What would make Britain negotiate in 1940-1?

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by wiking

For the purposes of this thread I am just interested in what it would take to get the UK to negotiate and accept an unfavorable deal that sees them recognize German conquests and the Fascist government in Vichy, give up Malta and return the Italians colonies they've captured (if they have), potentially give up Malta, and let the Germans trade in their Empire. The British would also have to restore German property they have seized.

It would leave the UK free and their empire intact. There would be no reparations and prisoners would be exchanged.

I'm interested in what it would take to do so. I like your analysis in your latest post.

I have a really hard time seeing this unless the invasion of the USSR is postponed a year. Here you are more looking for the nerves of Churchill, a large majority of the cabinet, or a majority of parliament to break. You will need a series of events where despair takes over, and this is more a subjective analysis you have to decide on than something that can be quantified which I am more comfortable.

All I can tell you is that in my TL with one half of the UK Merchant fleet on the sea floor and imports reduced by 70% and the blockade having over two years to break the will, it would have been about February 1918 when I had the UK leave the war on the U-boat war alone. It was literally running out of reserves combined with Ireland and Pakistan in open revolt that cause the UK to seek peace.

[ivanotter]

Blondie: Those were very good points.

These are the type of comments I believe this thread deserves.

So, which leader would consider the war lost, based on your comments:
Churchill?
Halifax?
Chamberlain?
...?

Maybe there is only one trigger really: If Churchill is convinced that US will not get involved, then he will look at a negotiated peace or maybe just a "de facto" peace - going from hot to cold.

The closing of the Suez may have to be a part of it, but that can be accomplished.

I also do believe it has to be after the fall of France. Nobody would and could believe that the French army, despite everything, being victorius in WWI, 100 divisions, could be defeated in 2 weeks.

It was a total shock and must have convinced Churchill, et. al that their time just could be up. If the US is not coming in, then it might just push the issue.

Churchill's claiming that he slept a fitful sleep for the first time in months after Pearl Harbour because "we have won", could be the other way round:

Churchill, after another sleeples night, realises that US is not interested and that the US population is dead set against any war in Europe again, starts the cabinet with "we cannot win, we could lose the war, but we can surely survive".

Now, maybe I am also a newbie (I am), and this has been redone 100 times over, but it still is a new twist to a continous question.

Ivan

[wiking]

Your source of information about Kinmen doesn't support claims.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

A lot. Hamburg, Bremen and Kiel ring a bell? Ports were on the priority target list due to the importance of German coastal shipping. We did a lousy job of closing them down though. In the far East we dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima and that didn’t close the port down either. In fact, I can't think of a single port that has ever been closed by bombardment.

Hamburg port wasn't the target of Allied efforts, its workers and war industries beyond just ship building were targeted. And the virtual destruction of the city crippled its war industries for months. Bremen was targeted for its Focke-Wulf facility and its oil facilities, which were successfully flattened. The port was left to Coastal Command to bomb, which was unable to handle the task presented to it. Later attempts by the USAAF to hit the port were aborted for a variety of reasons and focus was kept on the other war industries like its tank factory.
Kiel was heavily bombed and the town virtually wiped out, but I cannot find much information other than that.

None of these ports were importing goods from abroad. They built ships and were military bases, which found that their building and basing capacity was reduced due to bombing. Its not a proper comparison because we don't know what their import capacity was and how it was effected, because they weren't importing through these ports.

What I'm trying to get at is the the reduction of imports and suppression of the ability to bring in goods at a port facility; the US and RAF bombing of German ports in North Germany is a poor comparison because they weren't importing goods, they were exporting warships. Also the Allies didn't bomb the ports in Prussia along the Baltic that were actually importing goods like Swedish iron ore.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

That isn't correct. Coastal shipping was extremely important to the German war effort, in the Channel, North Sea and Baltic.
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What were they shipping in the English Channel??? They were sending Eboats, submarines, and warships, not trading vessels.

The North Sea didn't see much shipping at all for trade. Narvik in the winter for Swedish iron, but most of that went to Danish ports after 1939 or Baltic ports that were safe from Allied bombing until late 1944.

Really the only trade that was done was in the Baltic for Swedish iron.

Bombing German port cities was mostly either for stopping ship building or to hit the other industries in the cities, like in Hamburg or Bremen where there were either Luftwaffe or Heer production facilities. Or oil in both cities.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

1943. We had things down to a fine art by 1944. But, even earlier than that, we were still doing better than the Germans were two years earlier.

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The Luftwaffe was still a major threat both at night and during the day until it was finally gutted in 1944. That is what I meant. And yes the Allies had much greater numbers and bomb loads than anyone had in 1940, but still they lacked the concentration on critical targets like infrastructure and oil production until Autumn 1944.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

But, you have now diverted most of your bombing force away from bombing the port itself and turned it loose on the city as a whole. This dramatically reduces the force available to damage the port. Using London as an example – and this is by far the "best case" target set for the Germans since it is a huge target, at short range and with a very distinctive geographical feature to obtain target location – the port of London was never closed down despite the intensive bombing. Buried in your comment is another problem and that is bombing concentration. To stand any chance of damaging a port, the bombing has to be extremely accurate and extremely concentrated. To damage a city in the way you suggest, the bombing has to be dispersed over it. So, your two objectives are mutually exclusive.

Bombing port facilities means bombing a city. They are not mutually exclusive, because the warehouses are in the city, just as are the works. Bombing the city also allows for blocking the means of getting the imports off of the docks and to the trains for distribution to the rest of the country. Knocking out the quays is only part of the game and a small part, because the critical stuff is on the land. Especially starting fires in warehouses that spread to the city and damage/destroy important equipment is just as good if not better than knocking out the quays.

The bombing of London only rarely targeted the docks once the night blitz started. It was certainly a target, but various parts of the city, including its rail yards and the city center were targeted just as often. The reason the docks in London were not put out of action was that they were never bombed repeatedly, week after week. They were bombed once and then several weeks later perhaps 30-100 bombers tried again.

Dispersion is very bad when bombing a city, especially when trying to start fires, the most destructive part of bombing. So concentration is critical for all bombing activities. KGr100 demonstrated its accuracy at blind bombing that even RV Jones commented on. Yes this was a special unit and follow on units wouldn't be as effective, but as Conventry and the Dec. 29th bombing of London demonstrated, concentration could be achieved with practice, something the Luftwaffe would get lots of if they kept of the bombing offensive. Just as the Allies got better at bombing as time went on.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

This sounds like something Ponting came up with. He is not a reliable source and is not considered credible. He cherry-picks data to prove his own preconceptions and has a very string political axe to grind. The case here is an assumption (trekking is going to happen) based on an unreliable foundation. Therefore, the suggestion is hypothetical at best. You'll need to get actual productivity data to show this is actually a plausible outcome. By the way, all the existing evidence is that bombing campaigns didn't have the long-term effects you propose.

