What Would a Confederate "Fabian Strategy" Have Looked Like?

In counterfactual discussions of the American Civil War, there is a contention among some that the Confederacy, in order to win the war, should have adopted a "Fabian Strategy" designed to wear down Union morale until they gave up. This would be in contrast to the strategy apparently pursued by Robert E. Lee, which was to achieve a decisive battlefield victory over the main Union army (the Army of the Potomac) or the thinking of Jefferson Davis, which was to defend every square inch of Confederate soil.

Arguably, one can say that Joseph Johnston engaged in a Fabian strategy during the Atlanta Campaign, as he concentrated on preserving the combat strength of the Army of Tennessee until Sherman made a mistake that would leave him vulnerable or until Southern cavalry raids could cut the Northern supply lines. The problem with this strategy is that, while the South avoided heavy casualties (which was good) the North avoided heavy casualties as well (which was bad). In Virginia, Lee adopted a confrontational strategy to meet Grant's offensive head on, which inflicted terrible losses on the North at the price of having the South sustain heavy losses as well.

What, exactly, would a Confederate Fabian strategy have looked like? Moreover, would it have been any more effective than the strategy (such as it was) pursued by the South IOTL?

Anaxagoras said:

What, exactly, would a Confederate Fabian strategy have looked like? Moreover, would it have been any more effective than the strategy (such as it was) pursued by the South IOTL?

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A disaster.

Tennessee falls at least as fast as OTL. So does New Orleans. Since Virginia isn't being fought over tooth and nail, whoever is in charge - let's pick Johnston just because he's less likely to eat some more lead and was there pre-Lee - pulls out of Richmond.

There goes the vast majority of the Confederacy's industry, just between two states and New Orleans. Its not going to be able to maintain an army.

Fabius's strategy worked because Hannibal ravaging the countryside wouldn't win him the war, but that required cities Hannibal couldn't just take.

Here, since the Confederacy only can make that the case by committing to the kind of battles that certain generals were adverse to, and/or spending a considerable amount of troops to hold them "directly", that's not really possible.

Elfwine said:

A disaster.

Tennessee falls at least as fast as OTL. So does New Orleans. Since Virginia isn't being fought over tooth and nail, whoever is in charge - let's pick Johnston just because he's less likely to eat some more lead and was there pre-Lee - pulls out of Richmond.

There goes the vast majority of the Confederacy's industry, just between two states and New Orleans. Its not going to be able to maintain an army.

Fabius's strategy worked because Hannibal ravaging the countryside wouldn't win him the war, but that required cities Hannibal couldn't just take.

Here, since the Confederacy only can make that the case by committing to the kind of battles that certain generals were adverse to, and/or spending a considerable amount of troops to hold them "directly", that's not really possible.

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Agreed. The Union will ride roughshod over the Confederates, capturing key population and industrial centers without opposition. This goes even better for the Union if its willing to liberate slaves or pull a March to the Sea type maneuver, but the war will go so well it won't have to.

A key part of the Fabian strategy was that the Romans could retake the cities Hannibal took, but the Confederates will not be able to dislodge Union forces from cites. Any sort of head-on assault would be futile, which leaves only encirclement as an option. Union forces should be able to relieve any siege before the besieged are starved out.

Elfwine said:

A disaster.

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Hurrah!Praga! said:

Agreed.

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You both make good points, but is it possible you're both a bit too pessimistic? It's not like the only option aside from Lee's strategy of seeking direct battle is to abandon everything without a fight at all. If we look at phase of the Atlanta Campaign where Johnston lead the Army of Tennessee, it took Sherman more than two months to advance from Chattanooga to the outskirts of Atlanta, despite greatly superior numbers. He also suffered something like 20,000 casualties during that time.

Anaxagoras said:

You both make good points, but is it possible you're both a bit too pessimistic? It's not like the only option aside from Lee's strategy of seeking direct battle is to abandon everything without a fight at all. If we look at phase of the Atlanta Campaign where Johnston lead the Army of Tennessee, it took Sherman more than two months to advance from Chattanooga to the outskirts of Atlanta, despite greatly superior numbers. He also suffered something like 20,000 casualties during that time.

