Original Panther design kept

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 9, 2014

As first talked about in this thread:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=308653
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=8826247&postcount=16

Its hard to get the VK series into production due to the political atmosphere, just as altering things to get the VK will probably prevent the invasion of the USSR! The thought that the Panther would be ready by late 1942 prejudiced the VK3001 projection in favor of the 3002 that became the overweight Panther. So I think someone would need to be realistic with Hitler about the overweight Panther and Tiger's development cycle timeline to get a regular weight VK3002 in production. In fact a Panther that stuck t the original design would basically be a VK3001 with sloped armor and would have been an excellent tank, pretty much a 1940s version of the Leopard 1, which was originally 40 tons.

We should do a thread or turn this one into what if the original VK3002 spec was stuck to; in that case it would be in production by late 1942 without the mechanical issues of the up-weighted and -gunned OTL Panther; it would have taken the L48 75 and been 35 tons, only to be upgraded to probably around 37-8 tons in early 1943 with the 75mm L70 main gun. That's not a bad option either and probably a good 'split the difference' solution. A lighter Panther in late (October-November) 1942 that is later uparmored and gunned by early 1943 with the OTL Panther turret (designed for the VK3601 or VK4501 originally) would have been ideal and a nice balance between technological superiority, numbers, timeliness, and mechanical reliability. It could phase out the Pz IV chassis in 1942 if ready by late 1942 and have been the MBT that should have been.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank

The Panther was a direct response to the Soviet T-34 and KV-1 tanks. First encountered on 23 June 1941,[4] the T-34 outclassed the existing models of the Panzer III and IV.[5] At the insistence of General Heinz Guderian, a special Panzerkommision was dispatched to the Eastern Front to assess the T-34.[6] Among the features of the Soviet tank considered most significant were the sloping armor, which gave much improved shot deflection and also increased the effective armor thickness against penetration, the wide track, which improved mobility over soft ground, and the 76.2 mm gun, which had good armor penetration and fired an effective high explosive round. Daimler-Benz (DB) and Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nürnberg AG (MAN) were given the task of designing a new 30- to 35-ton tank, designated VK30.02, by April 1942 (apparently in time to be shown to Hitler for his birthday).

Albert Speer recounts in his autobiography Inside the Third Reich

Since the Tiger had originally been designed to weigh fifty tons but as a result of Hitler's demands had gone up to seventy five tons, we decided to develop a new thirty ton tank whose very name, Panther, was to signify greater agility. Though light in weight, its motor was to be the same as the Tiger's, which meant it could develop superior speed. But in the course of a year Hitler once again insisted on clapping so much armor on it, as well as larger guns, that it ultimately reached forty eight tons, the original weight of the Tiger.[8]

Click to expand...

What If?
Assuming the original MAN design for the Panther VK30.02 been maintained around the 35-38 ton mark and kept the same engine as IOTL, what would the effect have been? Historically the design was ready by September, perhaps earlier ITTL due to having less need for increased armor and weight development, but it was delayed due to the lack of specialized machine tools until January. IOTL it was delayed for several more months until May 1943 due to the mechanical issues stemming from the up armoring and increased weight. Had it stuck to the original spec it would have had weaker armor, but far less mechanical issues, so would have been in mass production from January 1943 on and in service by March. Due to being mechanically reliable and more maneuverable it would be a far better gun platform than the historical barely mobile pill box that was the Panther tank in 1943 and even part of 1944.

Historical production numbers:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panzerkampfwagen_V_Panther#Serienfertigung

Some examples are included in the links below, but it pretty much looks the same, but with less armor:
http://www.ipmsstockholm.org/magazine/2004/09/stuff_eng_mohlin_panther.htm
http://blogtanker.ru/tank-vk-30-02-m-v-wot.html
http://www.frost-zone.eu/category/all/skiny/nemecke/medium-tanky-nemecke/vk-30-02-m/

bm79 · Mar 9, 2014

More tanks to be chewed up by the steely jaws of the Russian bear at Kursk? Not to poo-poo the definite advantages of this tank, what could it change at this point?

Somua2 · Mar 10, 2014

An example

bm79 said:
More tanks to be chewed up by the steely jaws of the Russian bear at Kursk? Not to poo-poo the definite advantages of this tank, what could it change at this point?

Well the battle of Kursk was delayed to give the otl version of the Panther time to be deployed. An earlier in the year battle in keeping with Manstein's plan would have been a quite different scenario.

In any case many readers of this forum are interested in subtle changes to the circumstances of WWII.

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 10, 2014

bm79 said:
More tanks to be chewed up by the steely jaws of the Russian bear at Kursk? Not to poo-poo the definite advantages of this tank, what could it change at this point?

Kursk launched even 1 month earlier in June would have major changes to the Soviet defenses in terms of depth and density. Having 150 lighter Panthers with the long 75s, perhaps even more due to less development cycle due to not requiring extra time to develop from prototype and the resulting mechanical issues (not to mention production challenges resulting from the OTL final changes), would make a major difference in June at Kursk. The issue is not winning necessarily according to the "Plan" of April-May, but as Manstein suggested: chewing up Soviet armor reserves. Not having your Panthers become casualties to mechanical issues and actually participating in the battle, especially as it is not delayed and it take less time and casualties to break into open country, would have major changes, even with less overall Panzers present in the battle. June's Tiger production wouldn't be available, so Germany would be short some 60 units from that month, plus a few hundred regular Panzer IIIs and IVs (not all of which were sent to Kursk). Balance that against losses suffered breaking through the Soviet defenses, including never breaking through on the North Front.

