Deleted member 1487
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dornier_Do_19
So there is much hate directed toward the idea of a German strategic bomber fleet for good reason, but I have scenario with a twist:
This of course hinges on Wever living, which has tons of butterflies on its own...but we're only going to deal with Do 19.
OTL when Wever died, June 3rd 1936, the specs for the new Bomber A were issued with Wever's blessing, condemning the Ural bomber project, the Do 19 and Ju 89, to demonstrator status. Interestingly enough they weren't cancelled, but rather were kept on order to provide experience for the Luftwaffe in handling a 4 engine strategic bomber. Obviously neither design was fit for mass production because of their weak engines and airframe designed around providing enough lift to compensate for the very low horsepower of the early German engines. When the Ju 89 got some of the higher horsepower units its huge wingspan and weight, not to mention the drag of its less than 'clean' design meant that it was clearly not going to be improved by simply adding better engines. The Do 19 was never tried with higher HP engines (Wikipedia info about the Do 19 specs is incorrect FYI), because Wever died suddenly and Goering cancelled the later prototypes of both models in April 1937...
So clearly the 1st generation of German strategic bombers were bust, right? Not exactly. This was just about the time everyone was putting out their versions of strategic bombers and they were all equally shitty. The B17 wasn't even really usable until the 1940's for example. Erhardt Milch, head of the German Air Ministry and a man heavily involved in Luftwaffe armaments said in 1942 that had the 1st generation of German heavy bombers remained in testing and were incrementally improved, by 1942 they would have been better than the B17. And I think he was right.
First note that the Ju89 would require too much reengineering to really work as an operational bomber and the Ju 88 was a much more pressing engineering/design/development issue than a strategic bomber and required the full attention of Junkers. The Do 19 is a much more workable design, especially as it was 10k Lbs lighter than the Ju 89 and had greater wing area unnecessary with 1k+ HP engines.
Basically what I am proposing is that from October 1936 (first flight of the Do 19 prototype) until 1939 the Luftwaffe doesn't produce the Do 19 and instead works on testing it and improving on the design, much like how they produced more than 20 prototypes of the He 111 and Ju 88 to keep development moving forward beyond their first production date.
As better engines becomes available, like the Jumo 211a, which had over 1000hp, the greater wing becomes unnecessary because the necessary lift is generated by the more powerful engines rather than surface area of the wings. Interestingly the Do 19 had 1/3 the wing loading of the He 177 or Avro Lancaster, so could easily stand to lose 1/2 of the wing area and weight. That dramatically increases aerodynamics and reduces drag, meaning its performance increases with redesigned wings, which they would have to do to accomodate the more powerful Jumo engines. That should take between 6-8 months to do. The cockpit was pretty messy from an aerodynamics POV and, like the Ju88, could be easily redesigned and improved in the prototype phase. Both of these changes alone with save easily 1-2 tons of weight and dramatically improve aerodynamics and both can be accomplished in under a year. When the Jumo 211b's come into production in 1938 the bomber now has 1200hp engines available, which further increases performance, range, and bomb load.
All of this is great, but why? Wever was concerned about Britain even in 1936. I imagine that as times goes on and the He 177 project clearly won't be ready before 1941 for production and 1942 for combat assuming the best case scenario and the dive bombing require is avoided and 4 engine nacelles are used, a need for a four engine aircraft becomes apparent...but not for strategic bombing. After the Do 17 was planned phased out in 1938, Dornier was looking for new bomber contracts and designed the Do 217 was ordered in 1937, both for land and naval use. The Kriegsmarine was hounding the Luftwaffe for a long range naval bomber/reconnaissance aircraft too and Wever was clearly planning on working with the Navy before his death (Luftkreigfuehrung, Wever's air force doctrine manual, specifically stated that assisting the Navy was a priority of the LW and Wever was interested in creating a naval air force), which OTL resulted in the FW 200 Condor starting in 1938.
So it makes sense that Wever, ever the pragmatic (as was his technical team under Wimmer), probably wouldn't sanction a new design and waste the money spent on the 4 engine bombers, plus spend more money on the Do 217, and let the requirement for a 4 engine long range naval recon aircraft go unmet.