Provide a source the Ponting is not reliable, otherwise you are just stating a personal opinion that you don't like his conclusions.
Trekking did happen IOTL in both Germany and Britain.
http://www.amazon.com/Night-Blitz-19.../dp/0785816011
Its also mentioned here.

http://www.amazon.com/THE-MYTH-OF-BL...the+blitz+myth
Angus Calder also explores the sociological effects of the Blitz and supports Ponting's conclusions.

Both books cite documents in the British archives about the studies the government was doing in 1940 about civilian morale and the effects of the bombing on their will to work. Absenteeism went up dramatically in London and Liverpool with all of the bombing they got IOTL, which would be less than I'm proposing if a proper strategy is followed for a trade war.[/QUOTE]

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

There is no such thing as a small firestorm.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_...Fire_of_London

The largest continuous area of Blitz destruction anywhere in Britain occurred on this night, stretching south from Islington to the very edge of St Paul's Churchyard. The area destroyed was greater than that of the Great Fire of London in 1666. The raid was timed to coincide with a particularly low tide on the River Thames, making water difficult to obtain for fire fighting. Over 1500 fires were started, with many joining up to form three major conflagrations which in turn caused a firestorm that spread the flames further, towards St Paul's Cathedral.

Bibliography
Gaskin M. J. Blitz: The Story of 29 December 1940 (Faber, 2005; Harcourt, 2006)
Cyril Demarne The London Blitz, A Fireman's Story (After the Battle, 1991)

http://www.amazon.com/Night-Blitz-19.../dp/0785816011
John Ray mentions the fires reached 1000 degrees, which was the same as Hamburg and Dresden.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

As to loss rates, do you realize what a cumulative loss rate is and how it affects force levels? Using your one percent figure, assuming two missions per week and a six month bombing campaign, by the end of it you will have lost more than 60 percent of your bomber force – and, much more critically, more than 60 percent of your crews. Thus, your campaign will have effectively destroyed the German bomber force and the characteristics of your target set means that you will have lost the bombers without achieving the objective of closing the ports down. However, your basic figures here are inappropriate. You quote loss rates without considering the environment.

First of all that 1% was an average over 7 months. For the months of June-December losses were less than 1%, sometimes as low as .4%

Your numbers above assuming there are no additions to the bombing forces. The RAF worked out that 4% was the tipping point for a bomber force to exceed replacement ability. In 6 months how many new crews would be rotated in and how many replacement bomber would be produced? More than the 60% losses that you're talking about. Plus many of the losses of the aircraft were accidents after the bombers returned to base, not combate losses, which left the crews alive, but the bombers damage/written off. So the crews can keep flying with new aircraft. Plus without the losses of the Battle of Britain there would be more bombers and crews so that rotating units in and out of combat would reduce fatigue and reduce accidents over OTL and drop that historical loss rate further.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

Most of the German raids were aimed at

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

London which is only a few miles from the coast and a few minutes flying time in. That severely limited the time the British had to make interceptions and restricted the precision of their tracking data. If the bombers are ignoring London and going for targets in the north and Scotland, then we are in an entirely different environment. The bombers are over hostile territory for two and a half to three hours before reaching their targets as opposed to 15 – 20 minutes on a London raid (then they have to get out again). That alone will push their loss rate up dramatically. Then, the bombers will be accurately tracked and that greatly increases the efficiency of night fighters – in fact, as the Germans proved, day fighters under ground intercept control will do pretty well under those circumstances. Especially if the fighters have nothing better to do. Again we can take a lesson from bombing coastal cities in Germany here – targets analogous to London (ie a few miles from the coast) were considered milk runs, good for training newbie crews. Targets deep in Germany, analogous to your ports, were considered very hazardous.

Woah, most raids were NOT launched on London during the night Blitz. Especially after October-November it was maybe 1/3rd of raids. Targets all over Britain were bombed, even targets in Northern Ireland. Most missions even against Belfast and Glasgow lost no bombers to combat; in fact until 1941, that is after 6 months of sustained night raids, the greatest losses were due to accidents on landing, taking off, or mechanical failure. Combat losses only started to predominate in the loss of bombers in March-May 1941.

Also British nightfighters were awful IOTL until about 1942. Their radar units were bad, the Beaufighter wasn't available in numbers until 1941 and even then was having a hard time spotting bombers at night. In fact more bombers were lost to Hurricanes without radars than to radar equipped nightfighters. Of course the Hurricanes also crashed more often due to being unfamiliar with night flying, so it was actually costing more to use Hurricanes at night than helping. This was also the German experience when using the "Wild Boar" tactics in 1943-45 until those pilots were given extensive training in night flying. But remember that the British didn't have ground control intercept because their radar stations were only built on the coasts in 1940-1942, so could only track the Luftwaffe bombers headings while moving inland after which they had trouble using their mobile stations to track the bombers and guide anything, nightfighter or dayfighter to the bombers. Also the Wildesau tactics saw the fighters based to a city, not guided by ground radar.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

The 100 meter figure is incorrect; we can't achieve that level of precision today without using guided bombs. Suggesting that bombers can achieve better precision at night than in the day is also unsupportable; the suggestion ignores a wide range of factors that make 1940 night bombing a hit-or miss (mostly miss) affair. It's an easy mistake to make; the USAAC made the same basic error in the 1930s.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_...s#X-Ger.C3.A4t

X-Gerät was used to great effect in a series of raids known to the Germans as Moonlight Sonata, against Coventry, Wolverhampton and Birmingham. In the raid on Birmingham only KGr 100 was used, and British post-raid analysis showed that the vast majority of the bombs dropped were placed within 100 yards (91 m) of the midline of the Weser beam, spread along it a few hundred yards. This was the sort of accuracy that even daytime bombing could rarely achieve. A similar raid on Coventry with full support from other units dropping on their flares nearly destroyed the city centre.

References
-Jones, R. V. (1978). Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945. Coronet paperback edition 1979 ISBN 0-340-24169-1. First published 1978 Hamish Hamilton (HH), ISBN 0-241-89746-7.
-Price, Alfred (1979). Instruments Of Darkness: The History Of Electronic Warfare. Panther paperback edition
-Johnson, Brian. (1978). The Secret War. BBC.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

Actually, by then, the navigation systems used by the Germans were pretty much passé. Also, they are range-limited and range dependent. They were fine for attacking targets in the south of England; they were OK for attacking targets in the southern midlands. Beyond that, they were of marginal use.

They could be and were used against targets in Scotland and against Liverpool. Bombers could extend the range of the beams if they flew about 20,000 ft and then, because of the water features and reflected moonlight on the water, could then bomb the target by sight, especially when the defenses started using their spot lights, which the German night bombers often used to identify their targets. That's what the pathfinders were for, to specially identify targets through training; the Luftwaffe had these units in training since 1938.

