How Long Could America stay in Vietnam, with OTL Circumstances?

[Emperor Norton I]

This is not about a magic bullet scenario where Diem lives or Kennedy lives, or the Sino-Soviet war distracts resources from North Vietnam, or the US fully mobilizes for war, or where something was different in 1955, or anything like that.

With the original TL circumstances and pressures and problems all there, how long can the United States stay in Vietnam before it withdraws of its own accord or from overwhelming internal pressure? And what would the effects be in the United States and for Vietnam itself?

[Emperor Norton I]

I'd like to bump because I red-eye posted.

[M. Adolphe Thiers]

You maybe could see an Operation Linebacker III in 1975, but I'd put that as low since this isn't changing the circumstances of Watergate and the fall of Nixon. If ARVN is still resupplied by the US, then South Vietnam may limp along, but it depends on whether or not the Soviets get tired of the North Vietnamese and stop backing them after two failed invasions. Their war in Afghanistan is going to be a bigger issue for them.

[ModernKiwi]

Even if they somehow survive the 1975 invasion, Watergate plus Carter presidency = South Vietnam left to take their chances.

By 1975 the South Vietnamese didn't need US airstrikes so much as US ammunition supplies (neither of which they got). A resupply akin to that provided to Israel in 1973 gives them a pretty good chance of throwing back the 1975 invasion at the least. But a (say) 1977 invasion is going to be pretty much a repeat of the (OTL) 1975 one without US donated supplies.

[Dave Howery]

if the US is still in SV in 1975 (as in, still has troops there), would there be an invasion? I'd think not.
On the surface of it, there's nothing to keep the USA out of Vietnam... the anti-war protests that are so fondly remembered today, really weren't all that incredibly widespread or involving big sections of the public. The VC and the NVA certainly weren't winning in any real military way, although the US/SV troops weren't very effective in stopping their movement through the south either.
But internal pressures are the big problems. Nixon pretty much decided that he was going to get the US out of Vietnam, and I'm not really sure how you get past that. Even if he decides to stay the course, I think you have a major problem on the road ahead, due to the college exemption... basically, middle class and wealthy sons are going to college to avoid the draft, and the people heading off to war are composed too much of the poor and minorities. If this continues for even more years, then racial and poor/rich sectarianism is bound to grow. Cancelling the college exemption is just going to piss off everyone; the war is that unpopular...

[ModernKiwi]

The College exemption was removed back in the late 1960's.

The Viet Cong didn't exist anymore except in a theoretical way, all the battles of the 1970's were against NVA regulars.

[TxCoatl1970]

The big problem you confront past the Tet Offensive is that the US public turned against the war mostly due to the mixture of US casualties, seeing the VC and NVA running amok despite everything the US and allies could throw at them, and distrust of the official assurances of victory.

Never mind as you said Kiwi, the VC were wiped out as a military force and the NVA needed massive rebuilding afterwards. Finally, the Vietnam War ca 1970 was a conventional NVA vs US/ARVN conflict that Westy wanted to fight and the US military could readily whip the NVA.

By 1973, the US Congress and economic realities forced the US govt to assess whether further involvement in Vietnam was worth it.
Nixon had Watergate, the Yom Kippur war's aftermath, and other distractions from pushing further commitment to Vietnam.

Butterflying those distractions does a lot to increase what the US would be willing and able todo.
ALSO maybe Creightin Abrams got a lot more support and was able to Vietnamize the conflict by 1968 so the ARVN weren't quite as badly off.
As many have said, getting the ARVN sufficient ammo and air support in 1975 would've done a lot to convince the North Vietnamese that furtther invasions wouldn't work.

[Kidblast]

What's stopping the US from ending the draft and just using the regular army like they do today in Afghanistan?

[deathscompanion1]

Originally Posted by Kidblast

What's stopping the US from ending the draft and just using the regular army like they do today in Afghanistan?

Completely different animals


The Modern US army went through a gigantic effort in the late 70's and 80's to improve quality of life for soldiers build up morale and professionalism and restore the reputation of the forces in society.


The old army was no where near as popular or as well trained and equipped.

