AHC: Prussia visibly supports the Union in the ACW

My last attempt of a tl came to a halt rather quickly. In the discussion and while researching I came to the conclusion that the basic idea still needs some fleshing out and that not everything I planned for the future would work. It was out of the ages I am familiar with and thus my perception was a bit constricted. While I have not abandoned it entirely I have put it on hold to do some more reading. In the meantime I had a dozen other ideas I´d like to try. To avoid them being stopped quite that early, I want to discuss them before starting writing. This is currently my favourite one:

Basically I had the idea what a closer relationship (as in friendly neutral) and cooperation between the US and Germany during the 19th and early 20th century could mean - stemming from some support for the Union during the ACW. IOTL Prussia was undecided about the issue. On the one hand relations with the US had always been rather friendly, Prussia viewed the northern position favourably and considered a norther victory likely, on the other hand they were uncomfortable with the future potential of a united USA, the prominence of 48ers in the union army and the effect the ACW had in German liberal circles.

In the end Prussia rejected the idea to recognize the CSA strictly and were a bit more friendly than France or Britain towards the Union, but also tolerated/allowed the support of the CSA by individual Prussians, like the Rittmeister von Borcke. What POD could have Prussia offically supporting the Union? And to what extent? Loans, technological cooperation and especially advisors I aim for, but fighting formations under the Prussian eagle would be even better. I would also prefer the POD not originating from simple Southern stupidity.
 
I have nothing to add except that Prussian support of the Union is very possible. A lot--probably more than 50%--of northern/Midwest-Americans during the Civil War had German roots, and I'd say that most of those were probably first- or second-generation immigrants, with close ties to Germany. The Union is much more industrialized and "modern" than the CSA, and so is viewed more favorably by Prussia as far as trade and co-development are concerned. The Prussian social and political system, though notably conservative, still accepted natural rights of all men, and acceptance of all races, nationalities, and (civilized, to Prussians) religions; thus, slavery is viewed very negatively, as Germany never had any history of that evil institution.

Just some support for you :)
 
But why would Prussia care to officially support the Union, as opposed to just generally positive sentiments?

What's in it for Prussia?
 
But why would Prussia care to officially support the Union, as opposed to just generally positive sentiments?

What's in it for Prussia?
That is the problem I am struggling with. In the long run my tl idea would show a lot of benefits for Prussia/Germany, not least a better idea what danger a hostile US could pose. But few of those were visible in 61 and Prussia had its own problems. Combined with some obvious disadvantages, like the conflict with the British position, and the mentioned problems Prussia had with the Union side this prevented support otl. I know which situation I want to get and where to go from there, but have no idea how to make it happen.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Prussian involvement in any overseas adventures has to

Prussian involvement in any overseas adventures has to come after 1871; the immediate questions of Denmark, the Austro-Prussian competition over leadership of the German states, and German unification all come first.

The Prussians have to avoid their overseas entanglements in the Pacific and Latin America, as well.

Best,
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
This POD is a non-starter.

Lincoln did not want direct help from overseas, since it would have been politically disastrous to accept it. It would make the Lincoln administration appear incompetent, since they would appear unable to deal with the Southern insurrection on their own; the Democrats would make a huge amount of political hay out of it. It would have been a propaganda coup for the Confederacy, since they could talk about how Lincoln was bringing in foreign mercenaries to fight against Americans. Moreover, there was considerable anti-German sentiment in America at the time, especially in the army (look at how the rest of the Army of the Potomac viewed the largely German XI Corps); it would have pissed off lots of people.

The Union has nothing at all to gain from receiving direct Prussian support and doing so would cause them a whole host of problems. Lincoln was far too adroit a politician to allow such a thing to happen. And, as others have already pointed out, there is nothing in it for Prussia, so why would they even consider such a thing?
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Lincoln also did not NEED help from overseas,

other than - essentially - to deny it to the rebellion.

