The Italians of East Africa

I've been doing some reading on Italian East Africa and the campaign/battles that were fought there, and, I must say, it's a very interesting subject.

IMO, the British fought superbly, both when outnumbered and when enjoying superior strength. Their victories where awesome, and even their defeats they managed brilliantly, always quitting at the right time instead of being stubborn about the whole thing and suffering needles casualties as a result.

The Italians are more of a mixed bag. They had their moments, but overall, their performance was not exactly awe-inspiring.

Now, the question to you, dear members of AH.com, is if you can come up with ways for the axis forces in the area to do better. It can be minor tweeks, different decisions but also bigger changes that should mainly result in the Italians doing better instead of the British making unforced errors. The later the changes, the better.

I have a few ideas which I might include in a mini-TL I'm thinking of doing, but thought I should see what people here think as well.

First prize goes to anyone who manages to keep them fighting long enough for a more successful Japan to sort-of come to their aid for a while.

There are several problems with a more performing Italian forces in the AOI but basically the key problem is in the discrepancy between what it should have be done and what it could be done: for example there was a number of commanders that correctly thought that would have been crucial to attack Djibouti and start to take up to Sudan and then to Egypt in order to mount a joint operation with units in Libya; however they were denied this option 1) because orders from the highest ranks, both political and military, predicated defensive posture almost on all fronts (it can be said that this was clearly a miscalculation about the supposed duration of the conflict) and 2) because if you had looked beyond simple numbers you would have discovered that all these men lacked proper equipment and logistic to successful achieving the goals, that leaving apart the question of the loyalty of native troops, a very complex question not reducible to "they were all on our side/they were all on the British side".

Equipment was a big problem. You have fewer AT and artillery per brigade than other militaries. Italy had more divisions than it could properly equip imho

It spawned from the outdated idea that the strength of an Army was mainly given by the number of men that it could have deployed (regardless of equipment and logistics, again), see also the at least dubious affair about ternary and binary divisions in the RE.

Yeah, I highly doubt they could go marching off to the Nile Delta on their own.

HOWEVER,

what IMHO they could do would be to conduct more thought out and daring attacks early on, when the force disparity was truly MASSIVE in their favor, followed by a defensive posture to try and hold out long enough for help to arrive.

Here's the first of my thoughts:

OIL

1. apparently when the British captured Kismayu in Italian Somaliland after nearly 1 year of fighting, they found 1 million liters of petrol and 1/2 million liters of aviation fuel, undestroyed by the Italians, who had left in a hurry*. Why they had so much stored there, instead of near Massawa** is beyond me. Maybe they hoped for a campaign in the Indian Ocean which never materialized ? In any case, a simple decision to focus offensive operations in the north prior to the outbreak of hostilities could see most (or even all) of that oil transferred north

2. The German raider Atlantis was operational in the Indian Ocean in 1940-1941, and managed to sink, among others, three Norwegian oil tankers carrying both regular and aviation fuel. Even a little cooperation would well see Italian crew man those ships and sail them to Mogadishu. IOTL, the Atlantis only sent a ship carrying salt, and that only because they wanted to get rid of all the prisoners they had started to accumulate

3. Italian raiders. They could easily have had them, had they put in even the barest of effort prior to the outbreak of war. As it was, they only converted them waaaay too late, meaning they couldn't break out into the Indian Ocean from Massawa. Had they been completed before, its possible, going by the feats of the Atlantis, that they could have scored some valuable hits, further lessening the oil problem (as well as other potential gains, like explosives, bombs, medicine etc etc which were being shipped around the Indian Ocean)

So, what do you guys think, is this enough, or more than enough oil ?


* - Anthony Mockler, Haile Selassie's War, pg 364
** - where the most important fighting was taking place and where they truly did begin to experience a shortage - although they never really ran out, not even at their last big stand in Amba Alagi where, ironically enough, it was the oil that led to their downfall, with a hit causing it to contaminate the water supply

Mario Rossi said:

leaving apart the question of the loyalty of native troops, a very complex question not reducible to "they were all on our side/they were all on the British side".

