Early End to World War One

The Gallipoli thread got me thinking: what would be the postwar situation had World War One ended a few years earlier than it did IOTL? Suppose, for example, that it had ended with a negotiated settlement in late 1915 or early 1916? Neither side wins a decisive victory- there are no massive financial reparations or admissions of war guilt.

IOTL, all European nations, even the victors, were utterly exhausted at the end of the conflict, having suffered millions of casualties and completely bankrupted themselves. Had the war ended in late 1915/early 1916, they would still have suffered very heavy losses and would have spent a lot of money, but not nearly to the same extent as happened IOTL. What effect might this have on the social thought of the postwar world? Would the malaise which everyone seemed to sink into IOTL perhaps have been avoided?

If the war had ended earlier, would the Russian Revolution have been avoided, or just postponed?

If the war had ended before the United States joined in, might the Americans have remained relatively isolationist throughout the 20th Century?

Any thoughts would be appreciated.

I think the Russian Revolution would just be postponed, and the longer its postponed the less likely Lenin will come to power. Regarding US isolationalism, I agree with another American historian's POV that the US never was isolationalist, but prudent in its foreign affairs. It did become involved in international events and treaties that were in its best interests.

More importantly, the Austro-Hungarian Empire will still exist. Contrary to forecasts it was not falling apart in 1914.

The Anglo-German Naval Race will continue - absent an agreement for it not to, naturally. The RN'd already won, of course, but national pride, y'know.

O'course, we'll need a Washington Treaty eventually. But without everyone being bankrupted by the last 2 years of war, there'll be more big ships. Ooh, completion of the 4 Hoods and all the Lexies.

There'll be interesting repercussions for Britain and her welfare state. The roaring '20s may be a little more subdued. The Crash of '29, and the later ones, could get butterflied out of existence or delayed a few years.

Germany will retain her Imperial monarchy, and eventually Wilhelm III will be crowned. He appears to have been rather better than his dad - though I'd need to know more of him before saying aught for certain.

Absent '16 and we'll lose several key things:

* Gallipolli
* The Somme
* Verdun
* The Brusilov Offensives
* Caporetto
* The dismemberment of the Ottomans
* Jutland

I'd think the US would be headed for war with Japan no matter what... the seeds of the war were there already... With a short end to WW1, one is tempted to think there would be no WW2. However, you still have the problem of Alsace/Lorraine... Germany and France both want them, and this short war didn't really permanently solve the problem (OTL WW2 did just that...). So, will one side or the other be up for a rematch to settle the issue?

France: intense political turmoil with massive dissatisfaction over not regaining Alsace Lorraine after all the blood is shed. I would see Clemenceau becoming fanatical (more than he was already) accusing everyone who did not teach school in Stamford of treason. Likewise Socialists will press for greater power.

Germany: Also great turmoil. Likely there is pressure in the Reichstag for a reduction in the Kaiser's powers. If he fights too hard it may get really ugly.

Austro-Hungary: Assuming Serbia was overrun then there would be some satisfaction. However Kaiser Karl is a wildcard. He is full of good intentions but as the saying goes the devil is in the details. Pressures for a restructuring of the Dual Monarchy and/or electoral reform in Hungary will resume.

Britain: This will depend on the fine print of the peace. If Germany pays modest reparations to Belgium only and agrees to a moratorium on new capital ship construction, then HMG might spin this as a "win". There would be those on the Right who will deny that and those on the Left who will see it as the Huge Bloody Waste. Assuming there was an armistice before Easter 1916 then we are back to the Home Rule situation which the war interrupted.
Will it be enacted--the Unionists are now in coalition.

Russia: Norman Stone makes the interesting point that the early months of the Great War were good for the Russian economy as it stimulated growth in heavy industry. Later the labor shortages created bottlenecks and it all collapsed. There may be an attempt to replace Nicholas with his uncle. I do not believe revolution is inevitable and if it does a Kerensky government may survive.

Ottoman Empire: Has trouble with the Arabs but gets things together in a few years. Actually looks to do pretty good once the railroad is finished and oild is developed at Mosul.