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Leaving aside what Joe may or may not have intended to do OTL - the problems:

1) Johnston consistently had about 60% of the men Sherman had. Lee would have been sorely tempted to offer his sons as POWs to gain such favorable odds.

2) Sherman was not a masterful offensive (or in any other form of battlefield) general. This is true of most Union generals, but see #3.

3) Fine, its taken two months. So what? At this point the AoT has to either stand and fight - and thus stop a strategy based on retreating and harassment* despite the fact the numbers aren't favoring it more than a percent point or two than they were earlier (thanks only to the coincidence of three year enlistments expiring for the Union) - or keep retreating, in which case "Atlanta is ours and fairly won." is worth 20,000 casualties and two months for the Union - and that's much preferable to that plus what it took against Hood as well from the Union POV.

Meanwhile Lee delayed Grant for longer at a heavier price than Johnston did Sherman.

We can argue for an eternity on Lee's tactics and strategy, but they lead to his army being more successful than any other Confederate army. But that was at the price of having to confront the Federals instead of giving up ground for merely preserving an army which can then stumble on to the next point the Federals want to take.

I'm not saying that "fight him at the first and earliest opportunity" is best, but the Confederacy can't win the war by assuming its cities can't be taken or that they can be retaken if they are captured, which really puts some pretty serious limits on emulating Fabius.


* Going with the idea that Joe was intentionally fighting a Fabian campaign.

Elfwine said:

Lee would have been sorely tempted to offer his sons as POWs to gain such favorable odds.

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That would cost Lee absolutely nothing, since his son Rooney WAS a prisoner-of-war.

Elfwine said:

2) Sherman was not a masterful offensive (or in any other form of battlefield) general. This is true of most Union generals

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I'll grant you that. Sherman is overrated.

Elfwine said:

Going with the idea that Joe was intentionally fighting a Fabian campaign.

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Not strictly, but his general concept was to avoid engaging in a major battle so as to avoid heavy casualties, seeking to wear Sherman down and eventually cut his supply lines with cavalry. It's about as close as you can get to a Fabian strategy in the context of the American Civil War.

Anaxagoras said:

That would cost Lee absolutely nothing, since his son Rooney WAS a prisoner-of-war.



I'll grant you that. Sherman is overrated.



Not strictly, but his general concept was to avoid engaging in a major battle so as to avoid heavy casualties, seeking to wear Sherman down and eventually cut his supply lines with cavalry. It's about as close as you can get to a Fabian strategy in the context of the American Civil War.

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If the Confederacy had enough land in between the Union border and valuable territory, then this could work. It would be a risky strategy, but it could work. However, Richmond and Washington are all of 100 miles away from each other; the majority of Confederate industry was located close to the Union border. There's not enough room for the Confederates to pull of any logistical trickery - the supply lines are short enough that they can be protected, and the Union forces can also be supplied by sea depending on the location.

Anaxagoras said:

That would cost Lee absolutely nothing, since his son Rooney WAS a prisoner-of-war.

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Thus sons, plural. Trade George (back in Richmond) and Robert Jr. (a common artilleryman) for removing 20,000+ (at campaign start) Union troops?

"Sorry boys, sacrifices have to be made. Say hi to Rooney for me."

Not strictly, but his general concept was to avoid engaging in a major battle so as to avoid heavy casualties, seeking to wear Sherman down and eventually cut his supply lines with cavalry. It's about as close as you can get to a Fabian strategy in the context of the American Civil War.

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Cavalry which for some reason couldn't possibly be his own cavalry, for various reasons.

Leaving aside the pros and cons of that (wanting someone else's cavalry to raid Sherman's railroads), we still have "So you're at Atlanta, Sherman isn't giving up, now what?"

Elfwine said:

Cavalry which for some reason couldn't possibly be his own cavalry, for various reasons.

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Most likely because he simply didn't think Wheeler was up to the job (a correct assumption) and Richmond had made it clear to him that he didn't have the authority to select his own corps commanders. Still, I don't see why he didn't order Wheeler into North Georgia once the armies reached the line of the Chattahoochee. After all, what did he have to lose.

But supposing that A) Wheeler had raided Sherman's supply lines and been successful or B) Davis agreed to order Forrest against Sherman's supply lines, might Johnston's version of a Confederate Fabian strategy have been vindicated?

