Faeelin
Banned
I picked up a copy of Christopher Hall's British Strategy in the Napoleonic Was recently, and it offers some thoughts about how Britain faced our favorite Frenchman, along with some allohistorical ideas.
1) Although Britain had, on paper, an enormous number of men available to fight, with some 300,000 volunteers for defense of the isles in 1806 alone, when it came to deploying forces overseas the British were stretched thin. [1] Colonial commitments in 1804 tied down 52,204 soldiers, while thirty thousand troops were also deployed in Ireland. [2]
Britain could only regularly deploy about 30,000 men overseas for offensive operations; the only point when there were two separate armies on the Continent simultaneously was in 1809, when the British were in Walcheren and Spain; and even then, the troops were only deployed to Walcheren because the troops were close enough to England that they could be brought back if invasion threatened.
2) One of the major changes from earlier wars; improved health. During the 1790s the British basically defeated scurvy and smallpox, driving down losses from illnesses. If sailors had died at the same rate between 1793-1814 that they did between 1776-1783, about 133,000 men would have died; the navy's entire strength during the period. The army also fared better, which let British forces go into combat more quickly as they were dispatched around the world. [3]
3) Despite Britain's financial superiority, by 1811 it was running out of money and men. The pound plummeted on the Hamburg exchange, military units were tied down preserving internal order as luddites spread across the country, and there were peace petitions from towns like Liverpool Preston, and Bolton. Lord Grenville argued in Parliament that the Penninsular War should be abandoned because of the drain on the fisc, favoring a strategy of husbanding resources for a protracted struggle. The Bank of England's specie reserves fell from 6.4 million pounds in 1808 to 2.2 million in 1814. By 1812 Wellington's troops hadn't been paid for five months, and in 1813 the Earl of Bathurst, the Secretary of War, told Wellington that Britain couldn't afford to deploy any more troops to the Peninsula.
4) We tend to view Britain's overseas conquests during this period as unmitigated triumphs. But these were sideshows. After losing one hundred thousand men in its attempt to subdue the Caribbean in the 1790s, Britain couldn't afford to send these troops. Indeed, the only large expedition to sail from Britain overseas during this period was a the 6,500 men force which seized the Cape. The capture of French Caribbean islands in 1809 was accomplished by local troops and those from Nova Scotia.
But, one idea loomed in British conquest in this period; Latin America, as compensation for British exclusion from Europe. In 1803 Castlereagh proposed a plan to seize Vera Cruz or Chile, and in 1808 he spoke of sending 14,000 troops to Mexico, another 9,000 to Montevideo, and then moving on to Central America. William Grenville, one of the prominent members of the opposition, proposed a plan involving an assault on either Peru or western Mexico by troops form India, including sepoys (who would capture the Philippines en route) , while other troops moved in from Atlantic.
The British assumed that, after they were welcomed as liberators, these new territories could be garrisoned by colonials who were loyal to whatever arrangements Britain imposed.
The Duke of Wellington's Mexican Campaign! This would obviously be fantastic and awesome, right up until the troops all died from malaria. Maybe the survivors can bring back tequila to Britain?
5) The best route to Britain's defeat may have been in the Baltic. The Baltic was the source of timber for British ships; Russia supplied most of Britain's tallow, and half her pitch, tar, linseed, and iron. More came from Sweden and Memel and Danzig. More important than all of these was hemp, 90% of which came from Russia.
Seen in this light, Napoleon's efforts to woo the Tsar at Tilsit, and the continental System in general, make sense.
So, I think there's a route to a Napoleonic victory, involving a successful closure of the Baltic and disasters in Latin America. Thoughts?
Also, who can forget George III wandering through his palace, mumbling "Wellesley, Wellesley, give me back my (German) legion"?
[1] An interesting question is how these troops would have faired in battle. I have doubts that most of these men could have been properly mobilized in a Napoleonic invasion, but both American militia and Prussian landwehr performed competently.
[2] Another ninety thousand troops were deployed in the rest of the British Isles. Any of the British posters know how these numbers compare to the troops deployed in, say, 1825?
