Japanese target oil farm

[SgtD]

Was wondering if there is a thread dedicated to alternate targeting by the Japanese in regards to PH?

The Japanese ignored the oil farm, repair facilities, sub pens ect. If they had targeted these facilities....how long does it take the U.S to refurbish PH?

I don't think an invasion of Oahu was feasable but certainly targeting these high values assets was...and I think the U.S would have been set back much further than they were with the actual targeting.

If thishas been beaten to death I apologize...just can't find a thread addressing it.

[Shaby]

Since the Japanese planned to finish their campaign and, they hoped the war, within 6 months, all they sought to achieve at PH was to cripple US battle fleet. That was the primary objective, since the fleet was seen to be the only impediment for the Japanese plans in the Western Pacific. They recognized the fact that if the war lasted any longer than six months, they were basically scr*wed regardless of anything they could do.

Regardless of this, they only had limited time to execute the attack. Nagumo, having fulfilled his primary task, dismissed the option to mount a third wave attack which he deemed unnecessary and highly risky endeavor. Pilots returning from the second wave already reported that US air defense was intensifying and that US forces were reeling from the initial shock and starting to respond. Preserve the fighting efficiency of his unit (the 1st Air Fleet) was of paramount importance, as it still had vital roles to play in the most important part of the campaign. Mounting the third wave of attacks at the moment would take some time (probably around two hours) and expose the carriers to counter attack by (as yet unaccounted for) US Navy carriers.

Hitting sub pens, oil tanks and repair facilities in PH would thus (even if possible) be deemed unnecessary, as by the time this fact became important, the Japanese hoped they would win the war.

[CalBear]

The oil farm was not quite the easy target that is often imagined. While not nearly as rugged as the system that was being drilled into the lava to replace it (a replacement that was invulnerable to conventional weapons until the introduction of PGM in the late 80s), each tank was bermed, which tended to reduce the "splash" that any single bomb could create as well as tending to contain fires caused when any individual tank was damaged.

The tank and repair facilities were also not going to be targeted until a third wave, a wave that would have arrived around 14:00 local time. By then the defenses were 100% snapped on (2nd wave pilots were stunned by the amount of AAA they encountered, something that would have been even worse by the mid afternoon), the sea state where the Kido Butai was operating was poor (the 2nd wave had a number of aircraft write-offs due to landing damage onto pitching decks), and any returning 3rd wave would be landing in early darkness. Repair facilities were also remarkably robust, frequently you could simply clear debris away and the machine tools were readily usable (something that demonstrated time and again by Speer's people during the Allied Bomber Offensive in the ETO). Dry dock required quite a bit of work to kill, and the bombing conditions, thanks to the major oil fires from the ships that had been sunk and the resulting smoke, were far from the near perfect ones that had existed at 08:00.

Lastly, and probably most importantly, is the fact that the attack was not designed to do more than what it had achieved, namely take the Pacific Fleet off the table. The goal was the battleships and carriers, with cruisers as bonus targets. Submarines did not even enter into the planning as bombing targets. The entire "3rd wave" myth is the result of 100% hindsight. Had the U.S. submarine campaign not been the remarkable success that it eventually became it would never have been invented.

The Japanese fully expected to have won the war by the Summer of 1942, they had no plans to, nor the desire for, an extended war against the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, a war that they would lose. The goal was to strike fast, land crippling blows against deployed forces, and present the Western nations with a fiat accompli. There was no need for an attack against the long term infrastructure since by the time it would come into play, the war would be over.

[SgtD]

I realize the objective was to target the fleet and knock it out so they could proceed unhindered with the southern operation...clear the flank so to speak.

I don't think it's hindsight to say that targeting the submaine pens, oil storage would have served the Japanese better than hitting the battlefleet.

All the Japanese would have had to do was take a hard look at what was going on in the Atlantic to realize the importance submarines could play.

The main reason for going to war in the first place was to attain oil/resources from the "southern" area. Since the reason to go to war was resources....why didn't they understand the importance of knocking out the Pacific Fleets oil supply?

The Japanese achieved their objective at PH but it was a missplaced objective. The value of PH was as a forward staging area....they didn't do anything to limit that value in their attack planning. They take out the oil reserves at PH and the Coral Sea/Midway probably don't happen....just saying. I'm not sure how long it would have taken the U.S to build oil reserves back at Pearl but I'd assume it'd take longer than 6 months.

