German 1914 army with years to plan Eastern strategy

[Catspoke]

A 1914 "Germans go east" is a popular time line here. Assuming that the Germans had been planning to go east for years by 1914 (no attack in the west was ever considered). Would the German army be weaponed differently?

1) Would you have more cavalry?
2) More light infantry divisions?
3) More armored trains?
4) Less artillery in General (or maybe more heavy for the various fortresses)?
5) Gunboats transportable by rail for Eastern rivers and lakes developed
6) Barges developed for supply/transport invasion in the Baltic and or rivers.
7) A bunch of engineers capable of deploying light rail in a hurry?

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

A 1914 "Germans go east" is a popular time line here. Assuming that the Germans had been planning to go east for years by 1914 (no attack in the west was ever considered). Would the German army be weaponed differently?

1) Would you have more cavalry?
2) More light infantry divisions?
3) More armored trains?
4) Less artillery in General (or maybe more heavy for the various fortresses)?
5) Gunboats transportable by rail for Eastern rivers and lakes developed
6) Barges developed for supply/transport invasion in the Baltic and or rivers.
7) A bunch of engineers capable of deploying light rail in a hurry?

Generally, the number of units was determined by the Reichstag, and had a real political process to it. For example, the army had asked for more motorized battalions per regiment, but were turned down. It also had planed an Eastern Plan in many wargames, and it seems like the east plan was abandoned as an option about 1912.

Now how does the war work out if we assume the rest is the same. Well, it is debated whether the UK joins anyway, but lets us assume the don't. The Germans keep 4-5 armies in the west, my guess is 4. Three on the line, one in reserve and to prevent Belgium flanking. Russia runs War Plan Germany, and concedes Poland.

Now the Germans accepted that a war with Russia first is a multi-year war, so we might see changes to prepare for a long war. Strategic stockpiles, more nitrogen plants, etc. And if looking at a long war, we likely have a different focus on Germany diplomacy.

[miketr]

As noted the East First strategy was discarded in 1912 or rather not updated since then.

If Germany were to go all in on a East First you would see the following changes.

1) More railroad construction in the East to support the mobilization and movement of the army.

2) Depending on assumptions of the East First plan increased border defenses in the west vs. France.

Structure of the army would remain as is.

Michael

[Snake Featherston]

Germany has a major problem with any Eastern strategy, at least judging from their POV where they mistook the Russia of WWI for the USSR of WWII in terms of staying power. Their strategies will be rather underambitious relative to their enemy's actual power, while planning at a rate that will lead to credibility issues when Russia proves to be rather weaker than they expect, which is all too probably in a perspective shaped by human beings to lead to transferring from under-ambitious concepts and methods to vastly over-ambitious concepts and methods. Between the two, they'd give the Russians a fairer chance than the actual balance of power would allow for.

[Hörnla]

I think a necessary "condition sine qua no" would have been a thorough understanding of the state of things on the battlefield in 1914 due to correctly analysing the trends visible since 1864.

This would enable the Germans to leave only 4 armies in Elsaß-Lothringen and still feel safe.

The second condition would be the idea, that breaking up Germany's strategic dilemma as being "encircled" would rather be possible by crushing Russia.

Crushing France would give Germany just another humiliation and more bad blood, nothing productive. Any further annexations would just be a pain in the ***.
In the East, it would be possible to .... well ... do the Brest-Litovsk, i.e. just remove the existence of a Russo-German border. Neat.

***

Another effect: Germany would not need to declare war on France. Paris has to decide on that and to be "aggressive" here. And Belgium....yes, I would say that this means an initially neutral Britain, at least during the first campaign.
However, the Royal Navy would close the Straits of Dover. But the longer the blockade is delayed, the more thoroughly the Germans can order the rarest things they need in order to create at least modest stockpiles. This will pay off later on. It also means that Germany can hold on to some of its colonies for a longer time.
A lot of unpleasant things would get delayed just as well: unrestricted submarine warfare, anti-German swing of the US position...

***

The French Army of 1914 will not go far anywhere. I am fairly certain that fronts get stuck very close to the border. I also do not expect them to violate Belgian neutrality.

