electors to vote for both
Jefferson and Burr. The difference is that the Republicans meant it,
whereas the Hamiltonian plotters did not really have an Adams-Pinckney
victory in mind; rather, they wanted Pinckney to get the same number of
Federalist votes as Adams, so that with the help of some otherwise
Republican electors in South Carolina (where Pinckney was popular even
among Jefferson supporters), he would actually get more electoral votes
nationwide than Adams and would therefore become president.
In the end, Hamilton did (in contrast to 1796) succeed in persuading
almost all the Adams electors to vote for Pinckney as well (except for one
Rhode Island elector who voted for Adams and John Jay). (This of course
had its counterpart in much greater Republican unity behind Burr than in
1796.) The electoral vote outside South Carolina stood at 65 votes for
Jefferson, 65 for Burr, 65 for Adams, 64 for Pinckney, and one for Jay.
The key was therefore how the eight electors from South Carolina would
vote. The state legislature in this traditionally most Federalist of
southern states now had a nominal Republican majority, but party lines
were still somewhat vague, and many of the Republican lawmakers were also
devoted to Pinckney. What complicated things still further was the
discovery of the Gabriel Prosser conspiracy in Virginia, which raised
fears about the dangers of the Republican appeal to equality in a
slaveholding society.
As it turned out, the decisive role was played by Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney's second cousin, Senator Charles Pinckney.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Pinckney_(governor) Charles
Pinckney, elected as governor in 1789, had started out as a Federalist,
but had become alienated from the Washington administration. Initially,
this may have been a matter of resentment over being passed over for the
ambassadorship to Great Britain in favor of his cousin Thomas in 1792. In
any event, by 1795, he denounced Jay's Treaty, aligned himself with the
Republicans, and won election to a third term as governor in 1796. In
1798 he was elected to the US Senate. By this time, he was not on
speaking terms with his cousins CC or Thomas, and was regarded by South
Carolina's Federalists as a traitor, "Blackguard Charley." In 1800 he
managed Jefferson's campaign in South Carolina.
Charles Pinckney decided not to be on hand for the opening of the winter
session of Congress in Washington on November 17, 1800 because it was more
urgent for him to be in Columbia, South Carolina. According to Elkins and
McKitrick (*The Age of Federalism*, pp. 742-3):
"As for all the arts he used and how they were applied, this is still a
subject of conjecture. but we do know in more than a general way the
results they achieved. The number of Federalist legislators was almost
equal to the number of those committed to Jefferson and Burr, though
neither side had quite enough for the majority required to carry their
ticket. In between were some dozen to sixteen waverers, more or less
Republican but whose party attachments were qualified by an equal or
greater attachment to Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The internal struggle
that surged back and forth during the ten days prior to the final
balloting on December 2 was one in which a variety of cross-pressures were
brought to bear upon this knot of irresolutes. The Federalists tried to
detach some of them for their ticket, while temporary groupings of
Jefferson men, working at odds with Charles Pinckney's aim for a straight
Republican ticket, made at least two efforts for a compromise that would
result in a divided slate of Jefferson-Pinckney electors, one version of
which would have given Pinckney the vice-presidency, and the other the
presidency.
"In the end, Charles Pinckney's labors--a mixture of appeals for
Republican unity and inducements of influence in a Jefferson
administration--prevailed, and the eight electors chosen on the final day
were all committed to Jefferson and Burr..."
(Ironically, Charles Pinckney actually succeeded on behalf of the
Jefferson-Burr ticket a bit too well for Jefferson's---and Burr's--own
good. If he had just allowed *one* South Carolina elector to vote for
Jefferson and CC Pinckney instead of Jefferson-Burr, Jefferson would have
become president without the race going to the House. Consequences would
include (1) much less Republican resentment of Burr, who would remain a
viable if controversial future presidential possibility, (2) probably no
Burr-Hamilton duel, (3) probably no Burr conspiracy--whatever it was--and
(4) much less pressure for a Twelfth Amendment, inasmuch as the "system
worked.")
OK, so suppose that Charles Pinckney for some reason dies before the 1800
election and the South Carolina electors are split between, let us say,
six (basically Republican) votes for Jefferson and Pinckney and two
"straight" Federalist Adams-Pinckney. The result is that the national
electoral vote stands at 72 votes for Pinckney, 71 for Jefferson, 67 for
Adams, 65 for Burr, and one for Jay. CC Pinckney is elected POTUS.
Consequences?
(1) He will be seen as an illegitimate president by both Republicans and
Adams Federalists. The latter will claim that Hamilton tricked them,
though it really should not have been that hard to see through his plans.
(Nevertheless, it is true that the Hamiltonians did use deception on Adams
loyalists. One of them, Robert Goodloe Harper, who had recently moved
from South Carolina to Maryland, told a nervous Adams supporter not to
worry because, he assured him, South Carolina was not only sure to go
Federalist but would actually be more solid for Adams than for Pinckney!)
(2) President Pinckney will also have to face a hostile Congress.
Republicans picked up twenty-three seats in the House (giving them close
to a 2-1 majority) and seven in the Senate (enough to give them a majority
of two, the first time they had ever controlled the upper chamber).
(Indeed, in view of the congressional election results, it may be
surprising that the presidential election results were so close. Part of
the reason is that the Federalists prevented an at-large popular election
in Pennsylvania, which would almost certainly have resulted in Jefferson
sweeping the state.) Naturally the Sedition Act is dead, there is no
possibility of war with France (which is not to say that Pinckney would
*want* to renew the Act or to go to war with France, only that even if he
did, there would not be the slightest chance of success), and Pinckney
will have a hard time getting appointees, especially judges, confirmed in
the Senate. He will be widely regarded as a lame-duck president. By the
1802 elections the Republicans may have veto-proof majorities (even
without the likely help of some Adams Federalists).
(3) In view of these facts, it may be questioned whether CC Pinckney would
even accept the presidency. He promised New England Federalists that he
would not accept any votes for himself that were not also cast for Adams,
and certainly did nothing to bring about any such votes in South Carolina.
And yet--don't forget that Burr likewise said at first that he would never
betray Jefferson or the wishes of the American people, but then lapsed
into silence when it appeared he might actually win the presidency. I
couldn't totally rule out the possibility that CC Pinckney might yield to
temptation...