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Mario, how would you characterize said relationship ? From my understanding, loyalty differed between individual units and really began to go downhill once Haile Sellasie was back and began to make his presence felt and when Italian defeats kept mounting and they began to show signs of weakness.

Magnum said:

Mario, how would you characterize said relationship ? From my understanding, loyalty differed between individual units and really began to go downhill once Haile Sellasie was back and began to make his presence felt and when Italian defeats kept mounting and they began to show signs of weakness.

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Broadly speaking, a first split has to be made between local troops of Islamic and Christian Coptic faith: the first ones generally required a stronger leadership in order to be kept organized (id est they needed to feel that their commander had got the same courage that he required from them, otherwise they would have go their way) but had a more aggressive stance, they were more prone to put effort in the fights; the others were quite less enthusiast of Italian rule for obvious reasons and while more problematic in terms of erratic behavior on the field, they were not to be fully trusted. Of course news of an incoming return of the Negus caused troubles behind Italian lines, but a number of locals (especially between the Islamic) kept the fight along with our units.

Mario Rossi said:

the first ones generally required a stronger leadership in order to be kept organized (id est they needed to feel that their commander had got the same courage that he required from them, otherwise they would have go their way) but had a more aggressive stance, they were more prone to put effort in the fights;

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So basically men like Amadeo Guilett ?

Mario Rossi said:

the others were quite less enthusiast of Italian rule for obvious reasons and while more problematic in terms of erratic behavior on the field, they were not to be fully trusted.

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I think you mean less, right ?

Magnum said:

So basically men like Amadeo Guilett ?




I think you mean less, right ?

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About Guillett: Yes, and like him there were more than a few in AOI, even if many of them would have not escaped capture by Commonwealth forces after the defeat in 1941.

About more: yes, of course I meant "less"

I can recommend "The war of a hundred days" by Ambrose Brown.

Immensely interesting.

It also explains why Italy had sereious problems. The opposing forces were mostly South Africans and this was the first 100% mobile force

On top of, the invaded from the "wrong" direction, arcross waht Italy thought was waterles semi-deert.

SA got the Ford trucks from the Ford plant in Pretoria, Next they managed to dig wells wherever they went - in advance.

They also took their rather obsolete bi-planes along together with the Ju-86's from South African Airways.

Although it was un-conventional it was not improvised. THAT was the major point. This was thought through and executed very well.

For Italy to stem the tide, they would have had to understand modern warfare, SA's ingenuity and build a much more mobile force.

Whether Italian units were lacking in fighting spirit or not is sort of besides the point (I don't think they were, really).

I am not sure it could even be done with the Italian doctrine at that time.

Ivan

I think you got the point about mobility; one of the greatest weakness of RE is the completely outdated conception about the movement of the troops, the higher commands still thought it as it was WWI, so infantry has to move on feet even in places like AOI where this could prove very difficult given, as you correctly addressed, the scarcity of water.

So yes, beyond a more active stance, Italian Army needed also different equipment and different doctrines.

Mario Rossi said:

I think you got the point about mobility; one of the greatest weakness of RE is the completely outdated conception about the movement of the troops, the higher commands still thought it as it was WWI, so infantry has to move on feet even in places like AOI where this could prove very difficult given, as you correctly addressed, the scarcity of water.

So yes, beyond a more active stance, Italian Army needed also different equipment and different doctrines.

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although, to be fair, at the battle of Keren, the 11th Regiment of the Savoia Grenadiers and the Alpini battalion of the 10th Savoia Grenadiers made their way to the battle after a three day non-stop truck journey from Addis Ababa - 1162 km. So, there were instances where they managed to redeploy motorized troops quickly.

Mario Rossi said:

It spawned from the outdated idea that the strength of an Army was mainly given by the number of men that it could have deployed (regardless of equipment and logistics, again), see also the at least dubious affair about ternary and binary divisions in the RE.

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Dubious to say the least. Thats an understatement. Who thought that was actually a good idea? It was practically a purge of the officer and NCO corps.

