Hidetsugu administration of China

chornedsnorkack · Nov 2, 2012

Is this Before 1900 or Alien Space Bats?

Anyway, it is from a real, official source. Text presented at:
figal-sensei.org/hist108/Text/er/hideyoshi.pdf
page 2.

The adressee (called "Your Lordship") is Toyotomi Hidetsugu, then (at the time of writing, summer 1592) 24 year old.
Salient points:

Originally written by Toyotomi Hideyoshi said:
1) Your Lordship must not relax preparations for the campaign. The departure must be made by the First or Second Month of the coming year.

Meaning early 1593.

Originally written by Toyotomi Hideyoshi said:
2)The Capital of Korea fell on the second day of this month. Thus, the time has come to make the sea crossing and to bring the length and breadth of Great Ming under our control. My desire is that Your Lordship make the crossing to become the Civil Dictator of Great China.

What was Hidetsugu´s position in China going to be as the nephew and heir of Hideyoshi, between 1593 and 1598?

(Items 3 to 17 are military planning of the campaign)

Originally written by Toyotomi Hideyoshi said:
18) Since His Majesty is to be transferred to the Chinese capital, due preparation is necessary. The imperial visit will take place the year after next. On that occastion, ten provinces adjacent to the Capital shall be presented to him. In time instructions will be issued for the enfeoffment of all courtiers. Subordinates will receive ten times as much as their present holdings. The enfeoffment of those in the upper ranks shall be according to their personal qualifications.

The Emperor of Japan was to be moved to Beijing, permanently, in 1594.
The courtiers were to be enfeoffed.
The whole Japan had been surveyed as 18 million koku by Hideyoshi. Ming China had at the time a population of about 150 millions.

How big were the present holdings of the courtiers in Japan, as of 1592?

Originally written by Toyotomi Hideyoshi said:
19) The post of Civil Dictator of China shall be assigned, as aforementioned, to Hidetsugu who will be given 100 provinces adjacent to the Capital. The post of Civil Dictator of Japan will go to either the Middle Counsellor Yamato or to the Bizen Minister, upon declaration by either of his readiness.

Ming China did not have 110 "provinces" - there were 13. Hideyoshi must have meant some other level of administrative divisions. Which ones? "Counties" (about 1500 in China) or some intermediate ones, like prefectures?

If Hidetsugu was to be the Civil Dictator of the entire China, but receive just 100 counties adjacent to the Capital as his own fief, what was to be done to the rest of the length and breadth of Great Ming? What were the Toyotomi plans for the centralized bureaucratic administration of Ming China? (The Qing would take it over as going concern - only some of China was enfeoffed to Three Feudatories, and nothing to Manchu princes or generals.)

Who were "Middle Counsellor Yamato" and "Bizen Minister"?

How were the relationships between Toyotomi Hideyoshi, his heir Hidetsugu as "Civil Dictator of China" and whoever was ready to be "Civil Dictator of Japan" going to be between 1593 and 1598?

Falecius · Nov 2, 2012

Fascinating. Sounds like the Toyotomis had absolutely no clue about sort of things as what China's like.

Richter von Manthofen · Nov 2, 2012

No surprise this is

TL sounds interesting...

democracy101 · Nov 2, 2012

Aside from the fact that Japan would almost certainly be unable to conquer China, it would have difficulties with Korea. The issue was not whether it could be conquered, as this briefly occurred within the first year of the war, but whether it could be retained for a significant amount of time.

democracy101 said:
The Ming did help somewhat, but Korean resistance and strategies were the main reason for Japan's failure. Of course, the fact that the Japanese essentially overran the entire peninsula within a year or so suggests that the Koreans were initially extremely unprepared, but the situation started to reverse as time went on.

In numerical terms, at their heights, the Japanese numbered around 250,000, while the Koreans and Chinese put together was about 200,000, of which the former consisted of roughly 150,000 troops. However, in almost all individual battles, the Koreans (and later Chinese, who joined two years after the initial invasion with only a token force) were heavily outnumbered, and even though the Japanese quickly overran most fortifications, the Koreans managed to efficiently use their knowledge of the geography in order to conduct guerrilla warfare. There were also several cases of fortifications, often not supplied by the government, holding out for several days or weeks, even though the ones inside were heavily outnumbered, which tied up Japanese divisions for prolonged periods of time. Throughout the conflicts (two invasions), the Koreans also managed to develop new technologies and methods in order to counter the Japanese, which I will not specifically mention here.