[Sam R.]

Originally Posted by Dave Howery

if the US is still in SV in 1975 (as in, still has troops there), would there be an invasion? I'd think not.

No, because I strongly suspect this would have legitimised and radicalised the US left to the point of continuous and acceptable bombing and assassination campaigns. It also would have required mobilisation, shut down Great Society and Space, and caused blue collar riots related to wages and inflation by 1974 at the latest.

There's a reason the US got out—its government establishment is not completely and utterly retarded.

* * *

Please do note that I'm not suggesting that Weather Underground II (Metereological Army Fraction?), or an imbecilic fraction of the Panthers, or one, two many Symbonese Liberation Armies would be in the least competent at changing the balance of class forces—but they would produce an escalating hysteric politics such as the Bonn government experienced and justify the sentiment of a large body of people moving towards armed action.

yours,
Sam R.

[Sam R.]

Originally Posted by ModernKiwi

The College exemption was removed back in the late 1960's.

The Viet Cong didn't exist anymore except in a theoretical way, all the battles of the 1970's were against NVA regulars.

Is there such a thing as an NVA irregular? How about NVA soldiers.

yours,
Sam R.

[ModernKiwi]

Ha hah! So called to distinguish them from the Viet Cong irregulars.

Originally Posted by Sam R.

No, because I strongly suspect this would have legitimised and radicalised the US left to the point of continuous and acceptable bombing and assassination campaigns. It also would have required mobilisation, shut down Great Society and Space, and caused blue collar riots related to wages and inflation by 1974 at the latest.

There's a reason the US got out—its government establishment is not completely and utterly retarded.

Mobilisation? Why? What possible need would there be for that?

A US that decided to keep forces in South Vietnam to ensure the continuation of the Paris Peace agreement needed only leave no more forces than were in South Korea. i.e. a tripwire that stated that an attack on South Vietnam is an attack on the US.

[Sam R.]

Originally Posted by ModernKiwi

Mobilisation? Why? What possible need would there be for that?

A US that decided to keep forces in South Vietnam to ensure the continuation of the Paris Peace agreement needed only leave no more forces than were in South Korea. i.e. a tripwire that stated that an attack on South Vietnam is an attack on the US.

The 1968 US deployed man-power crisis and the "forwards or backwards" ultimatum in relation to the on the ground mission. The "Forward" option required mobilisation to keep other obligations (Germany, Korea, Japan) intact. It is one of the key reasons for the wind-down.

The idea of trip-wire forces is in the same category as "forward," the wire was and will be tripped—the US will be obliged to mobilise to meet its deployment obligations.

It all feeds back into the homefront, and the US was in a stress position as bad as the Soviet Union placed itself with Afghanistan.

yours,
Sam R.

[ModernKiwi]

There was no man power crisis in 1968. I have no idea where you got that from. There was a refusal to put even more manpower into Vietnam which is completely different. The US was more than capable (and did) keep sufficient forces in place in Germany and Vietnam and still have more to spare for other interventions.

The whole point of a "trip wire" force is to prevent invasions like the 1975 one. You'll note that North Korea with a leadership vastly more nutty than that of North Vietnam has never tried it on for that very reason.

[Sam R.]

Originally Posted by ModernKiwi

There was no man power crisis in 1968. I have no idea where you got that from. There was a refusal to put even more manpower into Vietnam which is completely different. The US was more than capable (and did) keep sufficient forces in place in Germany and Vietnam and still have more to spare for other interventions.

The whole point of a "trip wire" force is to prevent invasions like the 1975 one. You'll note that North Korea with a leadership vastly more nutty than that of North Vietnam has never tried it on for that very reason.

So why didn't the US mobilise in 1968 to present the required manpower to go forwards? Mobilisation. A crude claim that popular dissent halted expansion in 1968 belies the US government's actual opinion of popular dissent—we can see such an opinion from the nature of the internal use of military and paramilitary force in the 1960s—public opinion was not a significant issue in any situation prior to mobilisation. And mobilisation would be significant for precisely the reason that the Korean war was a social tension.