The Elefants were available by May so would be fine for a June start date. At least 5 months of Panther production, which would be higher than IOTL, would be available, which should be at least 100 units if not over 200, but the variables with this alternate Panther are hard to say without more information about the issues with the OTL version and we would need more details about the lighter prototype to know if they would crop up in the light production version.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank#Eastern_Front

The Panther tank was seen as a necessary component of the upcoming Operation Zitadelle, and the attack was delayed several times because of their mechanical problems, with the eventual start date of the battle only six days after the last Panthers had been delivered to the front. This resulted in major problems in Panther units during the Battle of Kursk, as tactical training at the unit level, coordination by radio, and driver training were all seriously deficient.[70]

It was not until June 23–29, 1943, that a total of 200 rebuilt Panthers were finally issued to Panther Regiment von Lauchert, of the XLVIII Panzer Corps (4 Panzer Army). Two were immediately lost due to motor fires upon disembarking from the trains.[70] By July 5, when the Battle of Kursk started, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within two days, this had dropped to 40.[70] On July 17, 1943 after Hitler had ordered a stop to the German offensive, Gen. Heinz Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of the Panthers:
Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days. By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the front line. 25 Panthers had been lost as total writeoffs (23 were hit and burnt and two had caught fire during the approach march). 100 Panthers were in need of repair (56 were damaged by hits and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown). 60 percent of the mechanical breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair service ... On the evening of 11 July, 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total writeoffs and 131 were in need of repair. A slow increase in the combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10 July) attests to the heavy fighting.[70]
During Zitadelle the Panthers claimed 267 destroyed tanks.[71]

A later report on July 20, 1943 showed 41 Panthers as operational, 85 as repairable, 16 severely damaged and needing repair in Germany, 56 burnt out (due to enemy action), and 2 that had been destroyed by motor fires.[72]
However, before the Germans ended their offensive at Kursk, the Soviets began their counteroffensive, and succeeded in pushing the Germans back into a steady retreat. Thus, a report on August 11, 1943 showed that the numbers of total writeoffs in Panthers swelled to 156, with only 9 operational. The German Army was forced into a fighting retreat and increasingly lost Panthers in combat as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles.[72]

The Panther demonstrated its capacity to destroy any Soviet AFV from long distance during the Battle of Kursk, and had a very high overall kill ratio.[73] However, it comprised less than seven percent of the estimated 2,400–2,700 total AFVs deployed by the Germans in this battle,[74] and its effectiveness was limited by its mechanical problems and the in-depth layered defense system of the Soviets at Kursk. Its greatest historical role in the battle may have been a highly negative one—its contribution to the decisions to delay the original start of Operation Zitadelle for a total of two months, time which the Soviets used to build up an enormous concentration of minefields, anti-tank guns, trenches and artillery defenses.[75]

Given the same or larger numbers of operational Panthers at the start of the earlier operation Zitadel would do at least as well as the OTL battle if not better due to not breaking down nor running into as heavy of defenses. They can last longer in battle racking up a larger 'score' as it grinds on.
The Soviets aren't as prepared to launch their follow up offensives against the flanks of the German attack, so its not as strong and with greater armor destruction success and holding the field longer, allowing for greater recovery of damaged tanks, Germany would do significantly better in 1943, especially if that is parlayed into greater Soviet losses in the flank battles than IOTL. They can't clear out the Ukraine nearly as quickly and the fight bogs down on the Dniepr at least if not further forward by the end of 1943. In that case it changes the dynamics of the Cold War and immediate post-war period if the Soviets finish the war further East.

Hell, butterflies might even allow for the June 1944 plot to succeed in killing Hitler and potentially preventing the dynamics that allowed Bagration to happen in 1944. We could be talking about major butterflies from a different Kursk, or potentially not, but we can certainly speculate.
I imagine Julian might be dropping in to offer a differing POV.

AdA · Mar 11, 2014

This is a relevant thread, and after a busy work day here's my thoughts on the matter.
By 1942 the international standard for medium tanks was a c30t tank with a c75mm multirole gun and de net mobility. The first off the breed was of course the T34, followed by the P26/40 (a very advanced tank in 1940, delayed to the point of mediocrity by an extremely long development cycle) the Sherman, and the Cromwell. The original Panther was to be of that class, but with a specialised AT gun, the superb 75L70, since T34 killing was a major German priority. The Henschel original Panther would have been a German Sherman, but with a better shaped hull, if given the 75L48, and equivalent to a Sherman Firefly with the L70.
Then Germany decided to increase the weight of its tank by 50% when compared to the international standard. What Wiking is suggesting is for the Germans to just be normal in tank matters. Given the similar goals, there is no reason for the production issues of a German standard to differ from those of the Sherman or the Cromwell. The light Panther could have been the best tank in the world in 1942, having the power to weight of the Cromwell, the firepower of the latter Firefly, the same level of protection as the late model Sherman or the later Comet, and being deployed, like those tanks, in large reliable numbers in time for the critical battles.
The level of ambition for the ATL Panther was huge, like jumping from the M47 straight to the Leopard II without bothering with the Leopard I. As Wiking as said, he's suggesting a more moderate leap, to what would be the Leopard I of its time. This brings the promise of 1943 PzD with two battalions of Light Panther rather than 1944 PzD with one each of PzIV and Panthers.

