Allied invasion of NW Europe in 1943

One of the reasons for the delay was to let the Nazis and Soviets bleed each other out some more. So, we have to convince the Wallies that this is not a good thing.

I've used this POD myself a few times, and it's an interesting proposition. If I recall, the US commanders wanted to attack the continent directly as soon as possible but the UK was keener for a 'mediterranean strategy' targeting Greece and Italy (the 'soft underbelly of Europe' that turned into a hard, bitter slog). In the end, OTL was a compromise between the two, so here in this timeline would have been more acceptance of a 'continental strategy' by UK commanders.

If the force was equal in size to that of D-Day then I'd think there was every possibility that the Allies would win. There was no 'Atlantic Wall' yet under Erwin Rommel and the Germans were pre-occupied in Kursk. So the events of summer 1944 would most probably happen 1943. After that, things get somewhat murky, since there's the question of Italy still being in the war (Monty may have pushed his way to forcing the Germans' withdrawal from North Africa by mid-'43, but without an invasion of Sicily there might not have been an overthrow of Mussolini, though his position was probably still somewhat vulnerable, having lost Italy's colonies). An end to the war by the end of 1944 somewhere east of Berlin still seems somewhat likely, however.

More to the point: a specific suburb of Berlin contained a uranium facility with materiel that was vital to the Soviet bomb project. With no Soviet 'Battle of Berlin' this material would have fallen into American hands, meaning a significant delay to the Soviet bomb, meaning a longer period of an American 'atomic monopoly'. Although with efforts concentrating against Japan by 1945, America may not be in the position to show it off, unless the OTL schedule in the Pacific was the fastest the Allies could go.

While Stalin would be pretty sore about the lack of a 'buffer zone', I doubt he would try to launch an offensive against the Anglo-Americans, for all the same reasons as OTL plus one: he'd be launching from a position of weakness.

How would Yalta and Potsdam go? I have my doubts on Churchill remaining, but FDR would still be alive for Potsdam.

PMN1 said:

I have the impression that Roosevelt wouldn't have been too concerned if the SU took control of the whole of Europe not just Eastern Europe (to knock the 'Imperialism' out of the Europeans and to 'civilise' the Soviets') is something i've heard mentioned - would he be tempted to 'give' parts of Germany and eastern Europe to Stalin?

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I find that first comment a little hard to believe (it sounds like 50-years-after-the-fact Republican-ese to me) but he definitely wouldn't have been as confrontational as Truman was (which was, after all, half the reason the Cold War began). I think it'd be a given that the Soviets would have an occupation zone in Germany, but I found after checking a map that by August 1944 the Soviets had only reached the gates of Warsaw and hadn't as yet moved into either the Balkans or the Baltic state capitals. Just having the section of Eastern Poland the Soviets annexed before the war, Bessarabia and the Baltic states back may be enough of a buffer zone for Stalin. The Anglo-Americans would be everywhere else, and FDR wouldn't succumb to Truman's knee-jerk anti-communism enough to screw up relations and potentially lead Stalin to push his luck.

But how does the Pacific War go? That's what I'm interested in.

If it had been launched in 1943, then the Western allies would have met the Soviets much further east with far more of Germany (possibly all of it) being captured by the Western Allies and parts of Poland, Czechoslovakia etc being liberated by the Western Allies.

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That is the most unreasonable thing ever. I cannot even imagine American troops entering Berlin while ready Nazi devisions are slowing down the Soviets still in front of Warsaw. If the allies enter western Germany, it would meen that the germans are essentially disorganized and can no longer put up a fight, so the Soviets would also make larger gains. It is more likely that Germans just transfer a couple of divisions from Italy and the east and push the allies out to sea.

":That is the most unreasonable thing ever. I cannot even imagine American troops entering Berlin while ready Nazi devisions are slowing down the Soviets still in front of Warsaw. If the allies enter western Germany, it would meen that the germans are essentially disorganized and can no longer put up a fight, so the Soviets would also make larger gains."

Yep, the Soviets will be moving west faster than OTL. But, movements of the allied junction a hundred or so miles to the east could happen. If Hitler is all anal about protecting East Prussia and Silesia, and the western allies are achieving breakthroughs, the allies could well meet east of Berlin and Prague. Warsaw is too far a stretch. For Poznan even, battlefield results would have to break out just right.

