Why did the Allies win WWI?

[Snake Featherston]

On the surface of it WWI at least looks like an instance of the Central Powers giving more than they got. The Russian Empire IMHO was in trouble if its war lasted more than three months regardless of what it did or did not do on the battlefield, but the Central Powers were the ones in that war to overrun entire countries and Russia the only Ally to make great, big, sweeping advances in Europe. Yet in 1918 the German army had only a week or two and then it was a glorified mob.

So the question I'm going to ask here is a simple one: why did the Allies ultimately win WWI? In my view the Allies won WWI partially because in 1918 an already flawed German plan was executed even worse than it was planned, which gave the Allies the ability to inflict a giant backhand, followed by a 1943-like grinding offensive that was a triumph of superior use of all arms. The broader Allied victory was due to the Germans having to dissipate their strength in some cases and willfully doing this for not much of a good reason in others, with the Allies having the ability to pay for and sustain a war to the last ditch while Germany had neither.

What do you think? In lieu of all the Central Powers victory scenarios I think a discussion like this is required in no small part to see what would have to change from an Allied POV to make a CP victory possible.

[BlondieBC]

1) Conrad - Either send the 2nd A-H army east in 1914 or don't attack Italy in 1916, and the CP win through chain events and butterflies.

2) Bad diplomacy and USW. Despite Conrad, the Central Powers had at worst a cold peace if they don't bring the USA in the war. Unlike what the Germany Navy claimed, USW was not that much more effective than cruiser warfare. What was most important was the number of U-boats on merchant patrol on any given day. Don't do USW, and a CP win.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

1) Conrad - Either send the 2nd A-H army east in 1914 or don't attack Italy in 1916, and the CP win through chain events and butterflies.

2) Bad diplomacy and USW. Despite Conrad, the Central Powers had at worst a cold peace if they don't bring the USA in the war. Unlike what the Germany Navy claimed, USW was not that much more effective than cruiser warfare. What was most important was the number of U-boats on merchant patrol on any given day. Don't do USW, and a CP win.

1) How do they win? Russia, after all, went through three governments and two wars to be knocked out of WWI and spent longer in the Russian Civil War than it did in WWI. This is hardly an indication that knocking Russia out altogether is either simple or easy.

2) How can the Germans avoid bringing the USA in the war simply by avoiding USW? The Germans controlling Europe is something the USA will find contrary to its interests no matter what happens, so Wilson could easily try to engineer a pretext if he has to go that far, and by 1917 Wilson was coming around to a viewpoint that US interests were best served by entering the war to sit at the peace tables.

[Grimbald]

No USA as an Ally = CP Victory

[Color-Copycat]

'Murrica.

[zoomar]

Given the choices, I went with the blockade, which did two things: (1) increasingly deprive Germany of raw materials for industry and food, etc for her population, and (2) force Germany to adopt unrestricted submarine warfare as the only effective response - it couldn't break the blockade but it could effectively strangle Britain like German was being strangled - which ultimately lead to US involvement against Germany and the other Central Powers.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

1) How do they win? Russia, after all, went through three governments and two wars to be knocked out of WWI and spent longer in the Russian Civil War than it did in WWI. This is hardly an indication that knocking Russia out altogether is either simple or easy.

2) How can the Germans avoid bringing the USA in the war simply by avoiding USW? The Germans controlling Europe is something the USA will find contrary to its interests no matter what happens, so Wilson could easily try to engineer a pretext if he has to go that far, and by 1917 Wilson was coming around to a viewpoint that US interests were best served by entering the war to sit at the peace tables.

1A) If Conrad send the 2nd Army east, you get a scenario similar to Wiking ATL on the subject. Wiking is a bit optimistic IMO, but I am sure Austria holds Pzemsyl, and might hold Lemberg. Russian casualties are much higher and Austria is either lower or the same. Austria also lose a less farm land, has more men to draft, and loses less railway cars. These changes alone likely get the CP a cold peace. And in early 1915, as Pzemsyl fell, it helped both bring Italy in the war since A-H looks like it might collapse and it delay Bulgaria entering by 6 months. Both will have follow on effects that benefit the CP, but they are difficult to say exactly where the extra men and material will be used after the first 6 months or so.

