Germany invents the tank during WWI?

Just as it says on the tin. Is there any way that the Germans could have been the first ones to invent and deploy the tank, instead of deploying some piddly little knockoff at the end of the war?

XNM said:

Just as it says on the tin. Is there any way that the Germans could have been the first ones to invent and deploy the tank, instead of deploying some piddly little knockoff at the end of the war?

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Have them adopt the Burstyn tank pre-war.
http://www.landships.freeservers.com/burstyn_tank.htm

The Austro-Hungarian War Office returned the designs to Burstyn saying they might be interested if a commercial firm could build it: Burstyn had no industrial contacts and so let the matter drop. Also, the War Office declined to finance any further work. Meanwhile the German War Department asked to see the design, but were not enthusiastic even though a leading German military periodical keenly endorsed the idea. A further complication arose when Burstyn in 1912 sought to patent the design and was told that this could not be granted as it infringed existing patents, including those for agricultural tractors. (He eventually was granted a patent, no Zl. 252 815 DRP.) Thus discouraged, Burstyn allowed the idea to drop, and it never progressed beyond paper.

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XNM said:

Just as it says on the tin. Is there any way that the Germans could have been the first ones to invent and deploy the tank, instead of deploying some piddly little knockoff at the end of the war?

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The problem is that before the war no one would have any use for a tank, they were slow and unreliable and not much use in the war of manouver everyone expected, replacing all those cavalry regiements with some nice armored cars on the other hand....

Hm, what about a converted artillery tractor (originally to tow the 21 cm Mörsers or other heavy artillery and carry ammunition, but drop the towing and up-armour it instead)?

Uruk said:

The problem is that before the war no one would have any use for a tank, they were slow and unreliable and not much use in the war of manouver everyone expected, replacing all those cavalry regiements with some nice armored cars on the other hand....

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From a writer's perspective, the easiest solution would be to have another war elsewhere with German observers getting the idea of trench warfare.

There's also the problem that tank doctrine was was WAY unobvious and not just a matter of putting out a bunch of tanks into the line, a gap democracies are better at overcoming faster because of more freedom for innovation.

And Churchill wrote he'd tried armored cars first thing in the war, but they couldn't break lines because they couldn't deal with lines.

The different pieces were available for all to see. The Holt tractor was there, using tracks.

But why look at it from a German perspective? trench warfare was not there yet and the power of the machine gun not really realised (on either side I would claim).

Coming along with a machine which was breaking down at any times, etc. was a difficult sell. What would be the purpose of it? it was too slow to act in any role of pursuing anything besides a turtle.

With Germany beng on the defensive, they had no use for an offensive weapon to break a trech line.

With all of this said, let us just imagine that Germany realises that here is a game changer and unless they do something about it, it will be used against them.

So, full force for Germany with a tank army.

First Ypres would have been markedly different IF the mechanical problems could have been solved. Foch would surely have been caught moving East while Falkenhayn moved South.

Eastern Front? That was much more action and maneouvre and could have provided some insight into a tank army.

So, let us look at a German offensive in the East involving tanks?

Ivan





Somme as a counter attack?

Where are the industrial resources coming from? The Navy (actually that might be a good idea, the Mackensen and Ersatz Yorck classes were never completed anyway, so the resources might as well go somewhere useful)?

Didn't this question come up a few weeks ago?

The answer is the same.

Why would the Germans do it? Unless they develop a time machine that shows newsreels of 1940 Panzers they aren't going to be interested in a 4 mph metal monster that does the job their infantry can do.

The tank was developed by the British to break the deadlock of the trenches. The Germans were happy with the deadlock. It was their defences that created the deadlock.

When they wanted to break through as in 1918 they could. The Germans in MArch and April 1918 advanced more in a day than tanks had done in 1917.

On the Eastern Front they broke through all the time and could walk faster than a tank could move.

If we are looking at the eastern front maybe you are looking for something to replace armoured cars over rougher terrain ... so rather than looking for something used as a breakthrough weapon you have a lighter faster machine-gun carrying platform on tracks to be used as a "chaser". Over time this could be adapted, up gunned, up armoured and no doubt there would be people looking at ways to exploit the new technology on the Western front.

Germany inventing the tank and using it means Germany losing faster.

The only reason for it is to attack in the west and that will tend to mean both sides adopting a tactical offensive posture, less depth in defensive positions on the german side so something like the allied 17 offensives will stand a chance of breaking through a la Kaiserschlacht. Sightly more so as the allies have better kit for infantry offensives - LMG's mainly by then.

XNM said:

Just as it says on the tin. Is there any way that the Germans could have been the first ones to invent and deploy the tank, instead of deploying some piddly little knockoff at the end of the war?

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I suspect you are looking for some big war winner. Sure if you have the 1942 German Tank regiments available, it is a war winner. But it is not really the tanks that are the key innovation needed. It is less sexy items like radios, trucks, working out the logistical train. It is important not to read history backwards. So lets look at the 1905-1914 window.