In addition, the navy was also a major factor, although it was more about the army (often self-supplied) and navy working together. In their rush to head north, because the Japanese failed to advance into Jeolla, which was in the southwest portion of the peninsula, the Korean navy was able to resupply there and cut off Japanese supplies from reaching their destination in the north. Also, a lot of emphasis has been put in the fact that Yi Sun-shin often engaged his enemies when he was vastly outnumbered (25:1 in the Battle of Myeongnyang), suffered no defeats, lost virtually no ships, and suffered very few casualties throughout the entire conflict. However it's also highly likely that another admiral could have utilized the geography in order to carry out similar tactics, although he would have probably not been as successful as Yi. In other words, although Japan could have temporarily set up a puppet government if they were somehow successful, they would have to eventually withdraw from the peninsula within 1-5 years due to the combination of tactics both used by the army and navy, and not necessarily because of Ming intervention.

mikegold · Nov 2, 2012

Is a Toyotomi conquest of China ASB, or just wildly unlikely?

If the latter, assume that everything goes Hideyoshi's way. Korea and at least Northern China are conquered and held for at least a generation The Tenno and the Shogun relocated from Kyoto to Beijing.

What does the resulting empire look like? How long can it last? How do the constituent nations develop if and when it falls?

chornedsnorkack · Nov 2, 2012

Remember that Great Ming fell like a house of cards after 1644. And not to pieces, at least for long. By Spring 1647, Qing controlled the whole China except for Koxinga´s fleet on the coast and the mountainous southwest. For comparison, the Mongols had needed 68 years to conquer China from Beijing to Guangzhou.

Dorgon, in 1643, ruled a weaker and less civilized realm than Toyotomi in 1591. But the Ming, in 1643, also had some problems they did not yet have in 1593. Such as Li Zicheng.

mikegold · Nov 2, 2012

chornedsnorkack said:
Remember that Great Ming fell like a house of cards after 1644. And not to pieces, at least for long. By Spring 1647, Qing controlled the whole China except for Koxinga´s fleet on the coast and the mountainous southwest. For comparison, the Mongols had needed 68 years to conquer China from Beijing to Guangzhou.

Dorgon, in 1643, ruled a weaker and less civilized realm than Toyotomi in 1591. But the Ming, in 1643, also had some problems they did not yet have in 1593. Such as Li Zicheng.

But I think the critical factor may be the difference between a semi-nomadic tribe capable of absorbing itself, to an extent, into Chinese culture, and a settled if highly martial empire in a self-contained geographic area. It's a lot harder - maybe not impossible, but harder - to graft Japan into China than Machuria or Mongolia into China.

democracy101 · Nov 2, 2012

chornedsnorkack said:
Remember that Great Ming fell like a house of cards after 1644. And not to pieces, at least for long. By Spring 1647, Qing controlled the whole China except for Koxinga´s fleet on the coast and the mountainous southwest. For comparison, the Mongols had needed 68 years to conquer China from Beijing to Guangzhou.

Dorgon, in 1643, ruled a weaker and less civilized realm than Toyotomi in 1591. But the Ming, in 1643, also had some problems they did not yet have in 1593. Such as Li Zicheng.

Yes, but the Japanese invasion of Korea and the Qing's conquest of the Ming were carried out in different situations. Before 1592, neither the Ming nor Joseon had invested resources into conducting significant military expeditions for about a century, and they were able to raise a sizable amount of troops, either through or independently of the government, within a year or so. Relatively speaking, both states were stable, although Seonjo was briefly forced to flee north when the capital was temporarily captured.

On the other hand, both states were still in turmoil when the Manchus invaded, as both had invested heavily in resources so that they could fight off the Japanese, while the Koreans were still struggling to recover. The Manchus first invaded Korea in 1627, only four years after Gwanghaegun had been overthrown in a coup, causing political instability among the court. By the second invasion, the Joseon court agreed to pledge allegiance to the Qing, which let the Manchus focus solely on invading China soon after. Meanwhile, widespread rebellions broke out in China by the 1630s due to harsh climatic conditions, hampering the Ming's ability to confront the Manchus directly.

In terms of the Mongols taking 68 years to take over China Proper, the area was ruled by the Jin and the Song at the time, so they had to take over two states, not one. In addition, they initially confronted Goryeo in 1231, but it was not until 1259, after seven campaigns, that the court was allowed to surrender after the military regime fell apart, and the last significant resistance occurred from 1970-3. One of the reasons for the consistent Mongol invasions was the fear that Goryeo and the Song would ally with each other, and that Goryeo would disrupt supply routes or harass the Mongol troops when they attempted to attack China. Aside from border conflicts, for more than a century, neither Goryeo nor the Song had conducted campaigns which drained the treasury, so both were thoroughly prepared to resist the Mongols for decades.

scholar · Nov 2, 2012

Its actually easier to conquer a divided nation than a united one, especially one so poorly administrated as the Southern Song and the Southern Ming.