Italy: There is a backlash against Salandra but also against a certain lapsed Socialist who pushed for entering the war (guess who).

United States: Having come close to entering the war withut doing so is trying to figure out what happened. Two interesting cultural features. HL Mencken and WR Hearst went into a Big Slump during the war and later rebounded. That is avoided here. Another interesting twist is the war allowed JP Morgan Jr to totally outclass his serious competitors who were proGerman Jews. This domination will be avoided.

Argentina: From another thread here the war disrupted Argentina's credit stream and it only partially recovered postwar. Look for a near complete recovery here.

Africa: Germany probably ending up losing Togoland & SW Africa and maybe Kamerun, but it likely kept East Africa. The combination of the very progressive Schnee and the Lettoe-Vorbeck might make for a very interesting place. Just before the war Liberia signed a very promising treaty with Germany to develop its rubber resources. Here that plan may get implemented making its development better. In Ethiopia Iyasu's overthrow may get postponed (it was partially the result of Entente pressure). Darfur is not incorporated into the Sudan and remains effectively independent though nominally Ottoman.

A few additional outcomes with respect to the US:

* No war = no prohibition. What put the Volstead Act over the top was wartime fervor for sacrifice. Without the war, I doubt this ever would have been enacted.
* Wilson would probably be re-elected by a narrow margin (in OTL, his victory over Hughes was extremely slim; the swing of a few thousand votes--ROUGHLY--in California would have given that state and the election to Hughes); his second term would probably be nothing remarkable, given no great causes. Then too, he would probably not have suffered that stroke in 1919; retirement back to Princeton and possible status as a professor emeritus once there was sufficient turnover in the power structure isn't out of the question.
* I don't think you'd get Harding running for the Republicans in 1920. Harding was the anti-Wilson in most, if not all, respects. The electorate was tired of Wilson preaching by 1920, and were largely in a mood for anyone BUT a Wilson protege. Possibly the stage could have been set for another Hughes attempt, which probably would have succeeded: he was progressive and scholarly also, but from the other party, and didn't have the moralizing baggage Wilson had.
* Would the economy, especially speculation on Wall Street, have gone as rampant? I'm not sure. I suspect the '20s would have been boom times, but not to the extent they were in OTL. A stronger president would have kept an eye on the economy, and buying on margin in particular, given a better Secretary of the Treasury than Andrew Mellon (perhaps Charles Dawes?). There could have been an early creation of an analog of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which could/would have put the brakes on buying on margin.
* Jazz would have remained-for some years anyhow-a largely New Orleans phenomenon, with no closure of Storyville. (Would men's excursions to Storyville be available today?) Similarly, the black migration to the north to work in industry would have been delayed or slowed.
* No "Red Scare" led by attorney general A. Mitchell Palmer in 1919, and thus no lurch to the right in American politics, which would have helped Hughes' election.

MrP said:

The Anglo-German Naval Race will continue - absent an agreement for it not to, naturally. The RN'd already won, of course, but national pride, y'know.

O'course, we'll need a Washington Treaty eventually. But without everyone being bankrupted by the last 2 years of war, there'll be more big ships. Ooh, completion of the 4 Hoods and all the Lexies.

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Probably no Hoods. The Royal Navy stops battlecruiser construction with HMS Tiger.

While no exactly POD is given for ending the war, for a naval oriented perspective, I would suggest some larger fleet action such as a true collision of fleets at Dogger Bank. The Royal Navy triumphs in the end and there is a negotiated truce later, much like the aftermath of the Battle of Tsushima. At least the British will get some of their ideas tested under fire and the battlecruisers will be revealed to be questionable investments.

Tom_B said:

France: intense political turmoil with massive dissatisfaction over not regaining Alsace Lorraine after all the blood is shed.

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The TL I have in mind results in a referendum in Alsace-Lorraine being put to the people, allowing them to decide whether to remain in Germanyor rejoin France. THe result is that they rejoin France.