By the way, a different war in the West also keeps some of a lid on silly German war aims. No Belgian plans mean that there is no "Mittelafrika"-concept, demands in the West will not go further but to add some colonies (Morocco + one or two bases on the way to Togo, enlarging Kamerun and Togo a bit, Tunis for Italy as a price for neutrality) and perhaps some border adjustments in France....Briey? Belfort?. It will look a lot less threatening than OTL.

***

In the East, 3 additional German armies mean a huge difference. Pushing out off Silesia and East Prussia, they would give the Austrians the assistance they counted upon and would hide the potential of the k.u.k.-desaster of 1914. Instead of being destroyed in Poland, the CP would probably conquer large parts of Poland (though not crush the Russian forces there).

With the AH-army apparently not on the verge of annihilation, Italy might think twice before attacking in Early 1914.

I also expect, without the burden of the very tight Schlieffen plan, the German Army Commanders to act as independant as the communication-technology demands of them and thus be more effective.

[Catspoke]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

Now the Germans accepted that a war with Russia first is a multi-year war, so we might see changes to prepare for a long war. Strategic stockpiles, more nitrogen plants, etc. And if looking at a long war, we likely have a different focus on Germany diplomacy.

Makes sense but a long war over Serbia is probably not worth it, even for the German military types, so maybe war is impossible without a plan like Schlieffen to make it seem like it can be short. And if going east, with the distances involved if seems like you would want an army more like Alexander the Great's than the German army of 1914 (or maybe at least a Turkish 1914 style army which could subsist on lower supplies).

As even if as Snake says the Russians were overrated, their military potential is still quite large. The big cities of Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev and Odessa all well connected by rail, is ultimately where Germany needs to win, Russia really wouldn't be defeated until at least 2 or 3 of them fall. I can't see Russia bothered by the fall of Poland or the Germans occupying the Baltic States or even the western parts of the Ukraine. Russian armies fighting in front of these cities would be reasonably well supplied and motivated and these cities would be large, hard to encircle, easy to defend with militia type armies if necessary. Any political collapse would be years and years away (as in OTL) and the politics would be different here to know for sure that would happen.

The Russians Stalin who can and will shoot anybody to help "motivate", but the Germans don't have airpower or armor or even the ability to supply by truck to help.

Ultimately I see the German army caught in some huge Borodino+ battle in front of Moscow and getting defeated or at least just stopped there.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

Makes sense but a long war over Serbia is probably not worth it, even for the German military types, so maybe war is impossible without a plan like Schlieffen to make it seem like it can be short. And if going east, with the distances involved if seems like you would want an army more like Alexander the Great's than the German army of 1914 (or maybe at least a Turkish 1914 style army which could subsist on lower supplies).

As even if as Snake says the Russians were overrated, their military potential is still quite large. The big cities of Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev and Odessa all well connected by rail, is ultimately where Germany needs to win, Russia really wouldn't be defeated until at least 2 or 3 of them fall. I can't see Russia bothered by the fall of Poland or the Germans occupying the Baltic States or even the western parts of the Ukraine. Russian armies fighting in front of these cities would be reasonably well supplied and motivated and these cities would be large, hard to encircle, easy to defend with militia type armies if necessary. Any political collapse would be years and years away (as in OTL) and the politics would be different here to know for sure that would happen.

The Russians Stalin who can and will shoot anybody to help "motivate", but the Germans don't have airpower or armor or even the ability to supply by truck to help.

Ultimately I see the German army caught in some huge Borodino+ battle in front of Moscow and getting defeated or at least just stopped there.

Modern wars aren't won by geographic points. Germany needs to defeat Russia's armies, not capture Russia's cities. This it actually has a rather good chance of doing assuming it has the right leadership and a Russian military as prone to assuming that they can march to victory over a bridge of corpses coupled with extremely rigid tactical-strategic actions as per OTL. WWI Germany, in a long war, is virtually guaranteed to win as the massive casualties under the absence of leadership Nicholas II provides, will ensure that Russia disintegrates in the long term regardless of what happens with the battles.

The question is whether or not the OP factors in Austria-Hungary as well, if it does, then the pattern will be as rapid as OTL, if not, Germany still batters into Russia, but it's a confusing war whose battles are purely chaos and difficult to describe even decades later and where Russia collapses for purely political reasons, enabling Germany to claim a military victory in the technical sense. Of course we're talking with the advantage of hindsight, in 1914 Germany rated Russia far, far more highly than the actual political-military situation warranted. So their plans will be based on those (utterly and totally wrong) assumptions at first.