1B) Brusilov breakthrough was where A-H pulled it best units to attack Italy. Avoid attacking Italy, and Brusilov is a successful offensive, but it does not break the A-H lines, saving A-H at least 400,000 soldiers and their equipment. Romania will not enter the war, so A-H has another million tons of wheat to eat, so it does not collapse in 1918. Russia will still fall apart over the winter due to lack of food, but Germany will not have to pull back to the Hindenburg line. The German attack of 1918 starts farther west, it is stronger by at least a full army, maybe 2-3 armies, and it breaks France. More likely though a stronger A-H means Russia leaves the war earlier than OTL, so the offensive may start in 1917.

2) The Lusitania was huge. No USW, not Lusitania. I read the NY times for the entire war, there is a dramatic change in USA attitudes due to the Lusitania. Also, even if the Lusitania is still sunk, just following the rules will avoid many of the additional losses that angered american at only a few % less tonnage sunk.

If you do all three, each an easily avoidable mistake, the war is an CP win in 1917, or mid 1918 at the latest.

[mowque]

Massive coalition wars often come down to the deepest pockets. They don't get much deeper then London and New York.

[Catspoke]

Unlie WWII, WWI Germany could win at least a compromise peace.

a WW1 Central Powers victory is within the realm of possibility:

a) Galacia 1914 was a disaster for the Austrians, the manpower losses, the rolling stock losses, resource losses, the frosbite / frozen to death losses in the Carpathians the following Winter. There have been good TLs on this forum that can make this go better for the Central Powers.

b) Others have said here the Hindenburg economic plan, Ruined the German economy and left submarine war as the only good option. So keep Falkenhyn around somehow.

But if random luck favoring the central powers is cancelled out by random luck favoring the Allies (Dardenelles 1915 could easily have gone better for the Allies for example), then The Germans are doomed. If Russia stays in the game some how the Germans are doomed, if the USA is in the game the Germans are doomed. So I pick the shoot 10 there will always be 11 answer.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by zoomar

Given the choices, I went with the blockade, which did two things: (1) increasingly deprive Germany of raw materials for industry and food, etc for her population, and (2) force Germany to adopt unrestricted submarine warfare as the only effective response - it couldn't break the blockade but it could effectively strangle Britain like German was being strangled - which ultimately lead to US involvement against Germany and the other Central Powers.

The blockade did hurt Germany, but the Germans had other options, and the data to know that USW was not that much better. It was a false choice the German Navy created for itself. In WW1, the average response time to a distress call was 10-12 hours. The RN lack sonar, and for much of the war lacked depth charges. Even if spotted, a U-boat could simply dive and if not sunk within a few minutes, simply sail away underwater. Since most attacks were done on the surface, the only difference between cruiser rules and USW was the firing of two warning shots that takes less than 30 seconds. If the ship does not immediately stop, you can fire the torpedo, which at 1000 or so yards is very, very difficult for a merchant ship to avoid.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by Grimbald

No USA as an Ally = CP Victory

The Germans didn't exactly lose much to the USA in a combat sense, at least partially because Pershing's refusal to allow US soldiers to serve under any but US command (if they were white) meant that the US Army guzzled resources while contributing precious little else. Its role in a combat sense was very late in the game and it actually nearly missed fighting the war altogether.

Originally Posted by zoomar

Given the choices, I went with the blockade, which did two things: (1) increasingly deprive Germany of raw materials for industry and food, etc for her population, and (2) force Germany to adopt unrestricted submarine warfare as the only effective response - it couldn't break the blockade but it could effectively strangle Britain like German was being strangled - which ultimately lead to US involvement against Germany and the other Central Powers.

The Blockade, though, was a long-term solution and was complicated by the Central Powers at least on paper building an ever-stronger base on land. And the ultimate victory was in 1918 in land battles, not the product of sea fighting.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

1A) If Conrad send the 2nd Army east, you get a scenario similar to Wiking ATL on the subject. Wiking is a bit optimistic IMO, but I am sure Austria holds Pzemsyl, and might hold Lemberg. Russian casualties are much higher and Austria is either lower or the same. Austria also lose a less farm land, has more men to draft, and loses less railway cars. These changes alone likely get the CP a cold peace. And in early 1915, as Pzemsyl fell, it helped both bring Italy in the war since A-H looks like it might collapse and it delay Bulgaria entering by 6 months. Both will have follow on effects that benefit the CP, but they are difficult to say exactly where the extra men and material will be used after the first 6 months or so.

1B) Brusilov breakthrough was where A-H pulled it best units to attack Italy. Avoid attacking Italy, and Brusilov is a successful offensive, but it does not break the A-H lines, saving A-H at least 400,000 soldiers and their equipment. Romania will not enter the war, so A-H has another million tons of wheat to eat, so it does not collapse in 1918. Russia will still fall apart over the winter due to lack of food, but Germany will not have to pull back to the Hindenburg line. The German attack of 1918 starts farther west, it is stronger by at least a full army, maybe 2-3 armies, and it breaks France. More likely though a stronger A-H means Russia leaves the war earlier than OTL, so the offensive may start in 1917.

