New Persia, Pahlavi Dynasty and Arab Spring

Let's assume that the Iranian Revolution is either put down or did not occur during the latter part of the 1970's and the Pahlavi dynasty exists up to the "Arab Spring".

Would there be a civil war going on in Persia or would their be massive protests with violent crackdowns by the royals?

Who do you think are the rebels in this situation?

What is the international reaction to this?

Lastly, what would a new Persia look like after?
 
Let's assume that the Iranian Revolution is either put down or did not occur during the latter part of the 1970's and the Pahlavi dynasty exists up to the "Arab Spring".

Would there be a civil war going on in Persia or would their be massive protests with violent crackdowns by the royals?

Who do you think are the rebels in this situation?

What is the international reaction to this?

Lastly, what would a new Persia look like after?

Well, if we ignore butterflies (don't think no Islamic Republic wouldn't create butterflies) if the Shah hasn't been booted out of office already at this point he would be now. But not without loads of bloodshed of course.
 
If the Pahlavi dynasty had managed to survive up to the Arab Spring I think it would have reached some sort of equilibrium with the liberal and Islamist forces that brought about its downfall in 1979 - the monarchy had to broaden its base of support if it was to survive.

Of course the survival of the Iranian monarchy would probably completely butterfly the Arab Spring as we know it now.

One more consideration though - of all the governments that have been overthrown since 2011 in the Middle East or which are now currently under serious threat, all have been secular republican dictatorships - none monarchies, despite protests in many of them.
 
It would also butterfly the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's which then leads to no invasion of Kuwait in 1990. This means no western intervention and maybe no 9/11 and no invasion of Iraq or Afghanistan.
 
Mohammad Rezā Shāh Pahlavī was terminally ill in 1980, suffering from a non-Hodgkin Lymphoma and would have died in 1980 or '81 anyway, so his then 20 year old son Rezā would have succeeded him. If the young Shāh had permitted the reforms his increasingly conservative father had not Iran might have become a true constitutional monarchy and with the influx of money following the rising oil prices in the early 1980s a lot of social tensions in the country might have been alleviated. Saddam Hussein would not have dared to attack an Iran, not weakened by the turmoil of islamic revolution and subsequent purging of officers loyal to the Shāh and supported by the west. With a stable, comparatively laicist and democratic Iran the west will also be less inclined to support Saddam Hussein and the theocratic autocrats on the arabian peninsula so that those regimes might be forced to accept some kind of reforms significantly earlier. Finally with no iranian hostage crises Ronald Reagan might lose against Jimmy Carter in the 1980 presidential elections leading to a completely different 1980s political situation in both the US and geopolitically.
 
One of the causes of the rise in oil prices at the time was the Iranian revolution so that wouldn't help the Pahlavi regime.
 
It would also butterfly the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980's which then leads to no invasion of Kuwait in 1990. This means no western intervention and maybe no 9/11 and no invasion of Iraq or Afghanistan.
Or to an earlier invasion of Kuwait, since Saddam Hussein might have chosen to invade Kuwait instead of attacking Iran in the early '80s. The ensuing situation would have been a completely different one. Without OTLs Iran-Iraq war Saddam Hussein would never have become "our bastard" for the US and would therefore most likely have to a larger extent cozied up with the Soviets and his Ba'ath party comrade dictator Hafez al-Assad. His attacks on the Kurds would thus not have been glossed over in the west for so long since he would have been regarded as one of Moscows cronies. There might have been 2 typically cold war solutions for the problem, either some tense negotiations between the US and the Soviets who force Saddam to retreat from Kuwait voluntarily or a tacit agreement between the USA and the Soviets that grants the Soviets Afghanistan as their sphere of interest with the Americans stopping their support for the mujahideen and the US Iraq which is occupied by an alliance of arabian states and Iran with support of the US armed forced to restore the independence of Kuwait and replace Saddam Hussein with a more pro-western ruler, maybe in the form of a restauration of the monarchy.
 
Sorry for bumping, but I'd like to bring one thing up. It would've been Farah who would've succeeded Mohammad-Reza had he died around the same time as OTL. He named Farah his successor as Regent in the event he died before Reza was 21. So assuming he dies at the same time as OTL, we would've had Shah Farah Pahlavi for about 18 months. Anyone care to add anything? What would Farah's Regency look like? How would she govern in comparison to her late husband? And what changes from his mother and father would Reza bring to the table?
 
