US 1941 invasion of the Azores

PMN1

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Framework/ch05.htm#b3   Page 117/118

President Roosevelt's order of 22 May led to hasty Army and Navy planning during the next five days to line up the proposed expeditionary force and arrange for it to receive as much preliminary training as possible. One of the principal difficulties was to find enough suitable shipping to transport it. As finally worked out, the plan called for an expeditionary force of 28,000 troops, half Army and half Marine, with strong naval and naval air support. The Army and Marine 1st Divisions were to supply the infantry contingents. To move the force would require a total of forty-one transports and other noncombatant vessels. The expedition was to be commanded by Admiral King, Commander in Chief, Atlantic fleet, and the landing force by Brig. Gen. Holland M. Smith, commander of the 1st Marine Division. At first, the services planned to send twelve combat landing teams (nine Marine, three Army) to the north shore of Puerto Rico for joint amphibious training. On 26 May this idea had to be abandoned because of the lack of sufficient shipping to carry the troops to and from Puerto Rico. Instead, limited amphibious training exercises were to be held at Atlantic coast points closer to the Azores-for the Army's 1st Division combat teams, in Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts. The shipping shortage was thereby solved, but the ammunition supply was certain to be short of estimated requirements. Nevertheless, by 27 May the general terms of an Azores expeditionary force plan that could be executed in time to meet the President's deadline of 22 June had been agreed upon. The planners thereupon drafted a formal joint plan (code name,GRAY, which the joint Board approved on 29 May, though an effort also to get the President's approval of it on the same day failed.


So if it had succeeded, there would have been a heavily escorted convoy of at least 41 ships heading East towards Europe presumably all sailing under an American flag, what kind of reaction would a U-boat contact report have generated in Berlin?

What would US occupation of the Azores do for Hitler keeping out of the Iberian peninsula?

Given the level of US preparedness for war, this article and others mention lack of shipping, ammunition shortages etc, what is the likely result of a US invasion of the Azores?
 

Carl Schwamberger

PMN1 said:
So if it had succeeded, there would have been a heavily escorted convoy of at least 41 ships heading East towards Europe presumably all sailing under an American flag, what kind of reaction would a U-boat contact report have generated in Berlin?
Click to expand...

the Germans still had a 'information gathering network' active in the US at this date. They may have become aware of a major operations in the works weeks or months ahead. US security was not all it should have been at the time. I cant say for certain but it is conceiveable the Germans could have learned of the target via motor mouthed military officers and poltiicians or their staff.

PMN1 said:
What would US occupation of the Azores do for Hitler keeping out of the Iberian peninsula?
Click to expand...

Nothing. It might even encourage him to send soldiers or German aircraft into Spain or Portugal. Politically this would be a large risk for the US & Britain. Portugal had a policy of strict nuetrality at this point & unless it invited the US into the Azores this would have ended the nuetrality policy in favor of the Axis. There had been secret discussion between the Portuguse and Britain about British occupation of the Azores, IF the Axis or Spain invaded Portugal. The Portuguese were also aware the Spanish had up to date plan for invading Portugal should it be necessary.

PMN1 said:
Given the level of US preparedness for war, this article and others mention lack of shipping, ammunition shortages etc, what is the likely result of a US invasion of the Azores?
Click to expand...

A good training exercise. According to the history of Portugal in WWII I just read ('Lisbon: War in the Shadows of the City of Light 1939-45' by Neil Lochery) The Portuguese army could only provide a few rifle battalions & inadequate artillery for defending the Azores. If all one wanted to do was seize the Azores a reinforced brigade would have been adaquate. Two brigades if one was in a hurry. Two divisions with twelve landing teams was overkill and suggests the plan was written for training purposes and not a realistic plan for capturing the Azores.

The plan outlined in the OP is one of many contingency plans the US wrote or updated from 1939. 'Plan Rubber' was for seizing the airfields on the north coast of Brazil should the Germans attempt to base reconissance aircraft there. Another plan revolved around landing on the various French territories in the Americas. One that was executed was the USN landing Marines in Iceland in early 1941 to replace British soldiers there.
 

FlyingDutchman

PMN1 said:
What would US occupation of the Azores do for Hitler keeping out of the Iberian peninsula?

