Conrad Waits: a better Austro-Hungarian Eastern Front (v 2.0)

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Deleted member 1487

I've decided to rewrite my original version of this TL, so I'm going to start a new thread. I'll keep the original information that is still applicable here:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=174905
Just a bit of background: Norman Stone, author of the only decent book on the Eastern Front in WW1 also wrote an article in German about the messed up AH mobilization of August 1914. He talks about the event a bit in his book and cites his paper in the foot notes. Having received that article in PDF through inter-library loan (the magazine it was published in no longer exists), I muddled my way through, thanks to the maps included. Several variants of the AH mobilization were included and this What If is based on the information therein.

Historically Conrad von Hötzendorf proved ridiculously indecisive when it mattered most: at the start of World War One.

http://www.firstworldwar.com/maps/easternfront.htm
(though some maps are a bit off)

As the Chief of Staff of the Austro-Hungarian general Staff, Armee Ober Kommando (AOK), he was in charge of prewar planning. He had his staff create some flexibility in mobilization by creating three groups: A-Staffel, three armies, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th; B-Staffel, 2nd army of 6 corps and one cavalry division; and Minimal Gruppe Balkan (MG-B), the 5th and 6th armies (really only the strength of 1 army), to hold the Balkan front against Serbia. A-Staffel was supposed to be deployed against Russia, MG-B against Serbia, and B-Staffel could go either way.

As war was declared he vacillated and only mobilized MG-B and B-Staffel for war against Serbia, despite knowing that Russia would support her Balkan ally, which meant that Russia was able to mobilize before AH, the latter only doing so in response to the Russia declaration. This meant that only half the army was headed to Eastern Front and the crucial reinforcements, B-Staffel, would have to first go to the Balkans only to turn around and head to the Eastern Front. Historically they arrived only to be caught up in the retreat after the AHs lost the battle of Lemberg, losing important equipment and manpower.

So, what if Conrad had ordered total preparation for mobilization of the whole army on July 25th, as he did historially with MG-B and B-Staffel, but instead of sending B-Staffel to the Balkans, it headed to the Eastern Front immediately?

Now just to make something clear, Franz Josef's approval was necessary to declare full mobilization. What I am proposing then, in light of Franz Josef's reluctance to immediately authorize full mobilization, is that Conrad waits for the 'Russian Clarification of Intentions' before deploying B-Staffel. He also would already issue a general warning order to the whole army on the 25th, canceled leave, called up officers, and readied rail and telegraph staff and offices that will be needed for deployment, all things NOT historically done on July 25th. So the first day of mobilization is July 30th for A- and B-Staffel. Waiting an extra few days wouldn't have hurt the Serbian Front, but instead would save AH the muddle it suffered historically. So THAT is what I am proposing: Conrad having the sense to wait and prepare instead of going off half-cocked and messing up mobilization.

First and foremost the AHs would not attack in the Balkans, they would solely defend, avoiding the defeats and losses that historically occurred, and probably would draw out the Serbs, who would start the war being defeated as they attacked AH, which they only did in September. Their morale from the defeat and losses would change from our historical level, potentially leaving the Serbs worse off when the AHs are ready to attack. Historically the AHs had better and more artillery than the Serbs, cutting them to ribbons when attacked from prepared positions.

This would also mean that within 21-25 days of the order the AH army would be totally mobilized in Galicia. That would be between August 20th and August 24th. Historically the 'attack group' in Galicia, the 1st and 4th armies, were mobilized the quickest, 16 days for the 1st army, 18 for the 4th, though the latter received reinforcements even later than this from B-Staffel. Here these would all arrive with the rest of the army. These armies would still be on track to attack, just maybe a few days earlier than OTL.

There are a few variables though: historically Conrad deployed his armies behind the San-Dniester river lines in defensive positions, as his necessary attack forces were not available, what with the 2nd army (B-Staffel) in the Balkans. He was forced to attack after Kaiser Wilhelm, supporting Moltke's plan, 'requested' Franz Josef have his armies attack to draw off the Russians. Conrad responded with his offensive.

Here though, with all his armies available up front, he would deploy forward near the border. Historically the AH armies were forced to march across their own country and wore themselves out before even reaching the border. Then they had to march to battle, leaving the Russians able to advance farther forward in East Galicia than the AHs.
With a more forward deployment, the AHs would be less tired, but would take longer to assemble. This probably adds about 1-2 days to the mobilization of the 1st and 4th armies respectively, but historically they had to spend several days marching forward to the border, so this would probably be a wash. However, it would telegraph AH intentions...

This would also add at least 3-4 to the 3rd and 2nd armies in East Galicia, but would cut down on their time marching forward, which took several extra days, meaning train travel would actually see them arriving at their historical positions sooner. Furthermore, this means that they will be mobilized along river lines in East Galicia, the 3rd along the Bug and the 2nd along the Sereth. There will be no historical battle of Gnila Lipa with the AHs running into prepared Russian positions being cut to pieces, rather it will be the Russians fighting roughly equal numbers of AHs in terrain of their own choosing.

The other issue is that historically the Russians thought the AHs were preparing to defend, because of their initial deployments, meaning that they attacked based on the assumption the AHs were not attacking (though not everyone made this assumption-Brusilov, Ruszki). Here with further forward AH deployments the Russians will know that AHs will attack, meaning they may defend instead. This could leave the AHs attacking Russians who are defending on their own territory, but it could also mean the Russians don't care and want to fight the AHs in a maneuver battle anyway (which some generals did). I don't know what would happen for sure, but with an educated guess I would say that the Russians will still attack with their 3rd and 8th armies, as these commanders still expected an AH attack historically, based on prewar intelligence and charged forward regardless. The Russian 4th and 5th armies though might opt to defend near Lublin and Cholm instead, as historically they were unaware of the attacking AH forces until too late. Perhaps we would see a reverse situation, where the battles in East Galicia see the Russians defeated, but the AH attacks in Poland bog down and route. However, the Russians would still be mobilizing by the time TTL AH reached them, giving them no time to create trenches and field fortifications. Both Lublin and Cholm were not fortified cities.

Honestly I see the Russians attacking anyway, just so the AHs don't disrupt their mobilization at Lublin and Cholm. With the AHs mobilizing sooner and in a more rested state, they would probably be able to march forward quick enough to disrupt Russian mobilization in Poland. OTL the battles of Krasnik and Komarow saw Russian forces moving out before they were totally mobilized. I assume Conrad would still only attack into Poland while defending East Galicia, because he would still believe the Germans are going to try and support him attacking toward Seydlitz.