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 11, 2014

Thanks for the reply. Yes, that is exactly what I was getting at; considering that even the OTL Panther was not intended to sit out in the open and slug it out with the big boys (Tiger and later Soviet heavies) it would have been a long range sniper, using its mobility to stay out of range of Soviet (or Allied) gunnery or gotten out once they started seriously ranging in with the long range tank hunters like the Su85 and other heavier models. On the attack the Tiger is still the breakthrough unit, while the Panther replaces the Pz IV as the exploitation tank; its just that with its gun it can't hunt infantry reliably, which is why Panzer Kampfgruppen usually had StuGs/StuHs, Pz IIINs, or some other low velocity HE cannon carrier. Instead it can hunt on the Steppe very well in 1943, especially given the target rich environment, while avoiding the trouble of breakdowns and losses due to mechanical issues stemming from being overweight. It is just better on the defense and offense due to its mobility, which was the main concept behind the tank in the first place, hence the name Panther.

For those interested in the effects, what is your opinion of its impact on the Battle of Kursk with a late 1942 production date? Let's say there is 6 months of production delivered ITTL before the battle, which would amount to some 2-300 tanks. The battalions would have some time to train on the new unit and wouldn't break down on the way to the battle. Pz IV production could be phased out early here and in fact the Nibelungenwerke could tool for the Panther instead of the Pz IV ITTL, so when it starts production in 1943 it can churn out some 250-300 units per month; if that happens, then we have well over 300 Panthers ready for June 1943, in fact perhaps over 1000 in the front lines. That would make a major impact at Kursk. This would result obviously in fewer Pz IVs in 194 and many more in 1943:
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nibelungenwerk

Also the battle is happening 1 month early due to the early availability of the Panther ITTL, so Soviet defenses aren't as tough, though their reserves are still quite high for the follow up counter offensives, and other German armor delivers aren't made ITTL (June's Panzer production, which IIRC amounted to less than 400 units excluding Panthers and not all were delivered to the Eastern Front).

hasdrubal barca · Mar 11, 2014

wiking said:
For those interested in the effects, what is your opinion of its impact on the Battle of Kursk with a late 1942 production date? Let's say there is 6 months of production delivered ITTL before the battle, which would amount to some 2-300 tanks. The battalions would have some time to train on the new unit and wouldn't break down on the way to the battle.
http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nibelungenwerk

.

I thinking the training part would be important, from what I have read the Panther units at Kursk suffered from poor leadership. These quotes are from the book "The Devils General". Tell me what you think.

"two panther battalion commanders had been replaced within two days of each other for incompetence, one whom froze in action due to his inexperience"

" the Panther regiment had been badly led from the very beginning and instead of being the great hope of the offensive it was rapidly becoming a liability."

"14 Panthers were rapidly put out of action standing stationary in a minefield, perfect targets."

"the Panther battalions in the meantime had been extricated from the minefield only to get bogged down in some marshy ground."

I mean these instances show that some improved leadership is needed right?

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 11, 2014

hasdrubal barca said:
I thinking the training part would be important, from what I have read the Panther units at Kursk suffered from poor leadership. These quotes are from the book "The Devils General". Tell me what you think.

"two panther battalion commanders had been replaced within two days of each other for incompetence, one whom froze in action due to his inexperience"

" the Panther regiment had been badly led from the very beginning and instead of being the great hope of the offensive it was rapidly becoming a liability."

"14 Panthers were rapidly put out of action standing stationary in a minefield, perfect targets."

"the Panther battalions in the meantime had been extricated from the minefield only to get bogged down in some marshy ground."

I mean these instances show that some improved leadership is needed right?

Yes, though there was also the issue of no recon work before the offensive, which was a major breech of German armor doctrine; IIRC I quoted that above. Basically they were late to the battle so had to forego reconnaissance, which led to problems like the above. Having units in the field on time will prevent running into mine fields and marshy ground like mentioned in your quotes.

Ravenflight · Mar 11, 2014

hasdrubal barca said:
I mean these instances show that some improved leadership is needed right?

Beg's the question, how much would leadership change (I.e. less purging and more urging) in the Soviet ranks would have changed the war.

I mean, massively is the natural answer... and an entire change in attitude of Stalin which would alter his rise to power yadda yadda yadda, but still be interesting if he had an epiphany.