Thanks for the responses.

[SgtD]

What got me on this subject is "Pearl Harbor:Verdict of History" by Gordan Prange (sp?) I'd been putting off reading it because I've read "At Dawn we slept" a coupletimes and thought it'd be redundant but it's ot....it's excellent reading.

Anyway, Kimmel prior to Dec 7 was on a short leash with the Pacific Fleet because he only had 7 fleet oilers so logisically speaking oil was already a problem for the country which at the time was an oil exporter....never came across the fleet oiler issue before. With the excellent intelligence network the Japanese ad out of their Honolulu consolate the IJN was well aware of the vulnerability of the tank farm. The IJN mindset towards the PH was flawed because they just didn't value the importance of logistics...ie even though they planned to take the resource rich "southern area" they never planned on how they would get those resources back to Japan. If they did theywould have realized their merchant fleet wasn't up to the task and would be extremely vulnerable.

I guess it is all hindsight but......the IJN had some smart dudes, but they really failed when it came to strategic planning.

[Elfwine]

Originally Posted by SgtD

I guess it is all hindsight but......the IJN had some smart dudes, but they really failed when it came to strategic planning.

This sums up the problem with the entire Japanese war effort, including China.

[BlondieBC]

Calbear assessment of bombing damage is accurate. Bombing the machine ships will be low value since the equipment survives and the men are probably either at the AA guns or in a bunker by then. You be better off bombing things like the hospital where you likely kill more soldiers. You can heavily damage the thank farm but as the Germans showed in Romania, these can be fixed. Once the fires burn out, you can bring in steel and build new tanks. And you don't burn the oil, you can repair the tanks. Much easier than say what they did to get the one BB upright. You will finish off some additional damaged ships and do other damage. All at the cost of losing irreplaceable experience pilots. Still, it probably would have been a good move, but not a hugely great move. Also remember than by killing the fuel hogs of the BB, you reduce the fuel needs of the fleet. And there is risk the IJN would lose a carrier. There is also a chance the USA would lose a carrier. I would not criticize Nagumo for either decision. War involve risks.

On submarines, the IJN was saw submarines as a warship for sinking warships. Unlike Germany and either war or the USN in WW2, the IJN did not focus on a merchant war. By Coral Sea, the USA fixes the tanks at Pearl. The fleet oilers are needed to fuel ships at sea and undeveloped anchorage. You could use a plain civilian tanker to fuel ships at Pearl, perhaps with a little extra port reconfiguration. The USA lacked the fuel at Pearl to run Plan Orange, but they also lacked other things.

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Originally Posted by SgtD

I realize the objective was to target the fleet and knock it out so they could proceed unhindered with the southern operation...clear the flank so to speak.

I don't think it's hindsight to say that targeting the submaine pens, oil storage would have served the Japanese better than hitting the battlefleet.

All the Japanese would have had to do was take a hard look at what was going on in the Atlantic to realize the importance submarines could play.

The main reason for going to war in the first place was to attain oil/resources from the "southern" area. Since the reason to go to war was resources....why didn't they understand the importance of knocking out the Pacific Fleets oil supply?

The Japanese achieved their objective at PH but it was a missplaced objective. The value of PH was as a forward staging area....they didn't do anything to limit that value in their attack planning. They take out the oil reserves at PH and the Coral Sea/Midway probably don't happen....just saying. I'm not sure how long it would have taken the U.S to build oil reserves back at Pearl but I'd assume it'd take longer than 6 months.

Thanks for the responses.

No, no, no!

Japan could not win an extended war with the US. If the oil tanks and other infrastructure at Pearl were to be significant, then Japan has already lost. The whole point of Pearl was to give the US a bloody nose and make the wimpy Americans back down. That was the only way Japan could win, and, well duh, guess what it didn't work.

As far as I can tell the Japanese war planning went something like this:
1) we need the Indies
2) the US is in the way
3) we've got to get the US out
4) so we give them a bloody nose and make them stand down.
5) this will work, because of Manifest Destiny (or something)

Your arguments only work if they were planning for an extended war. But they couldn't afford to fight an extended war - so it had to be short. So why bother damaging priceless resources like your aircrew to do something that's unnecessary?

