So this gets thrown around a lot without really being put up to scrutiny, and I feel it's an incorrect assumption. The argument that the phalanx was inferior to the legion naturally, is one that stems from the incredibly Pro-Roman Polybius. He was obviously heavily biased, but since I think going down that route to prove that the phalanx was not as inferior as believed would not be necessary.
Anyway, I have never completely bought into the narrative that the Macedonian pike phalanx was necessarily "inferior" to the Roman Legions, although it certainly was less flexible and adaptable. Pyrrhus was able to defeat the legions with his phalanx (and crucially, he valued the importance of cavalry), despite his losses. Still, this was not an evenly numbered battle on neutral terrain, so it is hard to take anything away from this of the superiority of either force.
At both Cynoscephylae (spelling?) and Pydna, the phalanxes were caught on terrain that was highly unfavorable to that style of warfare (and which would have been unfavorable for ANY close order battle line). This is in part due to the inferior generalship of both Phillip and Perseus, of which I will return to later. At the first of these battles, the Romans nevertheless had a hard time before they managed to turn the Macedonian phalanx and attack it in the flank, which is telling.
However, it should be remembered that the pike phalanx was only one part of the Philip/Alexander combination of strike and shock tactics and its role was to play the anvil to the other components' (cavalry and allied/light infantry) hammer. They were only supposed to hold the enemy in check, while the main striking component did their work. This didn't happen when the Antigonid Kings (Philip V and Perseus) opposed the Romans. According to some historians, it was because Macedonian cavalry had deteriorated in quality since Alexander (or because they had reverted to the skirmishing role that Greeks gave to cavalry) as opposed to playing the role of shock troops that Philip and Alexander had designed for them. Regardless, the key here was that the main striking components that made the Macedonian army so formiddable, were clearly lacking. The flanks were thus also as a result, not secure, which jeopardized the whole point of the phalanx to begin with.
Yet this cannot be explained for all the encounters. At Thermopylae, Antiochus III had been forced into defending the pass at a huge disadvantage in numbers, due to a miscalculation on his part on how the Romans would react to his invasion. Even then, the phalanx was completely successful in holding the Romans off, and it was only when the flying column lead by Cato skirted around the moutain pass and surprised the Aetolians forcing them to flee from their role of protecting said passes, that Antiochus was forced to execute a hasty withdraw before being completely encircled.
Antiochus however, used the phalanx exactly as intended during most of his other campaigns, including Magnesia. The cataphract cavalry was used as the heavy cavalry striking force, while the phalanx was to play the anvil. Antiochus was able to completely obliderate a whole flank of the Romans with his cavalry strike, but failed to capitalize on it and wrap up the Roman flank. It was his poor use of the scythe chariots on the other flank, and terrible placement of elephants that caused his cavalry on said wing and phalanx (which was holding their own) to become scattered and displaced by the panic of the elephants and chariots. Even then, the phalanx managed an orderly and fighting withdrawal, and the battle was not a complete walkover.
The phalanx, when used correctly at Magnesia proved to be more than a match for the Roman legions and it was only through screw ups in deployment and executed (i.e. not turning his cavalry to wrap up the Roman flank) the Roman army was not annihilated.
Another gross simplification - or even a mistake - is to state that the Macedonian phalanx was widely adopted and employed across the Mediterranean but that, as a modified version of the earlier hoplite phalanx, it was fatally flawed because it was rigid.
The first part of the statement is incorrect. Neither Carthage, nor Syracuse, for instance, seem to have ever adopted a Macedonian pike-style phalanx. The Spartans and the Achaian Ligue did, but only during the second half of the third century. Instead, they stuck to a hoplite style phalanx. It seems that it was with such an order of battle that Hannibal was able to smash the Romans repeatedly before being defeated by them at Zama. It is also with a hoplite phalanx that Xanthippos, the Spartan mercenary general, destroyed the Roman legions of Regulus at Bagradas in 255 BCE. The point here is that statements to the effect that the Roman organization was so superior simply do not stand up to the facts.
Second, it should also be remembered that the Roman order of battle was itself an evolution from the hoplite phalanx. Originally, the term legion meant a levy of troops, not a specific type of organization.
Third, warfare during the Hellenistic period was more innovative that what is often suggested. For instance, and as the Romans were themselves making their hoplite-style army evolve, Greek and Hellenistic states also made a number of experiences (increasing role of light infantry such as peltasts, introduction of the thureoi, a medium infantry type between a hoplite and a peltast) that were all targeted to introduce more flexibility in the line of battle.