The rebellion was unsustainable give the realities of the differential in economic and political strength between the US and the rebels.

There is no way that a "CSA" can outlast 1865, at the latest; more likely it gets crushed in 1862, 1863, or 1864 than it survives at any point.

The correlation of power between the US and the rebels states in 1861-62 is such that it makes the German war against France, Britain, the USSR, and the US in 1939-45 look rational in comparison.

Best,
 
This POD is a non-starter.

Lincoln did not want direct help from overseas, since it would have been politically disastrous to accept it. It would make the Lincoln administration appear incompetent, since they would appear unable to deal with the Southern insurrection on their own; the Democrats would make a huge amount of political hay out of it. It would have been a propaganda coup for the Confederacy, since they could talk about how Lincoln was bringing in foreign mercenaries to fight against Americans. Moreover, there was considerable anti-German sentiment in America at the time, especially in the army (look at how the rest of the Army of the Potomac viewed the largely German XI Corps); it would have pissed off lots of people.

Just for completeness's sake, anti-German sentiment seems to have been considerably weaker in the Western armies - but the rest is still a huge issue.

Even merely Prussian advisers and such would be too easy to make hay out of.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
The "good" foreign officers were at home;

the "available" foreign officers were the typical useless bunch of soldiers of fortune.

Obvious examples are Havelock and Cluseret, neither of which did much for any force they were part of, over multiple decades.

The '48ers were a different breed; von Willich being the most obvious. They, of course, were emigrants, not mercenaries.

Best,
 
But why would Prussia care to officially support the Union, as opposed to just generally positive sentiments?

What's in it for Prussia?

Support against France? (Which was pissing off the Americans because Mexico, too, and supporting a Hapsburg by the way).
Except that France wasn't a particularly big concern for Prussia at this point, and Prussia probably liked more French troops in Mexico than French troops on the Rhine.
 
It likely be more unofficial support I think.
Similar to how Russia was seen as supporting the Union when they had their ships reside in Union ports for the winter.

Exactly how much Russia really support the Union I'm not sure, but I recall reading an essay that argues Russia was strongly pro union and help persuade Prussia to lean Union as well.
 
the "available" foreign officers were the typical useless bunch of soldiers of fortune.

Obvious examples are Havelock and Cluseret, neither of which did much for any force they were part of, over multiple decades.

The '48ers were a different breed; von Willich being the most obvious. They, of course, were emigrants, not mercenaries.

Best,
That is not true to the same extent for German armies before WWI. The pay for junior officers was truly lousy. Even a Hauptmann needed still some external support. Thus for example Falkenhayn took extended leave for a profitable advisory job in China. Also a time in a foreign army was considered educational, thus helpful for the career. An example is Moltke the elder serving in the Ottoman army way before the close relations began.
In that vein some Prussian officers served iotl in the Confederate army despite Prussia leaning union and it did not hurt their careers.
It likely be more unofficial support I think.
Similar to how Russia was seen as supporting the Union when they had their ships reside in Union ports for the winter.

Exactly how much Russia really support the Union I'm not sure, but I recall reading an essay that argues Russia was strongly pro union and help persuade Prussia to lean Union as well.
That is more like what I did imagine. I did not really think an organised, official and extended support was possible, both for reasons in US and European politics. But indirect support or participation by individual officers which is nonetheless noted seemed possible to me. How about something like this:

Shortly before the start of the ACW in Europe tensions rise a bit on two different occassions. A French politician publicly voices a desire for the Rhine border angering not least Prussia. At about the same time Anglo-Russian relations reach a new low, which is also expressed to Prussia by the Tsar.

In that light Wilhelm I. expresses his disapproval with any officer who takes the uniform of the (French and British supported) CSA. Thus the officers which did iotl join the confederate army turn to the union. At the same time most official observers are sent to the Union armies.