BTW Conventry is not Southern midlands, its counted in the West midlands.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

Wikipedia is not an authoritative or reliable source; using it gets the scholar an F-grade. However, even assuming the information in it is accurate (a very big and unsupportable assumption) it misses the point completely. The thing about ports is that the damage to them is very easy to repair. In fact, a bombed port can be put back into operation within hours. There are two ways to close a port down. One is to send in demolition teams who can tape large charges of explosive to key structures and drop them into the port itself. In fairness the Germans were extremely good at that (combat engineers still marvel at how they managed to literally tie two cranes into a knot while dropping them into the basin). The other is to mine it. To do the latter one needs much more effective bombers than the Germans had in WW2.

Good thing I'm not submitting a thesis on a history forum. The information was used from Wikipedia because I have seen it corroborated in books on the subject, but its easier to copy and paste rather than order the books against from the library and type up sections. Also the articles are sourced. I've read the UK Civil Series history of WW2 of which there are about 50 volumes, one of which deals with shipping and the ports. It delves into the disruption to imports that were caused by both the bombing and the diverging of shipping to the Western ports, as the larger port of London and the various ports of Southern and Eastern England became too dangerous to import to.

Liverpool was badly disrupted by bombing and it was lucky that the raids lasted for a week, as it then gave them time to restore the port to operation. Raids like that week after week would leave it out of commission, which was the conclusion of the author describing the effects in the UK Civil Series on Port Operations in the war.

Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War, Behrens, C. B. A. London: HMSO and Longmans, Green, 1955

As to mining, the Germans had bombers that could deploy the mines to all the corners of the UK, but sufficient bombers were not tasked with mining, despite requests from the Navy and the Luftwaffe Naval Bombers themselves, who were often tasked with bombing land targets, rather than mining.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

The fundamental presumption that is false here is that the air operations take place in a void. You're blaming Goering for the dispersion of effort when in fact its inherent in running a war. The idea that an air force can concentrate all its efforts on a single objective to the exclusion of all others is the sort of thing that war gamers come up with and does not reflect what goes on in the real world. In reality, any given air campaign takes place in an environment where there are multiple conflicting demands for the use of resources and in which compromises have to be executed between the varying demands of interested parties.

Goering was seriously at fault because he refused to listen to the plans presented to him by people he tasked with developing said plans, Hellmuth Felmy being one of them. Hitler asked Goering for a plan in the strategic crisis of post-French conquest 1940. Hitler didn't have a plan and was asking everyone for one. Goering did not understand air strategy and his chief-of-staff was selected because he was a yes-man. Hitler also didn't understand airpower either and dithered while the Luftflotte commanders improvised their own plans. Luftwaffe intelligence wanted to mine ports and bomb them, while Jeschonnek, who clearly did not understand strategic operations, went along with Goering's 'let's bomb everything!' idea.

Had a serious commander like Wever been around a serious plan would have been developed pre-war, probably Felmy's one, and stuck with. It would have been offered up and pushed instead of letting Hitler, who pretty much stated he didn't know what to do, and the Army decide to try and plan what the strategy against Britain would be despite the Navy and elements of the Luftwaffe presenting offering plans. Goering just tried to please Hitler and ordered whatever the Fuhrer wanted (that is a gross simplification, but the result was pretty much that).

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

Read a history of the allied bomber forces and the policy decisions that took place over bombing priorities and you'll begin to get the picture. It's not just a question of waving a hand and stating that you'll only be bombing ports. It's a much more complex political environment than that. You yourself proved that when you brought in the transportation and dehousing issues. By doing so you turned your campaign of blockade by bombardment into a generalized assault on the cities – which the Luftwaffe did and failed at.

The Allied bomber offensive was very different from the Luftwaffe one, both its politics and goals. It is irrelevant to discussion, as reading up on the strategic crisis in the German high command of 1940 is pertinent to the discussion as it let's us identify what was simply unchangeable or was possible in the context of planing.
The German bombing IOTL was literally to bomb anything and everything. Groups of 20-30 bombers would attack targets every night all over Britain in pin prick raids, sometimes with even single bombers attacking targets. Efforts were dispersed instead of focusing on the one thing that both the Navy and competent planners in the Luftwaffe were pushing for: a trade war. The plan was there, but it was never implemented because the two guys that actually decided things, Goering and Hitler, had no concept of air strategy and surrounded themselves by yes-men to solidify their political power and avoid rivals.

This is why Wever was so important. His death triggered a crisis in the Luftwaffe and resulted in Goering feeling he needed to actively participate in commanding the Luftwaffe, but still was too lazy to actually do any planning, so he appointed a sycophant so he could swoop in and give orders when it pleased him. The problem was the resulting command and planning fragmentation crippled the Luftwaffe after 1936.

Had Wever lived none of this would have happened because Wever was a competent professional that kept Goering out of the Luftwaffe and Goering trusted him to run and command things. Plus as an early Nazi Wever was tight with Hitler and Goering, both of whom had serious respect for and deference to on matters of the Luftwaffe, so had their unlimited confidence, especially as Wever had been Ludendorff's adjunct in WW1, and Ludendorff was Hitler's political inspiration. This connection, plus his politics helped make Wever a person with the political clout and also competence to have his plans enacted when he pushed for them.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

There's another problem – assuming that the figure of 95 percent is correct – it applies to what happened. If those ports did have their capacity severely reduced, the British aren't going to simply break their pencils in half, throw them in the air and give up. They'll find other ports to take up the slack and there are plenty of choices. The British used key port complexes because they were the most efficient. If they become less efficient, emphasis shifts to the next most efficient and so on.

Except its not exactly possible to find new ports. The entire reason that these Western Ports were selected was that the other ones were too small and too endangered to use. Plus the rail links were lacking for other ports to handle the critical volume of imports that was coming into places like Liverpool.

Inland Transport, Savage, Christopher I. London: HMSO, 1957
This book is part of the UK Civil Series, the official history of various parts of the war economy in Britain during WW2. The ports that were used were the only ones that could handle the volume of rail transport needed to bring in the vast number of imports critical to keep Britain in the war. And even then the British government had very badly planned their rail transport scheme and had massive trouble actually getting the imports out of the ports and to the rest of the country. It took until the Blitz was called off to actually be able to get the rail system sorted out, which was helped by the German bombers being in Russia, so it opened up more ports for coastal traffic so that the rail roads wouldn't have to handle everything.

London was the only port big enough besides Liverpool to handle huge volumes of trade, but because the Thames was regularly mined, German bombers hit shipping in the Channel so heavily that it was stopped during daylight, and the docks were bombed enough to limit capacity that it could not be safely used for trans-Atlantic imports.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

I know where you are coming from on this and I sympathize; it really is extremely hard to find a way of knocking Britain out of the war in 1940. The problem is that there just isn't a way of doing it that has any reasonable shred of plausibility. Your port blockade by bombardment is probably less plausible than the unmentionable sea mammal. It assumes a gross over-exaggeration of Luftwaffe capabilities, a gross understatement of British capabilities, a complete overstatement of the vulnerability of ports to destruction and a complete understatement of the complexities of the political environment when planning a bombing campaign.