June 6th 1940, Italian steamer Umbria, Red Sea, 15 km south of the Sinai Peninsula

- I’m telling you, I don’t like this. Before this damn war, things were fine and everybody went about their business. People were friendly. Remember that time we won all that money at that poker game with the British captains and that fat Egyptian ?

- And then lost it all, thanks to that idiot Luigi !

- I know. Those were the times, my friend. Now, we have lie to everyone and take part in this silly masquerade, and, for their part, the English have become so damn cold. They speak to you as if you weren’t even there, and every paper and signature and stamp and whatnot seems to take forever.

- Hell, I think we just set a new record. Hopefully, Port Sudan will be different, though I doubt we’ll move at anything faster than a snail’s pace even there. As long as we deliver this cargo though…

- Captain!

- Yes, what is it, sailor ?

- We just received a message from Massawa.

- Let me see that… Hmm, this is … somewhat expected. Well Silvio, I think you just had your wish granted. Set course for Massawa, full speed, and distribute rifles to the men. If we get through this, I’m opening that bottle of Barolo wine from Piedmont.

- What about waiting for the Grimsby ? They would surely outrun us if they figured out we made a run for it.

- You’re right. But maybe they won’t.

- What do you mean ?

- What I mean is that I think it’s time we played dead. Send out an SOS and drop some flotsam into the water. Hopefully this will give us a little head start.

Excerpt from the Memoirs of Lorenzo Muiesan, Captain of the Umbria


Each passing hour proved to be more nerve-racking than the other, and each glimpse on the horizon a cause for alarm. Neither I nor the rest of my crew had any idea if our ruse worked. Eventually, as it turned out, it didn’t, and the sight of the HMS Grimsby approaching us brought with it a feeling of hopelessness among the men. I too became overcome by the same feeling, and then, more out of spite than anything else, decided we should at least make life at least a little bit miserable for the British, and so ordered we maintain course at max speed, despite the enemy gaining up on us.

What followed next has been much embellished, and I think it’s time we start telling the truth and put things in their proper place. It was not a case of extraordinary courage, nor a heroic attitude in the face of adversity, but rather fear and the inability to make a decision that kept me, kept us going, even as the Grimsby approached us. They continued to hail us, signal us, threaten us and fire warning shots that got closer and closer. In all honesty, I believe it was one of these misaimed warning shots that hit us, injuring two of my men and disabling our transmitters. I did not now it at the time, but several men decided to take the rifles we had issued them with and take up firing positions, just as the Grimsby approached us. As I was about to give the order to stop, I saw them back away a bit. Maybe they were intimidated by our apparent show of determination and strength ? At the time, I was clueless as to their motives. Out of sheer inertia, we kept on sailing south, at full speed.

Eventually though, I realized the logic behind their actions, as the cruiser HMS Leander approached us from the south-west. It seemed as though the game was up and that nothing more could be done to salvage the situation. Then, for what appeared to be an inexplicable reason, the Leander began to maneuver away from us. Moments later, we figured it out. Deliverance had come, in the form of 6 of our destroyers: Francesco Nullo, Nazario Sauro, Cesare Battisti, Pantera, Tigre and Leone. All around the ship, you could hear men cheering as they heard the news.

The stand-off that followed was probably one of the most tense moments of my life. The British were none too happy about what happened and continued to trail us even as we managed to join up with the destroyer squadron. Then, on the morning of June 10th, another British squadron of 4 destroyers, which I later found out to be the HMS Kingston, HMS Kandahar, HMS Karthoum and HMS Kimberley appeared on the horizon south of us, directly into our path. Minutes later, I heard on the radio that Il Duce had declared war on Britain and France, and hostilities were to commence at midnight and apparently so had the captain commanding our destroyers. In what has to be one of the most daring moves I have ever seen, we were ordered to steer left and head north-east, whilst all of our destroyers made a sharp turn towards the unsuspecting Leander.