A way for this scenario to happen, assuming that the end result is a Japanese administration controlling part or all of china, requires a little bit of a "too lucky" streak. The Mongols, Manchus, Babur of the Timurids, the Ottomans, Portual/Spain, France, and later Great Britain all benefited from the 'too lucky' streak.

However its not ASB levels, not if smartly written and the scenario favors it. We just need to lay down some factors:

Famine (wide-spread)
Civil War (long lasting)
Revolts of peasantry and nobility (common in any dynastic change)
External Conflict (nomads)
Fragmented Empire (other dynastic states existing side by side)
Weak and effectual government (common)
Corruption

This makes China capable of falling to anyone with will, manpower, and luck; but there's more to it than that.

Japanese must support the scholar-gentry
Japanese must support, and even present themselves, as Confucian
Japanese must restore order in the lands that they hold
Japanese Must present themselves as a continuation of the dynastic cycle, otherwise hope is lost
Japanese shift of governance to the mainland of china is mandatory

In other words, the Japanese conquer must present himself as Emperor of China and use the forces of china such as its massive armies, its scholar gentry, and the very tenants of its bureaucracy to support its rule. No state has conquered china without this, even the Mongols won using Chinese generals from the scholar-gentry using Chinese armies, and Kublai was a little obsessed with Chinese culture.

democracy101 · Nov 2, 2012

scholar said:
Its actually easier to conquer a divided nation than a united one, especially one so poorly administrated as the Southern Song and the Southern Ming.

Well, that's contradicting OTL, as it took the Mongols 44 years to conquer the Song, even though they had adopted borrowed numerous tactics from the Chinese. If the Chinese government is relatively stable, and willing to resist to the end, then a weak one can still hold out for an extended period of time, which will drain the invader's resources. However, this is assuming the absence of other factors, such as famine, revolts, or a fragmented China.

Also, Korea is a major factor, as both the Mongols and Manchus subdued Korea before reunifying China. In contrast, the Khitan failed to conquer Goryeo after three costly campaigns, and while the Jurchen maintained cordial relations with the latter, they never attempted to invade it.

scholar · Nov 2, 2012

democracy101 said:
Well, that's contradicting OTL, as it took the Mongols 44 years to conquer the Song, even though they had adopted borrowed numerous tactics from the Chinese. If the Chinese government is relatively stable, and willing to resist to the end, then a weak one can still hold out for an extended period of time, which will drain the invader's resources. However, this is assuming the absence of other factors, such as famine, revolts, or a fragmented China.

Its not contradicting. Times of dynastic change are never really quick unless its an internal one. Unless the people and government is spent, it takes time. The Southern Song was a weak government, but the Khanate didn't wage continuous war with it. They actually made peace a number of times and were held back more so by the terrain and the common person than standing armies. Xiangyang and its twin resisted years of siege with little support from the main government because of the advanced layout of the castle walls. The Chinese themselves from the north succumb to sickness and plague in the south with the change in seasons, its commonly found everywhere in OTL. Its why states tend to form on north-south divides.

China defends itself regardless of its administration, and china tends to conquer itself no matter who is at the helm of the northern armies.

Also, Korea is a major factor, as both the Mongols and Manchus subdued Korea before reunifying China. In contrast, the Khitan failed to conquer Goryeo after three costly campaigns, and while the Jurchen maintained cordial relations with the latter, they never attempted to invade it.

In the first Northern and Southern Dynastic period after the fall of the Han Korea was divided and conquered by the Chinese, but subsequently rose up in independence and ruled with relative security though the north of China was swarmed with a great many nomadic states and dynasties. While I would agree that it is important, even more so in the case of Japan, I would not state that it is an impossibility.

chornedsnorkack · Nov 2, 2012

Note that although the Mongols faced externally disunited China, both pieces were internally united. Whereas Southern Ming had 5 claimants between 1644 and 1647.

democracy101 · Nov 2, 2012

scholar said:
Its not contradicting. Times of dynastic change are never really quick unless its an internal one. Unless the people and government is spent, it takes time. The Southern Song was a weak government, but the Khanate didn't wage continuous war with it. They actually made peace a number of times and were held back more so by the terrain and the common person than standing armies. Xiangyang and its twin resisted years of siege with little support from the main government because of the advanced layout of the castle walls. The Chinese themselves from the north succumb to sickness and plague in the south with the change in seasons, its commonly found everywhere in OTL. Its why states tend to form on north-south divides.

China defends itself regardless of its administration, and china tends to conquer itself no matter who is at the helm of the northern armies.

Yes, but my reasoning is that even if the government is inefficient in terms of corruption and administration, the state itself can still resist if there are strong independent troops willing to fight to the end, with the absence of the factors (for the defending state) that I stated earlier.

scholar said:
In the first Northern and Southern Dynastic period after the fall of the Han Korea was divided and conquered by the Chinese, but subsequently rose up in independence and ruled with relative security though the north of China was swarmed with a great many nomadic states and dynasties. While I would agree that it is important, even more so in the case of Japan, I would not state that it is an impossibility.

