In your opinion, if, at the start of WWI, Germany did not follow a Schlieffen like plan but instead advanced from Alsace-Lorraine using the same amount of forces it allocated to OTL's Western Front, would Germany be more of less likely to win the war than in OTL?
No Schlieffen Plan
- Thread starter Mac Gregor
- Start date
I guess it depends on whether they still get bogged down like OTL's Battle of the Marne.
I'd really have to know more about their alternate plans to say, and even then I'm nowhere near knowledgeable enough to say for sure.
Snake Featherston
Banned
Germany really didn't follow the Schlieffen Plan IOTL, why would this by any different?
Well, according to OP, the Germans won't advance through Belgium at all, and concentrate all their force in Alsace-Lorraine.
Snake Featherston
Banned
So they what, seek a backhand here and then barrel right into a strong line of French forts?
Abhakhazia
Banned
More likely, because the British wouldn't do anything.
If France invaded Belgium, then British could be a CP.
If France invaded Belgium, then British could be a CP.
Snake Featherston
Banned
That's what backhand solution means. If they just let the French attack them (presumably ignoring the British here, as the UK *will* not let the Germans make Europe their bitch) then they're pretty much doomed to lose the war faster than IOTL.
If the Germans do not advance through Belgium in August, 1914 Britain does not enter the war then - it was the violation of Belgian neutrality and the treaty confirming it that decided the UK to get in at that time. This is not to say that they would not have gone in shortly..or not..but if the Germans attack from Alsace-Lorraine (or Elsaß-Lothringen if you prefer) or if they stand on the defensive and the French are the first to cross the border the UK may stay out entirely.
If the UK is not in then Italy may well decide to stay on the side of the CP and France is faced with attacks from Italy (effective or not they sap French strength/manpower). No UK=no RN=no blockade and the French navy has to deal with the high seas fleet (and U-boats) and potentially the Italian navy (and even the Austro-Hungarian fleet in the Med).
British foreign policy was always to play with all sides to prevent a single power from dominating the continent, so they would be unhappy seeing the CP defeat France & Russia however they did not intervene in the Franco-Prussian War so they may stay out, especially if France gets bloodied badly early on.
If the UK is not in then Italy may well decide to stay on the side of the CP and France is faced with attacks from Italy (effective or not they sap French strength/manpower). No UK=no RN=no blockade and the French navy has to deal with the high seas fleet (and U-boats) and potentially the Italian navy (and even the Austro-Hungarian fleet in the Med).
British foreign policy was always to play with all sides to prevent a single power from dominating the continent, so they would be unhappy seeing the CP defeat France & Russia however they did not intervene in the Franco-Prussian War so they may stay out, especially if France gets bloodied badly early on.
In the Battle of the Frontiers large parts of the French army were trounced making large scale offensives. Without the Schlieffen Plan there would be no reason for Britain to join the war. at least not right away. However, as I found many years ago when I wrote my history degree dissertation covering the effects of the 1905 Morroccan Crisis on pre war planning done by BritishFrench staff officers 'i found serious military planning had been done between the armies of both natioons. Without the political decisions taken b the Britis Government during the July Crisis ane in the first few days of August 1914 Britain. if it did enter the war for another reason would have done so later than was actually the case.
A German army deployedfor an offensive in Alsaace Lorraine might well have repeated 1870 in a matter of weeks , driving on to Paris. Assuminig of cours the French stuck with their own offensive plans. Accounts of the Frontier battles give us a good illustration of the disaster the French would have faced in the event the two armies meet head on.
Assuming this is what happened the Germans would have marched on Paris and the Channel Ports. Had the British not entered the war at this point the war in the West would be as good as over well before Chruistmas 1914. If the BEF was deployed to France in late August or September 1914 there would have to be a 1914 style Dunkirk although the war might well have continued.
Either way Germany, as intended under the German war plans would have been in positin to deploy a large part of their Western army to the Eastern Front. It might have taken another year or two but with much the same result, a Russian Revolution and a Brest Litovsk style peace And without the Western Front that would have been it. If Britain was still in the war at this point she would have faced a prolonged Napoleonic War style struggle lasting years if not a decade or two against a Europe dominated by the Central Powers or making a negotiated peace.
A German army deployedfor an offensive in Alsaace Lorraine might well have repeated 1870 in a matter of weeks , driving on to Paris. Assuminig of cours the French stuck with their own offensive plans. Accounts of the Frontier battles give us a good illustration of the disaster the French would have faced in the event the two armies meet head on.
Assuming this is what happened the Germans would have marched on Paris and the Channel Ports. Had the British not entered the war at this point the war in the West would be as good as over well before Chruistmas 1914. If the BEF was deployed to France in late August or September 1914 there would have to be a 1914 style Dunkirk although the war might well have continued.
Either way Germany, as intended under the German war plans would have been in positin to deploy a large part of their Western army to the Eastern Front. It might have taken another year or two but with much the same result, a Russian Revolution and a Brest Litovsk style peace And without the Western Front that would have been it. If Britain was still in the war at this point she would have faced a prolonged Napoleonic War style struggle lasting years if not a decade or two against a Europe dominated by the Central Powers or making a negotiated peace.