Despite trying to maneuver as best they could, they could not escape the wave of torpedoes heading towards them, and I clearly saw three explosions rack the British cruiser in short order, which only managed to get off a couple of shots, failing to score any hits. Next, our ships aimed their guns at the Grimsby, who responded in kind. Unfortunately for the British, they were heavily outgunned and were soon turned into a flaming wreck, although they did manage to both the Francesco Nullo once and the Tigre twice, killing three and wounding another five, without causing any significant structural damage though.


While all this was going on, the four British destroyers were closing in on our ships as they redeployed to meet them. What followed was a confused action, as both groups laid down smoke screens and attempted to lunge out of them to score hits with their torpedoes. I think it’s fair to say that everyone had fired every torpedo they had on board, and all of them missed (some of them extremely narrowly), except for one, which somehow hit the HMS Kimberley. As she went down, the commander of the British force ordered his remaining ships to break off the action and turn south.
The Tigre then headed back and rejoined us, whilst the others went off in pursuit of the fleeing British.

Later, as we safely arrived in Massawa, I learned that our bombers had sortied and bombed the British force, and had apparently sunk all of them. It was only after the war that I learned that, in fact, they failed to score any direct hits, but that the HMS Kingston had suffered splinter damage and could no longer keep up in the retreat, leading to the British captain’s decision to scuttle her and quickly transfer everyone on the other two ships.

Ok, nobody ? Is it really that bad ?

I will check it tomorrow, now I'm on mobile

Good, really catch the randomness of war and a good PoD for give some needed supply at the Italian army in East Africa

Lieutenant Togni was nervous, and he didn't like it. After all the difficulties they had went through in the past days, after all of the heat and exhaustion, after all of the near misses, they were finally at the climax of their journey, a moment he had been anticipating and thinking about for hours on end sometimes, and yet, here he was, nervous.

He wasn't sure if the cable would work, or if the explosives would detonate, and, if so, whether on time or too late, and, if they did, if it would be enough. Nonetheless, he waited, his eyes fixed on his target, as it drew ever nearer. For him, each moment that passed felt like hours. Eventually, he judged everything to be in place, and pressed the detonator.


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"Your Excellency, I've just received the latest reconnaissance information"

"And, are we looking at good news or bad ?"

"Well, I think it's fair to conclude our operation has met with reasonable success. Togni seems to have done an excellent job at the Butana Bridge, blowing it off completely. Apparently, there was a train crossing it, and, judging by the size of the blast damage, it must have been carrying ammunition"

"Must have been quite an explosion"

"Indeed. Furthermore, out of the remaining six attacks, three appear to have succeeded. These include the two done by our operatives in Kharthoum and Atbara and the one by the team we inserted north of Port Sudan"

"And they manage to get back on board the submarine ?"

"Yes, yes, they did. The captain said he has them aboard safe and sound."

"What of the others ?"

"Well, we have not heard anything from them, reconnaissance has turned up nothing and the boys upstairs tell me they haven't picked up any British communications regarding further blasts, so I think it's safe to assume they have failed in their mission."

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The railway system in the Sudan was a single line 3 ft. 6 in. gauge having one or more loop lines or sidings at every station. The main line began at Wadi Haifa in the north, from where everything was shipped up the Nile from Egypt, crossed the Nubian desert to Abu Hamed and then followed the right bank of the Nile to Khartoum via Atbara, from there continuing south along the Blue Nile to Sennar, from where it took a sharp turn west all the way to El Obeid.

Furthermore, from Atbara, a line ran north-east to Port Sudan, first across the desert and then over the Red Sea hills. This was the most important section of the line in the Sudan, as almost the entire export and import trade of the country passed along it.




From the Haiya Junction, on the Atbara-Port Sudan line, a line ran south to Kassala and thence south-west to Gedaref and west to Sennar, where it was connected with the main line.

From Sallom Junction, on the Atbara-Port Sudan line, a short length of line ran south to Suakin, which was the chief port of the Sudan before Port Sudan was built.

Not connected with the main railway system was the 18 mile long Tokar-Trinkitat light railway on the coast. Constructed in 1921, it's gauge was two feet only.