Sorry for bumping, but I'd like to bring one thing up. It would've been Farah who would've succeeded Mohammad-Reza had he died around the same time as OTL. He named Farah his successor as Regent in the event he died before Reza was 21. So assuming he dies at the same time as OTL, we would've had Shah Farah Pahlavi for about 18 months. Anyone care to add anything? What would Farah's Regency look like? How would she govern in comparison to her late husband? And what changes from his mother and father would Reza bring to the table?

I would imagine that Shah Farah Pahlavi would have found her reign short-lived thanks to the likes of Khomeini, as I cannot see Iran's hardliners ever accepting a female ruler. That said, if Iran's society can be placated (perhaps a major economic improvement in 1980-81) and/or the country's armed forces stay behind her, then Farah could well lead long enough to have her son crowned the Shah just after his 21st birthday in November 1981. I do also think its possible that Reza, who was trained by the United States Air Force, stays as a pilot for a while longer while his mother leads the nation for a while longer. Reza in himself creates kinda a problem in a few ways for succession, as he has no male children, though considering his mother would have been the Empress for a year or so and Iran would probably change under his guidance (Reza is a devout Shiite but loudly calls for the separation of church and state), so by the time that issue is real it might not matter.
 
I would imagine that Shah Farah Pahlavi would have found her reign short-lived thanks to the likes of Khomeini, as I cannot see Iran's hardliners ever accepting a female ruler. That said, if Iran's society can be placated (perhaps a major economic improvement in 1980-81) and/or the country's armed forces stay behind her, then Farah could well lead long enough to have her son crowned the Shah just after his 21st birthday in November 1981. I do also think its possible that Reza, who was trained by the United States Air Force, stays as a pilot for a while longer while his mother leads the nation for a while longer. Reza in himself creates kinda a problem in a few ways for succession, as he has no male children, though considering his mother would have been the Empress for a year or so and Iran would probably change under his guidance (Reza is a devout Shiite but loudly calls for the separation of church and state), so by the time that issue is real it might not matter.

Well he might take a second wife as his father was encouraged to do when Soraya couldn't bare him a child. While Soraya was a Roman Catholic and refused this, (leading to their divorce), I can't find enough info to suggest if Yasmine, Reza's OTL wife, would've accepted this. She is a Shi'a Muslim as well, and I'm not sure what her position would be. However, I know from "The Queen and I" documentary made by Nahid Persson that Farah seemed very open to the Shah having extramarital affiars: "He respected me, and never let women go that far, but if he had an affair and it made him happy, it was good for the country. For the good of the country, if that's what it takes to be a happy ruler, then I don't really care what he did." (I'm pretty sure I'm paraphrasing a bit, but you get the idea). So how would they (Farah and Reza) both rule?

I also gleamed from "I knew the Shah" that during the last few years of his reign, Mohammad-Reza was focused most on preserving his legacy and the succession of his son to the throne (and during the last 2 years or so preparing his wife for the same, just in case he died before Reza was 21). So what if he had a much less lavish celebration of Iran's 2500 years of monarchy and does not have the OTL single-party state? Would this be enough to placate the revolution for all but the most radical rebels? Then he gives fair trials to all nonviolent rebels, killing the violent ones? Would this be enough to keep the Shah in power? Or, going back further, what if he allowed Mossadiq to stay on as PM (no 53 coup, less shah power but he is given some additional power to placate the west)?

Finally, it seems to me that Reza is the most pragmatic and pro-democracy in his family, while Farah is the most likeable. Would Reza allow free elections, (of course with the likely exception of Tudeh)? What about Farah? I'm sorry if this is so much but I'm all excited now; I just got an email back from Farah, and I've been stuck thinking on this since. :eek:
 
I'd hardly an expert on Iran, but it seemed to be that the disputes between the religious conservatives and the Shah didn't blow up until well into the late 1970s. The discontent was real, as evidenced by the fact that Iran erupted like a dry forest in a lightning storm. If you can placate that earlier, then you may be able to allow the Shah to hang on long enough to allow a semi-smooth transfer of power to Farah and then Reza. The Shah's authoritarian tendencies, particularly in his later years on the throne, added to the problems.