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

Modern wars aren't won by geographic points. Germany needs to defeat Russia's armies, not capture Russia's cities. This it actually has a rather good chance of doing assuming it has the right leadership and a Russian military as prone to assuming that they can march to victory over a bridge of corpses coupled with extremely rigid tactical-strategic actions as per OTL. WWI Germany, in a long war, is virtually guaranteed to win as the massive casualties under the absence of leadership Nicholas II provides, will ensure that Russia disintegrates in the long term regardless of what happens with the battles.

The question is whether or not the OP factors in Austria-Hungary as well, if it does, then the pattern will be as rapid as OTL, if not, Germany still batters into Russia, but it's a confusing war whose battles are purely chaos and difficult to describe even decades later and where Russia collapses for purely political reasons, enabling Germany to claim a military victory in the technical sense. Of course we're talking with the advantage of hindsight, in 1914 Germany rated Russia far, far more highly than the actual political-military situation warranted. So their plans will be based on those (utterly and totally wrong) assumptions at first.

Indeed they overestimated Russia's ability to resist and their political stability during the first 2 and a half years of the war

The long and unnecessary wait for the Riga attack by Hutier showed this. Their was also the concerns during the height of the 1915 drives that they would get sucked in to Russia (which in WW1 was desirable since Germany was good at absorbing and administrating former Russian lands; and the loss of the national territory was speeding the political disentigration of the Czar's court)


Germany par say doesn't have enough front (and the common border is a terrain shithole) to launch a big offensive against Russia out of the gate; they would have to negotiate with the Austrians to stage out of their territory so they have more room for their attacks to develop out of

[Faeelin]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

(which in WW1 was desirable since Germany was good at absorbing and administrating former Russian lands; and the loss of the national territory was speeding the political disentigration of the Czar's court)

???!!!???

No it wasn't; the UKraine under German rule was a nigh civil war, and Poland was little better, because the Poles had no desire to be German cannon fodder.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

Indeed they overestimated Russia's ability to resist and their political stability during the first 2 and a half years of the war

The long and unnecessary wait for the Riga attack by Hutier showed this. Their was also the concerns during the height of the 1915 drives that they would get sucked in to Russia (which in WW1 was desirable since Germany was good at absorbing and administrating former Russian lands; and the loss of the national territory was speeding the political disentigration of the Czar's court)


Germany par say doesn't have enough front (and the common border is a terrain shithole) to launch a big offensive against Russia out of the gate; they would have to negotiate with the Austrians to stage out of their territory so they have more room for their attacks to develop out of

Well, it's not like they estimated *overly* wrong in a sense because the Russians *did* inflict defeats on the Germans at the Battles of Lodz and the Vistula. And of course did ultimately first almost wreck and then fully wrecked the A-H K.u.K. Armee. Which is why I've noted no amount of military changes in Russia's record are going to affect its outcome in WWI.

At the same time, the only really vital areas for Russia that Germany absorbed were in Ukraine and the Baltic states, in the latter case deliberately screwing their own word to their own allies (but then again, how exactly the army that couldn't hack war with Russia was going to occupy it is a good question so I can't fault them at a military level for that). Losing Poland actually strengthens Russia, not hurts it. Poland just provided political and economic handicaps, while militarily offering a vulnerable salient any enemy with sufficient ability would have tried to capture and ultimately might actually succeed in regardless.

However the claim that Germany was good in administrating former Tsarist territories requires a bit of proof. As I understand it nobody was particularly good at controlling this until the NEP era, as the whole major civil war thing indicated this. Usually most people do not define control as what Makhno, the Hetmanate, Soviet Ukraine, and Polish Ukraine were all able to make out of German control. Germany was good at winning battles, but I don't think it was good at administrating.

[Catspoke]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

Modern wars aren't won by geographic points. Germany needs to defeat Russia's armies, not capture Russia's cities.

I am thinking the Russians would contine to withdraw their armies in the face of a serious German invasion until the major cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev were threatened). If the Russians pick a fight in front of those cities, they have a decent chance of beating or at least stopping the Germans (close to supply, labor around to build fortifications, the cities are so big they are hard to encircle, same kind of problems as the Germans had to deal with in WW2).