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 12, 2014

BTW I was wrong about the phasing in of the lighter Panther. The lack of machine tools will mean a delayed phase in no matter what and Nibelungenwerke won't be to able to tool for it in 1942; instead the PZ IV will have to soldier on until 1943 when it can be phased out. The compressed development cycle of the Panther, made somewhat longer by the upweighting and needless (and in fact harmful) waterproofing, was too short to have a full scale phase in during 1942. So we get a phase in in December 1942 as planned instead of the 1 month delay, but then no technical delays initially. So by March its in full production and the phase it sticks to schedule. Basically it all moves up by 1 month:
December: 4 (preproduction)
January: 18
February: 59
March: 78
April: 165
May: 202
June: 257
July: 311
August: ~150 due to bombing of production as per OTL

That pretty much gives us the June 25th start date for Kursk, so we avoid the final delay that pushed it back until July 5th. 10 days early. That probably changes little in terms of the defensive difficulty, which stops the Northern thrust of the attack as per OTL. The major change would be for one more Panthers in the field, less losses to mechanical issues (especially without the waterproofing), and most importantly the early start prevents the call off due to the invasion of Sicily in July. The battle can go on longer as Manstein wanted, which chews up Soviet armor reserves much more badly.

The early production cycle without the OTL woes prior to August means any losses in the battle itself can be made good with June/July production. The follow up Soviet offensives then come off less well than IOTL, as the Germans don't have to pull out Panzer divisions as quickly and have many more active Panthers running around Southern Ukraine, not to mention more Luftwaffe power.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk#Termination_of_Operation_Citadel

Termination of Operation Citadel[edit]

On the evening of 12 July, Hitler summoned von Kluge and von Manstein to his headquarters at Rastenburg, in East Prussia.[249] Two days prior, the Western Allies invaded Sicily. The threat of further Allied landings in Italy or along southern France made Hitler believe it was essential to move forces from Kursk to Italy and to discontinue the offensive. Von Kluge welcomed the news, as he was aware that the Soviets were initiating a massive offensive against his sector, but von Manstein was less welcoming. Von Manstein's forces had just spent a week fighting through a maze of defensive works and he believed they were on the verge of breaking through to more open terrain, which would allow him to engage and destroy the Soviet armoured reserves in a mobile battle. Von Manstein stated "On no account should we let go of the enemy until the mobile reserves he [has] committed [are] completely beaten."[250] Hitler agreed to temporarily allow the continuence of the offensive in the south part of the salient, but the following day he ordered von Manstein's reserve - the XXIV Panzer Corps - to move south to support the 1st Panzer Army. This removed the force von Manstein believed was needed to succeed.[251]

On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. The following day, OKH ordered the II SS Panzer Corps to be withdrawn and transferred to Italy.[252][253] The strength of the Soviet reserve formations had been greatly underestimated by German intelligence, and the Soviets soon went onto the offensive.[251]

Controversy[edit]
The German generals were highly critical of Hitler's decision to call off the operation, at the height of the tactical battle.[254] This criticism has been supported by German officers of the post-war Bundeswehr,[255][256] and by a number of historians.[257] Both von Manstein and Guderian had anticipated that the Western Allies would conduct some form of operation in Western Europe, and had argued that forces would need to be deployed there and had used this argument to oppose the undertaking of Operation Citadel. Von Manstein argued that transferring forces from Army Group South, taking away Luftwaffe support and transferring his reserve, deprived his forces of its striking power at, what he believed was, the decisive point of the battle.[258] Whether or not von Manstein's assessment is correct, is debated. The extent of Soviet reserves was far greater than von Manstein had realized. These reserves were used to re-equip the mauled 5th Guards Tank Army, for Operation Rumyantsev. However, rebuilding this formation would take time. Hitler's unwillingness to accept risk in continuing the operation, resulted in his forces not being concentrated nor committed and restricted his commanders from fighting the type of mobile battle they wanted (as von Manstein has done very successfully only a few months beforehand).[259] Hitler's micromanagement constrained the freedom of action of his commanders,[260] and pushed his military into a battle of attrition that they were not prepared for and had little chance of winning.[261]

I don't know if the XXIV Corps would be kept in place ITTL if the Soviets are signaling and offensive near the Don Basin. If they are kept in place for Manstein's 'break into the green fields beyond' then the Soviets are going to have some trouble in early July.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Polkovodets_Rumyantsev

Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev had been planned by Stavka to be the major Soviet summer offensive in 1943. However, due to heavy losses sustained during the Battle of Kursk in July time was needed for the Soviet formations to recover and regroup. Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev commenced on 3 August, with the aim of the defeating the 4th Panzer Army, Army Group Kempf, and the southern wing of Army Group South. It was also hoped that the German 1st Panzer Army and the newly reformed 6th Army would be trapped by an advance of the Red Army forces to the Black Sea.[10]

The Soviet forces included the Voronezh Front and the Steppe Front, which deployed about 1,144,000 men[1] with 2,418 tanks[2] and 13,633 guns and rocket launchers[2] for the attack. Against this the German army could field 200 000 men and 237 tanks and assault guns.