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

I agree with Calbear’s assessment of the ease with which the tank farm could have been repaired. I would also note that the main United States repair facilities remained on the mainland. At worst you would be looking at a period of time, probably less than a year, when the Pacific Fleet would have operated from the West Coast rather than Pearl Harbor. So what would that have meant? First there would have been fewer nuisance raids since the distance to the Japanese occupied islands would have been greater. Since these were largely propaganda and training anyway this would not have altered the war much. Second, while the distance would have been longer the United States would still have moved to protect and support Australia. I would see Coral Sea playing out much the way it did. Third, there would not have been the Battle of Midway. If the Fleet was West Coast based the idea of an attack on Midway to lure out the remaining United States fleet doesn’t hold water. (Pun intended) I question whether the Combined Fleet had sufficient logistics to stage a Midway like attack on the West Coast. Certainly the landing force used for Midway would have been annihilated anywhere on the mainland, or for that matter Oahu. So with the Japanese carriers surviving the Solomon campaign would likely have been delayed but eventually there would have been a carrier battle. A year latter as the Essex and Independenceclass carriers are appearing the United States would have attacked and the Pacific Fleet would have had numerical superiority in carriers and planes. Remember it was ultimately the shear quantity that the United States could produce that determined the result.

[Glenn239]

SgtD writes,

What got me on this subject is "Pearl Harbor:Verdict of History" by Gordan Prange (sp?) I'd been putting off reading it because I've read "At Dawn we slept" a coupletimes and thought it'd be redundant but it's ot....it's excellent reading.

Historian Mike Wenger is working on the definitive PH account, and has been for about ten years or more. Look to it being out in a few years – by all accounts it’s going to be awesome. He posts over at Combined Fleet occasionally.

The Japanese ignored the oil farm, repair facilities, sub pens ect. If they had targeted these facilities....how long does it take the U.S to refurbish PH?

That depends on the scale of damage done and the resources committed to ‘fix’ it. In Europe, German targets of similar character tended to be pretty robust. Then again, these were well spread out inside a dense rail network. Not 2,000nm from the next major base, where space was at a premium. Generally, the BDA assessments given by others here look reasonable, providing that the fires did not get out of control.
Anything from 2 weeks to 6 months disruption might be possible.

Note that Genda's focus after the attack was on finding and sinking the carriers at sea, whereas your thinking is concentrated mainly on Pearl Harbor.

I don't think it's hindsight to say that targeting the submarine pens, oil storage would have served the Japanese better than hitting the battle fleet.

There were numerous planning mistakes made, and an over-emphasis on Battleship Row was one of them.

realize the objective was to target the fleet and knock it out so they could proceed unhindered with the southern operation...clear the flank so to speak

These were Nagumo’s minimal orders - he could have stayed if he wished. Combined Fleet had hoped for greater results if the tactical circumstanes warented, and when it became clear that the withdrawal was unjustified (at least in the opinion of Combined Fleet), this led to increased tensions between the two commands.

[Glenn239]

I question whether the Combined Fleet had sufficient logistics to stage a Midway like attack on the West Coast.

The general logistic requirements for that mission can be estimated. Seems improbable for operational reasons though.

[Herzen's love-child]

Originally Posted by Elfwine

This sums up the problem with the entire Japanese war effort, including China.

The effort part, not some of the thinking. Yamamoto, of course, for one, really didn't like Japan's chances of ultimately winning a war against the U.S. Even his best known but probably apocryphal quote, "I fear all we have done today is to awaken a great, sleeping giant", reflected his pessimism, even as he planned Japan's "best shots" at winning. Good minds were pinned down by nationalist militarist thinking that went so far as to issue death threats or worse, even to someone as imminent as Yamamoto.

[MattII]

What about stuff like the torpedo stores or dry docks? Those would have taken time to replace surely (and limited the US's option while being replaced)? Knocking out the city's power-plant might have had some interesting results too, since the Americans would have had to keep the battleships in port until the plant was repaired, and even that might not have been enough to keep the city from serious chaos.