Instead of the battles of Krasnik and Komarow, we would see the battles of Lublin and Cholm (maybe their suburbs/flanks), but without the Russians losing the maneuver battle, only being pushed back from their assembly points. They would lose their supply dumps, along with some equipment and probably take longer to put together a solid front, but they wouldn't be at risk of being encircled and have lots of space to fall back on. Meanwhile the Austrians have no rail lines to supply their advance, so taking Lublin and Cholm is the farthest forward they could go. No decisive battle yet, but it would hurt Russian attempts to counter attack. At this point we would probably see them getting bogged down in a see-saw struggle, especially as the Russian 9th army arrives to support them. Basically the historical defensive struggle in Poland in September 1914, but north of Lublin and Cholm.

Meanwhile in East Galicia the AHs would be fighting in rough, hilly, wooded lands where they have recent maps and home field advantage, plus the added bonus of fighting on ground of their choosing with equal numbers of troops and artillery as the enemy. The Russians would have had to march into enemy territory without rail supply and attack the AHs in the hills. They do have the benefit of the Ruthenians supporting them and providing guides for their patrols. But the fighting is going to bog down, with the Russians only able to advance at great cost and no decisive victory. Instead the Austrians will be able to hold them and keep the front in Galicia instead of being forced back to the Carpathians. Furthermore, they will not lose over 100,000 men as prisoners, nor lose the vast quantities of stores and equipment as historically happened.

The opening battles would then be inconclusive, with neither side defeated. There is no Austro-Hungarian emergency, instead Russian troops occupying East Galicia and AHs occupying the South of Russian Poland. Supply is difficult for both sides, but as the Russians get more reinforcements in September the situation gets more desperate for the AHs. In late September the Germans can now support the AHs with their 9th army, probably by attacking Ivangorod and breaking the stalemate in Poland, releasing AH troops to fight in East Galicia. This probably also breaches the Vistula river barrier, forcing the Russians to evacuate Poland like in August 1915.

The AHs avoid the major losses of 1914 and early 1915 because they aren't forced back into the Carpathians, forced to fight after losing massive numbers of men, artillery pieces, and crucial territory. However, the Russians also don't lose large numbers of men trying to break into the Hungarian plain. So in late 1914 and 1915 the Russians are defending their homeland with short supply lines, while the Central Powers are now having to ship everything far forward into enemy territory in the vast plains of the Ukrainian and Polish Steppe.

AOK would be further forward thanks to Conrad planning on an offensive from day 1. The DN group in the Bukowina is a Dniester group, which Conrad had planned on creating from Landsturm (3rd line troops), cavalry, and a single infantry division for flank defense in this mobilization scenario.



OOBs
Austria-Hungary:
Not included is the 5 2nd line territorial Landsturm brigades and 17 2nd line territorial brigades.

Serbian Front-
(5 Divs, 13 Mt Brgds (including 8 grouped into 3 Inf Divs OTL), 6.5 Brgds)

5th army:
XIII Corps- 3 divisions
1 Mountain Brigade
1 Landsturm Brigade
1 Marsch Brigade
(3 Divs, 1 Mt Brgd, 2 Brgds)

6th army:
XV Corps- 4 Mountain Brigades (2 Inf Divs)
XVI Corps- 8 Mountain Brigades (1 Inf Div of 4 Brgds + 4 Indp. Brgds)
2 Inf divisions
1 Landsturm brigade
1 Landsturm regiment
1 Marsch Brgd
(2 Divs, 12 Mt Brgds, 2.5 Brgds)

Rayon Banat:
Equivalent of 2 Brigades (Landsturm, Feldjägers) and attached artillery and pioneers..

There were also several Lst brgds in Bosnia to guard against insurrections which never occurred and will be reinforcements for this Front.

Eastern Front-
(42 Inf Divs, 11 Cav, 28 Brgds, 2 German Inf Divs)

Kummer Group:
1 Cav Divisions
2 Landsturm Inf Divisions
1 Landsturm Inf Brigade
1 Mountain Artillery Brigade

Woyrsch Group (German Landwehr Corps)-2 Inf divisions

Dniester Group:
1 Inf Div
1 Cav Div
5 Landsturm Brigades
1 Mountain Artillery Brigade

1st army:
I Corps-2 Inf Divs
V Corps-3 Inf Divs
X Corps-3 Inf Divs
2 Cav Divs
1 Inf Div
4 Landsturm Inf Brigades
3 Marsch Brigades
Polish Legion
(9 divs, 2 cav, 7 brgds, legion)

2nd army:
XII Corps-3 Inf Divs
III Corps-3 Inf Divs
VIII Corps-2 Inf Divs
IV Corps-2 Inf Divs, 1 mrsch brgd
2 Cav Divs
3 Marsch Brigades
(10 Divs, 2 cav, 4 Brgds)

3rd army:
XI Corps-1 Inf Div, 1 Lst Brgd, 1 Mrsch Brgd
XIV Corps-3 Inf Divs, 1 Inf Brgd
VII Corps-2 Inf Divs
4 Inf Divs
2 Cav Divs
2 Lst Brgds
5 Mrsch Brgds
(10 Divs, 2 Cav, 10 Brgds)

4th army:
II Corps-3 Inf Divs
VI Corps-3 Inf Divs
IX Corps-2 Inf Divs
XVII Corps-2 Inf Divs
3Cav Divs
3 Mrsch Brgd
1 Mt Art Brgd
(10 Divs, 3 Cav, 3 Brgds)

AOK-
Lemberg
(OTL Lemberg garrison+OTL Przemysl garrison and field fortifications)

This was the original what if question, so some of it is speculative. I'll start the TL in the next post when I finish writing it.

Here is a link to the original draft of TTL's events:
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showpost.php?p=3884018&postcount=9
Rough Outline
Bomb is thrown at the car of FF in Sarajevo, killing everyone inside, including Potiorek, Sophia, and FF

Conrad presses for war and appoints the Archduke Eugene to the 6th army and the Serbian theater. Consulting with his old mentor, Conrad makes several changes to the OTL plan of events.

War declared on Serbia July 25th, general mobilization preparations taken, but only the 5th and 6th AH armies are mobilized. All other forces give warning orders and prepare everything short of full mobilization.

After delivering his note to FJ on July 29th, Conrad is given the green light to order full mobilization on July 30th.