First task is to get the population behind him. This means paying more attention to Iran's identity and reducing the level of both corruption and the suppression of leftist elements. It seems somewhat counterproductive to lay off of groups like the People's Mujehadin, but if they had gotten a handle on the strength of Khomeini and the religious conservatives earlier on it could have slowed down their growth in power if not stopped it altogether. The other problem is the economic reform programs of the early 1970s were too ambitious, and caused problems with inflation and shortages. Getting the population behind the monarchy to a greater extent would knock down most of these problems.

Ironically, what might help is a bit of chaos in 1980 after the Shah's death, and Saddam being his usual thuggish self. If he invades as OTL just as Farah and Reza are consolidating power, the nationalism Iran has would have worked in their favor, and having not purged the officer corps and tossed out the western military support staff as IOTL, the Iranians could have handed Saddam a beating and allowed the Monarchy to use such actions as proof that they are working for Iran's betters. Farah was a better person in general than the Shah was, or so it seems to me, and if she can show enough leadership during such a situation it would, I think, pave the way for her to rise onto the throne. Saddam helping the Iranian monarchy might be a bit of an oddball move, but I think that might be a really good way of going about it. Farah rises to the throne, Reza is crowned in early 1982 and both of them use their own personal feelings and the realities of the day to advance Iran's society and economy, in the former working to a mix of both the country's Shi'a religious beliefs, Reza's personal view of a secular state but with religion playing a major moral influence and Farah's advancement of equal rights for women. Considering the Soviets in Afghanistan and Saddam's usual trouble-causing self, this Iran could continue getting the backing of the West, and if political reforms establish greater democracy in Iran, than this works to Iran's benefit in a number of ways. Saddam turning to Soviets while Iran and Saudi advance their economies in the 1980s could well end up backfiring badly on Saddam.

For best results based on my research and knowledge, start in 1971 at the 2500th Anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire. IOTL, this lavish celebration was only attended by foreign dignitaries. Bad idea. Better plan is that the Shah still does this but at the same time sends out hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to the people in Iran that were starving, and loudly proclaiming that this anniversary would be the beginning of a new country. The economic improvement program goes on, but the 1974 plans are scaled back as a result of falling oil prices in the 1970s, and efforts to hammer down corruption and waste bear fruit. Early problems with gaps between rich and poor are brought down through programs to increase the living standards of middle class and poor Iranians. This means that the problems of inflation and waste have much less effect. At the same time, the Shah sees the need to improve his support base among Iran's people. The Rastakhiz is never created, and people like Mehdi Bazargan, Abolhassan Banisadr and Ali Shariati move into the government. Aware that his legacy depends on his country not falling to the religious hardliners, he keeps Khomeini out of influence by trying to go around him using others who will work with him and improving his own support base. The armed forces' expansion plans are toned down considerably to put priority to economic concerns, and muzzling SAVAK is a must in order to not give Khomeini and his supporters ammo to attack the Shah for the brutality of his security services.

In 1978, he publicly discloses his serious illness from cancer and states that he is trying to ensure that Iranians are prosperous well into the future. This has the potential problem of backfiring though guys like Khomeini being emboldened, but having a major growth in support from the country's middle classes and having men like Bazargan, Banisadr and Shariati to help guide the integration of Islamic values into the country's more-liberal government, he can blunt Khomeini's power. The Shah asking Hussein to boot Saddam proved to be counterproductive, and I believe personally that if the Shah and his changing government can grow enough supporters to keep some semblance of control then the best thing to do about Khomeini is respect him as a religious figure but ignore him as a political one. This requires a power base, but the above actions could grow one.

Following the Shah's death in 1980, Farah takes over on an original interim basis. If she can get the various factions of Iran's opposition that use legal methods to work together, than she can both push plans to help keep the nation moving, recognizing that her husband's actions in later years were in some cases a mistake. Assuming Carter still loses in 1980 (quite possible), then Reagan will probably see Iran as a useful bulwark against the Soviets to the north. Reza is crowned in early 1982, but Farah still stays a high-ranking and influential person.
 
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What TheMann said

@TheMann IMO I think everything you're proposing is on the money as far as WHAT needed to be done, but the timing bugs me. The problems Iran had went back to the 1960's and the White Revolution.

I think any Shah-led reforms need ten, fifteen years of progress to point to.
Getting liberal and Islamist moderates like Bazargan, Banisadr, et al them onside needed to be done ca 1965 and a generation of leaders kept onside so all the student leaders felt some reason to continue with royalist Iran.