[FlyingDutchman]

Originally Posted by Herzen's love-child

The effort part, not some of the thinking. Yamamoto, of course, for one, really didn't like Japan's chances of ultimately winning a war against the U.S. Even his best known but probably apocryphal quote, "I fear all we have done today is to awaken a great, sleeping giant", reflected his pessimism, even as he planned Japan's "best shots" at winning. Good minds were pinned down by nationalist militarist thinking that went so far as to issue death threats or worse, even to someone as imminent as Yamamoto.

Then maybe he shouldn't have threatened to resign if his idea of striking Pearl Harbor wasn't put into action?

Just like when he threatened to resign if his Midway operation wasn't put into action?

[SARCASM ON]
Another great idea from Isoroku Takano AKA Isoroku Yamamoto.
[SARCASM OFF]

Yamamoto's notorious quote "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant" is apparently not his, but made up by the screenwriters from 'Tora, Tora, Tora'. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku...ng_giant_quote
I wonder if in 50 years we all commemorate the brave Americans who stole an Enigma from U-571.

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Originally Posted by FlyingDutchman

I wonder if in 50 years we all commemorate the brave Americans who stole an Enigma from U-571.

Considering that we celebrate Lindberg as the first person to fly the Atlantic, probably.

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Originally Posted by Bob in Pittsburgh

I question whether the Combined Fleet had sufficient logistics to stage a Midway like attack on the West Coast.

Given that some of the IJN had like 3 hours fuel left, IIRC, when they made it back to Japan from Pearl, the idea of making the West Coast (assuming you don't mean Anchorage), is totally out of the question.

[Herzen's love-child]

Originally Posted by FlyingDutchman

Then maybe he shouldn't have threatened to resign if his idea of striking Pearl Harbor wasn't put into action?

Just like when he threatened to resign if his Midway operation wasn't put into action?

[SARCASM ON]
Another great idea from Isoroku Takano AKA Isoroku Yamamoto.
[SARCASM OFF]

Yamamoto's notorious quote "I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant" is apparently not his, but made up by the screenwriters from 'Tora, Tora, Tora'. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isoroku...ng_giant_quote
I wonder if in 50 years we all commemorate the brave Americans who stole an Enigma from U-571.

I did state the quote was probably apocryphal... Your same wiki source essentially restates what I was saying. So, ???

[CalBear]

Originally Posted by Glenn239

The general logistic requirements for that mission can be estimated. Seems improbable for operational reasons though.

Term is impossible. West Coast is a THOUSAND miles further from Japan than Oahu is and to get to Oahu the Japanese did things that were, quite literally, insane, up top and including deck loading fuel barrels on the hanger decks of carriers.

Operationally, it would have been suicide. The U.S. had hundreds of combat aircraft along the West Coat on December 7th, by mid 1942 it was thousands. When you add in the number of aircraft that could reach the West Coast within 12 hours (keeping in mind that many of the training bases for the U.S. were in Arizona, New Mexico, Texas and the Midwest) the potential strike force becomes truly daunting even when you take into account the relative skill levels of the air crews. The U.S. was patrolling heavily, out as far as 700 miles, in over lapping arcs, mainly looking for subs, but if you are looking for a sub, a carrier is fairly obvious.

700 miles out is about two days sailing from where the Japanese could reasonably launch an attack, especially considering that they would need to fuel their destroyers in order to allow then m to get in and out (remembering that destroyers never travel in a straight line& that they burn fuel fairly quickly when at speed, and when you are escorting a carrier in enemy waters you are always at speed). In two days the USAAF and USN could have every aircraft in the inventory that could carry a weapon throughout the CONUS, not to mention long range bombers from Oahu, Panama, Iceland and maybe even the small number deployed in the UK at one of the bases along the West Coast.

Sailing 4,300 miles to be sunk, likely before even reaching launch range of your target, is a really bad idea.

(BTW: Last time this was brought up someone mentioned the IO Raid. The Indian Ocean Raid sailed from Staring Bay, DEI. The round trip is less than the one way distance from Tokyo to Seattle or San Francisco.)

[mowque]

Originally Posted by CalBear

Term is impossible. West Coast is a THOUSAND miles further from Japan than Oahu is and to get to Oahu the Japanese did things that were, quite literally, insane, up top and including deck loading fuel barrels on the hanger decks of carriers.)

They really did that? That sounds crazy dangerous.

[ModernKiwi]

And in four words you have summed up Japan's war...