6 groups are formed in Galicia: (from left to right Kummer, 1st army, 4th army, 3rd army, 2nd army, and Georgenegg detachment (Dniester group formed around the 11th Schützen division stationed at Czernowitz).

There is no wide cavalry reconnaissance ITTL, leaving AH cavalry forces rested.

Kummer is ready on the 12th of August, 1st army on 16th, 4th on the 18th, 3rd on the 24th, 2nd on 23rd, and Georgenegg on the 16th (he attacks earlier than this to secure Chotin).

Dankl (1st army) attacks north on the 17th, meeting the Russians around Borzechow between Krasnik and Lublin on the 21st, catching them in the flank, destroying half the 4th army while the rest retreat to Lublin and the swampy land around it.

The Russian 5th is forced to move out before it is assembled to aid them, crossing the Wieprz river too late to help, but quick enough to draw off some of the AH 1st army. This pulls the Russians to the West and makes them easy prey for the advancing AH 4th army.

Reinforced by the XIV corps from the AH 3rd army, Auffenburg (4th army) presses north on the 19th and clashes with the Russians starting August 23rd at Grabowiec, north of Komarow. Fighting grinds on until the 31st when Russian resistance collapses and most of the army is encircled, surrendering on the 2nd of September. The equivalent of 1 depleted corps escapes with half its artillery, plus enough cavalry for 1 division.

In East Galicia the Russians clash with the AH 2nd and 3rd armies starting August 26th, with many bloody engagements in the heavily forested hills and steep valleys of the Bug and Dniester tributaries.

Tarnopol falls on the 28th and AH 2nd army falls back behind the Sereth.
AH 3rd army is outnumbered and gunned along the Bug, fighting desperately to hold the line. Brudermann (AH 3rd) is outclassed by Ruszki (Russian 3rd) and is forced to steadily retreat, though the rugged hills and marshy ground delay the Russians, preventing a rout. Brudermann is sacked after losing 20k men at Busk on the 30th, ordering a suicidal bayonet assault with Landsturm and Marsch Brigade troops, allowing the Russians to break the Bug line. He is sacked and replaced by the more competent Boroevic.

Boroevic orders a major pull back to save his battered forces, but draws a line in the sand. Böhm-Ermolli is forced to retreat to the Zlota Lipa, despite his victories, to cover his flanks. Dniester group pulls back too to aid 2nd army.

As the war continues into September, Russian reserve divisions become available and they begin organizing an invasion of Bukowina by their 7th army, which has been guarding the Romanian border.

By September 6th AH 4th army forces had taken Cholm and doubled back to assist the embattled 3rd. After receiving the significant reinforcements, the Russian 3rd army paused its headlong rush into the AH 3rd and turned to fight the AH 4th.

Battle of Lemberg begins on September 8th, as AH 3rd army is pushed back near the city and the AH 4th army joins the battle. Heavy fighting as both sides pour on in their reserves. Ruszki's Russian 3rd army is defeated after being fixed and flanked, but is able to escape thanks to the AH 3rd army being too battered and exhausted to pursue very far, as is the AH 4th.

Russian forces in East Galicia fall back on the Sereth river and Brody, setting up a defensive line, using newly arrived corps and independent divisions to establish a continuous line. The Russian 7th army still attacks between the Pruth and Dniester rivers, falling short of taking Czernowitz.

Further Northwest near Ivangorod the AH, German, and Russian forces are locked in a bitter struggle without moving the line much. Supply difficulties are preventing the Austro-Germans from moving forward, even with the help of a brigade of Skoda mortars, while Russian reinforcements only allow them to hold the line, not pierce AH field works.

By late September the lines have bogged down with both sides having traded territory and large cities, though the AHs have gotten the best of the fighting, with nearly 200,000 PoWs captured. Large stores of Russian stores were captured at Lublin and Cholm, along with hundreds of artillery pieces. In east Galicia though the situation was somewhat dire. The Russians had taken a beating, losing up over half their August strength, but they had been reinforced. The AHs had not been, other than receiving 2nd line replacements. They had lost about half of their forces, with the 3rd army reduced to 40% of its prewar strength. 4th army was the best off, even with its losses in two separate struggles. The elite XIV corps was ironically one of the strongest remaining forces, having operated on the flanks during both attacks instead of suffering through frontal assaults like many other units.

AH ammunition stores were dangerously low, with captured Russian stocks only helping if crews could be trained to use their guns. The Russians on the other hand still had significant reserves in their fortresses and in storage, but were having difficulties bringing them to the front. October saw the AHs trying to push into Poland, while focusing most of their resources keeping the resurgent Russians at bay in East Galicia.

August 1914:

1914 (1).jpg
 

BlondieBC

Banned
Now just to make something clear, Franz Josef's approval was necessary to declare full mobilization. What I am proposing then, in light of Franz Josef's reluctance to immediately authorize full mobilization, is that Conrad waits for the 'Russian Clarification of Intentions' before deploying B-Staffel. He also would already issue a general warning order to the whole army on the 25th, canceled leave, called up officers, and readied rail and telegraph staff and offices that will be needed for deployment, all things NOT historically done on July 25th. So the first day of mobilization is July 30th for A- and B-Staffel. Waiting an extra few days wouldn't have hurt the Serbian Front, but instead would save AH the muddle it suffered historically. So THAT is what I am proposing: Conrad having the sense to wait and prepare instead of going off half-cocked and messing up mobilization.

First, if we use you dates, it could have some interesting international diplomatic and PR issues. With fewer men, I would guess A-H would not attack into Serbia in early September. So we possibly have Serbia firing the first shots. And seems like Russia mobilization begins on the 28th or 29th. It might change who is seen to start the war. Now to be fair, the information in the USA press was hugely inaccurate about the Eastern Front.

Second, it maybe be modern methods distort my views. Or it maybe the USA just mobilizing differently. I used to be in national guard, so I can speak to how it would happen if we had a similar event. First for the mechanics. We would first assemble at the local armory (few miles from our homes) and begin prewar. Cleaning, inventory, packing rucksacks, etc. A few days later, we head to the fort about 90 miles away where we again repeat on heavier equipment (artillery pieces, crew served weapons). We then load trains. So up to their, very much like what you do. We would have gotten to Bavaria a bit different, so I will skip that part.

Here is what seems odd to me. There are budgets for such items. On August 25th even being enlisted and a Class B unit, I could have showed up with pay to start the process. There are budgets for these things. More likely still, the Brigade commander would just move the weekend drill dates forward. So we all come in and start packing. Now if war did not come, we have to skip some weekends a few months later. They way you write your posts make me think this is impossible in A-H for some reason.