Excellent points everyone.
Just to clarify one thing the OP question suggests that the Germans advance against France as they did in OTL just not through Belgium. So the Germans are not simply manning their defenses and attacking on the Eastern Front.
I personally believe that not violating Belgium and Luxembourg's neutrality would significantly help Germany's chances in the Great War for the following reasons some of which have already been pointed out.
1) No Belgium Army: according to wiki ultimately 350,000 Belgians were incorporated into the armed forces during WWI to fight against the Germans. I totally understand that the Belgians were not exactly the most effective fighting force in Europe but these numbers should count for something.
2) No/Delayed British involvement: This is the big pay off. With out the Rap of Belgium and the violation of the Treaty of London, the UK and her Dominions will at least stay out of the war for the time being if not entirely. The BEF fielded a total of 5 million men against the Germans over the course of the war. Furthermore, with out the Royal Navy the Imperial German Navy will be free to attack the weaker French Navy. And of course the lack of an effective blockade on Germany would be huge. Granted the UK could very well still enter the war at a later date but it would buy Germany precious time.
3) Italy stays out of the Allied camp: Without the attack on Belgium and the subsequent British intervention, Italy definitely remains neutral longer meaning that the roughly 5 million men on the Italian side are not brought to bare against the Central Powers. If France starts to founder as it probably would in this scenario Italy might actually side with the CP against France. Either way, this will still force France to keep more troops on the Italian border and certainly helps free up Austro-Hungarian troops for other fronts.
4) Better German PR. Without the Rap of Belgium, Germany fares better in the British and American media. They certainly aren't the good guys, but it would dampen the cries for intervention. For the Americans this probably means that less money and material is given to France as isolationist sentiment is stronger.
In conclusion, by not attacking through Belgium the central powers would have 10 million men fewer (not including the Americans) to fight against. Germany would not be blockaded and instead be intercepting ships bound for France. Granted this or fears of German hegemony could still lead to British intervention but it would be delayed for months at the earliest. Therefore, Germany is far more likely to win the war despite having to take a more difficult route through France.
Just to clarify one thing the OP question suggests that the Germans advance against France as they did in OTL just not through Belgium. So the Germans are not simply manning their defenses and attacking on the Eastern Front.
I personally believe that not violating Belgium and Luxembourg's neutrality would significantly help Germany's chances in the Great War for the following reasons some of which have already been pointed out.
1) No Belgium Army: according to wiki ultimately 350,000 Belgians were incorporated into the armed forces during WWI to fight against the Germans. I totally understand that the Belgians were not exactly the most effective fighting force in Europe but these numbers should count for something.
2) No/Delayed British involvement: This is the big pay off. With out the Rap of Belgium and the violation of the Treaty of London, the UK and her Dominions will at least stay out of the war for the time being if not entirely. The BEF fielded a total of 5 million men against the Germans over the course of the war. Furthermore, with out the Royal Navy the Imperial German Navy will be free to attack the weaker French Navy. And of course the lack of an effective blockade on Germany would be huge. Granted the UK could very well still enter the war at a later date but it would buy Germany precious time.
3) Italy stays out of the Allied camp: Without the attack on Belgium and the subsequent British intervention, Italy definitely remains neutral longer meaning that the roughly 5 million men on the Italian side are not brought to bare against the Central Powers. If France starts to founder as it probably would in this scenario Italy might actually side with the CP against France. Either way, this will still force France to keep more troops on the Italian border and certainly helps free up Austro-Hungarian troops for other fronts.
4) Better German PR. Without the Rap of Belgium, Germany fares better in the British and American media. They certainly aren't the good guys, but it would dampen the cries for intervention. For the Americans this probably means that less money and material is given to France as isolationist sentiment is stronger.
In conclusion, by not attacking through Belgium the central powers would have 10 million men fewer (not including the Americans) to fight against. Germany would not be blockaded and instead be intercepting ships bound for France. Granted this or fears of German hegemony could still lead to British intervention but it would be delayed for months at the earliest. Therefore, Germany is far more likely to win the war despite having to take a more difficult route through France.
That is a bit of a myth. Even in OTL with not the best relations between Germany and the UK, the majority of the cabinet and a significant portion of MPs were against an entry into the war without an acceptable casus belli. Actually there was only one member of the cabinet who supported intervention under any circumstances, and that was Churchill. Asquith and Grey both leaned towards intervention, but saw the difficulties in selling this to the public and the parliament, the latter being a very important factor since the UK was a democracy and without parliamentary consent an entry into the war was impossible. Crewe maybe could be counted towards the pro-intervention faction, too, but his stance on the subject is much more spiffy.