Sure there are tanks or armored cars that could be developed. They would have likely helped some for the central powers as long as it represents added resources (more money) not same resources (fewer machine guns). Doctrine of the day said trenches could be broken (really bypassed). And more often than not in WW1, a talented commander with experienced troops could create a local breakout. What they generally were unable to do is make a local penetration a deep encirclement movement. What was missing? Ability to co-ordinate the breakthrough and ability to supply. You need radios and trucking regiments to fix these items.

Now to units. German Cavalry units could move 65 miles per day sustained per the logistical tables. The benefits of encirclement and deep penetration was well understood. For example, the German GHQ knew and talked about the benefits of cutting supply lines (RR) to congress of Poland. They could break through Russian lines with ease. They could not keep supply a unit deep in enemy lands where they could not co-ordinate the efforts. So they did not do these things. I look at writing a TL where the Germans have the 1914 version of blitzkrieg. Tanks are the last things I need to add. First, you have to have horse portable radios. Then you need to work out supply issue (wagons, horse, or trucks). Then you need to get airplanes/Zeppelins to scout. You need to work out details of bringing up infantry units to support flanks of cavalry advance. Tanks are too slow. And BTW, the Germans had all the stuff needed except funding for the miniturization of radios. Truck regiments existed. Armored cars were easy to build.

And if you gave the Germans some tracked tanks, what do they do with them? Well, they likely do unsexy work like help take out the Belgium forts or they might be used in the east as mobile pillboxes to extend fortresses. For example, the Austrians could have easily had a few dozen tanks at Lemberg trying to break up attacks. Now the faster armored cars could make good units to harass Russian cavalry.

Monty Burns said:

From a writer's perspective, the easiest solution would be to have another war elsewhere with German observers getting the idea of trench warfare.

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Agreed a good start. If I was writing a TL, I would look for a forward looking General with good political skills. Give him a little luck. And you have a shot at starting WW1 with one armored brigade somewhere. Win the first few battles, and he gets more power and units. Basically, my TL but using tanks. The basics are there. You just need a cavalry officer who can sell to GHQ the need for a deep penetration unit for a particular mission. You either have to find a location where fast and deep penetration helps Belgium or go for Russian bridges on RR. I really think that If you can take and hold a couple of key RR junctions for 48 hours, then destroy and retreat, you can wreck the Russian mobilization tables.

"From a writer's perspective, the easiest solution would be to have another war elsewhere with German observers getting the idea of trench warfare"

The Russia-Japan war of 1904/5 illustrated the nature of trench warfare, problem was that the lessons of what trenches + barbed wire + artillery + machine guns could do weren't learned. If you had the Germans somehow put aside their European superiority complex and bias about the relevance of a fight between 'easterners' then perhaps they could start preparing for solutions to trench warfare. But if the Germans somehow realised the future value of tanks, that would change the entire nature of their doctrine. If they plan to develop and build up a WW1-type tank force to fight a trench warfare battle then the Schlieffen plan would seem to be pointless as WW1 tanks will have no role to play in that. That in turn changes the whole strategic situation as without the apparent need to quickly knockout France (because the Germans are now training for a static trench war), then there's no need to invade Belgium etc etc. So the whole nature of any WW1 is likely to change.

My other question is what do all of the other European powers do when they notice this change in German planning? And word will get out, the armies of 1914 had a pretty good idea as to how everyone else's principal tactics and doctrine.

Part of Germany's problem in 1914 was budgetary. They had a very ineffective taxation system, which meant that they were seriously under taxing their population for the needs of the military; IIRC they were taking in so little money that although they were spending less proportionally than their likely enemies, the military budget was still more than 50% of government expenses. Come wartime and the blockade, Germany has her economic potential limited due to lack of critical imports, so she had to make hard choices about production; in 1914-16 Germany was far more concerned about mobilizing enough men for the war, which meant building up a massive artillery park and supplying shells for those, while also building up her truck reserves for supply purposes. Beyond that they needed to expand machine guns production, build more factories, expand the navy, all while mobilizing their skilled manpower for the front. Germany just didn't have the necessary slack with which to invest in new technologies at a time when they didn't have enough existing ones for their needs. So you would need something pre-war, such as the Burstyn tank enter development, so that Germany and A-H have a working prototype that has been developed for operations at the front.

Germany was on the tactical offensive in the West in 1914-15 after trench warfare set in and during the French and British offensives, so could have put such a unit to use. However unless it was developed pre-war, there is little reason for the Germans to take a risk on the untried technology during the war given their production constraints.
The British and French did not have that problem thanks to their ability to import so much, which some historians have categorized as a 50% increase of their economic potential; they also had access to the manpower of their Empires and neutrals, so they imported labor to replace that which was conscripted. Indo-Chinese labor was huge for France, as were Italian and Spanish migrant workers. Britain utilized her Indian labor extensively too, though not on the Western Front AFAIK. Germany couldn't do that; later they tried to use forced labor from Belgium, POWs, and Russians with mixed results.