Now more realistically, I think the process looks more like this. We have a period of high international tension. Warning orders show up on the 25th. On the 25th, the soldiers are warned. On the 26th, those that can will show up to work. Probably 25% of the unit or so. There are just so many man hours intensive things to do. New filter for mask and vehicles. Breaking track on vehicles with older track. Maintenance cycle. Rushed repairs. I would assume things like this are still done with horse and horse powered units a hundred years ago. On the 28th, you likely see the mandatory work for the whole unit. Why does A-H not have similar options? Why is Conrad losing so much time? The trains travel at about 10 miles per hour speed or 240 miles per day OTL. So in you 22-25 day period, no more than two are the long distance travel. Even if I add 5 days of marching, we still have the better part of two weeks assembling before the trains leave.

You talk about the Hapsburg Emperor needing to sign the mobilization order on the 30th for all units. Why can't Conrad simply still call up the first two groups like OTL and issue warning order to the third group. The MG-B can go to full activation on the OTL date. So can the B Staffel. We they really on the trains between the 25th to the 31st OTL? Why not just fully mobilize them and hold at the rail hubs (presuming there are military barrack or forts right by railhubs where you assemble). Then on the 30th, go with full mobilization of A Staffel. I may be taking too modern a perspective, but it should be easier to mobilize and hold in place than what you are proposing. I seem to be missing something on the A-H mobilization plans.
 

Deleted member 1487

Revised Events August-September 1914

A rough outline of events:
Bomb is thrown at the car of FF in Sarajevo, killing everyone inside, including Potiorek, Sophia, and FF.

Conrad presses for war and appoints the Archduke Eugene to the 6th army and the Serbian theater. Consulting with his old mentor, Conrad makes several changes to the OTL plan of events.

War
War is declared on Serbia July 25th, general mobilization preparations taken, but only the 5th and 6th AH armies are mobilized. All other forces give warning orders and prepare everything short of full mobilization.

After delivering his note to FJ on July 29th, Conrad is given the green light to order full mobilization on July 30th.

Deployment
6 army groups are formed in Galicia: (from left to right Kummer, 1st army, 4th army, 3rd army, 2nd army, and Dniester Group (formed around the 11th Schützen division stationed at Czernowitz).

The Austro-Hungarian cavalry is launched on a wide-ranging reconnaissance mission from their deployment points near the Galician-Russian border, where they clashs with Russian Cossacks, achieving little other than exhausting themselves.

North Galicia/Russian Poland:
Kummer's group is ready on the 12th of August, 1st army on 16th, 4th on the 18th, 3rd on the 24th, 2nd on 23rd, and the Dniester Group on the 16th (it attacks earlier than this to secure Chotin across the Russian border to narrow the front south of the Dniester river).

Dankl (1st army) attacks north on the 17th, meeting the Russians around Borzechow between Krasnik and Lublin on the 21st, catching them in the flank, destroying several units of the Russian 4th army, including capturing an entire regiment on the march and over 70 artillery pieces. Several Russian corps are decimated, but remain combat effective and retreat to the swampy ground around Lublin. The terrain gives the Russians a chance to rally, which blunts the momentum of the A-H advance. Lublin doesn't fall.

The Russian 5th is forced to attack before it is fully deployed to aid its retreating neighbor, crossing the Wieprz river in time to draw off some of the A-H 1st army. This pulls the Russian 5th army to the West opening their flank to the approaching A-H 4th army.

Reinforced by the XIV corps from the A-H 3rd army, Auffenberg (4th army) presses north on the 19th and meets with the Russians starting August 23rd at Grabowiec, north of Komarow. Clashes whirl in the dusty plains of southern Poland until the 29th when the superior numbers, attacking position, and maneuver training allows the A-Hs to surround the Russian 5th army, which valiantly holds out until the evening of the 31st of August.
Little more than 20,000 men escape from the cauldron, out of an army of nearly 200,000 men. Hundreds of artillery pieces, machine guns, and horses are captured, along with much of the army's baggage train and stores.


East Galicia
The Russian 3rd and 8th armies advancing out of Ukraine bump into the advancing AH 2nd and 3rd armies on August 26th, resulting in many disjointed and confused engagements in the heavily forested hills and escarpment of the Bug and Dniester river tributaries. Superior A-H musketry training gives them the advantage in small infantry engagements, but the Russian Cossack experience is rough terrain and mobile warfare allow them to best the tired A-H cavalry when they meet. Fighting is bloody and inconclusive, with the A-H 2nd army quickly adopting a defensive posture to force the Russians to advance into their artillery, while keeping the infantry organized. The A-H 3rd army keeps an offensive mindset, as its general, Brudermann, is a cavalry officer steeped in the offensive tradition. This costs them dearly, as the superior Russian artillery decimates Brudermanns troops.

Tarnopol falls on the 28th and AH 2nd army maintains a solid front, falling back behind the Sereth in a coordinated retreat to hold the line with their neighbor, the 3rd army. Their defense is effective and costs the Russian 8th army, its opponent led by the competent general Brussilov, painful losses during the advance.

AH 3rd army does not fair well against the better led Russian 3rd army near the Bug river. Brudermann orders a series of counter attacks which only serve to wear down his soldiers and let the Russians maintain a methodical advance, relying on their artillery and machine guns to smash up enemy attacks.

The rugged hills and marshy ground delay the Russians though, preventing a total rout of AH troops. Still they are shoved back toward Lemberg as the troops began to ignore orders to attack and instead reach the safety of the fortified capital of Galicia. Brudermann's poor leadership results in his sacking after losing 20k men in a large counter attack near Busk on the 30th. A suicidal bayonet assault led by his second line troops, all that were really left, is massacred and creates a gap that the Russians exploit. Their advance picks up steam, leaving Conrad to appoint Boroevic, a successful corps commander from the AH 4th army, to try and rally the broken 3rd army.

Boroevic orders a major pull back to save his battered forces, but draws a line in the sand. Böhm-Ermolli (AH 2nd army) is forced to retreat to the Zlota Lipa, despite his defensive successes, to cover his flank, which the AH 3rd army had left open. The Dniester group also pulls back to maintain its flank, as the AH 2nd army retreats.

As the war continues into September, Russian reserve divisions are mobilized and deployed. Some of those part of the Southwestern Front (a Russian army group designation) begin organizing for an invasion of Bukowina in the form of a new formation, the (Russian) Dniester Group.