Anaxagoras said:

The TL I have in mind results in a referendum in Alsace-Lorraine being put to the people, allowing them to decide whether to remain in Germanyor rejoin France. THe result is that they rejoin France.

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Clemenceau would be less crazy then. He would not be completely happy--he would like to see Germany obliterated but hey life is tough. As bare minimum the Germans would insist on the area remaining demilitarized (which some have suggested was what Bismarck really wanted). French politics remain convoluted--it is France--but the Center should hold against the Left.

If Germany makes this concession to France it probably got something in a return. Perhaps a "border adjustment" in Poland at Russian expense. Likely return of all African colonies. Maybe Katanga becomes a German protectorate.

I don't see Super Fleet fantasies ("It's a very kinky line, the type you don't take into battle") as inevitable here. What did Tirpitz's fantasies get for the Germans? You may instead see a large U-Boat fleet with a crash RN ASDIC program. Though I see the moderate Left being stronger than the Right in postwar Germany.

1940LaSalle said:

A few additional outcomes with respect to the US:

* No war = no prohibition. What put the Volstead Act over the top was wartime fervor for sacrifice. Without the war, I doubt this ever would have been enacted.
* Wilson would probably be re-elected by a narrow margin (in OTL, his victory over Hughes was extremely slim; the swing of a few thousand votes--ROUGHLY--in California would have given that state and the election to Hughes); his second term would probably be nothing remarkable, given no great causes. Then too, he would probably not have suffered that stroke in 1919; retirement back to Princeton and possible status as a professor emeritus once there was sufficient turnover in the power structure isn't out of the question.
* I don't think you'd get Harding running for the Republicans in 1920. Harding was the anti-Wilson in most, if not all, respects. The electorate was tired of Wilson preaching by 1920, and were largely in a mood for anyone BUT a Wilson protege. Possibly the stage could have been set for another Hughes attempt, which probably would have succeeded: he was progressive and scholarly also, but from the other party, and didn't have the moralizing baggage Wilson had.
* Would the economy, especially speculation on Wall Street, have gone as rampant? I'm not sure. I suspect the '20s would have been boom times, but not to the extent they were in OTL. A stronger president would have kept an eye on the economy, and buying on margin in particular, given a better Secretary of the Treasury than Andrew Mellon (perhaps Charles Dawes?). There could have been an early creation of an analog of the Securities and Exchange Commission, which could/would have put the brakes on buying on margin.
* Jazz would have remained-for some years anyhow-a largely New Orleans phenomenon, with no closure of Storyville. (Would men's excursions to Storyville be available today?) Similarly, the black migration to the north to work in industry would have been delayed or slowed.
* No "Red Scare" led by attorney general A. Mitchell Palmer in 1919, and thus no lurch to the right in American politics, which would have helped Hughes' election.

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Prohibition may not have been immediately enacted but it would not go away as an issue either.

The question is whether Wilson actually had a clear role in brokering the peace--which he wanted to do. His prestige may be enhanced by this even though being Wilson he would have wandered into unrealistic fantasies at some point. At Hist is usually unkind to James Cox but I could see him getting the Presidency by a narrow margin if Wilson brokers what is widely regarded as a fair peace. Hearst would remain proDemocrat in TTL and that alone would be a plus.

The other possible peacebroker is Pope Benedict and there might be some interesting aftereffects to that.

David S Poepoe said:

Probably no Hoods. The Royal Navy stops battlecruiser construction with HMS Tiger

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Aye, I suspect so . . . given the end-date, what think you of Revenge and Repulse in this ATL?

David S Poepoe said:

While no exactly POD is given for ending the war, for a naval oriented perspective, I would suggest some larger fleet action such as a true collision of fleets at Dogger Bank. The Royal Navy triumphs in the end and there is a negotiated truce later, much like the aftermath of the Battle of Tsushima. At least the British will get some of their ideas tested under fire and the battlecruisers will be revealed to be questionable investments.

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Aye, sounds nice The results of the victory being as much in t'Kaiser's head as in reality.