Wever than turns to the eager engineers at Dornier to adapt the Do 19 to a long range naval aircraft and take advantage of the new engines available to make the design workable.
Redesigned wings, nose/cockpit, and a rethinking of defensive armament (not as much) means that by 1938 the Do 19 is now much more capable than it was thought possible in 1936. Now a 5 man crew with a nose cannon and no other defensive armament (why it is needed for long range recon?) plus the capability to carry naval mines, torpedoes, and special navigation gear and radar mean that it is a prime candidate for the naval requirement and Dornier has a new contract.
Vastly superior to the Condor, which did not have armor, was very vulnerable to defensive fire of convoy ships, and was structurally deficient for maneuvers needed in a bombing run (several cracked in half because of these stresses), the LW and Navy had their aircraft for Uboat spotting/convoy bombing.
The problem though, I hear you all thinking, is where do the resources and engines come from? Firstly from the lack of needing FW 200 Condors for one, which means less resources on engines for the Condors, which in turn can be spent expanding Jumo engine production. Also the LW and Navy can stop building BV 138s, He115 sea planes, and the various smatterings of other projects, mainly sea planes like the BV 222, plus the Ju 90, and potentially phasing out the Do 17 in 1938 as planned, instead of keeping it in production until 1939.
So it enters into production in Dornier factories in late 1938- early 1939 in small numbers and is used as advertised. Plus, as war starts, the LW can either increase production for their own use as a night bomber with KG 100 and start with a specialist gruppe or geschwader of 4 engined strategic bombers. A unit of 30-50 can conceivably be operational by August 1940. Carrying up to 6 tons of bombs for a short (~700 mile) operation, 4-5 tons for a medium (~1000 miles) or 1-3 tons for a long range (1200 miles+) missions, it utility is obvious. Fewer aircrews and materials/mechanics compared to equal tonnage of medium bombers, it is obviously useful in the Blitz.
Couple this with long ranged recon that can be ramped up as its usefulness becomes obvious and the He 177 takes too long to become operational and Germany has a useful strategic bomber, though not a full fleet that conflicts with the medium bombers prior to 1939.
So what does the community think of my brainstorm?
So there is much hate directed toward the idea of a German strategic bomber fleet for good reason, but I have scenario with a twist:
This of course hinges on Wever living, which has tons of butterflies on its own...but we're only going to deal with Do 19.
OTL when Wever died, June 3rd 1936, the specs for the new Bomber A were issued with Wever's blessing, condemning the Ural bomber project, the Do 19 and Ju 89, to demonstrator status. Interestingly enough they weren't cancelled, but rather were kept on order to provide experience for the Luftwaffe in handling a 4 engine strategic bomber. Obviously neither design was fit for mass production because of their weak engines and airframe designed around providing enough lift to compensate for the very low horsepower of the early German engines. When the Ju 89 got some of the higher horsepower units its huge wingspan and weight, not to mention the drag of its less than 'clean' design meant that it was clearly not going to be improved by simply adding better engines. The Do 19 was never tried with higher HP engines (Wikipedia info about the Do 19 specs is incorrect FYI), because Wever died suddenly and Goering cancelled the later prototypes of both models in April 1937...
So clearly the 1st generation of German strategic bombers were bust, right? Not exactly. This was just about the time everyone was putting out their versions of strategic bombers and they were all equally shitty. The B17 wasn't even really usable until the 1940's for example. Erhardt Milch, head of the German Air Ministry and a man heavily involved in Luftwaffe armaments said in 1942 that had the 1st generation of German heavy bombers remained in testing and were incrementally improved, by 1942 they would have been better than the B17. And I think he was right.
First note that the Ju89 would require too much reengineering to really work as an operational bomber and the Ju 88 was a much more pressing engineering/design/development issue than a strategic bomber and required the full attention of Junkers. The Do 19 is a much more workable design, especially as it was 10k Lbs lighter than the Ju 89 and had greater wing area unnecessary with 1k+ HP engines.
Basically what I am proposing is that from October 1936 (first flight of the Do 19 prototype) until 1939 the Luftwaffe doesn't produce the Do 19 and instead works on testing it and improving on the design, much like how they produced more than 20 prototypes of the He 111 and Ju 88 to keep development moving forward beyond their first production date.
