One of the things that has always struck me about the 1990s Bosnian Civil War is how decisive air power could have been for both main factions of the war, prior to NATO stepping in during the late phase of the war to carry out a few airstrikes.
So, let's say both the Republika Srpska and the Federation would start the war on a more equal footing in terms of commandeered aircraft inventory. Some main questions related to the POD :
1.) How plausible is a roughly equal commandeering of aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters, and both combat and support aircraft ?
2.) Where would the RS and the Federation capture them ? Which side would have more of a difficulty in doing so ?
3.) Where would both sides house, maintain and rearm their aircraft and which side could have more difficulty in doing so ?
4.) Which of the aircraft at the RS' and Federation's disposal would probably be the most worthless, needing to be abandoned to not eat up the budget and supplies that would be needed for the more useful aircraft ?
5.) What roles would you assign to what aircraft, givent the context of the war ?
Info on Bosnian aircraft inventories when the war started :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika_Srpska_Air_Force#Creation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_Federation_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_and_Anti-Aircraft_Defence_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina
All in all, according to my calculations, when the war started, the two sides had the following :
Aircraft with relatively official numbers
3-11 UTVA 75 turboprop trainers (numbers are dubious on this one, the RS probably had 2, while the Federation had at least 1 - both probably had more, but didn't engage them too much)
11 SOKO J-21 Jastreb jet trainers (RS only)
1 SOKO G-4 Galeb jet trainer (RS only)
7 SOKO J-22 Orao strike fighters (RS only)
15 UH-1H Iroquois utility helicopters (Federation only, can't find more details on whether they were mostly post-war purchases or not)
22 SOKO Gazelle utility helicopters (seem to have been RS only during the war)
30 and more Mi-8 transport and CAS helicopters (numbers wary, but the Federation apparently had as much as 20 or more (22 ?), while the RS had at least 11)
Aircraft with exact numbers unknown (mostly from the RS side)
An-2
PZL-104 Wilga
Zlín 526F
Cessna 172
Piper PA-18-150 Super Cub (both RS and Federation, so it seems)
If we go by official numbers, then the entirety of Bosnia had about 70-82 airworthy military aircraft, with the RS having a 42-strong air force with adequate mixed capability in 1992 and the Federation side a 26-46 strong air wing with limited capabilities (mostly for transport and recon only) during the early 90s in general.
Obviously, the Federation only managed to commandeer a few helicopters (ca 15 UH-1Hs, 22 Mi-8s) and only a few UTVA 75 fixed-wing planes (some sources say they were 11, some say that only a single one). Naturally, without any fighters or ground attack planes, the capabilities of the Federation's air component was limited at best and only saw support flights for the ground forces of the ArBiH.
The RS had it generally better, with SOKO Oraos, Galebs and Jastrebs in addition to the SOKO Gazelle and Mi-8 helicopters. They also had a fairly good variety of support and liaison aircraft, especially later on - including the An-2, UTVA-66, UTVA-75, Zlin 526F, PZL-104 Wilga 80, Piper PA-18-150 Super Cub and Cessna 172. The RS' air force had roughly 42 aircraft in 1992. One notable fact is that the Banja Luka airbase grew considerably in capability between June and August 1991, after pretty much all of the existing air wings of the JNA were flown out of Slovenia and Croatia. While not all of the evacuated squadrons were moved to Banja Luka, the local airbase still received enough of an inventory to double the size of its aircraft complement. During the war years, the RS lost a total of 18 aircraft : 5 Oraos, 6 Jastrebs, 5 Gazelles and 2 Mi-8.
P.S. I am not naive or arrogant enough to assume that air power alone could decide the entire war - that's a very 1990s notion. But I do think that a less one-sided balance of domestic air power could have been beneficial for bringing about an earlier stalemate and would have created less of a need for outside military help.
So, let's say both the Republika Srpska and the Federation would start the war on a more equal footing in terms of commandeered aircraft inventory. Some main questions related to the POD :
1.) How plausible is a roughly equal commandeering of aircraft, both fixed-wing and helicopters, and both combat and support aircraft ?
2.) Where would the RS and the Federation capture them ? Which side would have more of a difficulty in doing so ?
3.) Where would both sides house, maintain and rearm their aircraft and which side could have more difficulty in doing so ?
4.) Which of the aircraft at the RS' and Federation's disposal would probably be the most worthless, needing to be abandoned to not eat up the budget and supplies that would be needed for the more useful aircraft ?
5.) What roles would you assign to what aircraft, givent the context of the war ?
Info on Bosnian aircraft inventories when the war started :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republika_Srpska_Air_Force#Creation
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Army_of_the_Federation_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_Force_and_Anti-Aircraft_Defence_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina
All in all, according to my calculations, when the war started, the two sides had the following :
Aircraft with relatively official numbers
3-11 UTVA 75 turboprop trainers (numbers are dubious on this one, the RS probably had 2, while the Federation had at least 1 - both probably had more, but didn't engage them too much)
11 SOKO J-21 Jastreb jet trainers (RS only)
1 SOKO G-4 Galeb jet trainer (RS only)
7 SOKO J-22 Orao strike fighters (RS only)
15 UH-1H Iroquois utility helicopters (Federation only, can't find more details on whether they were mostly post-war purchases or not)
22 SOKO Gazelle utility helicopters (seem to have been RS only during the war)
30 and more Mi-8 transport and CAS helicopters (numbers wary, but the Federation apparently had as much as 20 or more (22 ?), while the RS had at least 11)
Aircraft with exact numbers unknown (mostly from the RS side)
An-2
PZL-104 Wilga
Zlín 526F
Cessna 172
Piper PA-18-150 Super Cub (both RS and Federation, so it seems)
If we go by official numbers, then the entirety of Bosnia had about 70-82 airworthy military aircraft, with the RS having a 42-strong air force with adequate mixed capability in 1992 and the Federation side a 26-46 strong air wing with limited capabilities (mostly for transport and recon only) during the early 90s in general.
Obviously, the Federation only managed to commandeer a few helicopters (ca 15 UH-1Hs, 22 Mi-8s) and only a few UTVA 75 fixed-wing planes (some sources say they were 11, some say that only a single one). Naturally, without any fighters or ground attack planes, the capabilities of the Federation's air component was limited at best and only saw support flights for the ground forces of the ArBiH.
The RS had it generally better, with SOKO Oraos, Galebs and Jastrebs in addition to the SOKO Gazelle and Mi-8 helicopters. They also had a fairly good variety of support and liaison aircraft, especially later on - including the An-2, UTVA-66, UTVA-75, Zlin 526F, PZL-104 Wilga 80, Piper PA-18-150 Super Cub and Cessna 172. The RS' air force had roughly 42 aircraft in 1992. One notable fact is that the Banja Luka airbase grew considerably in capability between June and August 1991, after pretty much all of the existing air wings of the JNA were flown out of Slovenia and Croatia. While not all of the evacuated squadrons were moved to Banja Luka, the local airbase still received enough of an inventory to double the size of its aircraft complement. During the war years, the RS lost a total of 18 aircraft : 5 Oraos, 6 Jastrebs, 5 Gazelles and 2 Mi-8.
P.S. I am not naive or arrogant enough to assume that air power alone could decide the entire war - that's a very 1990s notion. But I do think that a less one-sided balance of domestic air power could have been beneficial for bringing about an earlier stalemate and would have created less of a need for outside military help.
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