"It is more likely that Germans just transfer a couple of divisions from Italy and the east and push the allies out to sea." - Nope, that's more unreasonable


"But how does the Pacific War go? That's what I'm interested in."

The USSR is likely to get into the war while the US is still further away from the Japanese home islands. The Russians may take four or five months after VE day to get in, but getting in does serve their interests. They will destroy the Japanese in Manchuria and north China, maybe all China. At their most extreme potential, they may get down to Hanoi before western forces arrive in the area (Japan had much less mobility to switch troops from front to front compared to the Germans). Bangkok would be a bridge too far I think, because the advance from Burma would be greatly speeded with transfer of British resources and any Soviet activity in south China. The Soviets will probably take all Korea too, though once the Japanese have no place to retreat to and can't get outflanked, the fighting will be a little bit harder and slower. The Soviets can start the bombing and provide early bomber bases for Americans. They won't be able to launch invasions of the home islands at least until there is a Leyte Gulf equivalent battle wrecking the Japanese fleet.

They'll be prepped to do an invasion at the same time as the Americans though, guaranteeing an occupation zone in Hokkaido at least, and maybe northern Honshu (a zone in Tokyo too?).

If Stalin dislikes western policies in Germany and Czechoslovakia, he can use China as a lever.

raharris1973 said:

":That is the most unreasonable thing ever. I cannot even imagine American troops entering Berlin while ready Nazi devisions are slowing down the Soviets still in front of Warsaw. If the allies enter western Germany, it would meen that the germans are essentially disorganized and can no longer put up a fight, so the Soviets would also make larger gains."

Yep, the Soviets will be moving west faster than OTL. But, movements of the allied junction a hundred or so miles to the east could happen. If Hitler is all anal about protecting East Prussia and Silesia, and the western allies are achieving breakthroughs, the allies could well meet east of Berlin and Prague. Warsaw is too far a stretch. For Poznan even, battlefield results would have to break out just right.

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Right, which still gives the Soviets Poland and the Balcans as buffer states.

reharris1973 said:

"It is more likely that Germans just transfer a couple of divisions from Italy and the east and push the allies out to sea." - Nope, that's more unreasonable

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Why exactly not? A battle of the bulge 1 year earler, except the Nazis still have oil and the allies don't have total air superiority. The allies will be badly beat up at best.

How about a more serious development? Hitler determines to put Germany on the defensive until such time as new weapons developments give him an edge. The 1943 invasion at Normandy becomes a meat grinder that costs hundreds of thousands of allied lives, which, after the first few months, means American lives as the British manpower base was already collapsing.

Indeed, in OTL within weeks of Normandy the British were actually forced to start dismantling units to fill out the others.

Of course, the RAF and AAC have not yet seized control of the air, so we see that situation not as favorable, and perhaps the Luftwaffe can also sink a battleship or two.

Meanwhile, Operation Kursk was cancelled and either Stalin sits back and takes a rest for a few months(disastrous for allied relations), or he launches an offensive of his own, at a time when the Red Army was not only incapable of doing so with real success, but with at least ten panzer divisions and more infantry divisions available to Hitler.

Again, in OTL, the Red Army was unable to isolate and destroy a German force, except for the special case of Stalingrad, until Operation Bagration.

By 1944 we have a Red Army which has probably been less successful and still taken horrific losses, while the British/Americans/Canadians have added hundreds of thousands dead as well.

Where does this lead to?

Soyuz said:

That is the most unreasonable thing ever. I cannot even imagine American troops entering Berlin while ready Nazi devisions are slowing down the Soviets still in front of Warsaw. If the allies enter western Germany, it would meen that the germans are essentially disorganized and can no longer put up a fight, so the Soviets would also make larger gains. It is more likely that Germans just transfer a couple of divisions from Italy and the east and push the allies out to sea.

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Thats not so much what the book says, its more me pointing out where the front lines were end 1943 and end of 1944.