Tom_B said:

I don't see Super Fleet fantasies ("It's a very kinky line, the type you don't take into battle") as inevitable here. What did Tirpitz's fantasies get for the Germans? You may instead see a large U-Boat fleet with a crash RN ASDIC program. Though I see the moderate Left being stronger than the Right in postwar Germany.

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It's not so much that I envisage super fleet fantasies, as that Germany had a great many ships sitting on the stocks throughout the war that weren't completed, but probably would have been if Germany had had money and resources. Incidentally, if we do posit a crushing German defeat at Dogger Bank, the Germans could explain it by pointing out that their guns were smaller than the RN's.

MrP said:

Absent '16 and we'll lose several key things:
* Gallipolli

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The Gallipoli Campaign started in the spring of 1915. If we assume an end to the war in late 1915/early 1916, it will still. Actually, the TL I'm thinking of has a Gallipoli POD.

Anaxagoras said:

The Gallipoli Campaign started in the spring of 1915. If we assume an end to the war in late 1915/early 1916, it will still. Actually, the TL I'm thinking of has a Gallipoli POD.

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Yes, quite right! What was I thinking?

The problem is that at the end of 1915 the CPs are ascendant: both the western front and the Italian front are stabilised (but the Germans are in occupation of Belgium and the fighting is inside France); Gallipoli has put an end to all hopes of a quick capitulation of the Ottomans (which means that the straits are closed for good, and no possibility for Russia to receive goods and export grain from the Black Sea); Serbia is gone; German victories in Eastern Prussia have pushed back the Russians, and the expectations for 1916 are not particularly good on that front. Wilson proposed to mediate in december 1915, and the response from the CPs was not negative (no surprise); the Entente was quite adamant in refusing any talk (spearheaded by the French). Pope Benedict made his efforts mainly in 1917, if I'm not wrong: however, he would have certainly supported a peace initiative.

We've been already discussing this POD in other threads: any peace agreement in late 1915-early 1916 would have resulted in an effective defeat of the Entente, whatever the actual peace treaty reads. No chance that France gets back A-L (not even a chance to go for a referendum): A-L are the landmark of the German empire, and giving them away it would be considered a big loss of face in Germany. Serbia is out of the war: any peace agreement would see it as the big loser. Probably it would end up loosing a big chunk of Macedonia to Bulgaria, with the rump Serbia turning into an A-H puppet. This would effectively turn the Balkans into an Austrian protectorate, and - together with the Ottomans being firmly in the CP field - would definitely threaten British interests in SE Persia. The political backlash in France would be awful: the government would certainly fall, and there would be riots and general strikes. I'm not forecasting any "red France" here, but a military coup could not be discounted: this TL would be likely to see a reactionary and revanchist France, with the Action Francais playing a big role: I'll go a step forward, and assume that here the myth of the betrayal of the otherland by Jews and Socialists would be a French refrain, not a German one. It is likely that socialist strikes will extend to Italy too, even if the situation there should be less complicated than in France (and the end result might be a moderate socialist government). The situation in UK is likely to be somehow complicated: even assuming that Belgium is restored (and even some compensation is paid by the Germans) the settlement will not be considered a victory and might even convince the Irish that the British government is weak. Bloody Easter is still in the cards.
Russia: the cheapest price they will pay will be an independent Poland, in the CPs's sphere of influence. There will be some significant political backlash there too (it is the second war in a row which goes badly, and Russian losses have not been insignificant). Riots and strikes will happen for sure; IMO, the czarist regime will hold, but will be forced to make some concessions to the Duma (and Nicholas might be forced to abdicate, to be replaced by his uncle).