Battle of Lemberg
By September 3rd the AH 4th army has taken Cholm but is forced to back to assist the embattled AH 3rd army. This development is noticed by the Russian 3rd army, which causes this army to pause its chase of the AH 3rd army and pivot to meet the looming threat marching from the north. Already the Russians have surrounded the city of Lemberg, which is fortified as part of Conrad's offensive plan. The Austrian High command (AOK) had already relocated to Przemysl on September 1st to avoid the Russian advance. Having to deploy troops to invest the city, the Russians cannot focus their full strength against the Austrian field armies.

The Battle of Lemberg begins on September 6th, as AH 3rd army rallies, launching a counter attack to break the Russian siege and the AH 4th army joins the battle from the north. Heavy fighting results as both sides pour in their full remaining strength in decisive battle of the campaign. Ruszki's 3rd army is defeated by superior numbers and having to surround Lemberg, but is able to escape thanks to the AH 3rd and 4th armies being too battered and exhausted to pursue.

Russian forces in East Galicia fall back on the Bug and Sereth rivers, setting up a defensive line, using newly deployed corps and reserve divisions to establish a defensive line. The Russian Dniester Group is the exception, launching an attack between the Pruth and Dniester rivers, but falls short of taking Czernowitz.

The A-H 4th, 3rd, and 2nd armies now remain locked in an exhausted line with the mix Russian forces from the Bug river down to the Romanian border, both sides too exhausted to attack for the moment.
To the north the A-H 1st army and its associated formations (Kummer and Woyrsch's Landwehr detachments) are stuck fighting the battered Russian 4th army, which was reinforced by the 9th army by Warsaw. Initially outnumbering the A-H formations, troops are pealed off of the A-H 5th army to reinforce and stabilize the front near Lublin. A-H forces have failed to take Lublin and have been pushed back from the city by Russian reinforcement by their 9th army. Additional A-H troops helped stop the Russians from collapsing the A-H position in West Galicia, but it had come at a heavy cost to the Central Powers forces. By late September the A-Hs had been pushed back nearly to the Galicia border, which at least shortened their supply lines.

Assessment
By late September the lines have bogged down with both sides having traded territory and some large cities, though the AHs have gotten the best of the fighting, with nearly 200,000 PoWs captured. Significant amounts of Russian supplies were captured at Cholm, which still rested in A-H hands. In east Galicia though the situation less than in hand. The Russians had taken a beating, losing up over half their August strength, but they had been reinforced. The AHs had not been, other than receiving 2nd line replacements. They had lost about half of their forces, with the 3rd army reduced to 50% of its mobilization strength, including most of its pre-war combat formations being wiped out. 4th army was the best off, even with its losses in the two largest battles of the campaign. The elite XIV corps was ironically one of the strongest remaining forces, having operated on the flanks during both attacks instead of suffering through frontal assaults like most other units.

AH ammunition stores were dangerously low, with captured Russian stocks only helping if crews could be trained to use their modern guns. The Russians on the other hand still had significant reserves in their fortresses and in storage, but were having difficulties bringing them to the front.

The Germans
Desperate, Conrad begged for help from the Germans, who were themselves bogged down further to the north. Realizing that there was both opportunity and political gain to the had, the new German Eastern Front commander, General Hindenburg, agreed to form an army in Poland to aid his Austrian allies. Starting in late September the new German 9th army began assembling in Silesia for an offensive.
 

Deleted member 1487

First, if we use you dates, it could have some interesting international diplomatic and PR issues. With fewer men, I would guess A-H would not attack into Serbia in early September. So we possibly have Serbia firing the first shots. And seems like Russia mobilization begins on the 28th or 29th. It might change who is seen to start the war. Now to be fair, the information in the USA press was hugely inaccurate about the Eastern Front.
The A-Hs still shell Belgrade just like IOTL long before they were ready to attack. They had the Danube flotilla that was patrolling the river and was eager to show the Serbs how they felt (IIRC they called it shaking the nest of rats). It would also let them know that a war was on, as the AHs would still declare war on Serbia ITTL. I'm not saying its good public policy, but given the hyper-nationalistic attitudes of August 1914, all of the bitter anger about Franz Ferdinand, and sheer bloody-mindedness means this still happens.

As to information about Russian mobilization in Britain and the US it wasn't made public that Russia mobilized first in 1914 until after WW1. Also public opinion was against Serbia among the public in Britain and France initially until the threat of a wider war started emerging.


Second, it maybe be modern methods distort my views. Or it maybe the USA just mobilizing differently. I used to be in national guard, so I can speak to how it would happen if we had a similar event. First for the mechanics. We would first assemble at the local armory (few miles from our homes) and begin prewar. Cleaning, inventory, packing rucksacks, etc. A few days later, we head to the fort about 90 miles away where we again repeat on heavier equipment (artillery pieces, crew served weapons). We then load trains. So up to their, very much like what you do. We would have gotten to Bavaria a bit different, so I will skip that part.

Here is what seems odd to me. There are budgets for such items. On August 25th even being enlisted and a Class B unit, I could have showed up with pay to start the process. There are budgets for these things. More likely still, the Brigade commander would just move the weekend drill dates forward. So we all come in and start packing. Now if war did not come, we have to skip some weekends a few months later. They way you write your posts make me think this is impossible in A-H for some reason.

Now more realistically, I think the process looks more like this. We have a period of high international tension. Warning orders show up on the 25th. On the 25th, the soldiers are warned. On the 26th, those that can will show up to work. Probably 25% of the unit or so. There are just so many man hours intensive things to do. New filter for mask and vehicles. Breaking track on vehicles with older track. Maintenance cycle. Rushed repairs. I would assume things like this are still done with horse and horse powered units a hundred years ago. On the 28th, you likely see the mandatory work for the whole unit. Why does A-H not have similar options? Why is Conrad losing so much time? The trains travel at about 10 miles per hour speed or 240 miles per day OTL. So in you 22-25 day period, no more than two are the long distance travel. Even if I add 5 days of marching, we still have the better part of two weeks assembling before the trains leave.

You talk about the Hapsburg Emperor needing to sign the mobilization order on the 30th for all units. Why can't Conrad simply still call up the first two groups like OTL and issue warning order to the third group. The MG-B can go to full activation on the OTL date. So can the B Staffel. We they really on the trains between the 25th to the 31st OTL? Why not just fully mobilize them and hold at the rail hubs (presuming there are military barrack or forts right by railhubs where you assemble). Then on the 30th, go with full mobilization of A Staffel. I may be taking too modern a perspective, but it should be easier to mobilize and hold in place than what you are proposing. I seem to be missing something on the A-H mobilization plans.