2) The Lusitania was huge. No USW, not Lusitania. I read the NY times for the entire war, there is a dramatic change in USA attitudes due to the Lusitania. Also, even if the Lusitania is still sunk, just following the rules will avoid many of the additional losses that angered american at only a few % less tonnage sunk.

If you do all three, each an easily avoidable mistake, the war is an CP win in 1917, or mid 1918 at the latest.

1) How do you alter the A-H forces' major defects in sustaining offensive battles, especially against relatively larger armies of Russians than usually fought the Germans? A-H had problems rather larger than the presence or absence of its troops in these battles.

2) There was no USW when the Lusitania was torpedoed, however, so this argument is self-contradictory.

[Arachnid]

Change "Money, money, and more money" to "Money, industry, and more money" and you've got it right.

[Blackfox5]

The Germans lacked a real strategic plan to win a multi-year war (this was their same problem in WWII). They relied on operational successes to somehow convince their opponents to give up. They simply weren't able to do that. Change a few things to give them more operational successes, and they might have gained some kind of victory, but probably not worth the cost they paid for it.

The Allies essentially had the same problem in 1914, but they had several advantages the Germans didn't. They controlled the oceans, had a vast colonial empire to provide them labor and raw materials, and retained access to the international finance markets. That enabled them to develop a strategy during the war that could work with the resources at their disposal. Their operations, therefore, could support the master plan even if they botched many individual operations. They were simply in a much better situation.

Germany simply lacked the capability of winning a multi-year war against Britian and France. Their sole shot was to quickly knock France out early enough to keep the war limited so that the Allies' greater strategic advantages never came into play. That hope ended on the Marne, and the Germans had no back up plan. Not that I can think of what one could be.

No matter how strong Germany was, the Germans put themselves in a bad position by making France AND Russia AND Britain their enemies.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

1) How do you alter the A-H forces' major defects in sustaining offensive battles, especially against relatively larger armies of Russians than usually fought the Germans? A-H had problems rather larger than the presence or absence of its troops in these battles.

2) There was no USW when the Lusitania was torpedoed, however, so this argument is self-contradictory.

1A) In 1914, these surrounded units fought on for weeks in fortresses. These troops were loyal and were the cream of the A-H army. And a lot of the defection was driven by the appearance that Russia would break into the Hungarian plane, which was possible. A-H doing better means fewer defections even among the Slavic troops. Wiking goes into a good bit of detail on this scenario, and i think he still takes question on his TL.

1B) If not Italy in 1916, Russia is not attacking second rate Slavic units of questionable loyalty but the cream of the Austrian and Hungarian army. These units both would not have surrender and likely would have prevented the Russian from breaking into green fields. Russia still takes land, but no breakthrough.

2) I thought they were under loser rules (not cruiser rules) for the Lusitania, I forgot what they were called. Anyway, shooting at the Lusitania without a warning shot falls under USW more than cruiser rules. We simply the USW v. Cruiser rules. In fact Germany never sank less than 10% under USW rules and never more than 90%. My point is Germany could have followed cruiser rules or a reasonable modification of them and keep the USA out of the war and still inflict great harm to the Entente merchant fleet. Here is the key, the tonnage per day does not correlate strongly to which set of rules were used, but correlated very strongly to how many ships were on merchant patrol. The higher tonnage in 1917 is mostly attributable to simply using more U-boats per day hunting merchant ships.

[Mikestone8]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

2) How can the Germans avoid bringing the USA in the war simply by avoiding USW? The Germans controlling Europe is something the USA will find contrary to its interests no matter what happens, so Wilson could easily try to engineer a pretext if he has to go that far, and by 1917 Wilson was coming around to a viewpoint that US interests were best served by entering the war to sit at the peace tables.

Wilson never displayed any desire to "engineer a pretext". Indeed in 1916/17 he was backpedalling even from the position taken in his Lusitania notes.

He refrained from taking any action over the sinkings of the armed merchantmen Marina and Arabia, though by the strict letter of his previous notes he should have done so - this despite reminders from the pro-Ally Sec of State Lansing. And in Feb/Mar he stuck to armed neutrality, though he could probably have obtained a declaration of war in February had he wanted one. He was wriggling on the hook.