German Army Group South commander General Erich von Manstein had anticipated that the Soviets would launch an attack across the Dnieper and Mius Rivers in an attempt to reach the Black Sea, cutting off the German forces extended in the southern portion of Army Group South in a repeat of the Stalingrad disaster.[11] When the Soviet Southern Front and the Southwestern Front launched just such an attack on 17 July the Germans responded by moving the II SS Panzer Corps, XXIV Corps and XLVIII Panzer Corps southward to blunt the Soviet offensive. In fact these Soviet operations were intended to draw off German forces from the main thrust of the Soviet offensive, to dissipate the German reserve in anticipation for their main drive.[12]

The issue is too the Soviet offensives to the south of Kursk:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donez-Mius-Offensive
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Изюм-Барвенковская_наступательная_операция

ObssesedNuker · Mar 12, 2014

wiking said:
The battle can go on longer as Manstein wanted, which chews up Soviet armor reserves much more badly.

As Manstein drastically underestimated the scale of Soviet reserves he failed to realize the Germans were being chewed up relatively worse then the Russians were. Then you run into the potential of the Soviets Orel offensive cutting off and destroying the 9th Army, still committed into the northern face of the battle, a full year ahead of schedule. That undermines any prospect of German resistance in the center of the front, which subsequently allow the Soviets to threaten the entire left flank of Army Group South.

Frankly, Hitler made the right call with cancelling Kursk. Dragging it on just weakens the Germans drastically without really affecting Soviet offensive strength.

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 12, 2014

ObssesedNuker said:
When one factors in that Soviet reserves were much larger, the Germans were being chewed up worse.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Panther_tank#Eastern_Front

It was not until 23-29 June 1943 that a total of 200 rebuilt Panthers were finally issued to Panther Regiment von Lauchert, of the XLVIII Panzer Corps (4 Panzer Army). Two were immediately lost due to motor fires upon disembarking from the trains.[70]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk#Casualties

German
Karl-Heinz Frieser, who reviewed the German archive record, calculated that during Operation Citadel 54,182 casualties were suffered. Of these, 9,036 were killed, 1,960 were reported missing, and 43,159 were wounded. The 9th Army suffered 23,345 casualties, while Army Group South suffered 30,837 casualties.[7] Throughout the Soviet offensives, 86,064 casualties were suffered. In facing Operation Kutuzov, 14,215 men were killed, 11,300 were reported missing (presumed killed or captured), and 60,549 were wounded.[282] During Polkovodets Rumyantsev, 25,068 casualties were incurred, including 8,933 killed and missing. Total casualties for the three battles were about 170,000 men.

During Operation Citadel, 252 to 323 tanks and assault guns were destroyed. By July 5, when the Battle of Kursk started, there were only 184 operational Panthers. Within two days, this had dropped to 40.[283] On July 17, 1943 after Hitler had ordered a stop to the German offensive, Gen. Heinz Guderian sent in the following preliminary assessment of the Panthers:

Due to enemy action and mechanical breakdowns, the combat strength sank rapidly during the first few days. By the evening of 10 July there were only 10 operational Panthers in the front line. 25 Panthers had been lost as total writeoffs (23 were hit and burnt and two had caught fire during the approach march). 100 Panthers were in need of repair (56 were damaged by hits and mines and 44 by mechanical breakdown). 60 percent of the mechanical breakdowns could be easily repaired. Approximately 40 Panthers had already been repaired and were on the way to the front. About 25 still had not been recovered by the repair service ... On the evening of 11 July, 38 Panthers were operational, 31 were total writeoffs and 131 were in need of repair. A slow increase in the combat strength is observable. The large number of losses by hits (81 Panthers up to 10 July) attests to the heavy fighting.[283]

Click to expand...

By 16 July, Army Group South submitted the losses of 161 tanks and 14 assault guns. Up to 14 July, 9th Army reported the loss of 41 tanks and 17 assault guns. These losses break down as 109 Panzer IVs, 42 Panthers, 38 Panzer IIIs, 31 assault guns, 19 Elefants, 10 Tigers, and three flame tanks.[284] Before the Germans ended their offensive at Kursk, the Soviets began their counteroffensive, and succeeded in pushing the Germans back into a steady retreat. Thus, a report on August 11, 1943 showed that the numbers of total writeoffs in Panthers swelled to 156, with only 9 operational. The German Army was forced into a fighting retreat and increasingly lost tanks in combat as well as from abandoning and destroying damaged vehicles.[285] The total number of tanks and assault guns lost during July and August along the entire Eastern Front amount to 1,331. Of this figure, Frieser estimates that 760 were lost during the entire Battle of Kursk.[282]

Soviet:
Grigoriy Krivosheyev, who based his figures on the Soviet archives, is considered by the historian David Glantz as the most reliable source for Soviet casualty figures.[276] His figures are also supported by Karl-Heinz Frieser.[277] Krivosheyev calculated total Soviet losses during the German offensive of at 177,877 casualties.[276] The Central Front suffered 15,336, irrecoverable casualties and 18,561 medical casualties, for a total of 33,897 casualties. The Voronezh Front suffered 27,542 irrecoverable casualties and 46,350 medical casualties, for a total of 73,892. The Steppe Front suffered 27,452 irrecoverable casualties and 42,606 medical casualties, for a total of 70,085.[246]

During the two Soviet offensives, total casualties amounted to 685,456 men. During Operation Kutuzov, Soviet losses amounted to 112,529 irrecoverable casualties and 317,361 medical casualties, for a total loss of 429,890 men.[278] The Western Front reported 25,585 irrecoverable casualties and 76,856 medical casualties. The Bryansk Front suffered 39,173 irrecoverable casualties and 123,234 medical casualties. The Central Front lost 47,771 irrecoverable casualties and 117,271 medical casualties.[278] Soviet losses during Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev totaled 255,566 men, with 71,611 listed as irrecoverable casualties and 183,955 as medical casualties. The Voronezh Front lost 48,339 irrecoverable casualties and 108,954 medical casualties, for a total of 157,293. The Steppe Front lost 23,272 irrecoverable casualties and 75,001 medical casualties, for a total of 98,273.