I'd have to check my sources again and get back to you about this. I wrote about it about 2 years ago so my memory on the details is pretty fuzzy.
IIRC there wasn't enough barrack space to have the soldiers fully assembly until mobilization orders were given.
 
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BlondieBC

Banned
I'd have to check my sources again and get back to you about this. I wrote about it about 2 years ago so my memory on the details is pretty fuzzy.
IIRC there wasn't enough barrack space to have the soldiers fully assembly until mobilization orders were given.

Something as simple as that could be the cause. We had all those WW1/WW2 training forts, so the fort my two artillery BN (1000 men) would have went to a fort that could probably house closer to a full division. Maybe two. Now I would assume the men had tents (shelter halves) and it was summer, so it still should be doable, but I can see leaders deciding it would not work when making plans. It is still hard to see how one thinks one can feed/shelter a million plus men in Galicia in winter (required for any War Plan with Russia) and not feed a million plus men on rail hubs in the interior of the country.

Another issue is how close is the assembly point to where people live. Part of what makes it easier in the USA is that I could live at home for the first few days. Cars make life easy. But if we have a situation where the assembly areas (forts) are far from the cities (more than walking distance), it could make it a lot harder. I always assumed the weapons and uniforms for the reserves were within an hour or two of someone's home.

I can get my mind around that you have to assemble the trains in such a way that you can only go one way (Germany). And I take it as a given that once you actually start moving the men on trains, it would be a fiasco to reverse flow as Russia and A-H showed IOTL. I also see the logic that mobilizing you army can provoke war, but I have trouble seeing how Russia can tell the difference from a half mobilization and a full mobilization. Same for sending your army to Russian border. It means a war. Germany had one mobilization plan and one transport to front plan, so it was trapped. Two days is not enough time to do a new plan. But A-H had one mobilization plan with two transport plans. So there seems to be a natural pause point.

And this brings us to another question. Surely A-H had a War Plan for Italy? It is not much of a stretch to see a war in the Balkans bringing in Italy. Some of the forces dedicated to Russia would have to go to the Italian border. Why is the plan so inflexible OTL. Germany pretty much knew it would always fight both France and Russia at the same time, so it planned based on that assumption. A-H could end up in a solo war with Italy or Serbia (at least it thought) or Russia. Or even in a war with Hungary. But its plans seem so inflexible. Even with the other mistakes of WW1, it is hard to see how A-H prewar Plans assume it can fight a war against Serbia and not fight Russia. And these things were not secrets. Mahan writes a book in 1908 that correctly aligns who will go to what side, excluding the Ottomans who he did not consider.
 

Deleted member 1487

I can get my mind around that you have to assemble the trains in such a way that you can only go one way (Germany). And I take it as a given that once you actually start moving the men on trains, it would be a fiasco to reverse flow as Russia and A-H showed IOTL. I also see the logic that mobilizing you army can provoke war, but I have trouble seeing how Russia can tell the difference from a half mobilization and a full mobilization. Same for sending your army to Russian border. It means a war. Germany had one mobilization plan and one transport to front plan, so it was trapped. Two days is not enough time to do a new plan. But A-H had one mobilization plan with two transport plans. So there seems to be a natural pause point.
I'll hopefully have an answer for you tomorrow.
Edit:
It depends on how many and what units. Russian intelligence had the Austrian war plans from 1913 (they were changed after it came to light when the traitor was exposed- Redl affair) so had an idea about what units were earmarked for what area. Units were geographically distributed, so intelligence picked up when and were units were gathering, just as the Austrians picked up Russian mobilization in 1914 thanks to businessmen's reports and wireless intercepts. As it was the A-Hs had a complete OOB of the Russian military and completely accurate mobilization plans thanks to excellent intelligence work by the A-H equivalent to the modern US's NSA. In fact A-H intelligence was the best part of their military, but Conrad routinely disregarded their work, which the Germans very quickly learned not to do, especially as they were able to gather information on the Russians quicker and more accurately than the equivalent German service.

The mobilization plans though WERE transport plans. Troops needed to be moved from their towns and villages to the combat area directly, rather than to a mobilization center than to the front. Once the order is given then the initial trains were to the battlefield, with some trains for the troops and some for the equipment. A-H plans were far slower than what their trains and rail lines were capable of, because of poor understanding by the A-H general staff's logistics department of the developments in the A-H rail infrastructure. It should be noted too that Conrad, not really a general staff trained officer, purged the Austrian general staff of his predecessor's personnel to form his own staff so that they wouldn't sabotage his tenure after some initial unpleasantness that he was jumped over the heads of several far more qualified staff officers. His resulting picks were the 'back benchers' of A-H general staff officers, because the best guys were already part of AOK and they all thought Conrad (rightly it turns out) was badly unqualified for the job and wanted another officer was that supposed to replace Feldzeugmeister Beck.

So it seems the problem was that the mobilization and transport plans were one and the same. So there was not a natural 'pause' point, as men living in an area belonged to the same units, so when they were transported to the front, they were all headed to the same area and didn't need to be first transported to a collection point and then as a unit transported to the battle zone. The collection point was the mobilization area where they were fight from, i.e. in this scenario the mobilization point is in Galicia, where men earmarked for the 4th army assembled around Rawa Ruska as their mobilization area and jump off point.
Norman Stone in "The Eastern Front 1914-1917" mentions it in passing, as IIRC does Hew Strachan in 'To Arms'.

And this brings us to another question. Surely A-H had a War Plan for Italy? It is not much of a stretch to see a war in the Balkans bringing in Italy. Some of the forces dedicated to Russia would have to go to the Italian border. Why is the plan so inflexible OTL. Germany pretty much knew it would always fight both France and Russia at the same time, so it planned based on that assumption. A-H could end up in a solo war with Italy or Serbia (at least it thought) or Russia. Or even in a war with Hungary. But its plans seem so inflexible. Even with the other mistakes of WW1, it is hard to see how A-H prewar Plans assume it can fight a war against Serbia and not fight Russia. And these things were not secrets. Mahan writes a book in 1908 that correctly aligns who will go to what side, excluding the Ottomans who he did not consider.
Yes it had an Italian war plan. IIRC it only posited fighting Italy by itself. I think there was enough flexibility in the Serbia war plan to allow for fighting Italy too, though defensively.
A-Hs war plan pretty much was as you suggest: it allowed it to fight either Serbia alone or Russia and Serbia together.