The desire to be at the peace table may indeed have made it easier to abandon neutrality, but there isn't the slightest sign that he would have gone to war for that reason alone, nor is it at all clear that Congress would have gone along had he done so. Whatever his hankerings to be a world statesman, it still took USW and the ZT to bring him round.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

1A) In 1914, these surrounded units fought on for weeks in fortresses. These troops were loyal and were the cream of the A-H army. And a lot of the defection was driven by the appearance that Russia would break into the Hungarian plane, which was possible. A-H doing better means fewer defections even among the Slavic troops. Wiking goes into a good bit of detail on this scenario, and i think he still takes question on his TL.

1B) If not Italy in 1916, Russia is not attacking second rate Slavic units of questionable loyalty but the cream of the Austrian and Hungarian army. These units both would not have surrender and likely would have prevented the Russian from breaking into green fields. Russia still takes land, but no breakthrough.

2) I thought they were under loser rules (not cruiser rules) for the Lusitania, I forgot what they were called. Anyway, shooting at the Lusitania without a warning shot falls under USW more than cruiser rules. We simply the USW v. Cruiser rules. In fact Germany never sank less than 10% under USW rules and never more than 90%. My point is Germany could have followed cruiser rules or a reasonable modification of them and keep the USA out of the war and still inflict great harm to the Entente merchant fleet. Here is the key, the tonnage per day does not correlate strongly to which set of rules were used, but correlated very strongly to how many ships were on merchant patrol. The higher tonnage in 1917 is mostly attributable to simply using more U-boats per day hunting merchant ships.

1) The Slavic stab in the back is nothing but the Habsburg army's inability to accept that it made major tactical errors and seeking for a scapegoats. The Habsburgs made major errors of deployment that more troops are not the answer to, while they held out primarily due to the weakness of Russian logistics in terms of the sieges. A-H was not betrayed by its Slavs but rather by its deploying its armies very poorly to meet a much larger Russian offensive.

2) This doesn't answer the problem that the USA of the time has no interest in Germany becoming hegemon of all of Europe....

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Blackfox5

The Germans lacked a real strategic plan to win a multi-year war (this was their same problem in WWII). They relied on operational successes to somehow convince their opponents to give up. They simply weren't able to do that. Change a few things to give them more operational successes, and they might have gained some kind of victory, but probably not worth the cost they paid for it.

All sides lack a multiyear war plan. All sides relied on operational successes. The CP almost won, so there are a dozen ways to have the CP win. It is not WW2, where it would be very hard to write a winning German TL.

And for all major powers, the war was not worth the cost. Only Japan won WW1. No one else came close to winning/benefiting from WW1 as opposed to having no war.

Germany simply lacked the capability of winning a multi-year war against Britian and France. Their sole shot was to quickly knock France out early enough to keep the war limited so that the Allies' greater strategic advantages never came into play. That hope ended on the Marne, and the Germans had no back up plan. Not that I can think of what one could be.

No matter how strong Germany was, the Germans put themselves in a bad position by making France AND Russia AND Britain their enemies.

Germany almost won. Russia had fallen apart in early 1917. Only the USA entering the war save the Entente from defeat or a cold peace. The Entente started to fall apart before the Central powers did.

Russia - 1917 Revolution

France - Mutiny/strikes by soldiers.

A-H - Collapse in 1918

Germany - 1918

Ottomans/Turkey forces the Entente to a negotiated Peace in 1923.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

1) The Slavic stab in the back is nothing but the Habsburg army's inability to accept that it made major tactical errors and seeking for a scapegoats. The Habsburgs made major errors of deployment that more troops are not the answer to, while they held out primarily due to the weakness of Russian logistics in terms of the sieges. A-H was not betrayed by its Slavs but rather by its deploying its armies very poorly to meet a much larger Russian offensive.

2) This doesn't answer the problem that the USA of the time has no interest in Germany becoming hegemon of all of Europe....

1) Slavic units defecting is well document. Also, I started out saying Conrad was the person most responsible for losing the war, and now you are trying to argue that the Hapsburgs made errors. This is getting a bit circular.

2) You are flat wrong on #2. You are confusing WW1 and WW2. In WW1, the USA would have NEVER entered a war solely based on the desire to stop German domination of central Europe. Wilson is not FDR. Wilhelm is not Hitler.

[yourworstnightmare]

All of the above: Manpower, money and the blockade all contributed to Germany's demise in the war. Of course some idiotic German decisions like unrestricted submarine warfare (yeah, it's like they invited the Americans) also contributed.