I agree that it is a heavy task to explore this subject. I've read over 150 books and scholarly articles about this subject and am still learning more all the time.
I have to seriously disagree with you about the plausibility of Britain being forced to negotiate. She was vulnerable to a trade war, as concluded by her own government post-war with her Civil Series that explores and lays out the numbers.
The Luftwaffe, the rest of the Wehrmacht, and her economic planners (Goering) made tremendous numbers of bad decisions during the as the Bundeswehr's official history of the War concludes, among others.
The Luftwaffe had tremendous potential in the strategic role, but lost its sole proponent of competence, General Wever, in 1936 and badly evolved as a result. Military and political incompetence kept the stunted Luftwaffe of OTL from even achieving its full potential.

I agree that OTL Luftwaffe would have a hard time achieving the task I am suggesting for them, but it was their only hope of achieving success, because Britain was more vulnerable than you are allowing for. I've researched this up and down and Britain was seriously vulnerable, but the Wehrmacht and Nazi state was far too fragmented to even attempt to seriously exploit her weaknesses or even really to identify them (or at least to listen to those that had). A better plan actually being implemented and cooperation with the Kriegsmarine would have put very heavy pressure on the British vulnerability, her reliance on imports. Whether the Luftwaffe of OTL could have been able to inflict enough damage to force Churchill or his successor to negotiate is a toss up, but an earlier POD that leaves the Luftwaffe's command and production planning intact, which is achieved with a surviving Wever, would result in major improvements in the Luftwaffe's performance and size. That Luftwaffe would have had a better than good chance to cripple Britain.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

I'd rephrase the question differently; how much can port capacity be reduced in ways that cannot be compensated by making alternative arrangements. In this case, alternative arrangements would mean using other ports, repairing damage etc. My point is that I can't think of a single case where a port's operations have been inhibited by direct assault via air or artillery. Murmansk, for example, was under fire for an extended period in World War Two yet operations through it were never seriously inhibited.

Which ports could handle what Liverpool could? London is the only one and was too dangerous to use because it was so exposed.

As to Murmansk the Axis wasn't able to bring major weapons to bear because of the terrain and weather. There weren't enough roads and low caliber and limited munition mountain artillery was all that was available. Some 50 aircraft were also used, but not in concentrated groups and were frequently grounded by weather, as it was in the arctic circle. The port wasn't interdicted because the attacking force was far far too weak and ill-supplied to do much of anything.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

The point was that it was a massive amount of projectiles thrown at a relatively small target and it didn't stop the port operating Even small ports like that do have infrastructure; its called people. What is significant is that the artillery fire didn't stop them working. So, how much less effective will scattered, sporadic night bombing be?

Again I didn't find anything in your article that dealt with fire on the port. And the beaches of the south part of the island were turned into ports, which could handle small sized supplies brought in by special ships. Where can the British do this? What volume of heavy good could be brought on to a beach with her existing merchant fleet that required special port equipment, quays, and harbors not to mention rail infrastructure to distribute the imports brought in!

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

I agree with you on the infrastructure question but things like cranes and derricks are very difficult to destroy. Studying aerial photographs of bombed ports (See RF-101C Operations In South East Asia by Greenhalgh) its interesting to note that the cranes and derricks are still intact while buildings are not. The metal lattice framework of a crane is inherently blast-resistant. There's another point here; the bombing will be at night only. The collective description of a Heinkel He-111 crew that tries to fly to Tyneside in daylight is "the late lamented". That means all the daylight hours, the port will be running at fall capacity. if the bombing is too bad, the ships simply don't come in at night.

Fire was very effective at destroying metal equipment, as both the British and Germans found out when they were on the receiving end of bombing. HE did little against putting gear out of action, but when fire was used it wrecked metal equipment mainly because the incendiaries were chemical like thermite and phosphorus. AFAIK the US wasn't firebombing ports nor were the Chinese.

The bombing would reduce operational capacity, and as the British were lacking necessary ports in 1940-1 they had a large wait to unload in their large ports like Liverpool where there was a 10 day wait to discharge oil.
These ships need to huddle somewhere and if its near the ports at night, naval bombers can follow the regular bombers and hunt ships by the light of fires.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

The bombing will also be sporadic. Assuming German bomber crews flew two missions a week (which seems to be about right) and there are three primary target areas, that means one gets visited every ten days or so. That's not going to kill the port; they're too easy to repair for that. Yes, there'll be goods lost in warehouses and so on but here's another thought. Without the Battle of Britain drinking fuel and other supplies, demand will be reduced as well.

So you are suggesting that they concentrate for one big mission twice a week. This means that if the Luftwaffe of OTL engaged in a Night Blitz in August, that is avoiding the Battle of Britain, they would have about 1400 bombers. Assume 60% serviceability in the aftermath of conquering France. That's 840 bombers. An 840 bomber raid on London would mean about 1008 tons of bombs, HE, AP, and incendiaries if we assume that Do-17s are 20% of the force as they were during the Battle of Britain, 50% He111s and 30% Ju88s. The Do17 can take 1/2 ton to Liverpool, the He111 1 ton, and the Ju88 2 tons.

1008 tons of bombs is a pretty heavy raid twice a week. The RAF didn't achieve raids like that until 1942. In fact the Luftwaffe only did a raid of that size maybe once over Britain during the whole war. Assuming two targets get hit by that per week at least one city is catching 2016 tons every two weeks. That would probably be Liverpool, because it was so important. So Glasgow and Bristol get it every other week, while Liverpool takes a 1008 ton raid or more, as the Do17s are replaced by Ju88s in 1940, every week. Being generous with bomb filling, that's about 604 tons of pure high explosive. Otherwise we could assume half HE, half incendiary so that's about 300 tons pure HE and 504 tons of Thermite and White Phosphorus.

With one ton being 2000 pounds, that's 600,000 pounds of pure high explosives and 1,008,000 pounds of incendiaries. High concentration of bombers over one target at one time increases the damage due to fires not getting put out before they expand and the HE whipping the fires into conflagrations, plus exposing the innards of buildings to the fires so that they have more fuel to burn.

Week after week that's going to take a serious toll on the British ports and the cities they are literally a part of.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

I agree there is a graduated scale here and that if the Luftwaffe did make a concerted, sustained effort to pound the ports, it will have some effect. However, I believe that effect will fall far short of being critical and a combination of dispersal, repair and defense will compensate for much of the losses. In short, a nuisance in seriousness ranging from ephemeral to irritating but a long, long way from a war-winner,

As I said, if Miss Buffy can't close a port, who can?

When the only ports Britain had to import from the rest of the world were already operating under capacity and had a hard time moving their goods out of the cities they were attached to, a bombing campaign is going to destroy those goods, making the British have to ship in replacements for the losses; this was at a time when they were running out of cash fast and Lend Lease wasn't available until March. Even they the British still had to pay cash for months, but as of January 1941 they ran out of money and were using up Belgian gold in the US banks.