Anaxagoras said:

Most likely because he simply didn't think Wheeler was up to the job (a correct assumption) and Richmond had made it clear to him that he didn't have the authority to select his own corps commanders. Still, I don't see why he didn't order Wheeler into North Georgia once the armies reached the line of the Chattahoochee. After all, what did he have to lose.

But supposing that A) Wheeler had raided Sherman's supply lines and been successful or B) Davis agreed to order Forrest against Sherman's supply lines, might Johnston's version of a Confederate Fabian strategy have been vindicated?

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My understanding [based off of Shelby Foote] was that Forrest was raiding Sherman's supply lines, but Sherman could lay rail line faster than Forrest could destroy it. Even assuming the lines are cut, Sherman demonstrated an aptitude for living off of the land in the march to the sea - Johnston would have to launch into a scorched earth campaign to have a chance at success.

Hurrah!Praga! said:

My understanding [based off of Shelby Foote] was that Forrest was raiding Sherman's supply lines, but Sherman could lay rail line faster than Forrest could destroy it. Even assuming the lines are cut, Sherman demonstrated an aptitude for living off of the land in the march to the sea - Johnston would have to launch into a scorched earth campaign to have a chance at success.

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Forrest was in northern Mississippi or Western Tennessee until after the Atlanta Campaign had concluded. It was only in October that he went raiding into Central Tennessee. By then it was far too late. And even striking at the Union railroads in Tennessee might not have made much difference, since Sherman had stockpiled enormous amounts of supplies at Chattanooga. The only real way for Johnston's strategy to have worked would have been to cut the Western and Atlanta Railroad in northern Georgia.

This is, as Elfwine points out, assuming that this was Johnston's actual strategy. It may be that his plan was to lure Sherman below the Chattahoochee and attack him there, where a Union retreat would be difficult or impossible. Or perhaps he had no strategy at all and was merely responding to Sherman's actions the whole time. We'll never know.

Anaxagoras said:

Forrest was in northern Mississippi or Western Tennessee until after the Atlanta Campaign had concluded. It was only in October that he went raiding into Central Tennessee. By then it was far too late. And even striking at the Union railroads in Tennessee might not have made much difference, since Sherman had stockpiled enormous amounts of supplies at Chattanooga. The only real way for Johnston's strategy to have worked would have been to cut the Western and Atlanta Railroad in northern Georgia.

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Which would be best done by Johnston's own cavalry, as opposed to leaving Forrest's area free for Federal troops to attack (the reason Davis did not support this) - even if that meant someone other than Wheeler.

Johnston may not have had the authority to just pick his own commanders, but neither did Lee - Lee got his way because of his ability to communicate his wants and needs in a way that got a productive response.

Johnston lacked that ability to write convincing messages, and failed to do it in person.

So I would say - giving Joe all reasonable doubt on his strategy - that it would not have worked without him doing more than he did to make at least this part happen.

And even if he does break the line, Sherman can retreat to the break if need be and repair it, and be on the offense again.

It still leaves his army as a challenge Johnston's plans are incapable of meeting - his failure to give any sign he intended to do anything at the Chattahoochee to Davis does not encourage me to think he really did intend to attack there, at least to the extent of having a worked out plan of how it would happen as opposed to the notion of doing it here.

But let's say Johnston does attack. That would mean a break with merely harassing and delaying, and goes back to having to fight a battle of the sort Lee tried to fight with the AotP.

Remember that Hannibal wanted to win over the Italian cities to his cause, so, even if he could have really engaged in any serious siege warfare, it would be counter-produtive politically. Grant (to embody the Union military in one man) didn't really operate under comparable restrictions.

Sherman's policy of total war meant that the longer the Union was present in Rebel territory, the worse implications for the Confederate war effort.
Hannibal's army depended upon the Roman countryside for its food and supplies, which could not be shipped in from Carthage. Total war was not possible for them.

People are being a bit too literal, methinks. I half-expect people to assume by the use of the phrase "Fabian Strategy" that I'm insinuating that the Confederacy should have fought with spears and shields rather than Enfield muskets. I'm simply referring to a strategy of general avoidance of major battles (especially offensive ones) in an effort to avoid high casualties and seek to wear down the Union will to fight. In other words, the opposite of Robert E. Lee's general strategy, which was to destroy the main Union field army in a decisive battle.