Imperial germany will try and sell the result as a victory (which is partly true); still I'd anticipate that the german socialist will benefit too from the peace, and - just possibly - that Germany will slowly move toward a more democratic regime. A-H and Turkey will enjoy the greatest benefits: once again, it will look like a victory, and will strengthen both (internally at least).
IMHO, I'm quite confident in the Ottomans continuing with renewed will in the political and social reforms supported by the Young Turks (there is the risk of an increase of pan-Turkism, which would effectively restrict the benefits of the reform to Istanbul and Anatolia, leaving the arabs very unsatisfied): this, together with the economic benefits of the Berlin-to-Bagdad railway and of the development of Mosul oil fields, might have very beneficial effects for Turkey. I'd be a bit more cautious with the after-effects in A-H: the "quasi-victory" and the humbling of Serbia will have a positive effect for sure, but it might effectively delay the much-needed reform of the empire (still Karl is scheduled to be emperor in one year: he is likely to be in favor of reforms).

Overall, both Europe and ME would significantly benefit with an early peace (even factoring in the political unrest and the unavoidable economic slump, while the heavy industry is phased down): TTL should be able to avoid WW2 and the fascism (and quite likely communism too), and is likely to be more democratic; the Irish might end up much worse than OTL. The difficulty is in convincing UK and France (mostly France) that the war has to end.

Tom_B said:

Prohibition may not have been immediately enacted but it would not go away as an issue either.

The question is whether Wilson actually had a clear role in brokering the peace--which he wanted to do. His prestige may be enhanced by this even though being Wilson he would have wandered into unrealistic fantasies at some point. At Hist is usually unkind to James Cox but I could see him getting the Presidency by a narrow margin if Wilson brokers what is widely regarded as a fair peace. Hearst would remain proDemocrat in TTL and that alone would be a plus.

The other possible peacebroker is Pope Benedict and there might be some interesting aftereffects to that.

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Prohibition might not have gone away but I don't see a driving force to put it over the top, either. If it didn't make it in the days of revivalistic fervor in the late 19th century, and it took a war to give it the final boost, absent the war, what puts it through?

Not sure at all about Wilson brokering a peace: I don't recall any offers to do so in OTL, and for the most part, he was an unknown in the chancelleries of Europe (Theodore Roosevelt, on the other hand, enjoyed significant renown and prestige). About the only US-based mediatory action I can think of before Versailles was Henry Ford's poorly-conceived "Peace Ship" idea.

Now, the Pope as mediator...that's interesting.

Perhaps a victory at Gallipoli could be what it takes to bring about an early end to WWI. Arms could be shipped to Russia and grain could be shipped from Russia via the Black Sea, which will surely hamper the Germans on the Eastern Front.

Meanwhile, if the Allies can strike into the Balkans from Gallipoli, it would put pressure on the Austrians. The Germans might have to pull back in the West to help the Austrians against the Italians and whoever's invading via the Balkans (Romanians, Serbs, Anglo-French).

A successful Gallipoli would certainly end the war much earlier.
IMHO, however, Gallipoli was an "impossible mission", predicated on the collapse of Ottoman troops when confronted by British/ANZAC forces, and therefore flawed in the premises.
A kind of WW1 "Operation Sealion".

Had the Brits kept going instead of hanging back when they did, the Ottoman troops would have fled the area. Instead, they had the opportunity to bring in reinforcements.

Now, the Brits breaking out of Thrace could prove tricky. However, a large Allied force, so close to Constantinople, would keep the Ottomans quite busy and it would definitely keep the Straits open.

I agree on the Gallipoli idea. Maybe Greece and Bulgaria will join the Allies to get a bit of Thrace (and the Eastern Turkish coast, in Greece's case). Maybe a peace is signed in late 1915, with Russia losing Poland, Germany gaining a slice of land in Alsace-Lorraine and Luxemburg, Serbia becoming an Austrian puppet (eventually joining just like Bosnia did) with Macedonia divided between the Greeks and Bulgarians, and Germany losing most of the colonies (except Tangaikya and Kamerun) but getting the Congo (?) in return.

Peace as you outlined (or any less than decisive peace), means a second war, same as IOTL. The issues surrounding the war would still be unresolved, much of the wholesale slaughter never happened, and no one's broke. You still get WW II, perhaps a few years sooner or, god forbid, a few years later. Imagine WW II with WMD's on all sides wielded by nations without any memory of Flanders or Verdun as a moderator (at it was WW II was an abattior)