Repeated heavy strikes are going to cause more damage than can be repaired by the time the next comes. I'm not saying the ports will be destroyed in one strike, but the effect of repeated strikes reducing capacity with every strike and repairs not fixing the damage completely when the next raid comes means that the repairs have to start over and from a low point. Eventually it will be degraded to the point that the port and its transportation from the port to the rail heads will be non-functional. If left alone they would recover, but continue raids would prevent that recovery.

Originally Posted by Bill Garvin

I think you'll find it does; the point is that despite that massive concentration of artillery fire, the port kept working and materials kept flowing in. It doesn't prove the point on its own but as one point on the graph (down in the corner, tiny facility, massive bombardment) and taken into context of all the other examples of ports that have not been closed by bombing, its part of a valid overall picture. I've given you plenty of other examples of attempts to close ports by bombing that failed despite a much greater effort and capability than anything the Luftwaffe could achieve. Haiphong kept working and it was importing all the things you list (or it did until we mined it which is another matter entirely).

The onus is now on you to prove that a port can be permanently by bombing and you haven't done that yet.

What other examples of ports not closed by repeated bombings to you have? Murmansk wasn't seriously interdicted, Haiphong was hit by small bomber raids and was more often than not off the acceptable bombing target list. Reading about Linebacker, Linebacker II, and Rolling Thunder and it was a restricted target that was only occasionally bombed. The mining worked because bombing it consistently was never tried. Honestly the best policy would be to mine and bomb the ports to maximize disruptions to shipping.

[Dan Reilly The Great]

The problem is that the Germans are literally in a no-win situation as far as the OK goes. Without drastically changing the way the war was fought and who was involved(on both sides), every possible situatuion that could have realistically led to the British sueing for peace would have required ASB help for the Germans to achieve. A complete failure at Dunkirk wouldn't have done it, driving the RAF out of southern England wouldn't either, and neither would have an attempt at sealion.


Not to mention the fact that the Reich was not set up to fight the kind of war that would have led to peace in the west before 43. The KM was the most poorly funded and equipped branch and even if it wasn't it only stood a slightly better than average chance of actually starving the UK into submission. In fact achieving such a goal would have required them to completely reform their entire strategic doctrine and force composition from what it was IOTL.

The LW was likewise incapable of doing more than pissing off the British further. In order to win an offensive air war, you need relative parity in terms of numbers, pilot quality, and plane quality and considerable superiority in at least one of those categories. While it could be argued that the Germans did in fact have relative parity with the RAF in those three areas, they most certainly lacked any kind of significant superiority in any of them.

Also, the Germans had little interest in pursuing a full scale campaign fighting the British in their colonial regions, and lacked the real ability to hurt the British in their colonies due to a lack of naval capabilities in those areas. Seriously threatening the British in North Africa or the Middle East any more than OTL without completely derailing Nazi plans for Eastern Europe would have required almost ASB levels of luck.


Worse is that if the Germans did in fact manage to extract a high enough price in terms of blood and starvation from the populace of the British Isles, it might have actually pushed the US into more of an interventionist attitude toward the European theatre.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by ivanotter

Blondie: Those were very good points.

These are the type of comments I believe this thread deserves.

So, which leader would consider the war lost, based on your comments:
Churchill?
Halifax?
Chamberlain?
...?

I see this decision being less person driven than event driven. Lets say Wiking does massive damage to the ports, and the fuel (oil) supply is the most critical resource. Now obviously, the UK will keep enough reserves for the anti-Sealion operation for how every many days they think stopping it will take. So lets say 5 days of ship fuel and 10 days for airplanes. So rough TL of what it looks like, don't get too tied up on the exact figures.

Day X. Due to ports being down capacity by 50%, oil received is down 50%. The High Command starts to make hard choice. With some hard choice, the UK can endure indefinitely. Bomber command is put on a brutal fuel budget. The RN has to start conserving fuel by being more careful with patrols. Admirals have to think of fuel consumption first, when planning operations that are not responding to SeaLion. Churchill is making heroic speeches. The diaries read much like OTL.

Day Y: Due to more bad things happening, fuel reserves keep dwindling. Even more hard choice made. While Churchill is still optimistic, some leaders are not. You get some discussions of how to moderate the war, radical concession to USA to get them to join, concession to Stalin. None of this is public. The military analysis start to have notice minority that says we will lose, but it is suppressed. Quality of pilots training begins to suffer to conserve fuel.

Day Y + 25: Whether through bad luck or deliberate action, there will be a dramatic and unforeseen event. Lets say major series of raid over 3 day hitting fuel storage for the navy. Day 25 is first day of bombing. Senior leaders diaries generally optimistic, but express concerns over the coming winter.

Day Y+27: Sea Lords understand they lack fuel to execute anti-SeaLion plan. To rebuild fuel supplies, non-coal using ships are confined to whatever is nearest port.

Day Y+28: Sea Lords meet with Cabinet. Say RAF has to carry load for next 15 days if Germans come. Few hours later RAF leaders are at meeting, and say then can stop it, but don't sound like the fully believe it. First day of war that majority of diaries of these leaders say we will lose. Some diaries are 100% optimistic.

Day Y+29: Overnight, several cabinet leaders decide the peace deal on table from Germany has to be taken. Some hold out. Vicious infighting. Regularly scheduled Privy Council meeting is most heated in memory. King is concerned. During the day, some other setback , but not know at this high a level.

Day Y+30: King learns of this setback and of filtering of negative news by Churchill. Churchill is losing support of Cabinet. The King being the only one not immediately tied to the failed decisions, and for the good of the country, dismisses Churchill. New PM accepts terms.

Don't get too tied up in specific, such as what the King do, look more at the pace. IMO, it is likely under 7 days from "everything is ok, we can fight on and win" to "It is over, we have to accept the deal". It will be event driven, so it might not be the King acting, but the Cabinet, House of Commons, or even military commanders.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

I see this decision being less person driven than event driven. Lets say Wiking does massive damage to the ports, and the fuel (oil) supply is the most critical resource. Now obviously, the UK will keep enough reserves for the anti-Sealion operation for how every many days they think stopping it will take. So lets say 5 days of ship fuel and 10 days for airplanes. So rough TL of what it looks like, don't get too tied up on the exact figures.

Day X. Due to ports being down capacity by 50%, oil received is down 50%. The High Command starts to make hard choice. With some hard choice, the UK can endure indefinitely. Bomber command is put on a brutal fuel budget. The RN has to start conserving fuel by being more careful with patrols. Admirals have to think of fuel consumption first, when planning operations that are not responding to SeaLion. Churchill is making heroic speeches. The diaries read much like OTL.

Day Y: Due to more bad things happening, fuel reserves keep dwindling. Even more hard choice made. While Churchill is still optimistic, some leaders are not. You get some discussions of how to moderate the war, radical concession to USA to get them to join, concession to Stalin. None of this is public. The military analysis start to have notice minority that says we will lose, but it is suppressed. Quality of pilots training begins to suffer to conserve fuel.