Even if they were cultivated in 1975- things had advanced way too far for even the most well-run coalition to avoid getting Kerensky'd in the tsunami of pent-up anger with the Shah's economic mismanagement and toxic mix of political heavy-handedness and fecklessness.

IOTL, what screwed the liberal side of the Iranian Revolution was the fact they had zero experience scrapping in the streets or developing a good ground game as a shadow government getting popular support as the Islamists did.

The secularists that did scrap well and do outreach to the poor were Tudeh or MEK- too Marxist for Western or Islamist comfort, and weren't willing to back a single leader until it was too late, whereas Khomeni was able to pitch himself as the first among equals in SCIR(I)ran.
The secularists always had to pledge they'd work well with the Islamists, while the Islamists didn't feel like returning the favor and weren't in the mood for debate. They had more of a conform-or-die approach.

I see the Iranian Revolution as a double tragedy. The Iran-Iraq War and myraid purges of moderates and secularists managed to completely piss away whatever good could have been done by it.
The efforts of Rafsanjani and other reformists who are tired of the revolutionary rhetoric and international isolation that have economically marooned Iran keep getting blocked and undermined by a bunch of clerics and Basij thugs terrified of losing what crumbs they et from running Iran even further into the ground.
it's not near North Korean-level horror and want, but more this sterile shuffle to implosion by a bankrupt elite like Romania or East Germany.

Butterflying OTL nightmare is difficult, because it needs Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi to have a much better picture of what kind of country he was leaving, develop a much more collaborative style of government with party leaders willing to be a loyal opposition, find ways of keeping British and US interests from seeming to fatten at the trough while ordinary Iranians suffered, etc that seem like the most berserk juggling act one can imagine and he was manifestly not up to the task.
 
I'd hardly an expert on Iran, but it seemed to be that the disputes between the religious conservatives and the Shah didn't blow up until well into the late 1970s. The discontent was real, as evidenced by the fact that Iran erupted like a dry forest in a lightning storm. If you can placate that earlier, then you may be able to allow the Shah to hang on long enough to allow a semi-smooth transfer of power to Farah and then Reza. The Shah's authoritarian tendencies, particularly in his later years on the throne, added to the problems.

First task is to get the population behind him. This means paying more attention to Iran's identity and reducing the level of both corruption and the suppression of leftist elements. It seems somewhat counterproductive to lay off of groups like the People's Mujehadin, but if they had gotten a handle on the strength of Khomeini and the religious conservatives earlier on it could have slowed down their growth in power if not stopped it altogether. The other problem is the economic reform programs of the early 1970s were too ambitious, and caused problems with inflation and shortages. Getting the population behind the monarchy to a greater extent would knock down most of these problems.

Ironically, what might help is a bit of chaos in 1980 after the Shah's death, and Saddam being his usual thuggish self. If he invades as OTL just as Farah and Reza are consolidating power, the nationalism Iran has would have worked in their favor, and having not purged the officer corps and tossed out the western military support staff as IOTL, the Iranians could have handed Saddam a beating and allowed the Monarchy to use such actions as proof that they are working for Iran's betters. Farah was a better person in general than the Shah was, or so it seems to me, and if she can show enough leadership during such a situation it would, I think, pave the way for her to rise onto the throne. Saddam helping the Iranian monarchy might be a bit of an oddball move, but I think that might be a really good way of going about it. Farah rises to the throne, Reza is crowned in early 1982 and both of them use their own personal feelings and the realities of the day to advance Iran's society and economy, in the former working to a mix of both the country's Shi'a religious beliefs, Reza's personal view of a secular state but with religion playing a major moral influence and Farah's advancement of equal rights for women. Considering the Soviets in Afghanistan and Saddam's usual trouble-causing self, this Iran could continue getting the backing of the West, and if political reforms establish greater democracy in Iran, than this works to Iran's benefit in a number of ways. Saddam turning to Soviets while Iran and Saudi advance their economies in the 1980s could well end up backfiring badly on Saddam.