The Western Allies could have reached Berlin in the OTL if the political will to keep it was there, Eisenhower was not prepared to take casualties for land which the politicians were going to hand to the Soviets in the post war world.

The Germans are going to have serious problems transferring units from Italy to the NW of Europe and having Allied forces in Scilly at least is going to stop any major reinforcement from Italy.

By the time the Western Allies enter Germany any transfer of forces is going to be redundant - what happened to the units in Italy when the Allies historically entered Germany, in this scenario, many would probably still be guarding against a move from Scilly etc and even if the majority did move the communicatiosn are not good enough for them to make much difference.

The invasion of Europe could not even be considered until Allied Air superiority (if not supremacy) was in hand. By 6/44 the Allies had established complete control of the airspace over the Channel and most of France. An invasion before the Allies had this advantage was unthinkable.

What happens if the invasion is held too soon, or if the invasion fails, or if the Red Army doesn't breakout?

Berlin & most likely Munich become the 1st cities to die under mushroom clouds. The bomb was built for use againt the Nazi's; in this case that's what happens.

Rasputin said:

I find that first comment a little hard to believe (it sounds like 50-years-after-the-fact Republican-ese to me) but he definitely wouldn't have been as confrontational as Truman was (which was, after all, half the reason the Cold War began). I think it'd be a given that the Soviets would have an occupation zone in Germany, but I found after checking a map that by August 1944 the Soviets had only reached the gates of Warsaw and hadn't as yet moved into either the Balkans or the Baltic state capitals. Just having the section of Eastern Poland the Soviets annexed before the war, Bessarabia and the Baltic states back may be enough of a buffer zone for Stalin. The Anglo-Americans would be everywhere else, and FDR wouldn't succumb to Truman's knee-jerk anti-communism enough to screw up relations and potentially lead Stalin to push his luck.

But how does the Pacific War go? That's what I'm interested in.

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That line is from a recent BBC documentary 'The Warlords', a 3 part series talking about Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, I haven't heard it mentioned elsewhere but from waht i've read i get the impression Roosevelt was quite prepared to give Stalin what he wanted.

As for the Pacific war, the earlier commitment to NW Europe means less commitment to the Pacific, however, I think it really only means means less LC's so does that mean MacArthur's drive is restricted while the USN drive through the central Pacific carries on, the Essex's etc construction programme is not going to be afftected that much if at all as the material is already going to be allocated.

Soyuz said:

Right, which still gives the Soviets Poland and the Balcans as buffer states.


Why exactly not? A battle of the bulge 1 year earler, except the Nazis still have oil and the allies don't have total air superiority. The allies will be badly beat up at best.

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Grigg does point out that the distances East -West are much greater and the chances of the German formations moving West without being detected is much reduced.

The Allies could have had Air Superiority earlier and the Germans much less oil if bombing policies had been different (something which has been brought up time and tiem again post war) - thats the whole point of the book, it needs some changes in policy and removal of stubbon commanders.

I recomend reading it as it does make you think.

CalBear said:

The invasion of Europe could not even be considered until Allied Air superiority (if not supremacy) was in hand. By 6/44 the Allies had established complete control of the airspace over the Channel and most of France. An invasion before the Allies had this advantage was unthinkable.

What happens if the invasion is held too soon, or if the invasion fails, or if the Red Army doesn't breakout?

Berlin & most likely Munich become the 1st cities to die under mushroom clouds. The bomb was built for use againt the Nazi's; in this case that's what happens.

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The book does require changes in policy - concentrated RAF and USAAF attacks on oil and transport in 1942/43, Harris is told to do what he is ordered or is moved and the USAAF acknowleges earlier than it did that unescorted daylight bombing is suicide so develops LR fighters earlier.

PMN1 said:

The Western Allies could have reached Berlin if the political will to keep it was there, Eisenhower was not prepared to take casualties for land which the politicians were going to hand to the Soviets in the post war world.

The Germans are going to have serious problems transferring units from Italy to the NW of Europe and having Allied forces in Scilly at least is going to stop any major reinforcement from Italy.