Day Y + 25: Whether through bad luck or deliberate action, there will be a dramatic and unforeseen event. Lets say major series of raid over 3 day hitting fuel storage for the navy. Day 25 is first day of bombing. Senior leaders diaries generally optimistic, but express concerns over the coming winter.

Day Y+27: Sea Lords understand they lack fuel to execute anti-SeaLion plan. To rebuild fuel supplies, non-coal using ships are confined to whatever is nearest port.

Day Y+28: Sea Lords meet with Cabinet. Say RAF has to carry load for next 15 days if Germans come. Few hours later RAF leaders are at meeting, and say then can stop it, but don't sound like the fully believe it. First day of war that majority of diaries of these leaders say we will lose. Some diaries are 100% optimistic.

Day Y+29: Overnight, several cabinet leaders decide the peace deal on table from Germany has to be taken. Some hold out. Vicious infighting. Regularly scheduled Privy Council meeting is most heated in memory. King is concerned. During the day, some other setback , but not know at this high a level.

Day Y+30: King learns of this setback and of filtering of negative news by Churchill. Churchill is losing support of Cabinet. The King being the only one not immediately tied to the failed decisions, and for the good of the country, dismisses Churchill. New PM accepts terms.

Don't get too tied up in specific, such as what the King do, look more at the pace. IMO, it is likely under 7 days from "everything is ok, we can fight on and win" to "It is over, we have to accept the deal". It will be event driven, so it might not be the King acting, but the Cabinet, House of Commons, or even military commanders.

Good analysis.

[Jukra]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

I see this decision being less person driven than event driven. Lets say Wiking does massive damage to the ports, and the fuel (oil) supply is the most critical resource. Now obviously, the UK will keep enough reserves for the anti-Sealion operation for how every many days they think stopping it will take. So lets say 5 days of ship fuel and 10 days for airplanes. So rough TL of what it looks like, don't get too tied up on the exact figures.

Well written thoughtful analysis, but according to this forum it is of course impossible since Churchill stated in his speeches that Britain would not surrender nor make conditional peace. In this he might be the only politician in history actually make binding resolutions during fluid political situations in public statements

But in order to make things truly unpalatable to British public as well I think coastal convoys would have to be targeted. This would destroy the energy production in Southern England and lead into crippling problems. Stopping coastal traffic is possible with just somewhat different strategic use of resources, such as withdrawing U-boats from overdimensioned training effort etc.

[Cockroach]

Originally Posted by wiking

Good analysis.

Originally Posted by Jukra

Well written thoughtful analysis, but according to this forum it is of course impossible since Churchill stated in his speeches that Britain would not surrender nor make conditional peace.

I see our professional Germano-wank brigade is out in force.

Though, at least this thread seems to have attracted the better class of 'em and we don't have Overon proposing a scenario dependent on every British officer and politician taking up lead-eating as a hobby circa 1918 (while the corresponding Germans' develop genius level mental abilities...) or esl gibbering about how a German destroyer running from a British trawler constitutes a German naval victory to rival Trafalgar.


Onto the actual topic at hand; I would agree given the handwaves of the Luftwaffe neutralizing all major British ports and the poms' suffering chronic bad luck with their fuel storage and stray bombs Blondie's scenario looks plausible. There's just the question of the two handwaves...

On the Luftwaffe's ability to neutralize British ports...

The Liverpool Blitz certainly indicates the Luftwaffe could hit a British port hard, but the question is how many of the cargo berths put out of action during the Liverpool Blitz were out of action beyond a couple of days? I mean it's fairly easy to force the dock-side handling equipment (cranes, etc.) to be shut down temporarily (smash up power cables; water and gas pipes; etc. elsewhere in the city) but it's rather more difficult to actually destroy or damage the equipment in such a way as to disable the berth long-term (pretty much requires a direct hit or near miss with a bomb...).

There's also the question of how long the Germans could sustain such an effort. The Liverpool May Blitz lasted 7 days and if, wikipedia is to be believed, involved the use of 681 bombers... I don't have a detailed OOB of German air strength in May 1941, but if it's anything like it was at the height of the Battle of Britain that represents roughly two thirds of the twin-engined level bombers the Germans could deploy. Now, losses aren't going to be too bad (British Night Fighters are still nothing to write home about) but crew exhaustion will be (particualrly if trying to run operations against multiple major port in parallel...).

As for the second handwave, examine virtually any of the Pearl Harbor 3rd Strike threads buried througout this forum and you'll find people pointing out that oil storage is designed with the risks of fire in mind, so you can't count on a handful of hits to cause the total destruction of an entire tank-farm... and the level of precision to take out all tanks would require a passing ASB to give the Germans a plentiful supply of LGBs...

[ivanotter]

Blondie, Wiking,

Good analysis, and a fair way of looking at it, interms of being event driven.

HOWEVER, people make decisions, so we have to look at personalities sooner or later.

Instead of focusing on details in terms of raids, let's look at the events as they may have come across:

1) Fall of France, major shock, hardly possible to comprehend
2) Churchill is new in the PM seat (being a minister years back is not enough experience)
3) Hardly any equipment salvaged from Dynamo
4) Constant LW air raids (whether effective or not is besides the point if they create "havoc" with the mind)
5) Japan's goals are becoming clearer, UK expecting a conflict in Asia sooner rather than later
6) Fuel situation not good at all
7) It is clear that US will not be a part of any European war
8) Kennedy is talking the US out of it al, claiming UK is lost (Kennedy is not just anybody. He was listened to, also in the UK)
9) Pilot training and RN sorties are becoming problematic

All of these things, piled on top of each other, may convince cabinet that "We cannot win, we could lose the war"

The interesting point here is: There need not be any negotiations!

My pet poject is a de facto stalemate. The whole thing just ending up in nothing. No negiotiations, no attacks, just dwindling down, damp squid.

How would the British react to this? just a fizzle. After all, the Phoney war was acceptable?

Who of the British leders would go for a stalemate?

Ivan

[SAVORYapple]

Originally Posted by Cockroach

On the Luftwaffe's ability to neutralize British ports...

The Liverpool Blitz certainly indicates the Luftwaffe could hit a British port hard, but the question is how many of the cargo berths put out of action during the Liverpool Blitz were out of action beyond a couple of days? I mean it's fairly easy to force the dock-side handling equipment (cranes, etc.) to be shut down temporarily (smash up power cables; water and gas pipes; etc. elsewhere in the city) but it's rather more difficult to actually destroy or damage the equipment in such a way as to disable the berth long-term (pretty much requires a direct hit or near miss with a bomb...).

what about simply having many ships caught during bombings and thus blocking the port mouths, or at least making navigation difficult?

It's not just a port's infrastructure that affects unloading speed, one also needs to take into account clogged shipping (a sunken ship blocking traffic would be difficult to remove), and also morale. would you work on the docks if you had to deal with constant German aircraft strafings and bombings?

or, perhaps, a suicide commando team (shipped in by U-boat) doing some sabotage?