[3] With an obvious what if: an earlier discovery of how to combat scurvy.
1) Although Britain had, on paper, an enormous number of men available to fight, with some 300,000 volunteers for defense of the isles in 1806 alone, when it came to deploying forces overseas the British were stretched thin. [1] Colonial commitments in 1804 tied down 52,204 soldiers, while thirty thousand troops were also deployed in Ireland. [2]
Britain could only regularly deploy about 30,000 men overseas for offensive operations; the only point when there were two separate armies on the Continent simultaneously was in 1809, when the British were in Walcheren and Spain; and even then, the troops were only deployed to Walcheren because the troops were close enough to England that they could be brought back if invasion threatened.
2) One of the major changes from earlier wars; improved health. During the 1790s the British basically defeated scurvy and smallpox, driving down losses from illnesses. If sailors had died at the same rate between 1793-1814 that they did between 1776-1783, about 133,000 men would have died; the navy's entire strength during the period. The army also fared better, which let British forces go into combat more quickly as they were dispatched around the world. [3]
3) Despite Britain's financial superiority, by 1811 it was running out of money and men. The pound plummeted on the Hamburg exchange, military units were tied down preserving internal order as luddites spread across the country, and there were peace petitions from towns like Liverpool Preston, and Bolton. Lord Grenville argued in Parliament that the Penninsular War should be abandoned because of the drain on the fisc, favoring a strategy of husbanding resources for a protracted struggle. The Bank of England's specie reserves fell from 6.4 million pounds in 1808 to 2.2 million in 1814. By 1812 Wellington's troops hadn't been paid for five months, and in 1813 the Earl of Bathurst, the Secretary of War, told Wellington that Britain couldn't afford to deploy any more troops to the Peninsula.
4) We tend to view Britain's overseas conquests during this period as unmitigated triumphs. But these were sideshows. After losing one hundred thousand men in its attempt to subdue the Caribbean in the 1790s, Britain couldn't afford to send these troops. Indeed, the only large expedition to sail from Britain overseas during this period was a the 6,500 men force which seized the Cape. The capture of French Caribbean islands in 1809 was accomplished by local troops and those from Nova Scotia.
But, one idea loomed in British conquest in this period; Latin America, as compensation for British exclusion from Europe. In 1803 Castlereagh proposed a plan to seize Vera Cruz or Chile, and in 1808 he spoke of sending 14,000 troops to Mexico, another 9,000 to Montevideo, and then moving on to Central America. William Grenville, one of the prominent members of the opposition, proposed a plan involving an assault on either Peru or western Mexico by troops form India, including sepoys (who would capture the Philippines en route) , while other troops moved in from Atlantic.
The British assumed that, after they were welcomed as liberators, these new territories could be garrisoned by colonials who were loyal to whatever arrangements Britain imposed.
The Duke of Wellington's Mexican Campaign! This would obviously be fantastic and awesome, right up until the troops all died from malaria. Maybe the survivors can bring back tequila to Britain?
5) The best route to Britain's defeat may have been in the Baltic. The Baltic was the source of timber for British ships; Russia supplied most of Britain's tallow, and half her pitch, tar, linseed, and iron. More came from Sweden and Memel and Danzig. More important than all of these was hemp, 90% of which came from Russia.
Seen in this light, Napoleon's efforts to woo the Tsar at Tilsit, and the continental System in general, make sense.
So, I think there's a route to a Napoleonic victory, involving a successful closure of the Baltic and disasters in Latin America. Thoughts?
Also, who can forget George III wandering through his palace, mumbling "Wellesley, Wellesley, give me back my (German) legion"?
[1] An interesting question is how these troops would have faired in battle. I have doubts that most of these men could have been properly mobilized in a Napoleonic invasion, but both American militia and Prussian landwehr performed competently.
[2] Another ninety thousand troops were deployed in the rest of the British Isles. Any of the British posters know how these numbers compare to the troops deployed in, say, 1825?
[3] With an obvious what if: an earlier discovery of how to combat scurvy.
But touche, those numbers are higher than anything I'd ever read but I won't argue them. I wonder if they include the King's German Legion, though?