The demand from US leadership in Vietnam was to put the United States on a war footing and seriously damage its economy during a year of social crisis after years of ongoing social crisis.

yours,
Sam R.

[ModernKiwi]

Yes there was a demand to put the US on a war footing, but it was not because there was a need for extra manpower, rather it was to make the general populace recognise that there was a war and to (rediculously optimistically in my opinion) get the general populace behind it.

The reasons that no further manpower was provided (that I have seen) were that it was recognised that if the existing forces couldn't do the job, then extra manpower would make no difference.

As it turned out, in terms of the unconventional guerilla war, 1968 was indeed the defining year. Following Tet, the VC were destroyed as a force and from that point onwards the war (necessarily so from a North Vietnamese perspective) became a much more conventional one. The subsequent draw down of US forces in Vietnam was in large part possible due to the defeat of these on the battlefield as well as the finishing of the VC.

All of which is largely irrelevent to a 1975 scenario which the original poster refers to. There would be no more need for mobilisation in 1975 to keep a single division (not even fully manned) in South Vietnam than there was to keep a similar division in South Korea.

[Sam R.]

Originally Posted by ModernKiwi

Yes there was a demand to put the US on a war footing, but it was not because there was a need for extra manpower, rather it was to make the general populace recognise that there was a war and to (rediculously optimistically in my opinion) get the general populace behind it.

I disagree with this. The structure of US forces required mobilisation due to the posture of numerous units which would have been required. I will accept that this isn't a "man power issue" such as in Germany in 1945; but, this is a man power issue in terms of the disruption and dislocation that mobilisation would have produced in the workforce and more importantly in civil society. As I noted above, I believe mobilisation would have justified the miniscule armed fragments of the US Left, and would have pulled the hysteric left-idealists towards armed struggle because of their demonstrated lack of materialist analysis. As in Germany. The General populace would react with the kind of latent horror seen in Korea, but justified by years of unrest. (This wouldn't necessarily be a left-wing reaction, of course, and in fact primarily wouldn't be. Blue collar draft dodging operated very differently to white collar draft dodging).

The reasons that no further manpower was provided (that I have seen) were that it was recognised that if the existing forces couldn't do the job, then extra manpower would make no difference.

I don't believe this to be an adequate supposition as it relies on the voiced intentions of the agents involved, voiced in a public atmosphere of dolchstosslegende. State agents are famously reluctant to admit the influence of mass movements, or the latent role of mass sentiment.

As it turned out, in terms of the unconventional guerilla war, 1968 was indeed the defining year. Following Tet, the VC were destroyed as a force and from that point onwards the war (necessarily so from a North Vietnamese perspective) became a much more conventional one.

I would challenge this on two points: Firstly, areas under "NFL"/PRG control continued to be formed and maintained. I am happy to admit that Tet-1 left the NFL gutted as an independent force, and entirely under the control of the VWP; but, to suggest that 1968 meant that the development of areas outside of SVN control ceased is ludicrous. Who were the executed PRG tax collectors if not part of the PRG, even if they came from northern VWP sources. Secondly, and more significantly, the NVA restocked NFL units with NVA replacements and continued them in similar functions to the prior units.

All of which is largely irrelevent to a 1975 scenario which the original poster refers to. There would be no more need for mobilisation in 1975 to keep a single division (not even fully manned) in South Vietnam than there was to keep a similar division in South Korea.

So what in the hell is the trip-wire threat in a sub-divisional unit that will make 1975 any different to the VWP's post-1968 line of General Offensive? Vietnam appears to be able to keep this up until the mid 1980s if the subsequent wars and humanitarian interventions are any measure of the reserve capacity for human suffering in Vietnamese society circa 1975. Further aerial bombardment is no deterrent.

yours,
Sam R.

[ModernKiwi]

Originally Posted by Sam R.