Soviet materiel losses, during the German offensive, amounted to 1,614 tanks and self-propelled guns destroyed or damaged[15] of the 3,925 vehicles committed to the battle. The Soviet losses were roughly three times larger than the German losses. During Operation Kutuzov, 2,349 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of an initial strength of 2,308; a loss of over 100 percent. During Polkovodets Rumyantsev 1,864 tanks and self-propelled guns were lost out of the 2,439 employed. The loss ratio, suffered by the Soviets, was roughly 5:1 in the favour of the German military.

I fail to see how the Germans were losing, in fact, assuming the situation on the Mius Front holds on, the Germans were well positioned to kill many more Soviet tanks, even with the Soviet production advantage the combat loss rates were unsustainable, so if the Germans continue the fight on their terms the Soviets will be very poorly positioned to launch Polkovodets Rumyantsev. The Panther quote shows that of the damage over 40% was due to break down. Couple that with those damaged to mines, which was the result of the rushed introduction and delayed arrival not allowing sufficient recon time, and potentially over half of losses would be preventable, not to mention there would be more available at the start, as the 184 units actually present in the battle on July 5th were left out of 200 actually sent to the battle. 16 were lost to mechanical issues immediately on route including two burned up due to mechanical issues getting off the train! That wouldn't be nearly as much of an issue here. Those losses were added to the OTL loss rates, helping skew the losses in favor of the Soviets; here they won't happen.

As to the earlier start to the battle, resulting in it being 10 days early, it would prevent 10 days worth of further defenses being built, which means the Southern Wing of the attack would actually breakthrough quicker, so on the same time line of attack they would be in open ground fighting Soviet armor without the worry of Soviet defensive positions. Not only that but the Soviets obviously did very poorly in the armor vs. armor battles at Kursk itself, so losses would increase if Manstein breaks through sooner and Soviet armor has to fight a mobile operational engagement against Tigers, lighter Panthers, assault guns, and PzIVs.

ObssesedNuker said:
So a loss for the Germans rather then a gain. Then you run into the potential of the Soviets Orel offensive cutting off and destroying the 9th Army, still committed into the northern face of the battle, a full year ahead of schedule. The subsequent Kharkov offensive will also threaten 4th Panzer Armies rear.

Manstein's plan I'm referring to is only the southern part of the offensive, so Orel is on the defensive as per OTL.

ObssesedNuker said:
Frankly, Hitler made the right call with cancelling Kursk. Dragging it on just weakens the Germans drastically without really affecting Soviet armored strength.

Given OTL's problems with the late start I agree, but TTL is a different situation.

ObssesedNuker · Mar 12, 2014

wiking said:
I fail to see how the Germans were losing, in fact, assuming the situation on the Mius Front holds on,

Rather unrealistic assumption there. The Germans were unable to hold on to Orel even with the 9th Army not busy hammering its head against the northern face of the salient. If anything, with the 9th still locked in offensive operations, they will collapse faster.

the Germans were well positioned to kill many more Soviet tanks, even with the Soviet production advantage the combat loss rates were unsustainable

Yeah, they were unsustainable... for the Germans. Your little article only counts the Soviet armor committed to the battle, it ignores that the Soviets still had plenty of armor in their strategic reserve... ie: not committed. They were in the kind of slugging match that was to the Soviets advantage, mechanical casualties were mounting at an accelerated rate as the German tanks kept getting used (while the Soviet kept feeding in more), and their infantry forces guarding the flanks were steadily collapsing in the face of Soviet counter-attacks. Continued fighting at best would see the panzer spearheads being attrited to nothing, meaning the Germans are in no position to stop later Soviet offensives. At worst? The spearheads get cut off and annihilated in both the south and the entire 9th army in the north.

Manstein's plan I'm referring to is only the southern part of the offensive, so Orel is on the defensive as per OTL.

Then the entire basis for Kursk is gone and the Germans are better off cancelling and moving into the defensive.

Given OTL's problems with the late start I agree, but TTL is a different situation.

Not really. Earlier start means the Germans start getting attrited away earlier. Not to mention that more lightly armored Panthers would take heavier losses in attacking Soviet anti-tank fronts.

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 12, 2014

ObssesedNuker said:
Rather unrealistic assumption there. The Germans were unable to hold on to Orel even with the 9th Army not busy hammering its head against the northern face of the salient. If anything, with the 9th still locked in offensive operations, they will collapse faster.

Okay, you are just ignoring my entire previous statement that the Northern part of the attack would be called off as per OTL when it cannot breakthrough.

ObssesedNuker said:
Yeah, they were unsustainable... for the Germans. Your little article only counts the Soviet armor committed to the battle, it ignores that the Soviets still had plenty of armor in their strategic reserve... ie: not committed.