All stations were inter-connected by telephone and certain stations were also connected by the railway telegraph system. This was in addition to the ordinary telegraph lines which were controlled by the Director of Posts and Telegraphs.

The thousand mile war: The story of Italian East Africa during the Second Great War, Columbia University Press, 2013

While at sea the war started off in the most dramatic way possible even before it had officially been declared, hostilities land took several hours to materialize. The very first prisoners were two unlucky British officials who had dined with the Italian Residente on the other side of the Kenya frontier at Moyale. They strolled over the frontier again at dusk and were promptly, justifiably, but rather unchivalrously, arrested. Meanwhile, at Gambeila in Ethiopia, the Italian Major Praga informed, unofficially, his friend Major Maurice from the British consulate about the declaration of war, and gave him six hours to get clear and away, provided the rifles and the powerful transmitter inside the consulate were left behind, intact.

Major Maurice, a bachelor long time in charge of his own little trading kingdom, headed the last British consulate in Italian East Africa, excepting the consulate-general in Adddis Abba. Over the years, the Italians had been taking pains to mislead observers and conceal anything that might lessen the impression of their complete conquest of Ethiopia, meaning that British contacts with local chieftains and rebels hostile to Italian rule, located mainly in Gojjam and to the east of Lake Tana, was scarce.

This meant Maurice was a valuable asset in any future enterprise relating to arming the rebels. Unfortunately for the British, Major Maurice, after travelling for two days down the Baro river in his canoe, was stopped at the frontier and arrested.

British plans however did not rest solely on him. Ever since early 1939, various schemes had been proposed by several officers, such as Captain Whalley from the Equatorial Corps or Wilf Thesiger, in command of the fort at Gallabat, although most of these were mostly buried by the likes of Governor-General Sir Stewart Symes, who hardly envisaged the anglophile, polo-playing Duke of Aosta as an enemy, and found it most distasteful that their subordinates (“ the next would-be Lawrence” in the words of Sir Symes) should concoct plans and wild schemes for invading territories which the Duke was trying, much in the spirit of the best British colonial governance, to administer.

Amadeo, Duke of Aosta, the Viceroy of Italian East Africa​

Eventually, it was Colonel D. A. Sandford, on the instructions of General Wavell, who had conducted the study regarding the possibility of fostering rebellion in Ethiopia, even though there was still no sufficient information on which to base a sound plan, even though some sources indicated that the seeds of a national rebellion existed and that there was a desire, in some Ethiopian circles, for the Emperor to return to his country. The main emphasis of his plan was to acquire more contacts in the country. Encouragement would not be given to native uprisings before the prospect of their success could be gauged and until they could be supported by more effective means than by propaganda or the use of inadequate forces. It was recognized that premature risings would be likely to fail in view of the military superiority of the Italians; they would do more harm than good. It was deemed as possible to eventually pass arms and ammunition to the various chieftains in Gojjam from across the Sudan frontier between Kassala and the Blue Nile.

Then, in an instruction on policy issued on June 10th General Wavell laid down that the existing unrest was to be encouraged to spread as widely as possible, in order to force the Italians to expend their resources on internal security. The early activities were to be confined to isolated attacks by only small parties, culminating later in larger operations against important objectives, which would depend on the success already achieved and the extent to which arms and money could be introduced. He attached great importance to this step-by-step method, and insisted that the patriots were not to be led into enterprises beyond their powers by false hopes that they would be supported by troops. A small military mission was to be sent to give them advice and co-ordinate their efforts; its organization was entrusted to Colonel Sandford.

The opening phase of the operation was to be the arming and forming up of groups of Ethiopian rebels at the two main border outposts in the Sudan: Gallabat and Kassala. Consequently, hundreds of Ethiopians had gathered there, both exiles living in Sudan who had had some prior training by the British, and people still living in Ethiopia, such as the one-eyed Fitaurari Worku, who had travelled from Kwara to Gallabat at the head of more than 200 men, impatient for rifles. It would be here, and at the crucial rail-junction at Kassala, that the first real engagements on land would take place.