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by SAVORYapple

what about simply having many ships caught during bombings and thus blocking the port mouths, or at least making navigation difficult?

It's not just a port's infrastructure that affects unloading speed, one also needs to take into account clogged shipping (a sunken ship blocking traffic would be difficult to remove), and also morale. would you work on the docks if you had to deal with constant German aircraft strafings and bombings?

or, perhaps, a suicide commando team (shipped in by U-boat) doing some sabotage?

I love the concept of a better Special Forces type operation in WW2 by the Germans, and I have played around with the concept of a WW2 TL based on an elite group of naval officers with some access to Hitler. But to be fair to the UK, this requires a second major POD to both Buff the Luftwaffe and the Navy.

I can't really see it winning the war with totally changing OTL, but it could extend the war and cause great grief to the UK. Hitler had little naval knowledge, and he relied on advisers in a ad hoc way, so it would be easy to write. And as long as these advisers were willing to use equipment from Allies such as the Italian Special Forces or equipment from Japan, the technical hurdles are easy to overcome. The difficulty is that even a brilliant series of attacks that hits Scapa Flow, Liverpool and a few other locations matters little if Hitler still turns east. Say we double the success of the Italian special forces and call it the German special forces success in 40/41. The German Navy is too weak to capitalize and the UK pulls forces the Pacific.

In most variations of the TL Wiking is working on or my better German Navy TL, the butterflies flow in such a way to benefit Japan via a lot fewer forces in Asia by the UK. It is hard for the Japanese to go much faster than OTL initially, but by the April 1942 timeframe, the UK would have very few naval forces in the Indian Ocean and fewer around Australia. Realistically, Japan is not going to take India, but Port Moresby and the Solomon Island fall without resistance and place like French South Pacific may fall. Then at some point, the USA curb stomps Japan. It would take a second butterfly of FDR moving forces to the Pacific, to have a big help for Germany.

And it is also just as likely FDR makes peace with Japan instead of Churchill with Hitler. FDR would not want to do it, but there were compromise positions available with Japan between May 1940 and December 1941.

[Devolved]

Originally Posted by Cockroach

I see our professional Germano-wank brigade is out in force.


Onto the actual topic at hand; I would agree given the handwaves of the Luftwaffe neutralizing all major British ports and the poms' suffering chronic bad luck with their fuel storage and stray bombs Blondie's scenario looks plausible. There's just the question of the two handwaves...

On the Luftwaffe's ability to neutralize British ports...

The Liverpool Blitz certainly indicates the Luftwaffe could hit a British port hard, but the question is how many of the cargo berths put out of action during the Liverpool Blitz were out of action beyond a couple of days? I mean it's fairly easy to force the dock-side handling equipment (cranes, etc.) to be shut down temporarily (smash up power cables; water and gas pipes; etc. elsewhere in the city) but it's rather more difficult to actually destroy or damage the equipment in such a way as to disable the berth long-term (pretty much requires a direct hit or near miss with a bomb...).

There's also the question of how long the Germans could sustain such an effort. The Liverpool May Blitz lasted 7 days and if, wikipedia is to be believed, involved the use of 681 bombers... I don't have a detailed OOB of German air strength in May 1941, but if it's anything like it was at the height of the Battle of Britain that represents roughly two thirds of the twin-engined level bombers the Germans could deploy. Now, losses aren't going to be too bad (British Night Fighters are still nothing to write home about) but crew exhaustion will be (particualrly if trying to run operations against multiple major port in parallel...).

The German-wank brigade are the only ones who would even bother to try to make a thread like this work. It's like a dragon they have to slay.

Delivered in a William Shatner/Kirk style:

"There.....must....be .....some.....way....to......defeat.....the.....Br itish...in

19....hundred....and....40"

Furrowed brows and people rubbing their chins.

McCoy suggests

"Maybe Jim, we should change our tactics. Bomb the ports every night until they run out of supplies"

Spock speaks.

"An illogical suggestion as I would expect from the Doctor. We don't have enough aircraft to maintain a continuous pressure on ALL THE major western ports and if the British knew we were attacking the same targets each night they would deploy more night fighters along the flight paths and stronger AA defences that would lead to a steady increase in our attrition rate while the damage done would progressively fall. It's called the law of diminishing returns"

Finally Hitler bursts in to the room.

"You fools. I'm not interested in diverting all my resources into a prolonged blockade of Britain that could last more than a year and maybe even two.

The ONLY REASON I wanted a war in the first place was to go east and destroy the Jewish Bolsheviks.

WHY would I want to waste so much time on trying to defeat a country that is in no position to attack us for years. The real enemy is Stalin and his asiatic hordes that have just threatened our oil supplies in Romania by annexing Bessarabia!!

Just bomb London for a few months and see if they negotiate and let the U Boats have their fun but it makes no difference to me if they surrender or not. I want the Army and the Luftwaffe on the Soviet frontier and ready to go by spring 1941"

Meeting ends.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

I love the concept of a better Special Forces type operation in WW2 by the Germans, and I have played around with the concept of a WW2 TL based on an elite group of naval officers with some access to Hitler. But to be fair to the UK, this requires a second major POD to both Buff the Luftwaffe and the Navy.

The Germans did eventually develop their own frogmen, marine commandos, and had the Marinesturmkompanie in 1939.



I have no idea where to begin with this nonsense.

Originally Posted by Devolved

"An illogical suggestion as I would expect from the Doctor. We don't have enough aircraft to maintain a continuous pressure on ALL THE major western ports and if the British knew we were attacking the same targets each night they would deploy more night fighters along the flight paths and stronger AA defences that would lead to a steady increase in our attrition rate while the damage done would progressively fall. It's called the law of diminishing returns"

Except that the British Nightfighters were not successful despite the Germans operating at night from 1939 on over Britain, demonstrating they had the power to accurately bomb at night. From June 1940 on they were consistently bombing Britain until May 1941 and then continued in a diminished capacity until 1943 when British defenses and commitments elsewhere finally made bombing prohibitive.
British AAA was useless until late in the war; if you go to Hyperwar.org there is a book about night defenses in Britain and they discuss how even in May 1941 after nearly 11 months of sustained bombardment at night there was still a massive shortage of AAA because it wasn't useful enough to spend resources on. Nightfighters were even worse until 1941 when better Airborne Interception Radar appeared and even then it was a minor source of losses. Dayfighters used at night were more effective, though that because there were many more than nightfighters. It took over 6 months IOTL for the British to even start to inflict losses greater than the number of accidents per mission on the German bombers even intermittently and even then there it was purely a matter of luck. As late as May 1941 there were still whole several hundred bomber raids that took no combat losses.

And of course this assumes that the reduction in imports doesn't affect British production and prevent them from building up this massive defensive wall that you're positing.