The only way to kill it is to bring it to battle. By continuing the fight the Germans can chew it up on their terms.

ObssesedNuker said:
They were in the kind of slugging match that was to the Soviets advantage, mechanical casualties were mounting at an accelerated rate as the German tanks kept getting used (while the Soviet kept feeding in more), and their infantry forces guarding the flanks were steadily collapsing in the face of Soviet counter-attacks.

Not really; the Germans were scoring a massively favorable armor kill ratio at Kursk. Subtract the Panther mechanical issues that resulted in so many being overrun after they were broken down and unable to recovered quickly due to not being upweighted here and the ratio is even more in Germany's favor. Include better recon from the earlier introduction of the Panther and they don't hit as many if not any mines early on and the losses are even further reduced.

Casualties and losses
Soviets:
1,614[15] – 1,956[16] tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged

German:
323 tanks and assault guns destroyed,[8]

This includes those lost when left on the battlefield or written off. I fail to see the Soviet advantage in terms of loss rates. What counterattacks are you referring to that were chewing up German infantry? Not during Citadel. Even the Mius offensive caused lopsided Soviet losses and the Germans pretty much checked the Soviet advance. The offensive there was a total failure. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Donez-Mius-Offensive

Here are the casualties for the fighting around Kursk including the later Soviet offensives at Orel and against the Southern Breakthrough (which BTW happened in August well after Kursk was over):

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk
This is the wider battle losses from July 5th (Citadel) through August 23rd (end of Soviet counter attacks)

German
203,000 casualties
Estimate 760 tanks and assault guns destroyed

Soviet:
863,303 casualties
6,064 tanks and assault guns destroyed or damaged[18]

The Northern part of the Kursk offensive is being called off here as per OTL, but again the Soviets offensive there shattered their forces much worse than the Germans:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Kutuzov

Casualties and losses
German:
86,064 men[N 1]
unknown tanks[N 2]
unknown guns
218 aircraft[6]

N2 ^ 343 tanks and assault guns were lost from 5 July till autumn[5]

Click to expand...

Soviets:
429,890 men[N 3]
2,586 tanks[8]
892 guns[8]
1,014[8]-1,705[N 4] aircraft

Click to expand...

The above German armor losses indicate what was lost at Kursk AND during Kutuzov. Not exactly a horrible loss rate for the Germans.

ObssesedNuker said:

Continued fighting at best would see the panzer spearheads being attrited to nothing, meaning the Germans are in no position to stop later Soviet offensives. At worst? The spearheads get cut off and annihilated in both the south and the entire 9th army in the north.

Click to expand...

What are you talking about? The German loss rate at Kursk was minor as I posted above. The Soviet's was totally unsustainable, especially considering how long it took to return the shattered Soviet armor units to combat readiness after Kursk. Again the Northern part of the offensive is called off as per OTL, check my previous posts.

ObssesedNuker said:

Then the entire basis for Kursk is gone and the Germans are better off cancelling and moving into the defensive.

Click to expand...

Not if they can hold the flanks, which they did IOTL for the most part in the South until August, as they were butchering Soviet armor at Kursk. It was the overreaction to the invasion of Sicily, which won't matter here, and the Mius offensive which drew off some of the breakthrough armor; by the time the Soviets launch TTL's version of the Mius offensive, German armor reserves will have already broken through at Kursk in the South and be committed to battle, which means they won't be wasted being transferred around to the Mius river. Instead they can continue to attrit the Kursk armor reserves, which will further delay Polkovodets Rumyantsev, which was already delayed until August due to OTL losses, weeks after Kursk was called off IOTL.

ObssesedNuker said:

Not really. Earlier start means the Germans start getting attrited away earlier. Not to mention that more lightly armored Panthers would take heavier losses in attacking Soviet anti-tank fronts.

Click to expand...

Considering that IOTL they weren't the breakthrough unit and we taking most of their losses due to mines and mechanical issues, they didn't need to worry about PAK fronts. Earlier start means less AT defenses!

AdA · Mar 12, 2014

OTL Kursk was very conventional on the operational level (a very obvious double envelopment) it was original on the tactical level since it was planned as an assimetrical battle, where the Germans expected to use their technically advanced new tanks and better unit training to archive advantageous kill rates. It is probable that the mindset that leads to a more symmetrical tank choice (a panther in the T34 weight class) also leads to a operational concept that is less reliant on tactical advantage.
Assuming Kursk still happens (this are big butterflies) it would be a earlier, less telegraphed battle in which the Germans.

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 12, 2014

AdA said:
OTL Kursk was very conventional on the operational level (a very obvious double envelopment) it was original on the tactical level since it was planned as an assimetrical battle, where the Germans expected to use their technically advanced new tanks and better unit training to archive advantageous kill rates. It is probable that the mindset that leads to a more symmetrical tank choice (a panther in the T34 weight class) also leads to a operational concept that is less reliant on tactical advantage.
Assuming Kursk still happens (this are big butterflies) it would be a earlier, less telegraphed battle in which the Germans.

I think we missed something at the end there.

