WWII PC/WI: Japan focuses on China only

[Rainbow Sparkle]

Is it possible that Japan could have focused only on China, rather than all of asia/the pacific, and if so, would having as much of the Japanese military being brought to bear on the Chinese be enough to give the Empire of the Rising Sun victory in China?* And if so, what might things be like afterwards

*Victory not necessarily meaning Japan crushes and conquers all of China.

[deathscompanion1]

Originally Posted by Rainbow Sparkle

Is it possible that Japan could have focused only on China, rather than all of asia/the pacific, and if so, would having as much of the Japanese military being brought to bear on the Chinese be enough to give the Empire of the Rising Sun victory in China?* And if so, what might things be like afterwards

*Victory not necessarily meaning Japan crushes and conquers all of China.

No.

The Japanese always gave China priority for ground forces the divisions they used in the pacific would not make a real difference.

Another problem is they NEEDED those resources they were running out of oil thanks to the american oil embargo and their currency reserves were almost depleted.

If they didnt invade south east asia their economy would have collapsed.

[Genmotty]

For that to happen the 'Advance South' Polcy should never gain traction.

The decision for the Advance South policy grew out of the IJN (Imperial Japanese Navy) fearing that the IJA (Imperial Japanese Army) was out of control in Manchuria and that they were gaining influence over the Diet ('public government') which would drag Japan into an unwinnable war with the Soviets and Chinese.

Hence the IJN believed it more sensible to hold Manchuria and avoid upsetting Russia and leave North China alone, and look south for territorial gains. This came in 1935 and 1936, long before the Marco Polo Bridge incident and Japan getting involved in fighting in China. Therefore it is a common myth that attacking south grew out of a need for resources for the army. The Navy and airforce being the main consumers of oil and strategic resources (naturally wanting them to sercure territories with these resources).

In 1938 the army forced the governments hand by giving the ultermatum that "a government more fitting to deal with national emergency was needed." The Navy alarmed at this move by the Army unilaterally took the decision to attack and occupy Hanan islands off South China and force their policy of attacking south through. From there, incidents at Shanghai and along the Tawain Gulf forced the IJA to come to the navys aid and so draw away resources from Manchuria, thus preventing a war against the Soviets.

The IJN using up Japans strategic reserve of oil, thus used their belligerancy to force the Diet and Japanese administration to accept that they would need to sercure the oil fields in the DEI, to which the Phillippines were nessicary to provide sercurity to this operation, and so an attack on the United States. The rest we can say is history.

--------------------------------------------

Without the Navy making its move the IJA would have most likely got as far as the Qingdao penisular and occupied a large region of North China as a given.

Whether or not the border skimishes in Manchuria blow up into a full sino-soviet war is an unknown, but a possibility.

In the case this does happen, Japan may loose a large section of north Manchuria, but eventually sue for peace and status quo with Russia.

In the case this doesn't happen, the Chinese theater will be a long and bloody war with an unknown outcome. It depends on 3rd parties backing either side. What can be safely assumed though is that if the navy doesn't orchastrate 'incidents' that require massive logistics shipping and naval patrol, Imperial Japan will be most likely beable to weather its oil shortages since it was the navy acting unilaterally that used the majority of Japanese oil, not the army forces.


Tl;dr
Its a tought call in the long run, you need to understand that 3rd parties involvement will reflect the long term results of the Chinese theater. The Soviet question is a relative unknown, and the whole POD depends on the navy not acting unilaterally to get themselves involved in army operations.

[Tyr]

as deathscompanion says they didn't really have a choice. They didn't want to attack the US, they didn't really have serious designs on American territory- just the occasional vague dream about the Phillipines but it was very minor.
The American embargo was hurting them hard though. They had to try and break it.

Though...assuming they don't try that...interesting times. I really don't know enough to comment on quite how they would bog down.

[WhatIsAUserName]

Originally Posted by Rainbow Sparkle

Is it possible that Japan could have focused only on China, rather than all of asia/the pacific, and if so, would having as much of the Japanese military being brought to bear on the Chinese be enough to give the Empire of the Rising Sun victory in China?* And if so, what might things be like afterwards

*Victory not necessarily meaning Japan crushes and conquers all of China.

This basically describes Japan's strategy from 1937 to 1940/1941 (whichever the year they invaded French Indochina) was. They tried to focus on China initially, and when they didn't have the resources to do so, they moved on to the rest of Asia.

[MattII]

Assuming a PoD after they moved on FI-C, how much would it have taken for the Americans to lift the embargo?

[Kome]

It requires a downsizing of the IJN's 30% budget several years before the war even starts, while giving the army a lot more money than they got historically.

But downsizing the IJN means giving up the idea of Japan becoming a great power, since at the time you could not be a great power if you didnt have a great navy. And that opens up a whole barrel of problems ranging from public protests to a Navy mutiny.