After the Emancipation Proclamation the king congratulates Lincoln. Publically he only offers some economic support if wanted, like lowering tariffs, for the great mission the US is undertaking. But quietly he withdraws the Southern observers, while he permits Northern observers to participate actively if it´s appropriate and wanted. Some union officers use that as an excuse to get rid of the obnoxious guys by giving them positions which are unpopular. Some get command of mainly German units, which produces some tensions with the 48ers dominating those. Others are pushed off to the newly forming coloured troops. A number of the Prussian officers distinguish themselves.

While their participation is at the time only mildly noted, out of that grows a myth of strong Prussian support for the Union (in the legacy of Steuben) and both sides take lessons from it influencing later decisions.

Is this possible? For Prussia it means only missing one or two dozen officers for a time (most of which would be there anyway), but they send a message to the other great powers, get some positive PR and first-hand experience on a war different from those they are facing in Europe. OTOH Lincoln can not be accused of having to rely on foreign support, while he also can show it exists for his politics.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
It likely be more unofficial support I think.
Similar to how Russia was seen as supporting the Union when they had their ships reside in Union ports for the winter.

That was just a goodwill trip and a desire to keep those ships out of blockaded Russian ports in the event of a conflict with Britain. They would have gone even if the American Civil War had not taken place.

Exactly how much Russia really support the Union I'm not sure, but I recall reading an essay that argues Russia was strongly pro union and help persuade Prussia to lean Union as well.

The only help pro-Union European powers really would bother to do is to lean on Britain and France not to recognize or support the Confederacy. Actually sending active help in the form of troops or even advisors (which were not needed anyway), never crossed anyone's mind. It wouldn't have made any sense.
 
How could Prussia have given any meaningful support to the United States? The Prussian navy wasn't exactly a world-spanning colossus; it couldn't have sent any major support to the United States, nor did it have any reason to do so when Central Europe, which was obviously of much greater concern to Prussia than North America, was so turbulent. It's not quite like Poland picking a side in a war between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, but it's close.

There are plenty of ways to make Germany close to the United States. With sufficient anti-British sentiment in the United States (e.g. the Boer wars get nastier), if you remove unrestricted submarine warfare from the equation but you make Britain continue to enforce its blockade against American ships, a single incident with an American merchant ship might well suffice to bring the United States into the First World War on Germany's side.

But even if Prussia did support the Union during the Civil War, relations between nations are not forged by sentimentality and national friendship but by national interests, to paraphrase Palmerston. It wouldn't make much of a difference anyway.

The correlation of power between the US and the rebels states in 1861-62 is such that it makes the German war against France, Britain, the USSR, and the US in 1939-45 look rational in comparison.

Undeniably foolish, surely, but that last statement seems a little far. The CSA perceived that it had the possibility of foreign intervention which, if it had occurred (and this is the wrong thread to discuss whether it would have done), would have increased their chances of success significantly, even if it wouldn't have given them victory. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan had, between them, managed to antagonise every great power in the world apart from themselves.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
True, but the perception was in itself, an example of the rebels' idiocy

Undeniably foolish, surely, but that last statement seems a little far. The CSA perceived that it had the possibility of foreign intervention which, if it had occurred (and this is the wrong thread to discuss whether it would have done), would have increased their chances of success significantly, even if it wouldn't have given them victory. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan had, between them, managed to antagonise every great power in the world apart from themselves.


Margaret Mitchell was a romantic at heart, but even she got it:

"...I think it's hard winning a war with words, gentlemen...I'm saying very plainly that the Yankees are better equipped than we...All we've got is cotton and slaves, and arrogance..."

Best,
 
True, but the perception was in itself, an example of the rebels' idiocy

Margaret Mitchell was a romantic at heart, but even she got it:

"...I think it's hard winning a war with words, gentlemen...I'm saying very plainly that the Yankees are better equipped than we...All we've got is cotton and slaves, and arrogance..."

Best,

Fair enough, then.
 
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