Horsey herrenvolk

I think the 65 miles may be Km not miles below quote from the US cavalry manual 1941- don’t suppose german horses are that different. Incidentally a 60 mile march is the low end of the range of expected of ww2 Panzer division out of contact. In contact ww2 not motorised is 10-15 miles with M/T 30 miles per day.

‘Horse elements of Cavalry on good roads in daylight under favorable conditions, with well-seasoned men and animals, are able to march 35 miles per day at the rate of 6 to 61/2 miles per hour for 6 days a week as long as the situa tion requires.’

I am not sure this accurate this is for a whole division - its taken from the horse components of a semi motorised formation. Motorised bit would include the arty and supply columns. It also requires good roads.

Incidentally a 60 mile march is the low end of the range of expected of ww2 Panzer division out of contact. In contact ww2 not motorised is 10-15 miles with M/T 30 miles per day.

Increasing the M/T available to ww1 Cav div is of course feasible as is increasing radios but only if you assume a technological advance of around a 10-20 only available to Germany. There is a special place for these threads.

It also requires a dramatic change of German cavalry doctrine btw, which is much more likely

every time this question comes up (and it's come up many times in the month or so I've been here), my answer is always the same: physically, it's easy to come up with a workable tank in time for WWI. several people/nations thought up the idea prewar. It's the mindset that's the problem. Hindsight is usually 20/20, but there's really no good reason, other than hubris, why the need for a tank wouldn't be obvious. while the leading practice had offense ruling the day, defense was known to be a vital factor. Thus, whether you wanted your offense to be more offensive, or whether you saw that your offense needed to overcome the other guy's defense, it should have been obvious that mechanized warfare was the wave of the future. Both on the ground and in the air, the ruling military class was oblivious, even though there were plenty of warnings, and plenty of folk talking.

So, you want a tank? no problem. You want conditions where germany builds a tank? problem.

a good question, to me, is, sans WWI to accelerate development, when does the military powers realize mechanized is the wave of the future? the world is reletively new to the notion of horseless carriage vs the horse&buggy, so a bit of a pass can be given in 1914. But, how much longer afterward would people start to say "ya know, an armored gun with mechanical locomotion might be a good idea"?

Same thing for aircraft. 1914 is only 11 years after the first recognized flight. People had already prophecied that they would be offensive weapons. how long before they start being designed as such.

It's a guess to me, but to me, 1925 is a reasonable timeframe.

The Great Powers were already using armoured cars, and had some tanks on the drawing board, so early 20s seems likely.

Gannt the chartist said:

I think the 65 miles may be Km not miles below quote from the US cavalry manual 1941- don’t suppose german horses are that different. Incidentally a 60 mile march is the low end of the range of expected of ww2 Panzer division out of contact. In contact ww2 not motorised is 10-15 miles with M/T 30 miles per day.

dramatic change of German cavalry doctrine btw, which is much more likely

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You may be right. Seems like the source was one of the post WW1 German General books, so the number is likely in the unit of measured favored by the imperial German Army.

I disagree the Germans getting an advantage in radios is ASB. The known limiting factors of a deep penetration of enemy lines was resupply and communication. The Germans had trucking regiments years before WW1, but the Reichstag limited funding for requested additional funding. So this part is an easy solution that involves either attaching existing trucking units to cavalry units or funding additional regiments to attach. Just a funding issue. The other is lack of radios that can be used for coordination. I have not research in much detail, but I would be very surprised to find that one could not research one to fit on a horse or barring that to simply mount one on a truck. If you have communication between regiments, you can control the formation. Battalions would be better, but you could probably work with just the regiments having radio trucks. It was not the intraregimental communication that was the issue as much as keeping the regiments in contact with higher commands. So this is a funding issue on top of needing to change the issue. Exactly what prevents mounting a radio on a dedicated radio truck?

Now I don't really think that this would even be the best use of "more mobility for the German Army" type POD. The best use would be trucking units to make infantry regiments more mobile for critical portions of the attack on Belgium/France. Gain a few more critical locations with a few regiments, and the war looks different. While a POD like this means the battles are not the same as OTL, we can look at some battles to see potential. For example IOTL, at least part of a regiment took Ameins for a short period of time. If the Germans could have gotten extra regiments to this key logistical area, they might hold. If they hold, the war looks different. Or more supplies near the Marne.


Now to the doctrine, yes it would be a noticeable change. In many ways, changing doctrine is the hardest part. When I look at POD from the 1900 to 1941 time frame, the hard part is not the technical issues. Often the technology is around 20 years before understood and funded. The problem is figuring out how it can work and then funding the idea in the PreWar era when time exist to work out bugs.