[Shaby]

Even without embargo, Japan had very little money to buy the resources she needed. Eventually they will get into situation where further war with China is impossible without access to resources. And those happen to be at hand. If only those Europeans could be moved away.

[Shaby]

Originally Posted by Kome

It requires a downsizing of the IJN's 30% budget several years before the war even starts, while giving the army a lot more money than they got historically.

But downsizing the IJN means giving up the idea of Japan becoming a great power, since at the time you could not be a great power if you didnt have a great navy. And that opens up a whole barrel of problems ranging from public protests to a Navy mutiny.

And they are a island country. They depend on their Navy for defence, just like Britain.

[sloreck]

Any Japanese war in China beyond what they had already grabbed in Manchuria will lead to the USA gradually tightening the financial and resource screws. Over a period of several years the USA applied financial and material limitations/restrictions on Japan that made it impossible for them to keep fighting a war (China or elsewhere) for much longer.

By late 1941 the Japanese had two choices: stop the war in China and settle for Manchuria or attack the US/UK/Dutch (and occupy the French) to seize the raw materials that they did not have money to buy &/or were not allowed to buy. The continuation of the war in China was the cause of the attack on the USA et al - had the USA not put severe restrictions of Japanese access to capital and restricted access to strategic material (essentially giving them a free hand in China) there would have been no Pearl Harbor.

[Rainbow Sparkle]

Seems all one really needs here than is a USA that's either more isolationist, or just really doesn't care about China.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by Rainbow Sparkle

Seems all one really needs here than is a USA that's either more isolationist, or just really doesn't care about China.

Probably. You would have to go at least as far back as 1932 and American involvement in the League of Nations committee headed by Lord Lytton that investigated the Mukden (or Manchurian) Incident. The United States was Isolationist only with respect to Europe; they were heavily involved in Asia with their colony of the Philippines and with major business investments in China. The United States policy for China was the ‘Open Door’ policy, opposition to the existing colonial trade concessions as well as any Japanese expansion into China which would naturally have cut the US out of the Chinese market. This suited the Kuomintang, who in the 1930s and ‘40s had a lobby group in Washington every bit as strong as the ‘Israeli lobby’ was accused of being in the 1990s.

But a United States that was disengaged from Asia, presumably exiting the Philippines in the 1920s and not allowing pro-KMT lobbying, would also have meant that S.E. Asia would be an even more inviting target for acquisition; the Japanese demand for strategic raw materials caused by the China war exceeded anything that they could acquire through trade with the United States even without restrictions, so the demand remains as long as the war in China does, and increases with Japanese success in China. At the same time, without Americans in the Philippines, the forces defending the resources of S.E. Asia are more than halved, making the urge to take by force what they cannot afford to buy that much stronger.

[MUC]

Is there a way to make the Japanese come to terms with the USSR (I know they hated each other in OTL), so they could get oil from them?
Or would this not be within the logistical capability of the USSR (they would have to ferry it by train to Vladivostok, right?)?

[Henriksson]

Originally Posted by MUC

Is there a way to make the Japanese come to terms with the USSR (I know they hated each other in OTL), so they could get oil from them?
Or would this not be within the logistical capability of the USSR (they would have to ferry it by train to Vladivostok, right?)?

Presumably Uncle Joe would want to get paid, and the Japanese don't exactly have a lot of money available.

[Genmotty]

Originally Posted by MUC

Is there a way to make the Japanese come to terms with the USSR (I know they hated each other in OTL), so they could get oil from them?
Or would this not be within the logistical capability of the USSR (they would have to ferry it by train to Vladivostok, right?)?

That would be very difficult to come to pass. The Japanese had a well founded belief in their supiriority over the Russians, and had claims on their territories. This means to get the Japanese to support a consolodation movement would be very difficult.

However apart from some small oil reserves, North Manchuria and that region of Siberia doesn't have a lot of solid resource reserves known about at that time. So its not a winner, since really any trade is being exported from central or western Russia.

Any Japanese war in China beyond what they had already grabbed in Manchuria will lead to the USA gradually tightening the financial and resource screws. Over a period of several years the USA applied financial and material limitations/restrictions on Japan that made it impossible for them to keep fighting a war (China or elsewhere) for much longer.

By late 1941 the Japanese had two choices: stop the war in China and settle for Manchuria or attack the US/UK/Dutch (and occupy the French) to seize the raw materials that they did not have money to buy &/or were not allowed to buy. The continuation of the war in China was the cause of the attack on the USA et al - had the USA not put severe restrictions of Japanese access to capital and restricted access to strategic material (essentially giving them a free hand in China) there would have been no Pearl Harbor.

This is true to a point, but only in terms of the navy really.


What we have to remember is that a large proportion of the supplies and equipment for the IJA was coming out of industry in Manchuria. The oil and high grade steel that Japan really needed to import came from overseas. These resources were mainly used by the navy, not the army forces.