The problem is that Conrad was an idiot. He knew that Russia was going to come into the war, but went to fight Serbia first anyway. Then when Russian mobilized he was caught flat-footed. He even tried to avoid declaring war in August after Germany had already declared, even though it was already apparent that Russia was going to attack A-H no matter what.
AH war plans pretty much assumed Russia was going to fight and in that case that it would be a Russia first strategy...the only problem was that Conrad thought he could dismiss all previous planning on the subject and get away with a limited war. But he had the chronic problem of ignoring reality for his fanciful imagined scenarios.

http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-16531423.html
 
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Deleted member 1487

http://books.google.com/books?id=sY9Pn3urkQ4C&pg=PA1#v=onepage&q&f=false
@BlondieBC
I edited some info in my last post about mobilization, but the above book describes the A-H mobilization procedure in great detail, as the 1880s scheme that General Beck devised remained in effect in 1914, as it cut over a week off of the previous mobilization scheme, which did exactly what you describe: mobilize and then transport. Instead Beck adopted a territorial mobilization scheme whereby where you lived after military service determined what unit you were in, so men in reserve could be transported directly from their homes by the nearest rail station directly to the battlefront (IIRC they kept their equipment at home and once a year turned out for drill). I have to see if I can find my copy and get more details for the mobilization scheme.

Edit:
All European armies operated on this system by 1900.
Basically there were designated corps areas wherein all the men living there would serve in that corps in the event of war. Of their equipment and supplies were based there, including horses and artillery, so that it can all be transported to mobilization/jump off area together very quickly. In the WW1 era European militaries had small units of active personnel around which reservists would be added to form divisions and corps; the difference between the active and reserve corps in the German army for instance was the amount of reservists to active personnel, as both types had both active duty and reservists personnel.
A-H was a bit different in that there was no difference between active or reserve units. There were so few active personnel thanks to the Hungarian filibuster of military expansion that all units had equal amounts of reservists to active duty troop ratios.

Below is a map of corps areas. The red numbers are the regiments in that corps. Note that this is only for the combined army; the Landwehr and Honved had similar system superimposed on this one.
Corps_of_Austria-Hungary.jpg
 
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Regarding a war plan against Italy, well sure it exist...expecially under Conrad but very few in Vienna thinked that they need to use it, basically all their negotiations for italian neutrality were based on the assumption that Italy will not enter the war against them in any case...i don't really know if this was more due to faulty analysys or wishfull thinking run amok
 

Deleted member 1487

Interesting - subscribed

What happened in the West?

Same so far.

Regarding a war plan against Italy, well sure it exist...expecially under Conrad but very few in Vienna thinked that they need to use it, basically all their negotiations for italian neutrality were based on the assumption that Italy will not enter the war against them in any case...i don't really know if this was more due to faulty analysys or wishfull thinking run amok
I think he was just asking whether or not there were other war plans besides Serbia and Russia just to gauge the flexibility of A-H war planning.
Conrad was definitely obsessed with crushing Italy, pathologically so. Everyone else thought he was insane, which was the major reason he was close to being replaced when FF was assassinated; Franz was looking for a replacement when he died.
 
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abc123

Banned
Wiking, you are goeing from a wrong presumption here. That A-H will not attack Serbia with strongest force they can assemble and that they will sit on defensive positions there is just about as likely like USA after 9/11 park 2-3 aircraft carriers in Indian Ocean, few thousand troops in Pakistan and then sit there waiting for some imaginary invasion of Talibans from Afghanistan into Pakistan or wherever...

That would be a political and PR disaster. The whole point of the war ( from A-H's point of view, not German point of view ) was to punish Serbia. Sarajevo assasination was the most important event in convincing both domestic and foreign public that A-H must attack Serbia. If A-H knew for certain that Russia will attack, they would most probably not declared war to Serbia, even with German care blanche. The whole point of carte blanche was to deterr Russia from interferring.
 

Deleted member 1487

Wiking, you are goeing from a wrong presumption here. That A-H will not attack Serbia with strongest force they can assemble and that they will sit on defensive positions there is just about as likely like USA after 9/11 park 2-3 aircraft carriers in Indian Ocean, few thousand troops in Pakistan and then sit there waiting for some imaginary invasion of Talibans from Afghanistan into Pakistan or wherever...
Pre-war planning was based on the fact that Russia would intervene in any war A-H had with Serbia. The situation is very little like going after the Taliban, because the Black Hand was actually the intelligence organization of a modern nation-state with great power backing, which was further backed by an alliance with other great powers. The US did not have a power of equal or greater strength telling them a world war would result from their invasion of Afghanistan.

There was no illusion that the fate of Serbia would be decided on the Vistula, not the Drava. Russia was coming not matter what if A-H decided to handle the Serbs, so it was infinitely wiser to plan on fighting in Galicia first to get a free hand to take on Serbia. What's the point of invading Serbia only to lose against Russia?
As it was the A-Hs pretty much took all of the troops that were to invade Serbia and shipped them to Galicia the second they stepped off the train in the Balkans, meaning that IOTL the troops that I'm suggesting head directly for Galicia don't that the costly detour.

That would be a political and PR disaster. The whole point of the war ( from A-H's point of view, not German point of view ) was to punish Serbia. Sarajevo assasination was the most important event in convincing both domestic and foreign public that A-H must attack Serbia. If A-H knew for certain that Russia will attack, they would most probably not declared war to Serbia, even with German care blanche. The whole point of carte blanche was to deterr Russia from interferring.
The nice part about living in the closet thing to an absolute monarchy outside of the Russian Empire is that the media is totally controlled by the government. They can put out whatever narrative about events they want and get the media to print it. As it was the government decided on war and whipped the public into a frenzy for it, not the other way around. It took over a month to draft an ultimatum to Serbia and then go to war over it. Attacking Serbia isn't necessary if Russia is in the war. They can just as justifiably defend Galicia from the greater threat than invade Serbia when Russia is mobilizing against them.
There was no illusion about Russia coming in the war to support Serbia in Austrian political circles, just in Conrad's mind. He did seem to think that the Russians would sit the war out and he could quickly deal with Russia, but part of the problem is that he didn't wait to get clarification first.
Here he is just waiting to see how Russia would react to the initial mobilization, as he'd lose just a few days by waiting to see the Russian reaction to the mobilization of Minimal Group Balkan and the shelling of Belgrade.
If they didn't mobilize, then he could mobilize Staffel-B and invade; if they did, then he would send Staffel-A and -B to Galicia. There is nothing politically dangerous about waiting a few extra days to see if an existential threat materializes and then reacting accordingly.
Here Conrad is counselled to wait until clarification is received about Russia, i.e. that Germany's blank check is actually a deterrent, before preceding. Its not assuming that Russia would intervene or that the blank check wouldn't work, but simply making sure it did before committing forces in a way that could lead to the total defeat of your army and the destruction of your nation.