Although Bonar Law, the leader f the Unionists, supported immediate intervention and in the end Asquith, Grey and Churchill (and maybe Crewe) did that, too, they did it not all with the same fervor. Asquith's priority was the unity of his government, of the cabinet and the party. Grey had already mentioned that he might be willing under certain circumstances to let Britain stay aside. That is if British interests were not touched. Grey thought that the British public would not have been willing to go to war for Russia and he always emphasised that if France get into the war because of Russia it was their own fault. If Germany had taken a neutral stance in the west, that is neither invading Belgium nor attacking over the French border, Grey might very well had lived with that. Grey threatened resignation only for the case that the cabinet would support neutrality in any circumstances, which the cabinet had not. Only Churchill was quiet adamant on intervention regardless of the situation.
If Asquith had really decided to go with the Conservatives I am not sure he would have had a majority in parliament. Most likely only Churchill and Grey would have followed him. Lloyd George than would have led the vast majority of the cabinet, including a large portion of the Liberal party which could have also relied on Labour's support (which would have even gone further). Lloyd George was a quiet influential figure in the Liberal party and would have been a formidable opponent. Either way such an entry would have been difficult to sell to the public, would have sparked lots of heated debates and a government of national unity would have been difficult to promote under these circumstances. Not to say what would have happened if those in the know had revealed Grey's secret dealings with the French up to and including to send a BEF to the continent.
Besides that according to Thirteenth Days by Clive Ponting, although the possibility of a coalition of Liberal Imperialists and Conservatives was known it had not become an issue in the discussion and thus might not have been considered seriously at all:
As long as Germany would have taken a defensive stance in the west I doubt a British intervention. Russia was not looked favourably upon. Britain would have intervened in the end if France as a Great Power was really in danger. That might mean a late entry into the war, only a blockade going or just threatening Biritish involvement to ensure early peace talks favourably to France.
A defensive stance might also bring great difficulties for France. Although France was obliged to enter the war on Russia's side they did want Germany to be in the wrong. The decision makers found it paramount that Germany has to attack first. If Germany just was sitting in their forts and did nothing there is the question how long was France willing to wait for a German attack? And if its not coming forth, would they really risk to attack, although that might have turned public opinion against them? What if butterflies had Jaurès still living? And all the while the French would still have no positive decision by the British government that they would intervene on their side. That would really be a dilemma which would grow more seriously every day the French would wait while their Russian ally would have to take on Germany and A-H.
Here are some other quotations of Thirteen Days, by Clive Ponting, Chatto & Windus, London 2002:
To summarise: There was no unified opinion in the leadership of the UK on this matter. Parliament and cabinet were deeply devided with only small minorities backing an intervention regardless of the situation leading to the war. Belgium's neutrality was indeed the decisive matter on this issue. Without it the field of speculations is wide open. There were economic, military, domestic and diplomatic reasons for staying neutral, but favouring France.
Actually it all depends on the PoD. The second Moroccon Crisis was a turning point in British-German relations: in OTL bad diplomatic moves by then German secretary of the Foreign Office Kiderlen-Wächter mismanaged the situation which was a once in a lifetime-opportunity to gain ground again. Germany was clearly in the right with its protest towards France and a different handling of the affair with open cards towards Britain might have ended quite favourably for Germany. Grey was initially very unhappy with France and only the Panther at Agadir, the silence of the German diplomats and exaggerated demands later let to a change in attitudes - not only of Grey, but also and more importantly of Lloyd George and churchill, up until then quite Germanophile and pro-peace.
Better talks on naval armament controls are another factor which might help establish a better relationship between Germany and the UK.
But even with a very late PoD, (say abandonement of te Schlieffenplan during the mobilisation phase) - as long as Germany is not declaring war first and then at least at the beginning is just holding the line in the west against the French, the probability of the UK staying out of the war is much higher than its entrance. This includes, of course, that the German navy stays put and oes not move against France, too. Without a PoD before June 1911 the UK will have an informal naval agreement with France that they will protect their channel coast against naval attacks. If German armies are becoming a serious threat to French channel and Atlantic ports, a British intervention becomes increasingly more likely.
In the end a note on military matters:
The latest iteration of German war plans for a defensive stance in the west in OTL are from 1912. They saw 3 armies deployed on the French border, each with 5 army corps, and additional 2 army corps with their own command. That made about 35 divisions in the west compared to French 45. The plan thought also that an Italian army with 5 army corps would join Germany there, which might be overly optimistic, but would have brought the divisions on par. Germany would have also enjoyed a strong defensive position reinforced by forts, whereas the French themselves would face the narrow attack corridor. German plans were designed to counter-attack through Luxembourg or where-else it would be suitable after the French moves would have become known. Although pressure on the German armies would have been high, I think that this plan has some value.
Anyway there were also some plans for a straight (counter-)attack on the french fortress line. These attacks would have concentrated on the fortresses of Toul and Nancy.
Kind regards,
G.
David S Poepoe
Banned
Wouldn't it help if Germany didn't declare war upon Russia first on August 1st? Belgium wasn't invaded until August 3rd. Italy's declaration of neutrality has nothing to do with the invasion of Belgium.
Nope, the Germans are not going to have better PR is this ATL.
In an unrelated note, Mac, when are you heading out for the 'Stan? I remember you mentioning it would be in June.
It got pushed back till mid August. I have actually still been messing around with some material for The Union Forever. Hopefully I will be posting something in the not to distant future.