By the time the Western Allies enter Germany any transfer of forces is going to be redundant - what happened to the units in Italy when the Allies historically entered Germany, in this scenario, many would probably still be guarding against a move from Scilly etc and even if the majority did move the communicatiosn are not good enough for them to make much difference

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OTL the allies took 14 months from D-day till the end. Here, the allies are less prepared, the soviets are weaker, the Germans are stronger, Italy is still in... It will take only longer, so plenty of time to create new divisions/transfer units to the Western front. Then again Rommel wanted to immediately abandon Italy. So if the allies are pressing on the Rhine, Hitler may take the advice, since there's no point keeping them in Italy while Germany gets conquered.

Some more points, the Atlantic wall didn't do shmidt to stop the allies. So whether it's there or not doesn't matter, except the resources will be spent better.

Planning Watch am Rhine, Hitler realized that even if he destroyed American 5 divisions, if will create a major setback, while the Soviets won't even blink. So it's reasonable to assume that Hitler will again concentrate on pushing the allies out to sea. And 1 year earlier, he will be sucessful.

PMN1 said:

Thats not so much what the book says, its more me pointing out where the front lines were end 1943 and end of 1944.

The Western Allies could have reached Berlin if the political will to keep it was there, Eisenhower was not prepared to take casualties for land which the politicians were going to hand to the Soviets in the post war world.

The Germans are going to have serious problems transferring units from Italy to the NW of Europe and having Allied forces in Scilly at least is going to stop any major reinforcement from Italy.

By the time the Western Allies enter Germany any transfer of forces is going to be redundant - what happened to the units in Italy when the Allies historically entered Germany, in this scenario, many would probably still be guarding against a move from Scilly etc and even if the majority did move the communicatiosn are not good enough for them to make much difference.

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Political will or common sense? The Germans were a badly wounded animal in early 1945, not a dead one. Given the losses eventually incurred by the Red Army, Stalin was welcome to Berlin. Ike made the right decision.

The arguement that the West could have taken all of Germany, saved the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians & the rest Communist occupation is baseless. It both overlays political hindsight and dismissal of the reality on the ground in one specious arguement. No one knew what Stalin would do (some may have suspected, but no one really fought for the position) with the occupied Eastern European states. It is easy to look back & say 'Stalin was BOUND to do that'; doing it at the time...

From the pure military position, the Western Allies wanted to END THE WAR. That meant pursuing the German Army, defeating & destroying it, and cutting the Nazi leadership off from retreat and possible "last stand" opportunities in the Bavarian mountains. The Western allies, especially the Americans, also had to look at preserving as much combat power as possible for the Pacific. Every extra soldier killed or wounded in the Berlin suburbs was one lost to Olympic or Coronet. It is also important to remember that the Western Allies had a serious logistical problem for much of the fall of '44. Tanks & trucks don't run very well without fuel, this delayed the allies during a critical period that MIGHT have made the "Dash to Berlin" possible.

Logistics. Gets ya' every time.

CalBear said:

Political will or common sense? The Germans were a badly wounded animal in early 1945, not a dead one. Given the losses eventually incurred by the Red Army, Stalin was welcome to Berlin. Ike made the right decision.

The arguement that the West could have taken all of Germany, saved the Czechs, Poles, Hungarians & the rest Communist occupation is baseless. It both overlays political hindsight and dismissal of the reality on the ground in one specious arguement. No one knew what Stalin would do (some may have suspected, but no one really fought for the position) with the occupied Eastern European states. It is easy to look back & say 'Stalin was BOUND to do that'; doing it at the time...

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Given the political situation then yes Eisenhower's decision was correct - why expend lives for something that is going to be given up, but would it have been the same political situation if the Allies had landed in 1943?

From the pure military position, the Western Allies wanted to END THE WAR. That meant pursuing the German Army, defeating & destroying it, and cutting the Nazi leadership off from retreat and possible "last stand" opportunities in the Bavarian mountains. The Western allies, especially the Americans, also had to look at preserving as much combat power as possible for the Pacific. Every extra soldier killed or wounded in the Berlin suburbs was one lost to Olympic or Coronet. It is also important to remember that the Western Allies had a serious logistical problem for much of the fall of '44. Tanks & trucks don't run very well without fuel, this delayed the allies during a critical period that MIGHT have made the "Dash to Berlin" possible.

