Can the Dardanelles be forced?

[Orry]

1. No action must be taken against the Dardanelles forts before the big push. The Turks greatly increased minefields after the November 1914 actions.

2. British still attack and consolidate around Basra in 1914.

3. Constantinople is given the code name Jerusalem and is always refered to as such. Forces for the Dardanelles campaign are to base out of Egypt.

4. Trawlers to be used as minesweepers are provided with limited armour, light guns and the crews are called up or replaced with naval sailors.

5. Naval commander is given written orders that the loss of battleships is to be expected and he is to force a passage at all costs.

Is there any chance they might get through?

[Herzen's love-child]

OTL it seems that a combination of timidity and strong currents that hampered minesweeping prevented surface ships from forcing the Dardenelles. Submarines did successfully manage it.

I would think it would be possible to do so on a one time basis with some losses and it would be a psychological blow to the Ottomans but what would be the strategic purpose?
Actual physical control of the Dardenelles would still have to be attempted to make this more than a stunt.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by Orry

Is there any chance they might get through?

No, a naval forcing of the Straits without support from an amphibious landing was not feasable, something that Admiral Limpus, the British naval attache to the Sublime Porte had already reported prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Unfortunately the British, in a feat of profound stupidity, thought it tactless to assign the officer with the most knowledge of Turkish defences to the task of commanding naval operations against them, posting him to command the base at Malta instead.

The presence of howitzer artillary in positions on both sides of the Staits had also been reported to the British by their agent in Canakkale prior to the Turks entering the war. These were located where they could provide plunging fire onto targets in the straits while being secure from the direct fire of ship's guns; ships guns fire on a very flat trajectory, making them almost completely ineffective against targets concealed in the steep valleys and re-entrants of the Gallipoli peninsula. It was these guns that caused the most damage to the boats trying to clear the minefields and anti-submarine nets.

Stories claiming that the Turk's were down to their last few rounds of amunition when the ships withdrew on 18 March 1915 are baseless, the howitzers were well stocked with amunition, as were the guns in the forts directley overlooking the straits.

For details of the events leading up to the main assault on the Straits, Hugh Dolan's 36 Days is excellent, clearing up many of the myths concerning the campaign.

For details of the disposition and extent of Ottoman defences around the Straits, including intitial deployments, intelligence and reinforcements, there is Gallipoli: The Ottoman Campaign by Edward Erickson.

Originally Posted by Herzen's love-child

I would think it would be possible to do so on a one time basis with some losses and it would be a psychological blow to the Ottomans but what would be the strategic purpose?

Because past the Dardanelles Straits there were no defences before Istambul; Turkey's largest city, centre of government, administration, business and industry lay completely exposed to bombardment on the shores of the Bosphorus and Sea of Marmara. Turkey's only amunition factory was actually on forshore of the Bosphorus, its location well know to the British.

No other major nation in World War One had as little industry supporting its war effort, all of which was centrally located in a target so exposed to costal fire.

As it happens the British probably wouldn't have needed to fire a shot; the American Ambassador reported that when he visited the Sublime Porte on the 18th of March 1915, the day of the British assault on the Straits, the found the government preparing to evacuate the city and Enver Pasha making plans to set fire to Istambul in an attempt to achieve some sort of Pyrrhic victory.

[Lord Brisbane]

As it happens the British probably wouldn't have needed to fire a shot; the American Ambassador reported that when he visited the Sublime Porte on the 18th of March 1915, the day of the British assault on the Straits, the found the government preparing to evacuate the city and Enver Pasha making plans to set fire to Istambul in an attempt to achieve some sort of Pyrrhic victory.

Thats quite interesting. What if, in a fit of panic based on the rumours that must been spreading around fast, Enver Pasha decided to actually enact the plan? How much could the resulting devastation and distruption make to the Ottoman war effort?

[Cook]

Originally Posted by Lord Brisbane

Thats quite interesting. What if, in a fit of panic based on the rumours that must been spreading around fast, Enver Pasha decided to actually enact the plan? How much could the resulting devastation and distruption make to the Ottoman war effort?

It would have gutted it; they would have lost their only source of artillary ammunition until the Austrian's defeated Serbia a year later and opened a land link to the Central Powers. And that is without even considering the other industries that would have been lost if Istambul went up in flames.

[Herzen's love-child]

The unique concentration of the Ottoman's arms industry was something I wasn't aware of. Interesting, Cook. Thanks.

[Devolved]

Originally Posted by Orry

1. No action must be taken against the Dardanelles forts before the big push. The Turks greatly increased minefields after the November 1914 actions.

2. British still attack and consolidate around Basra in 1914.

3. Constantinople is given the code name Jerusalem and is always refered to as such. Forces for the Dardanelles campaign are to base out of Egypt.