For best results based on my research and knowledge, start in 1971 at the 2500th Anniversary of the founding of the Persian Empire. IOTL, this lavish celebration was only attended by foreign dignitaries. Bad idea. Better plan is that the Shah still does this but at the same time sends out hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to the people in Iran that were starving, and loudly proclaiming that this anniversary would be the beginning of a new country. The economic improvement program goes on, but the 1974 plans are scaled back as a result of falling oil prices in the 1970s, and efforts to hammer down corruption and waste bear fruit. Early problems with gaps between rich and poor are brought down through programs to increase the living standards of middle class and poor Iranians. This means that the problems of inflation and waste have much less effect. At the same time, the Shah sees the need to improve his support base among Iran's people. The Rastakhiz is never created, and people like Mehdi Bazargan, Abolhassan Banisadr and Ali Shariati move into the government. Aware that his legacy depends on his country not falling to the religious hardliners, he keeps Khomeini out of influence by trying to go around him using others who will work with him and improving his own support base. The armed forces' expansion plans are toned down considerably to put priority to economic concerns, and muzzling SAVAK is a must in order to not give Khomeini and his supporters ammo to attack the Shah for the brutality of his security services.

In 1978, he publicly discloses his serious illness from cancer and states that he is trying to ensure that Iranians are prosperous well into the future. This has the potential problem of backfiring though guys like Khomeini being emboldened, but having a major growth in support from the country's middle classes and having men like Bazargan, Banisadr and Shariati to help guide the integration of Islamic values into the country's more-liberal government, he can blunt Khomeini's power. The Shah asking Hussein to boot Saddam proved to be counterproductive, and I believe personally that if the Shah and his changing government can grow enough supporters to keep some semblance of control then the best thing to do about Khomeini is respect him as a religious figure but ignore him as a political one. This requires a power base, but the above actions could grow one.

Following the Shah's death in 1980, Farah takes over on an original interim basis. If she can get the various factions of Iran's opposition that use legal methods to work together, than she can both push plans to help keep the nation moving, recognizing that her husband's actions in later years were in some cases a mistake. Assuming Carter still loses in 1980 (quite possible), then Reagan will probably see Iran as a useful bulwark against the Soviets to the north. Reza is crowned in early 1982, but Farah still stays a high-ranking and influential person.

So if your description is what happens, what does Iran look like in 2012? Is it in the top 5 world economies, as predicted? (there was a statistic the shah said in his interview that Iran would surpass UK economically in 5 years, then join the top 5 in the world within 15 years) Also, how is the Shah remembered by his people? Would any OTL pragmatic/reformist political leaders, such as Rafsanjani and Khatami, become PM or other high-ranking government officials? What happens to Khomeini, and Hussein-Ali Montazeri? What about extremists like Ahmadinejad? Finally, for the Iran-Iraq War, let's assume the following:

During the transfer-of-power of either Mohammad-Reza to Farah or Farah to Reza, let's say Saddam's Iraq strikes Kuwait, then Iran. The military buildups under the Shah have reaped similar benefits, including an extremely powerful military (much moreso than otl 1980s Iran). But Saddam has built up his military as well (more than otl). Do major powers take sides, and does the conflict spill over into Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, etc.? Finally, what is the result of the war? Let's say it lasts about 2 years culminating with a massive victory for Iran (maybe the US sides with Iran sending troops but USSR doesn't send aid or take sides, at least directly). Does Iran annex Iraq? Do they establish it as an independent monarchy (perhaps with a restoration of the old royal family) or maybe Reza puts his brother on the throne there? Or do they create a democratic system similar to otl Bush's Iraq? How does this affect regional politics?

Thanks guys
 
So if your description is what happens, what does Iran look like in 2012? Is it in the top 5 world economies, as predicted?

Probably not, those predictions were incredibly over-optimistic, and based on flawed assumptions. Iran may be one of the best economies in the region, and may be considered a newly developed economy by 2012, but not an economic superpower.

Does Iran annex Iraq? Do they establish it as an independent monarchy (perhaps with a restoration of the old royal family) or maybe Reza puts his brother on the throne there? Or do they create a democratic system similar to otl Bush's Iraq? How does this affect regional politics?

Iran would win an Iran-Iraq War with American support. I doubt many other regional powers would assist Iraq, and Soviet involvement would certainly not equal America's investment in Iran.

Iraq is not going to be annexed, that would be ludicrous. Sure, they are majority Shia, but Arab-Persian enmity is too well ingrained to have a functional state. Iraq would not accept Ali, a Persian boy-king, and he'd have to be propped up by bayonets. Restoring the Hashemites seems like a long shot as well.
 
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