Anaxagoras said:

People are being a bit too literal, methinks. I half-expect people to assume by the use of the phrase "Fabian Strategy" that I'm insinuating that the Confederacy should have fought with spears and shields rather than Enfield muskets. I'm simply referring to a strategy of general avoidance of major battles (especially offensive ones) in an effort to avoid high casualties and seek to wear down the Union will to fight. In other words, the opposite of Robert E. Lee's general strategy, which was to destroy the main Union field army in a decisive battle.

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That could work, if the Confederacy had land to give. It certainly worked for the Russians against both Napoleon and Hitler. Unlike the Russians, the Confederates can't give up much land without losing valuable infrastructure - at least in the East. The Virginia front was so strategically shallow that Confederate forces would have had to defend a key point well before the Union overextended itself.

The strategy could perhaps work in the West, against an excitable commander such as Pope. Halleck was far too conservative to fall for it, and he was in command for a good length of time. Still, as long as the Confederates can lure the Union forces away from major waterways, it work in theory.

One of the biggest problems is this, for the leaders of the South the war was fought to preserve slavery. If you keep retreating more and more slaves will escape. So from the point of the elites who started the war in the first place they have already lost.

Anaxagoras said:

People are being a bit too literal, methinks. I half-expect people to assume by the use of the phrase "Fabian Strategy" that I'm insinuating that the Confederacy should have fought with spears and shields rather than Enfield muskets. I'm simply referring to a strategy of general avoidance of major battles (especially offensive ones) in an effort to avoid high casualties and seek to wear down the Union will to fight. In other words, the opposite of Robert E. Lee's general strategy, which was to destroy the main Union field army in a decisive battle.

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I don't know about anyone else, but I'm simply looking at the reality that the Confederacy cannot rely on certain factors that made Fabius's strategy appropriate vs. Hannibal.

The Union will to fight is not going to be worn down by relatively less bloody captures of Tennessee and Virginia - successes of the sort that the Fabian strategy is unable to stop will bolster the claims that the Union is winning, undermine the enthusiasm of Confederate soldiers whose homes are behind enemy lines, and weaken the ability of the CSA to support its army with the goods it needs to be a viable army in being.

By contrast, what damage could Hannibal do the Roman war effort by marching about the countryside, unpopular, away from supplies and people willing to join, and with the Roman legions holding firm to the colors (well, eagles)? Very little.

It says something when you immediately hear "how can the confederacy slowly reform into a socialist state" from that.

The thing about a Fabian strategy is that in modern warfare, what you are really talking about is guerrilla warfare of the Mao Zedong Chinese Civil War or Vo Nguyen Giap of the French Indochina War or Tito's Partisan warfare. The enemy advances. You retreat. The enemy camps. You harass and ambush. The enemy withdraws. You attack.
If you are going to do that, it helps a lot if you have spent a year or two before hand building a guerrilla infrastructure behind the enemy's lines, not just your own. And that's hard to do (but not impossible) if you have to mobilize immediately after seceding.
Kentucky and Southern Indiana and Ohio (which is hilly and contained quite a few "copperhead" Southern sympathizers) would have been the best place to organize an infrastructure like this, where Northern supply lines could be cut and the Union forced to devote valuable troop strength to chasing guerrillas through the hills--and even dealing with terrorist attacks and sabotage farther north in Union sympathetic territory. But this could have worked all over Maryland as well. Just because President Buchanan could call the Massachusetts Militia out to prevent the Maryland Legislature from voting for secession would not mean that sympathy for secession would be any less in Maryland--or that given proper organization, Marylanders would not aid Confederate guerrillas in cutting Washington DC's supply lines by blowing up bridges across the Susquehanna and repeatedly ambushing and derailing trains between Washington and Baltimore and between Baltimore and Philadelphia. And in Delaware and even southern New Jersey as well.
If the entire Middle Border bled the way Kansas bled during the 1850s, Grant and Sherman's Total War would look very different. It would look much more chancy and much more costly. The question then would be, would the North or the South crack first.