4. Trawlers to be used as minesweepers are provided with limited armour, light guns and the crews are called up or replaced with naval sailors.

5. Naval commander is given written orders that the loss of battleships is to be expected and he is to force a passage at all costs.

Is there any chance they might get through?

The Dardanelles could have been forced and although it is customary to dismiss the whole thing as a foolish blunder it was the ONLY big strategic idea the Entente had in the war.


The problem was that in 1914/15 the 'element of surprise' was not a big part of Entente strategy. Attacking the Dardanelles was pretty much an open discussion. It was more like the long build up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 than Operation Torch.


So I don't think postponing shelling the forts in November 1914 would make a huge difference. The Entente practically told the world as well as the Turks that they were going to force the straits at some point.


The problem was that they underestimated the Turkish power of resistance. This wasn't just because of simple minded arrogance as most military men and politicians were aware that the Ottoman Turks had been formidable warriors for centuries. Their assessment was based on the poor Turkish perfomance in the recent Balkan wars and the war against Italy.


There was really nothing in early 1915 to indicate that the Turks would resist as strongly and effectively as they did. In many ways it was the opposite of Gulf War One. On that occasion most experts predicted a fairly bloody and hard fought war to defeat the battle hardened Iraqis. None of them predicted that they would collapse as soon as the ground war started. If the experts got it wrong in 1991 then perhaps it's a little too harsh to criticize the Entente for being wrong in 1915.


Tactical errors were common. The Naval commanders knew they would lose ships but when it actually happened they became disheartened too quickly. Perhaps this was due to the lack of war experience in a Navy that until 1914 hadn't lost ships in battle since the days of Napoleon.


According to Churchill (not an impartial source but still a primary one) many of the Admirals and officers had an emotional attachment to the ships that were lost. Many had served on the older ships and although they knew they were obsolete they still saw them as venerable battleships. Their orders about accepting losses were quite clear but the men on the spot had operational control and still backed off.


You needed a naval equivalent of a Field Marshal Haig to push on and worry about the cost later.


Using civilian crews on some of the minesweepers was also a mistake but I suppose there weren't enough naval crews until the surviviors of the sunk battleships became available.


Finally there is the problem of what happens if they force the narrows and enter the sea of Marmara. Most think the Turks would just close the door behind them and trap them. IMO this was beyond their capability in early 1915 and it's possible that forcing the narrows so early would lead the Turkish government to flee to the Asian mainland and the city of Constantinople would be declared an open city to avoid a mass bombardment. The American consul reported mass panic in the city and said that many expected the city to fall within days.


They could then be met by Russian ships from the north and the straits would be theoretically open.


The problem comes if the Turks don't sue for peace. Although IMO they would have as the Asian side would be cut off from the CP with no hope of rescue or reinforcement from Europe. No new guns, no large quantities of ammuntion and surrounded by the British and Russian Empires may be enough to force the Ottomans to seek terms to preserve what's left of their empire.

[Kome]

Originally Posted by Cook

It would have gutted it; they would have lost their only source of artillary ammunition until the Austrian's defeated Serbia a year later and opened a land link to the Central Powers.

I think you mean the Bulgarians.

[Ariosto]

As the others are saying, without land support from at least one side of the straits, trying to ram a naval force through there is damn near suicidal, considering you are talking about a relatively narrow space, mines lined around everywhere as far as the British know, and artillery emplacements on both sides. Its a killzone.

[sloreck]

Gallipoli COULD have worked if:
(1) There had been no preliminary attempts to alert the Turks, but rather do the assault/landing without "warning"
(2) Decent planning on the part of the Brits, and proper leadership. The planning process was a complete shambles and in spite of the Turks having warning and building up and the shambles of the planning there were times where had the British pushed forward rather than landing, advancing a little, then stopping they could have seized commanding positions that would have allowed them to clear out the artillery that threatened the straits.

When you read the documents in the British National Archives (I have) & the various first hand accounts of the process leading to the assault, the sheer level of incompetence is staggering - even accounting for the fact that no amphibious assault of this magnitude, and against modern weapons had ever been done the general attitude of "we'll muddle through" and "we're only fighting wogs anyways" was tragic.

Gallipoli working, even with the items above is by no means a sure thing but it would have had a very good chance.

[Lord Brisbane]

Originally Posted by Cook

It would have gutted it; they would have lost their only source of artillary ammunition until the Austrian's defeated Serbia a year later and opened a land link to the Central Powers. And that is without even considering the other industries that would have been lost if Istambul went up in flames.

Would the destruction of Istanbul cause enough of a morale loss/collapse and disorganisation in the government/military that the landings at Gallipoli- despite all their fundamental issues get more traction?