As better engines becomes available, like the Jumo 211a, which had over 1000hp, the greater wing becomes unnecessary because the necessary lift is generated by the more powerful engines rather than surface area of the wings. Interestingly the Do 19 had 1/3 the wing loading of the He 177 or Avro Lancaster, so could easily stand to lose 1/2 of the wing area and weight. That dramatically increases aerodynamics and reduces drag, meaning its performance increases with redesigned wings, which they would have to do to accomodate the more powerful Jumo engines. That should take between 6-8 months to do. The cockpit was pretty messy from an aerodynamics POV and, like the Ju88, could be easily redesigned and improved in the prototype phase. Both of these changes alone with save easily 1-2 tons of weight and dramatically improve aerodynamics and both can be accomplished in under a year. When the Jumo 211b's come into production in 1938 the bomber now has 1200hp engines available, which further increases performance, range, and bomb load.
All of this is great, but why? Wever was concerned about Britain even in 1936. I imagine that as times goes on and the He 177 project clearly won't be ready before 1941 for production and 1942 for combat assuming the best case scenario and the dive bombing require is avoided and 4 engine nacelles are used, a need for a four engine aircraft becomes apparent...but not for strategic bombing. After the Do 17 was planned phased out in 1938, Dornier was looking for new bomber contracts and designed the Do 217 was ordered in 1937, both for land and naval use. The Kriegsmarine was hounding the Luftwaffe for a long range naval bomber/reconnaissance aircraft too and Wever was clearly planning on working with the Navy before his death (Luftkreigfuehrung, Wever's air force doctrine manual, specifically stated that assisting the Navy was a priority of the LW and Wever was interested in creating a naval air force), which OTL resulted in the FW 200 Condor starting in 1938.
So it makes sense that Wever, ever the pragmatic (as was his technical team under Wimmer), probably wouldn't sanction a new design and waste the money spent on the 4 engine bombers, plus spend more money on the Do 217, and let the requirement for a 4 engine long range naval recon aircraft go unmet.
Wever than turns to the eager engineers at Dornier to adapt the Do 19 to a long range naval aircraft and take advantage of the new engines available to make the design workable.
Redesigned wings, nose/cockpit, and a rethinking of defensive armament (not as much) means that by 1938 the Do 19 is now much more capable than it was thought possible in 1936. Now a 5 man crew with a nose cannon and no other defensive armament (why it is needed for long range recon?) plus the capability to carry naval mines, torpedoes, and special navigation gear and radar mean that it is a prime candidate for the naval requirement and Dornier has a new contract.
Vastly superior to the Condor, which did not have armor, was very vulnerable to defensive fire of convoy ships, and was structurally deficient for maneuvers needed in a bombing run (several cracked in half because of these stresses), the LW and Navy had their aircraft for Uboat spotting/convoy bombing.
The problem though, I hear you all thinking, is where do the resources and engines come from? Firstly from the lack of needing FW 200 Condors for one, which means less resources on engines for the Condors, which in turn can be spent expanding Jumo engine production. Also the LW and Navy can stop building BV 138s, He115 sea planes, and the various smatterings of other projects, mainly sea planes like the BV 222, plus the Ju 90, and potentially phasing out the Do 17 in 1938 as planned, instead of keeping it in production until 1939.
So it enters into production in Dornier factories in late 1938- early 1939 in small numbers and is used as advertised. Plus, as war starts, the LW can either increase production for their own use as a night bomber with KG 100 and start with a specialist gruppe or geschwader of 4 engined strategic bombers. A unit of 30-50 can conceivably be operational by August 1940. Carrying up to 6 tons of bombs for a short (~700 mile) operation, 4-5 tons for a medium (~1000 miles) or 1-3 tons for a long range (1200 miles+) missions, it utility is obvious. Fewer aircrews and materials/mechanics compared to equal tonnage of medium bombers, it is obviously useful in the Blitz.
Couple this with long ranged recon that can be ramped up as its usefulness becomes obvious and the He 177 takes too long to become operational and Germany has a useful strategic bomber, though not a full fleet that conflicts with the medium bombers prior to 1939.
So what does the community think of my brainstorm?