I don't think the political effects of the loss of territory would be awful because you are doing what was done in 1812, and even the common people would understand that.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

I am thinking the Russians would contine to withdraw their armies in the face of a serious German invasion until the major cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev were threatened). If the Russians pick a fight in front of those cities, they have a decent chance of beating or at least stopping the Germans (close to supply, labor around to build fortifications, the cities are so big they are hard to encircle, same kind of problems as the Germans had to deal with in WW2).

I don't think the political effects of the loss of territory would be awful because you are doing what was done in 1812, and even the common people would understand that.

We're talking WWI. Leningrad was Petrograd at this point. That being said, I'm not not sure Russia would withdraw ITTL, IOTL they had at least three chances where this done deliberately would have been a military godsend but they did not do it. Likewise in 1812 there's some question as to whether or not their retreat was deliberate or calling it deliberate was a face-saving move.

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

Well, it's not like they estimated *overly* wrong in a sense because the Russians *did* inflict defeats on the Germans at the Battles of Lodz and the Vistula. And of course did ultimately first almost wreck and then fully wrecked the A-H K.u.K. Armee. Which is why I've noted no amount of military changes in Russia's record are going to affect its outcome in WWI.

At the same time, the only really vital areas for Russia that Germany absorbed were in Ukraine and the Baltic states, in the latter case deliberately screwing their own word to their own allies (but then again, how exactly the army that couldn't hack war with Russia was going to occupy it is a good question so I can't fault them at a military level for that). Losing Poland actually strengthens Russia, not hurts it. Poland just provided political and economic handicaps, while militarily offering a vulnerable salient any enemy with sufficient ability would have tried to capture and ultimately might actually succeed in regardless.

However the claim that Germany was good in administrating former Tsarist territories requires a bit of proof. As I understand it nobody was particularly good at controlling this until the NEP era, as the whole major civil war thing indicated this. Usually most people do not define control as what Makhno, the Hetmanate, Soviet Ukraine, and Polish Ukraine were all able to make out of German control. Germany was good at winning battles, but I don't think it was good at administrating.

Russian victories against the Germans in WW1 versus the context of this OP don't bear much consideration because the Russians started the war fighting 1/5 of the German army and never had the pleasure of engaging more than 1/3 of it. It is safe to assume that if Germany was to devote 2/3 of her army and most of her shell output to punching Russia to the mat that they could do it considerably earlier

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

Russian victories against the Germans in WW1 versus the context of this OP don't bear much consideration because the Russians started the war fighting 1/5 of the German army and never had the pleasure of engaging more than 1/3 of it. It is safe to assume that if Germany was to devote 2/3 of her army and most of her shell output to punching Russia to the mat that they could do it considerably earlier

Well, sure, the question is if Russia is doing this without engaging Austria-Hungary, in which case instead of two Russian armies from the first Germany's engaging more of its army against more of the Russian army. Same pattern, but it'd still take longer to get there.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

Makes sense but a long war over Serbia is probably not worth it, even for the German military types, so maybe war is impossible without a plan like Schlieffen to make it seem like it can be short. And if going east, with the distances involved if seems like you would want an army more like Alexander the Great's than the German army of 1914 (or maybe at least a Turkish 1914 style army which could subsist on lower supplies).

There is truth to the illusionnary "quick win" of the Schlieffen plan allow the diplomacy to unfold as it did. Assuming the War Plan East was for a many year war and detailed (a big, big assumption), the pre-mobilization period will have huge costs to the German economy as the ammunition plants ramp up well before the war starts. As food rationing kicks in prewar. As the German merchant marine is rerouted to bring vulnerable supplies to Germany. The huge cost of billions of marks spent in June and July likely changes German diplomacy.

And if that failed, Germany obviously making huge domestic sacrifices to ramp up for what they obviously believe to be a very long war will have profound impacts on the decision making in Entente capitols. It seems that big wars start because sides determine they can win, and often they decide the war will be a quick win.

A modern example is Iraq. If Bush/Congress believed it would cost $1 trillion dollars to remove Saddam, then the USA finds another solution. Or going forward, look at Iran. Generally speaking, it appears the pro-attack Iran believe it will be a bombing campaign of a few weeks with few long term consequences.