Even the statement that a pike phalanx was more complex to operate and therefore needed, on average, a more talented general than for a legion needs discussing. It is however a bit of a simplification (and even a caricature or a Pro-Roman stereotype) to oppose the rigid phalanx to the flexible legion. The main difference between these two evolutions from the hoplitic phalanx seems to be that while the Macedonian pike phalanx became a core part of an integrated battle force, along with shock cavalry and skirmishing light cavalry and infantry, the Romans still put all the emphasis on heavy infantry. While the Hellenistic system was more sophisticated, it was also more difficult to handle in a fully effective way.
Another gross simplification - or even a mistake - is to state that the Macedonian phalanx was widely adopted and employed across the Mediterranean but that, as a modified version of the earlier hoplite phalanx, it was fatally flawed because it was rigid.
The first part of the statement is incorrect. Neither Carthage, nor Syracuse, for instance, seem to have ever adopted a Macedonian pike-style phalanx. The Spartans and the Achaian Ligue did, but only during the second half of the third century. Instead, they stuck to a hoplite style phalanx. It seems that it was with such an order of battle that Hannibal was able to smash the Romans repeatedly before being defeated by them at Zama. It is also with a hoplite phalanx that Xanthippos, the Spartan mercenary general, destroyed the Roman legions of Regulus at Bagradas in 255 BCE. The point here is that statements to the effect that the Roman organization was so superior simply do not stand up to the facts.
Second, it should also be remembered that the Roman order of battle was itself an evolution from the hoplite phalanx. Originally, the term legion meant a levy of troops, not a specific type of organization.
Third, warfare during the Hellenistic period was more innovative that what is often suggested. For instance, and as the Romans were themselves making their hoplite-style army evolve, Greek and Hellenistic states also made a number of experiences (increasing role of light infantry such as peltasts, introduction of the thureoi, a medium infantry type between a hoplite and a peltast) that were all targeted to introduce more flexibility in the line of battle.
Even the statement that a pike phalanx was more complex to operate and therefore needed, on average, a more talented general than for a legion needs discussing. It is however a bit of a simplification (and even a caricature or a Pro-Roman stereotype) to oppose the rigid phalanx to the flexible legion. The main difference between these two evolutions from the hoplitic phalanx seems to be that while the Macedonian pike phalanx became a core part of an integrated battle force, along with shock cavalry and skirmishing light cavalry and infantry, the Romans still put all the emphasis on heavy infantry. While the Hellenistic system was more sophisticated, it was also more difficult to handle in a fully effective way
Anyway, I have never completely bought into the narrative that the Macedonian pike phalanx was necessarily "inferior" to the Roman Legions, although it certainly was less flexible and adaptable. Pyrrhus was able to defeat the legions with his phalanx (and crucially, he valued the importance of cavalry), despite his losses. Still, this was not an evenly numbered battle on neutral terrain, so it is hard to take anything away from this of the superiority of either force.
At both Cynoscephylae (spelling?) and Pydna, the phalanxes were caught on terrain that was highly unfavorable to that style of warfare (and which would have been unfavorable for ANY close order battle line). This is in part due to the inferior generalship of both Phillip and Perseus, of which I will return to later. At the first of these battles, the Romans nevertheless had a hard time before they managed to turn the Macedonian phalanx and attack it in the flank, which is telling.
However, it should be remembered that the pike phalanx was only one part of the Philip/Alexander combination of strike and shock tactics and its role was to play the anvil to the other components' (cavalry and allied/light infantry) hammer. They were only supposed to hold the enemy in check, while the main striking component did their work. This didn't happen when the Antigonid Kings (Philip V and Perseus) opposed the Romans. According to some historians, it was because Macedonian cavalry had deteriorated in quality since Alexander (or because they had reverted to the skirmishing role that Greeks gave to cavalry) as opposed to playing the role of shock troops that Philip and Alexander had designed for them. Regardless, the key here was that the main striking components that made the Macedonian army so formiddable, were clearly lacking. The flanks were thus also as a result, not secure, which jeopardized the whole point of the phalanx to begin with.
Yet this cannot be explained for all the encounters. At Thermopylae, Antiochus III had been forced into defending the pass at a huge disadvantage in numbers, due to a miscalculation on his part on how the Romans would react to his invasion. Even then, the phalanx was completely successful in holding the Romans off, and it was only when the flying column lead by Cato skirted around the moutain pass and surprised the Aetolians forcing them to flee from their role of protecting said passes, that Antiochus was forced to execute a hasty withdraw before being completely encircled.