I assume ITTL the "sane" decision was taken: deal with the biggest threat first - crush them serbs later
Its not even a matter of that, but rather waiting to see if the deterrent to the biggest threat works before committing the necessary troops. Once its clear that the Russians aren't backing down, then Serbia becomes a secondary objective to the existential threat mobilizing on your border. A-H decided to roll the dice by declaring war on Serbia IOTL knowing full well that Russia could and probably would declare war; the German blank check was the only hope of getting Russia to back down, but not a guarantee, as both Berlin and Vienna well knew. Its just makes more sense to make sure that you are not misallocating your forces before giving orders, which was entirely dependent on waiting to see what Russia does.
 

abc123

Banned
Fine, if the war with Russia was inevitable, than why Willy-Nicky corespodence and all efforts of various countries to keep this war contained? Why didn't Germany and A-H attacked Russia and France on July 28th, why bother with Serbia?
 

Deleted member 1487

Fine, if the war with Russia was inevitable, than why Willy-Nicky corespodence and all efforts of various countries to keep this war contained? Why didn't Germany and A-H attacked Russia and France on July 28th, why bother with Serbia?

They didn't want the war to expand of course, because why fight an Europe-wide war when you want to crush Serbia? Of course it was fully logical to expect Russia to threaten war and potentially mobilize, but that isn't guaranteed. They had to try and contain it to a regional war in the Balkans, but be prepared in case it didn't, which they were, at least mentally, otherwise they wouldn't have risked war with Serbia in the first place.
Also it takes time to mobilize forces, so no one could attack anyone else until they mobilized.
 

abc123

Banned
Also, A-H was not absolute monarchy, not even close to that... It is a illusion to think that because FJ didn't ask for DoW in Parliament he didn't need nobody's approval for such descision, at least from Tisza, but from Austrian Minister-President too.
And Government there had no more control over media there than any modern European/American Government has over their medias... But sometimes that media had the same goals like their government...
 

abc123

Banned
They didn't want the war to expand of course, because why fight an Europe-wide war when you want to crush Serbia? Of course it was fully logical to expect Russia to threaten war and potentially mobilize, but that isn't guaranteed. They had to try and contain it to a regional war in the Balkans, but be prepared in case it didn't, which they were, at least mentally, otherwise they wouldn't have risked war with Serbia in the first place.
Also it takes time to mobilize forces, so no one could attack anyone else until they mobilized.

Absolutly, but that's what I'm telling you, they wanted to show the world ( and to the public opinions in Russia, France, UK- when I say public opinion, it might mean public opinion in UK/France, but it can also mean important descision-makers in Petersburg ) that this is a police action against the Serbs ( terrorists and murderers of royalty ) not just an excuse to start WW1. If they declare war to Serbia, but then do not attack Serbia, but concentrate the bulk of their Army in Galicia, what do you think that Nicky will think about that fact?
 

Deleted member 1487

Also, A-H was not absolute monarchy, not even close to that... It is a illusion to think that because FJ didn't ask for DoW in Parliament he didn't need nobody's approval for such descision, at least from Tisza, but from Austrian Minister-President too.
And Government there had no more control over media there than any modern European/American Government has over their medias... But sometimes that media had the same goals like their government...

I didn't say that it WAS an absolute monarchy, but was as close as Europe had outside of Europe. The Reichsrat had been disbanded for years by 1914 and Hungary was a full on oligarchy run by the Hungarian nobility. So there were two powerful oligarchies in charge of each half of the empire, as neither was really run by just one person, but rather a group around the leader, one elected in Hungary, the other born in Austria.
The Austrian oligarchs had been set on war for years, as Franz Josef was pretty much a non-factor for years in decision making, while Franz Ferdinand had been the peace candidate and increasingly the decision maker. Tisza was pretty much supportive of war, but needed assurances that Transylvania would be protected from Romania in case of war there, which caused much of the hold up until the Romanian monarch signaled his intent to stay neutral. Then Tisza was all for squishing Serbia even if it meant war with Russia.

A-H media was tightly censored even pre-war by the government, which only got much worse once the war started. A-H censorship was worse than just about any state West of Russia. Of course at that time most of Europe had censorship laws being enforced, which only got worse once the war started.

Absolutly, but that's what I'm telling you, they wanted to show the world ( and to the public opinions in Russia, France, UK- when I say public opinion, it might mean public opinion in UK/France, but it can also mean important descision-makers in Petersburg ) that this is a police action against the Serbs ( terrorists and murderers of royalty ) not just an excuse to start WW1. If they declare war to Serbia, but then do not attack Serbia, but concentrate the bulk of their Army in Galicia, what do you think that Nicky will think about that fact?
I think you are missing the point of what I am saying. A-H is mobilizing MG-B and shelling Belgrade in preparation for conflict; they are just delaying the mobilization of the rest of the invasion force for a few days to get clarification about the Russian position, because it is still very unclear as to whether they were going to declare war. If Staffel-B is sent south before its clear that the German intimidation worked, then very bad things happen, just like IOTL. A few days delay won't make a difference to the military plan against Serbia, but a quick mobilization followed by the Russians declaring war would be much worse.

So here I have Conrad waiting a few days only to see Russia mobilize, which causes him to instead focus his mobilization in Galicia instead; when Russia mobilized IOTL he had already started mobilization to Serbia, but hadn't gotten even a single man yet to the Serbian border when Russian mobilized, yet immediately cancelled his plan to invade Serbia with Staffel B; by that point it was too late to cancel the Serbian mobilization, so he had to wait until they mobilized in southern Hungary before he could then ship them to Galicia, meaning they didn't invade Serbia anyway and the Serbian invasion was pretty much called off but for Oskar Potiorek invading anyway because it was his fault FF was assassinated.

So IOTL Conrad was not worried about public opinion when Russia entered the war, he cancelled the Serbian invasion and moved into Galicia. The difference is that here Conrad has a bit of caution instilled by his mentor, so he holds back from his natural urge to jump in with both feet and avoids second guessing himself and screwing up mobilization.
 
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