Given the level of US preparedness for war, this article and others mention lack of shipping, ammunition shortages etc, what is the likely result of a US invasion of the Azores?
Click to expand...

If Hitler wants to copy Napoleon in everything, then he rushes forces into Spain and Portugal and gets stuck in a guerilla conflict whilst fighting in Russia. :D

On a more seriously note;
how big is the chance that Hitler does nothing except try to send some submarines to interdict convoys to the Azores? Seeing that Barbarossa is about to start, possibly quite likely?

It's also far from a guarantee that the Germans will spot the convoy. All normal Atlantic convoys moved through the North Atlantic and if the season allowed - which it would in May - as close to Iceland as possible.

A convoy moving to the Azores OTOH would follow almost the same route the OTL Torch convoy followed 18 months later, which wasn't spotted IIRC.
 

Carl Schwamberger

FlyingDutchman said:
...
It's also far from a guarantee that the Germans will spot the convoy. All normal Atlantic convoys moved through the North Atlantic and if the season allowed - which it would in May - as close to Iceland as possible.

A convoy moving to the Azores OTOH would follow almost the same route the OTL Torch convoy followed 18 months later, which wasn't spotted IIRC.
Click to expand...

Checked a few pages in my books this after noon and confirmed the Germans were still monitoring the US port traffic with agents at this time. In October 1942 it was felt necessary to 'cover' the assembly of the Western Task Force for op Torch in the US with a through deception operation. Reinforcements for the Pacific and a yet another amphibious training exercise were cover stories circulated.

You are correct in that the WTF convoys were not spotted by submarines, there were not many in the central Atlantic in October, and the British made a sucessfull effort to have them diverted south to intercept convoys taking reinforcements to Egypt by way of the south Atlantic.

A more likely venue for German discovery of such a action might be from messages via the London/Washington telephone link. This channel was used for urgent conversations between VIP to coordinate operations underway. In 1941 a Abwehr signals monitoring station in the Netherlands managed to penetrate the AT3 voice scrambler system and the daily traffic on this link was carefully monitored. Although direct operational matters were not to be discussed on this phone link and British security monitors had the ability to cut off any compromising conversation the Germans picked up a lot of valuable background material, including hints about convoys and operations.

Of course what the Germans can do with this information is another matter. The invasion force would arrive in barely five days out of port. It would require much more than a week to organize any effective counter actions.
 

Uruk

Probably bad news for the Soviets as Germany now gets all the Tungsten it wants from Portugal
 

Carl Schwamberger

Actually the Brits were free to outbid the Germans when they could. The Portuguse allowed each side enough in the hope that neither felt drastic actions would be justified. There were a few smaller Wolfram mines just across the border in Spain, which made the Germans feel a bit better, and profited the Spanish.

Of course the entire problem changed in August 1944 when Allied armies took control of the railroads crossing France from Iberia to Germany. Only the tiniest amounts reached Germany after that.
 

Carl Schwamberger

Thinking this through I have to consider what if the Portuguese government finds itself in trouble and asks for a Allied force to defend Lisboa and to arm the Portuguese Army. What sort of utility would the amphibious corps outlined in the OP have in helping to defend the capitol and its port?
 

PMN1

End of May beginning of June the British government suggested that if Portugal were to be invaded the government move to the Azores
 

Carl Schwamberger

That would have been in 1941. The Brits and Portuguese were aware Spain had updated its plan for invading Portugal and made some routine preparations. All three estimated it would take the Spanish army about three weeks to defeat the few Portuguese infantry regiments. At that point the Brits did not have much extra to send, maybe a corps to defend Lisbon for a few extra weeks.
 

Dilvish

While reading through the US Army history of continental defense in WW-2, I came across this:

"As of February 1941 the War Department expected to deliver radars to Hawaii in June and hoped they could be operated as soon as they were delivered. The first mobile sets actually reached Hawaii in July, delivery having been delayed by about a month because of a temporary diversion of equipment to an emergency force being prepared for occupation of the Azores."

Guarding the US and its Outposts. Chapter VI, The Reinforcement of Oahu, pg 167, paragraph 3.

http://www.history.army.mil/books/wwii/Guard-US/ch6.htm
 
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