I'm ignoring anything before the fall of Balhae, as the Sui reunified China without invading Goguryeo. The Chinese never managed to conquer the entire peninsula because it was too fragmented and there was no particular reason for overrunning all of the statelets (Han), or the southern peninsular state was prepared to push China out (Tang).

scholar · Nov 2, 2012

democracy101 said:
Yes, but my reasoning is that even if the government is inefficient in terms of corruption and administration, the state itself can still resist if there are strong independent troops willing to fight to the end, with the absence of the factors (for the defending state) that I stated earlier.

True, which is why the invading state needs a laundry list of factors in its favor as well as a reconstruction of its own appearance to the chinese.

Do you have anything to add to my list of factors which could result in a japanese conqueror of at least part of china?

democracy101 said:
I'm ignoring anything before the fall of Balhae, as the Sui reunified China without invading Goguryeo. The Chinese never managed to conquer the entire peninsula because it was too fragmented and there was no particular reason for overrunning all of the statelets (Han), or the southern peninsular state was prepared to push China out (Tang).

Gongsun Kang had most of modern day Korea under his direct influence and their relationship to the Han could only be described as tributaries, and directly ruled a good portion of it. Gorguryeo resisted, but they were mostly outside of Korea proper at the time, and any resistance in the extreme south of Korea is too poorly documented in the English translations for me to be certain. That is, if you do not dismiss the idea that the Han never once touched Korea proper and that Gongsun Kang was actually a subordinate to Gorguryeo that is commonly being presented and I soundly reject. But, this is a minor quibble. One I suspect we may have had before?

democracy101 · Nov 2, 2012

scholar said:
True, which is why the invading state needs a laundry list of factors in its favor as well as a reconstruction of its own appearance to the chinese.

Do you have anything to add to my list of factors which could result in a japanese conqueror of at least part of china?

At a glance, your list looks fine, but I was just trying to present other additional viewpoints/requirements as well.

scholar said:
Gongsun Kang had most of modern day Korea under his direct influence and their relationship to the Han could only be described as tributaries, and directly ruled a good portion of it. Gorguryeo resisted, but they were mostly outside of Korea proper at the time, and any resistance in the extreme south of Korea is too poorly documented in the English translations for me to be certain. That is, if you do not dismiss the idea that the Han never once touched Korea proper and that Gongsun Kang was actually a subordinate to Gorguryeo that is commonly being presented and I soundly reject. But, this is a minor quibble. One I suspect we may have had before?

Chinese influence never expanded beyond the Lelang Commandery, as Goguryeo continuously raided the four commandaries and probably destroyed two of them within only 25 years. The Han, and later Gongsun Kang, probably only controlled about 1/4-1/8 of what is now North Korea. Meanwhile, the southern states were politically under Mahan, Jinhan, and Byeonhan's loose influences, and although some were influenced by the Chinese, they were never under its direct political control.

scholar · Nov 2, 2012

democracy101 said:
Chinese influence never expanded beyond the Lelang Commandery, as Goguryeo continuously raided the four commandaries and probably destroyed two of them within only 25 years. The Han, and later Gongsun Kang, probably only controlled about 1/4-1/8 of what is now North Korea. Meanwhile, the southern states were politically under Mahan, Jinhan, and Byeonhan's loose influences, and although some were influenced by the Chinese, they were never under its direct political control.

That's not right from my understanding, but I recognize that we won't reconcile on this one because of the various conflicting records and modern 'reassessment' of old records.

But the notion that it was only 1/8th of North Korea is almost as bad as the people saying he never invaded Korea at all.

democracy101 · Nov 2, 2012

scholar said:
That's not right from my understanding, but I recognize that we won't reconcile on this one because of the various conflicting records and modern 'reassessment' of old records.

But the notion that it was only 1/8th of North Korea is almost as bad as the people saying he never invaded Korea at all.

Well, no. Although the statelets in Korea were politically independent, and the Chinese probably had limited control beyond what is now Pyongyang, I certainly recognize that culturally speaking, the Han significantly influenced the various states within the peninsula. Borders also fluctuated over time.

Also, my point was that Korea as an entity becomes much more opaque before Balhae, which was why I was ignoring it previously. Although most of Goguryeo's territory was located in what is now Manchuria, there are very few people who consider it as a Chinese state, rather than a Korean one. Although "China Proper" certainly existed from around 221, after the Qin unified China, to the present, there is technically no such thing as "Korea Proper," as Goguryeo and Balhae possessed numerous similar cultural elements as those of the southern peninsular states, and (Southern) Manchuria could have been considered as culturally "Korean" at the time.