[Detlef]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

I am thinking the Russians would contine to withdraw their armies in the face of a serious German invasion until the major cities (Moscow, Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev were threatened). If the Russians pick a fight in front of those cities, they have a decent chance of beating or at least stopping the Germans (close to supply, labor around to build fortifications, the cities are so big they are hard to encircle, same kind of problems as the Germans had to deal with in WW2).

I don't think the political effects of the loss of territory would be awful because you are doing what was done in 1812, and even the common people would understand that.

As Snake Featherston already said, we´re talking about WW1 here.
With a Russian defeat in the Japanese-Russian war 1904-1905.
A Russian "revolution" in 1905.
I really doubt the Czarist government would willingly give up large parts of the country given the domestic situation?

Add to that smaller (or no) war loans from the neutral British (for now).
Which translates into less ammunition, less war material.

There´s also the fact that without Belgium and Britain (at least initially) involved more of the German navy could be deployed in the Baltic Sea.
The Russian Baltic fleet will be bottled up in the Gulf of Finland almost from the beginning. Expect an earlier "Operation Albion" and earlier unrest in Finland.

[Detlef]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

Well, sure, the question is if Russia is doing this without engaging Austria-Hungary, in which case instead of two Russian armies from the first Germany's engaging more of its army against more of the Russian army. Same pattern, but it'd still take longer to get there.

But in that case even the decisions of Conrad von Hötzendorf might not lead to the loss of Austrian Galicia early on. And a lot of resources and stores. You´d see a somewhat stronger Austria-Hungary then.

There´s also the fact that the Russians would have to know about the German war plans to revise their own plans?
In which case they´d probably scream to the French to accelerate their offenses? And should those French offensive fail against Alsace-Lorraine what will be the reaction of the French high command?
Will the French accept a stalemate on the Western front and observing their Russian allies having troubles? Or will they think about moving through Belgium and the Netherlands to destroy / occupy the Ruhr region?

[maestro876]

This reminds me of the old Fire Eagle/Snow Bear thread from the old board. That one spun out of a "Germany Goes East" POD and snowballed into this massive project culminating in a fascist Russia.

[Kome]

Originally Posted by Detlef

But in that case even the decisions of Conrad von Hötzendorf might not lead to the loss of Austrian Galicia early on. And a lot of resources and stores. You´d see a somewhat stronger Austria-Hungary then.

There´s also the fact that the Russians would have to know about the German war plans to revise their own plans?
In which case they´d probably scream to the French to accelerate their offenses? And should those French offensive fail against Alsace-Lorraine what will be the reaction of the French high command?
Will the French accept a stalemate on the Western front and observing their Russian allies having troubles? Or will they think about moving through Belgium and the Netherlands to destroy / occupy the Ruhr region?

Going through the low countries is a bit extreme. Throwing more bodies into Alsace-Lorraine is to be expected though.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by Detlef

As Snake Featherston already said, we´re talking about WW1 here.
With a Russian defeat in the Japanese-Russian war 1904-1905.
A Russian "revolution" in 1905.
I really doubt the Czarist government would willingly give up large parts of the country given the domestic situation?

Add to that smaller (or no) war loans from the neutral British (for now).
Which translates into less ammunition, less war material.

There´s also the fact that without Belgium and Britain (at least initially) involved more of the German navy could be deployed in the Baltic Sea.
The Russian Baltic fleet will be bottled up in the Gulf of Finland almost from the beginning. Expect an earlier "Operation Albion" and earlier unrest in Finland.

And of course the kicker is that Russia doesn't have the luxury to make ordinary military errors due to its political weaknesses. What would be "ordinary" mistakes for the other powers are disproportionately crippling to Russia for this reason.

Originally Posted by Detlef

But in that case even the decisions of Conrad von Hötzendorf might not lead to the loss of Austrian Galicia early on. And a lot of resources and stores. You´d see a somewhat stronger Austria-Hungary then.

There´s also the fact that the Russians would have to know about the German war plans to revise their own plans?
In which case they´d probably scream to the French to accelerate their offenses? And should those French offensive fail against Alsace-Lorraine what will be the reaction of the French high command?
Will the French accept a stalemate on the Western front and observing their Russian allies having troubles? Or will they think about moving through Belgium and the Netherlands to destroy / occupy the Ruhr region?

Not leading to the loss of Galicia is one thing. Smashing up the great bulk of the Russian Army is quite another. The Black-Yellow Offensive calls into question how efficient the K.u.K. Armee would have been by itself.