Logistics. Gets ya' every time.

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True but if the Allies had landed in 1943, they would have found the landward defences much much weaker (bit like Singapore) so would the Germans have had the time to wreck port facilities the way they did?

If not then the fuel situation possibly becomes less extreme?

PMN1 said:

Given the political situation then yes Eisenhower's decision was correct - why expend lives for something that is going to be given up, but would it have been the same political situation if the Allies had landed in 1943?

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Allies try to land in 1943 the political situation is MUCH worse. They wind up getting repulsed or bottled up as happened in Anzio. The players and parts were just not there yet.

PMN1 said:

True but if the Allies had landed in 1943, they would have found the landward defences much much weaker (bit like Singapore) so would the Germans have had the time to wreck port facilities the way they did?

If not then the fuel situation possibly becomes less extreme?

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The shore defenses do not matter (unless they are attacking an actual port in which case they are very important indeed). On D-Day even Omaha (by far the best defended section of beach) was secure before sundown on June 6. Now, if you want to attack a port, just look at Dieppe for why that is such a BAD IDEA. Ports are always overdefended, they are also distressingly easy to wreck if the situation seems about to go against the defenders.

The fuel shortage was not an availability problem, it was a transportation issue. The Allies would not have been able to create a fuel distribution pipeline any more quickly in 1943 than 1944.

BTW: Had the entire Atlantic Wall been fortified to Singapore's seaward defense level, the allies would have had a very difficult nut to crack indeed. The Japanese did not choose the jungle route for the fun of it. Had the Coastal Artillery been supplied with enough of the right kind of ammunition (High Explosive instead of or in addition to AP), the Island would likely have never fallen, at least not due to the December attack.

Grimm Reaper said:

The 1943 invasion at Normandy becomes a meat grinder that costs hundreds of thousands of allied lives, which, after the first few months, means American lives as the British manpower base was already collapsing.

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This is absurd. What allied leader would keep landing troops in NW Europe after it became clear it was hopeless? Any invasion of the continent would be called off far before hundreds of thousands of men died.

Recommended reading: Grigg and Second Front Now!

in a back issue of Command magazine.

The thing about both is they anticipate most of the anti-1943 counterarguments.

Grigg focuses on the facts that its local air superiority in the region to be invaded that matters. That could be achieved with the right emphasis, and it was achieved in the invasion theaters the allies actually chose in 1943.

The Second Front Now article predicts something well between an Anzio and OTL's 1944 advance. They see a chunk of northwest France liberated, much bigger than Anzio, and an advance rate comparable to that of the Allies in Italy in late 43. However, the authors pretty much figure that the accumulated forces and supply structure brought in over the summer, fall and winter will mean a major breakout through the rest of France and into the Ruhr is inevitable in the spring and summer of 1944.

Regarding the victorious Bulge idea, local allied air superiority, and a secure resupply system, plus tie downs due to the Soviets, uncertainty about the Italian situation and the allied ability to keep many German forces static along uninvaded parts of the coast through deception will prevent the Germans from making more than local offensive gains, and certainly nothing that's capable of tossing the western allies off the continent. The western allies will tough out their first months on the continent, and the harder the Germans struggle against it, the more they set themselves up for the crash in 1944.

Even if Grigg's book didn't acknowledge it, the Command Magazine article acknowledged that an earlier invasion will shift some of the casualties away from the Soviets and onto the west.

The air picture, thought to doom a '43 invasion, actually is not a slam dunk for the anti-43 argument. For one, allied pilot survival and recovery will probably better if they spend the months before the summer of 43 focused on operational interdiction and blasting away the Luftwaffe infrastructure in France and Belgium, compared to attempting daylight bombing over Germany. Once you have enough space for some airfields in the liberated zone Luftwaffe attrition will get very bad in the theater, and closer proximity will provide a base for more effective bombing of German territory once firm establishment and broadening of the allied zone in northwest France is complete. Note that in OTL, strategic bombing became much more effective when there were two main active fronts in late '44 and in early 45 when theater air forces were tossed into the mix. The closer proximity of allied air bases to the Ruhr will help prevent Speer from making many of the production strides he made in OTL's early 1944.