Or perhaps it has better longer term implications for the Entente in that theatre.

[BigWillyG]

Originally Posted by Devolved

Tactical errors were common. The Naval commanders knew they would lose ships but when it actually happened they became disheartened too quickly. Perhaps this was due to the lack of war experience in a Navy that until 1914 hadn't lost ships in battle since the days of Napoleon.


According to Churchill (not an impartial source but still a primary one) many of the Admirals and officers had an emotional attachment to the ships that were lost. Many had served on the older ships and although they knew they were obsolete they still saw them as venerable battleships. Their orders about accepting losses were quite clear but the men on the spot had operational control and still backed off.


You needed a naval equivalent of a Field Marshal Haig to push on and worry about the cost later.

I was thinking about having the Allies be more accepting of ship losses would help as well. Maybe a British or French version of Admiral Farragut who's reaction to a lost ship or two will be "damn the torpedoes full speed ahead?"

[sharlin]

That and getting naval crewed mine sweepers rather than civilian crewed trawlers.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by Lord Brisbane

Would the destruction of Istanbul cause enough of a morale loss/collapse and disorganisation in the government/military that the landings at Gallipoli- despite all their fundamental issues get more traction?

It would also render the landings unnecessary; the purpose of the landings was to allow passage of ships that would threaten to, and possibly carry out a bombardment of Istambul. If Istambul is already a series of smoking ruins and the government decamped to Ankara or Adrianopol, such landings are pointless.

Originally Posted by Lord Brisbane

Or perhaps it has better longer term implications for the Entente in that theatre.

Definately.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by BigWillyG

Maybe a British or French version of Admiral Farragut...

Farragut wasn't dealing with ten known lines of mines (and one unexpected one).

[LordIreland]

Originally Posted by Cook

Farragut wasn't dealing with ten known lines of mines (and one unexpected one).

He was referring to the attitude rather than a direct historical comparison.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by LordIreland

He was referring to the attitude rather than a direct historical comparison.

Farragut ran into a line on mines ('torpedoes') unexpectedly directly underneath the guns of a coastal fort; stopping or turning would have been disasterous so he gambled that the screen of mines was not extensive and he wouldn't lose more than a couple of ships, which is less than he'd lose by stopping. Ships don't stop on a dime, he would be through the mines before he could stop or turn anyway.

The British knew that there were ten lines of mines in the straits, each with mines spaced closer together than the width of a warship. It is one thing to utter stirring one liners when you run into something unexpectedly and have no choice, it is a very different thing (and a far stupider thing) to actually plan that way.

[Riain]

One thought I had ages ago with no real rigour was to build up forces on the Greek Islands ostensibly for defensive purposes but whose real purpose was the 2nd wave of the amphibious landing. Have the naval and amphibious forces gather out of sight in Egypt and assault from there in one big strike. That way the follow-on forces are close by and can quickly reinforce the initial landing.

Feel free to pick it apart Cooky.

[Orry]

Given the Central Powers do well thread I am looking at doing the opposite and this would be part of that. The allies are not going to make the same mistakes as they did in OTL - Plan 17 will be cancelled after a week rather than 17 days and the shock of that will have knock on effects. The Russians will have some vague idea that somebody else might listen to the radio so will not be using uncoded signals - the codes will not take that long to break BUT at least it will slow the Germans slightly so it will be slightly less of a disaster for them against the Germans and go slightly better against the AH.

Using Jerusalem as a code name for Constatinople is intended as a deception. Having the other actions against the Ottomans go ahead is to draw their attention away so they do not reinforce the minefields and no particular attention is paid to reinforcing the forts - checking ammunition etc etc.

As a working assumption I expect the Allied navies to lose 4 Battleships sunk and several damaged. I am looking at 3-4 landings of troops in support (one of which will suffer the same fate as at W beach in OTL. The troops being available and used as part of the initial attack is part of what I think might make it work.

I am looking to knock the Ottoman Empire out of the war in 1915 and defeat the Central powers in 1916 without a Russian revolution and without Roumania getting trashed - maybe even have Greece join the allies as a result of Turkey being knocked out...

With Turkey out of the war and Greece in Serbia can be supported properly helping to put more pressure on AH....

[Grey Wolf]

The best ships to lead any assault are the Queen Elizabeths since these are the ships best-placed to take damage and remain afloat. Unnfortunately, that is not a guaranteed attribute (hello, Barham).

One supposes they could just have piled in all the pre-dreadnoughts and hope that their spirit wouldn't have broken, but even if not, a load of sunken ships in the narrows is more or less doing the Turks' job for them of making it harder to get by!

Best Regards
Grey Wolf