I don't know how the Germans could have fought a less telegraphed battle though, they just could launch it earlier and with better preparation for its Panther units; reading some first hand accounts of the Panthers at Kursk show how badly they were employed by their late arrival, as no recon was done and virtually no coordination with other units they were about to attack with was done including with sappers, which is the reason its worst enemy in the battle was mines. The Panther even after its uparmoring was not a breakthrough tank and wasn't used as such, which is why the 80mm OTL armor layout was unnecessary and harmful. At Kursk the major problem was mines, mechanical issues, and terrain, rather than Soviet direct fire.

ITTL more Panthers will be lost to Soviet AT simply due to them actually participating in the battle longer, so being exposed to Soviet AT fire more than IOTL; the lesser armor will not mean that much given the OTL vulnerability. The lack of mechanical issues and some extra time to do recon work and coordinate with sappers and other attacking units will in fact increase Panther performance dramatically at Kursk; when they met Soviet tanks they dominated from the accounts I've read; they only got into trouble when they hit minefields and became sitting targets for Soviet AT guns and Su152s.

Edit:
Soviet AT gun penetration:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/76_mm_divisional_gun_M1942_(ZiS-3)
At 1000 meters it couldn't penetrate 60mm of armor. Only at around 500meters could it defeat a lighter Panther's armor.
T-34 guns couldn't penetrate 60mm of sloped armor except at 500 meters or less, which is 1/4th the Panther's kill range for the T-34.

AdA · Mar 13, 2014

A double envelopment battle is manouver warfare when done by surprise or speed, but is just siege warfare when expected.

Kursk was comceived as hight tech siege warfare. The germans knew the russians expected the attack, and they thought their recently aquired tech advantage (Tigers and Panthers) and superior battle handling prowess woul allow them to wear down the soviet forces.

It wasn't enterely different from EvF original thinking for Verdun, a battle designed to bleed the soviets to (near)death.

This was logical, but as in 1916, something to do when you've run out ideas. The Germans underestimated Soviet resilience, and over estimated their own striking power.If the encirclement had been completed, the bulk of soviet casualties would have occured in the fight to close it, not in the reduction of the pocket phase, which negates the logic of this type of operation.

I have allways argued that the germans should have spent 1943 in russia conducting a series of smaller, localized offensives aimed at keeping the soviets off balance and preventing the soviet offensives of the second part of the year, while rationalizing their front lines.

Deleted member 1487 · Mar 13, 2014

AdA said:
I have allways argued that the germans should have spent 1943 in russia conducting a series of smaller, localized offensives aimed at keeping the soviets off balance and preventing the soviet offensives of the second part of the year, while rationalizing their front lines.

Where were the Soviets vulnerable enough to do this that would make the effort profitable? The Germans went for Kursk because they needed a quick game changer in 1943 before the Allies landed in Sicily/in the Mediterranean and the Soviets went on their offensives. I don't think the Germans had the opportunity for a series of limited offensives in 1943 in the East, even with a lighter Panther. Instead it might have just made sense to prepare for the Soviet attacks and let them assume the strategic offensive, trading space for time and lives, while bleeding the Soviets; looking at the losses the Soviets took on the offensive in 1943, conducting a mobile defensive, not like what Manstein wanted, that was too grandiose, rather a slow, but steady pull back to a series of prepared lines, such as what was done in the Orel bulge. South of Kursk the Germans could have done that phased pull back in the face of the Soviet advance in good order with a greater focus on StuGs as Guderian claims he wanted. Use the lighter Panther for mobile ambushes and just accept the inevitable pull back on your terms, costing the Soviets dearly as they advance and try and negotiate while making the price of continuing the war too costly.

thaddeus · Mar 13, 2014

don't think the Panther or Tiger had enough benefit to attempt the transition at the time, should have fought on with the Panzer IV.

launch a tank with diesel engine circa 1945-46 if they had survived.

build something like http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nashorn using parts in widespread use, something the force knew how to repair, able to be towed away, etc.

AdA · Mar 13, 2014

wiking said:
Where were the Soviets vulnerable enough to do this that would make the effort profitable? The Germans went for Kursk because they needed a quick game changer in 1943 before the Allies landed in Sicily/in the Mediterranean and the Soviets went on their offensives. I don't think the Germans had the opportunity for a series of limited offensives in 1943 in the East, even with a lighter Panther. Instead it might have just made sense to prepare for the Soviet attacks and let them assume the strategic offensive, trading space for time and lives, while bleeding the Soviets; looking at the losses the Soviets took on the offensive in 1943, conducting a mobile defensive, not like what Manstein wanted, that was too grandiose, rather a slow, but steady pull back to a series of prepared lines, such as what was done in the Orel bulge. South of Kursk the Germans could have done that phased pull back in the face of the Soviet advance in good order with a greater focus on StuGs as Guderian claims he wanted. Use the lighter Panther for mobile ambushes and just accept the inevitable pull back on your terms, costing the Soviets dearly as they advance and try and negotiate while making the price of continuing the war too costly.

We've discussed this extensively on a previous thread.
I'm one of those who thinks post war focus on mobile defence (notably works based on Halder's 50's biased studies) is overrated. But, IIRC, none of us moved an inch last time we discussed this in lenght, so I won't go there again.

Original Panther design kept

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