Because of the actions by the IJN in getting involved at Shanghai, Hanan and along the Taiwan gulf, vast amounts of shipping had to be sent to keep the IJA troops fighting and supplied there.

This is what 'burnt' Japans strategic reserve. That, and not having planned for the war in the first place. But to say the entire armed forces was out of money and resources is incorrect. If the IJN doesn't get largely involved then the IJA would be able to keep going for a fair bit longer even with Americas embargo.






What we must recognise is without the IJNs actions a lot of history will be changed. Naking might not happen, the Japanese won't look like they are strangling China, prompting the American embargos. Qingdao might be seized and a peace along the lines of the 21 demards signed. The xi'an incident might go differently. The Japanese might 'support' the chinese communists, if only to aid in the Balkenisation of the Chinese interior. The Southern warlords not threatened by the Japanese navy might not be so quick to forge the united front.

There is a lot of unknowns that creep in here. Which makes comming to a decent conclusion difficult. All we can say is for Japan to focus only on China, it needs to reign in the navy to stop promoting the Advance South policy, and with that you won't get the whole pacific theater being drawn into the war. What happens in China all depends on 3rd parties.

[jotabe1789]

Is there any reason, beyond ideological motivation, for the Japanese not to simply say "ok, here's as far as we can get in the war wtih China, let's call it a day and consolidate what we have taken".

Would have the US continue the reprisals and force them to give up what they had taken? Would their economy collapse equally even if they had stopped the war?

[Rainbow Sparkle]

Originally Posted by jotabe1789

Is there any reason, beyond ideological motivation, for the Japanese not to simply say "ok, here's as far as we can get in the war wtih China, let's call it a day and consolidate what we have taken".

Would have the US continue the reprisals and force them to give up what they had taken? Would their economy collapse equally even if they had stopped the war?

I believe part of the problem was that the Chinese wouldn't really accept that. Japan did offer peace terms if I recall correctly after they made some gains with the Marco Polo incident started total war between the two, but Chiang Kai-Shek wasn't going to accept them as he knew eventually the west would get involved, whether due to a desire to protect their interests in China or because the Japanese got cocky/greedy.

Having a more isolationist USA when it comes to China could convince the KMT to try peace with the Japanese.

[Genmotty]

Originally Posted by Rainbow Sparkle

I believe part of the problem was that the Chinese wouldn't really accept that. Japan did offer peace terms if I recall correctly after they made some gains with the Marco Polo incident started total war between the two, but Chiang Kai-Shek wasn't going to accept them as he knew eventually the west would get involved, whether due to a desire to protect their interests in China or because the Japanese got cocky/greedy.

Having a more isolationist USA when it comes to China could convince the KMT to try peace with the Japanese.

This is seconded and true.


I doubt that Kai-shek would cave quickly though, in many ways he was the one that escalated things so the Japanese wouldn't get their way. What is important or not is if/when he can forge the united front between him and the other warlords.

If the battles in north China drag, and the Communists gain strength while the other warlords don't back him enough that is the kind of time when he might have to opt for an armistice. However this might lead to protests in Europe and America over terms and end up becoming a 'non-peace' much like North and South Korea with multiple parties backing either sides making it a powder keg for another world war.

We also have to consider if the Japanese 'win' in North China and get the Chilli gulf and Qingdao penisular, that's not going to be it.


If we look at the perspective for the Japanese plans, they wanted the Chinese consumer market....exactly like the Americans. They wanted chinese consumers buying Japanese goods for cold hard currency. Which is why they wanted economic freedoms in coastal China because that's where the people were.

Territory wasn't really the issue, more than economic monopoly.

This is why they wanted to 'break chinese nationalist sprit' so that they could have de facto rule over China to move in Japanese industry and goods without embargo or trade saction from a hostile Chinese regime.

Eliminate the nationalist sprit and the common Chinese will fold.


Unfortunatly, Kai-shek was not going to be bullied into becoming a puppet and thus history was history.


Context reading:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Twenty-One_Demands
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_...War#Background

[Cook]

Originally Posted by Rainbow Sparkle

Having a more isolationist USA when it comes to China could convince the KMT to try peace with the Japanese.

The United States was not Chiang Kai-shek’s only source of external aid though; he was receiving aid from Britain, France and the Soviets.

Originally Posted by Genmotty

Unfortunatly, Kai-shek was not going to be bullied into becoming a puppet and thus history was history.

I take it you mean unfortunately for the Japanese, Kiang Kai-shek was not going to be bullied?

[Rainbow Sparkle]

Originally Posted by Cook

The United States was not Chiang Kai-shek’s only source of external aid though; he was receiving aid from Britain, France and the Soviets.

True, but an interesting question is would those nations have enacted an embargo against Japan, and how well would it have worked?

I take it you mean unfortunately for the Japanese, Kiang Kai-shek was not going to be bullied?

Since the pov we're working from here is that of the Japanese Empire...yes, I would assume that's how it's being meant.