Antiochus however, used the phalanx exactly as intended during most of his other campaigns, including Magnesia. The cataphract cavalry was used as the heavy cavalry striking force, while the phalanx was to play the anvil. Antiochus was able to completely obliderate a whole flank of the Romans with his cavalry strike, but failed to capitalize on it and wrap up the Roman flank. It was his poor use of the scythe chariots on the other flank, and terrible placement of elephants that caused his cavalry on said wing and phalanx (which was holding their own) to become scattered and displaced by the panic of the elephants and chariots. Even then, the phalanx managed an orderly and fighting withdrawal, and the battle was not a complete walkover.
The phalanx, when used correctly at Magnesia proved to be more than a match for the Roman legions and it was only through screw ups in deployment and executed (i.e. not turning his cavalry to wrap up the Roman flank) the Roman army was not annihilated.
Another gross simplification - or even a mistake - is to state that the Macedonian phalanx was widely adopted and employed across the Mediterranean but that, as a modified version of the earlier hoplite phalanx, it was fatally flawed because it was rigid.
The first part of the statement is incorrect. Neither Carthage, nor Syracuse, for instance, seem to have ever adopted a Macedonian pike-style phalanx. The Spartans and the Achaian Ligue did, but only during the second half of the third century. Instead, they stuck to a hoplite style phalanx. It seems that it was with such an order of battle that Hannibal was able to smash the Romans repeatedly before being defeated by them at Zama. It is also with a hoplite phalanx that Xanthippos, the Spartan mercenary general, destroyed the Roman legions of Regulus at Bagradas in 255 BCE. The point here is that statements to the effect that the Roman organization was so superior simply do not stand up to the facts.
Second, it should also be remembered that the Roman order of battle was itself an evolution from the hoplite phalanx. Originally, the term legion meant a levy of troops, not a specific type of organization.
Third, warfare during the Hellenistic period was more innovative that what is often suggested. For instance, and as the Romans were themselves making their hoplite-style army evolve, Greek and Hellenistic states also made a number of experiences (increasing role of light infantry such as peltasts, introduction of the thureoi, a medium infantry type between a hoplite and a peltast) that were all targeted to introduce more flexibility in the line of battle.
Even the statement that a pike phalanx was more complex to operate and therefore needed, on average, a more talented general than for a legion needs discussing. It is however a bit of a simplification (and even a caricature or a Pro-Roman stereotype) to oppose the rigid phalanx to the flexible legion. The main difference between these two evolutions from the hoplitic phalanx seems to be that while the Macedonian pike phalanx became a core part of an integrated battle force, along with shock cavalry and skirmishing light cavalry and infantry, the Romans still put all the emphasis on heavy infantry. While the Hellenistic system was more sophisticated, it was also more difficult to handle in a fully effective way.
Another gross simplification - or even a mistake - is to state that the Macedonian phalanx was widely adopted and employed across the Mediterranean but that, as a modified version of the earlier hoplite phalanx, it was fatally flawed because it was rigid.
The first part of the statement is incorrect. Neither Carthage, nor Syracuse, for instance, seem to have ever adopted a Macedonian pike-style phalanx. The Spartans and the Achaian Ligue did, but only during the second half of the third century. Instead, they stuck to a hoplite style phalanx. It seems that it was with such an order of battle that Hannibal was able to smash the Romans repeatedly before being defeated by them at Zama. It is also with a hoplite phalanx that Xanthippos, the Spartan mercenary general, destroyed the Roman legions of Regulus at Bagradas in 255 BCE. The point here is that statements to the effect that the Roman organization was so superior simply do not stand up to the facts.
Second, it should also be remembered that the Roman order of battle was itself an evolution from the hoplite phalanx. Originally, the term legion meant a levy of troops, not a specific type of organization.
Third, warfare during the Hellenistic period was more innovative that what is often suggested. For instance, and as the Romans were themselves making their hoplite-style army evolve, Greek and Hellenistic states also made a number of experiences (increasing role of light infantry such as peltasts, introduction of the thureoi, a medium infantry type between a hoplite and a peltast) that were all targeted to introduce more flexibility in the line of battle.
Even the statement that a pike phalanx was more complex to operate and therefore needed, on average, a more talented general than for a legion needs discussing. It is however a bit of a simplification (and even a caricature or a Pro-Roman stereotype) to oppose the rigid phalanx to the flexible legion. The main difference between these two evolutions from the hoplitic phalanx seems to be that while the Macedonian pike phalanx became a core part of an integrated battle force, along with shock cavalry and skirmishing light cavalry and infantry, the Romans still put all the emphasis on heavy infantry. While the Hellenistic system was more sophisticated, it was also more difficult to handle in a fully effective way