I disagree with this. The structure of US forces required mobilisation due to the posture of numerous units which would have been required. I will accept that this isn't a "man power issue" such as in Germany in 1945; but, this is a man power issue in terms of the disruption and dislocation that mobilisation would have produced in the workforce and more importantly in civil society. As I noted above, I believe mobilisation would have justified the miniscule armed fragments of the US Left, and would have pulled the hysteric left-idealists towards armed struggle because of their demonstrated lack of materialist analysis. As in Germany. The General populace would react with the kind of latent horror seen in Korea, but justified by years of unrest. (This wouldn't necessarily be a left-wing reaction, of course, and in fact primarily wouldn't be. Blue collar draft dodging operated very differently to white collar draft dodging).

There was no need for extra manpower. Full stop. So no need for mobilisation. The demand was (once again) due to a desire to get more involvement from the general public, not because there was a lack of boots on the ground anywhere where the US had military responsibilities.

Originally Posted by Sam R.

I don't believe this to be an adequate supposition as it relies on the voiced intentions of the agents involved, voiced in a public atmosphere of dolchstosslegende. State agents are famously reluctant to admit the influence of mass movements, or the latent role of mass sentiment.

I am not talking about the PoV of people post 1975 trying to justify anything. This was the point of view of people at the time. Which proved to be correct.

Originally Posted by Sam R.

I would challenge this on two points: Firstly, areas under "NFL"/PRG control continued to be formed and maintained. I am happy to admit that Tet-1 left the NFL gutted as an independent force, and entirely under the control of the VWP; but, to suggest that 1968 meant that the development of areas outside of SVN control ceased is ludicrous. Who were the executed PRG tax collectors if not part of the PRG, even if they came from northern VWP sources. Secondly, and more significantly, the NVA restocked NFL units with NVA replacements and continued them in similar functions to the prior units.

You make my point for me. The "VC" consisted entirely of ersatz units from the north. If the VC were such a force post 1968, please feel free to point out to me anyone who ended up on the post-unification politburo from the south who was part of the Viet Cong.

Originally Posted by Sam R.

So what in the hell is the trip-wire threat in a sub-divisional unit that will make 1975 any different to the VWP's post-1968 line of General Offensive? Vietnam appears to be able to keep this up until the mid 1980s if the subsequent wars and humanitarian interventions are any measure of the reserve capacity for human suffering in Vietnamese society circa 1975. Further aerial bombardment is no deterrent.

How many conventional invasions did the North start while US troops were on the ground in South Vietnam? (Answer is zero). If aerial bombardment is no deterrent, why was the 1973 invasion halted? Did they all get sore feet and decide spontaneously to go back home?

Capacity for suffering means bugger all in a conventional invasion when your bridges over which supplies come are broken and in the river and the port through which your supplies arrive are mined.

[Cook]

Have Abrams replace Harkins in 1964 instead of Westmorland; the wholly futile ‘search and destroy’ is never implemented and instead the strategy of ‘clear and hold’ is applied from the outset with a US commitment that never exceeds 50,000 backing the ARVN. With the ARVN strengthened and able to secure the regions from VC intimidation, the Communists would be unable to extract support for their ‘parallel administration’ and the local element of the guerrilla war would be reduced to nuisance value only. Without the locals providing support and intelligence, the North Vietnamese main army field forces efforts would be considerably less effective and would be dealt with primarily by the ARVN, backed by US and SEATO elements.

With US forces ‘providing support to South Vietnam in their struggle to resist Communism’ and never constituting the principal ground forces, American casualties would remain at a manageable level (seldom exceeding 1,500 dead in any year and more often well less than that ) and the political dimension would be almost completely different; Congress being unlikely to swing against the war and motivated to punish an ally in their fight against Nixon. Support for South Vietnam would just be accepted as an unexceptional part of the Cold War.

With the economic recovery of West and Asia the late 1970s and the concurrent decline in the Eastern Block, Soviet backing for the North would be declining just when the South’s could more afford to defend itself and the US could simultaneously provide more aid. The war would either end in negotiations that the North would through economic difficulties and no further Soviet support be forced to abide by or would continue at a greatly reduced nuisance level, the Communist regime using its efforts to ‘reunite’ the country as the basis of their legitimacy.

US forces are drawn down but remain, just as they do in Korea and Cam Ranh Bay remains one of the US navy’s largest overseas bases.