Originally Posted by Devolved

"You fools. I'm not interested in diverting all my resources into a prolonged blockade of Britain that could last more than a year and maybe even two.

The ONLY REASON I wanted a war in the first place was to go east and destroy the Jewish Bolsheviks.

WHY would I want to waste so much time on trying to defeat a country that is in no position to attack us for years. The real enemy is Stalin and his asiatic hordes that have just threatened our oil supplies in Romania by annexing Bessarabia!!

Just bomb London for a few months and see if they negotiate and let the U Boats have their fun but it makes no difference to me if they surrender or not. I want the Army and the Luftwaffe on the Soviet frontier and ready to go by spring 1941"

Hitler didn't just want an eastern front campaign without dealing with the British first; the problem was that the Soviets were getting too aggressive and Hitler thought he could not afford to wait or the Soviets would attack him first. Still, he did commit the majority of the Luftwaffe against Britain from July 1940 to the end of the war. In June 1941 about 50% of the Luftwaffe was engage against the British. At least until December 1941 units were being rotated into the Air Fleets engaging Britain, Hitler did have the will to continue to engage Britain with the majority of the Luftwaffe until about May 1941 when the Eastern Front required about half of the Luftwaffe.
Yes, Hitler had little idea of air strategy and let his subordinates deal with Britain after meddling for a month or two in matters. Goering was the real culprit for having no idea what to do and just looking to Hitler for direction. Had a serious plan been offered like the one I'm suggesting there is no reason why Hitler would just dismiss it, but he would set a time limit to give it a chance to work, because beyond that LW units were needed for the East.
In fact IOTL it was only the request of Mussolini for LW units for the Mediterranean and the Balkan crisis that LW units were peeled off of bombing Britain before 1941; without those issues popping up Hitler wouldn't have actually taken bombers from the effort against the UK proper until May 1941.

[Cockroach]

Originally Posted by SAVORYapple

what about simply having many ships caught during bombings and thus blocking the port mouths, or at least making navigation difficult?

Liverpool: Channel order of 1-2km wide.
Bristol (and surrounding lesser ports): Open more or less directly onto open waters.
Clydeside: Ditto.
Last two are pretty much right out, first one requires getting a ship bang in the middle of the main channel, and even then is a nuisence (go round it slowly) rather than a firm blockage.

would you work on the docks if you had to deal with constant German aircraft strafings and bombings?

Moral is a rather more slippery issue than the dirct physical damage, and I admit could be a cause for British collapse. However, it is still subject to the Germans' ability to keep the pressure up, which, if they're trying to keep hitting multiple ports I'd be somewhat doubtful of.
Strafing would be out... not something you do with medium bombers at night. And if the Germans try during the day... well, they got a Spitfire or Hurricane on their arse blazing .303 calibre death from eight Browning guns.

or, perhaps, a suicide commando team (shipped in by U-boat) doing some sabotage?

But to do any meaningful damage you'd be needing to hit multiple berths at each port which ups the manpower required, hence upping the support required and hence the chacne of premature detection and destruction. To put things in perspective, consider Operation Chariot... while sucessful it utterly gutted the British forces involved (in excess of half the landing party captured or killed, 13 Motor Launches destroyed)... and that was just concentrating on one target with plenty of time for preperations and a good year of prior experiance at commando raids.

Try that with half a dozen targets to hit over four or five ports with no heavy naval support, little time to prepear (late 1940 or early 1941 given a start at best in mid-1940 vs early 1941 given a start in early 1941) and little prior experiance... well, cluster fuck is putting the likely outcome lightly.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by wiking

The Germans did eventually develop their own frogmen, marine commandos, and had the Marinesturmkompanie in 1939.

The POD is them being effective. The Italians achieve great success, and I am unaware of equivalent success by Germans against the UK in WW2. And I am unaware of near success, such as "the frogman would have disabled two UK carriers except for the <insert lucky break for UK>.

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by Devolved

"An illogical suggestion as I would expect from the Doctor. We don't have enough aircraft to maintain a continuous pressure on ALL THE major western ports and if the British knew we were attacking the same targets each night they would deploy more night fighters along the flight paths and stronger AA defences that would lead to a steady increase in our attrition rate while the damage done would progressively fall. It's called the law of diminishing returns"

This is true and not true

True in the sense that the Germans will not be able to generate the sorties to completely and utterly suppress all the western ports between august and the end of the year

not true in the sense that AA and night fighters will really mean anything in 1940 as there where not the necessary gadgets yet to have either reliably even engage night bombers

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Devolved

Delivered in a William Shatner/Kirk style:

"There.....must....be .....some.....way....to......defeat.....the.....Br itish...in

19....hundred....and....40"

Furrowed brows and people rubbing their chins.

McCoy suggests

"Maybe Jim, we should change our tactics. Bomb the ports every night until they run out of supplies"

Spock speaks.

"An illogical suggestion as I would expect from the Doctor. We don't have enough aircraft to maintain a continuous pressure on ALL THE major western ports and if the British knew we were attacking the same targets each night they would deploy more night fighters along the flight paths and stronger AA defences that would lead to a steady increase in our attrition rate while the damage done would progressively fall. It's called the law of diminishing returns"

Finally Hitler bursts in to the room.

"You fools. I'm not interested in diverting all my resources into a prolonged blockade of Britain that could last more than a year and maybe even two.

The ONLY REASON I wanted a war in the first place was to go east and destroy the Jewish Bolsheviks.

WHY would I want to waste so much time on trying to defeat a country that is in no position to attack us for years. The real enemy is Stalin and his asiatic hordes that have just threatened our oil supplies in Romania by annexing Bessarabia!!

Just bomb London for a few months and see if they negotiate and let the U Boats have their fun but it makes no difference to me if they surrender or not. I want the Army and the Luftwaffe on the Soviet frontier and ready to go by spring 1941"

Meeting ends.

Thanks for conceding the debate by using space fiction as your source material. You managed to find a source even less credible than "Ancient Aliens". Congrats.

Have a nice day.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

The POD is them being effective. The Italians achieve great success, and I am unaware of equivalent success by Germans against the UK in WW2. And I am unaware of near success, such as "the frogman would have disabled two UK carriers except for the <insert lucky break for UK>.

The German frogmen weren't formed until later in the war and successfully managed to blow up a number of bridges in France after the US had driven out the Germans.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=50&t=44026
This is a short bit about the Kustenjaeger.

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

This is true and not true

True in the sense that the Germans will not be able to generate the sorties to completely and utterly suppress all the western ports between august and the end of the year

not true in the sense that AA and night fighters will really mean anything in 1940 as there where not the necessary gadgets yet to have either reliably even engage night bombers

IOTL yeah you're probably right about the sortee generation, but with better production planning and pilot training programs that would occur without the untimely death of Wever and the splintering the Luftwaffe command, that's a different story.

[Grimm Reaper]

BlondieBC, if there had been compromise positions available then Japan would have presented some of them prior to Pearl Harbor.