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#61
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"Were any of them military failures?"
Okay, I know the debate has moved on from Easterling's post and others have answered it already so sorry for the late reply. But, I think the following reflects on a lot of this. Yes, they were military failures, or in the case of Korea at the very least it was a non-success. Military and political decisions and aims are not separable in these cases. Mao knew it, the VC knew it, the US Army failed to learn the lesson. You may wish to argue that these weren't battlefield failures, though even that would be debatable in some of these cases, but that's a different argument entirely. And it misses the main point. You don't fight wars to win battles, you fight them to win the war. If you win both then wonderful, but in the end the only important matter is to win the war. Whether the enemy won by using WWI tactics, or a willingness to absorb more casualties than our side or by realising that the battle for hearts and minds is just as important as any other battlefield is not crucial to either the question or the world shaped by these conflicts. But who actually won is. |
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#62
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No they weren't and no it didn't. Repeating this a million times makes it no more truthful the millionth time than it was the first time. |
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#63
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#64
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Possible suggestion: Make conscript service a requirement for higher education? It gives them a carrot for the end of those two years, and it could be hoped this could stop the brain drain a bit and develop a loyal intelligentsia class.
Of course, im not sure whether that would generate enough college graduates for the needs of the Soviet Union...
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#65
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Claiming that the UN did not win in Korea because it did not conquer the North is as absurd as claiming tha Britain did not win in the Falklands because it did not conquer Argentina. Quote:
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![]() Yet they were willing and able to do so. Also, I would say that the way te Soviet military was set up during the Cold War implies they expected to fight a large war of attrition, like the Great Patriotic War had been. |
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#66
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Yes, during the Cold War. You were arguing their WWII Army was structured for this. It was poorly structured in 1941 but on paper was supposed to be an all-arms *mechanized* army. Not a WWI-style infantry-machine guns-artillery-engineers-some airpower army. Imperial Japan was a pure old-school WWI Army in a WWII setting. The USSR....was not. |
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#67
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#68
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No, it still goes to the USA for propping the damn thing up far too long when all this did was set up something where failure is the only possible outcome.
Then you phrased your words very poorly by claiming that the Soviets were prepared for a WWI-style attrition war. The chaotic flailing of the 1941 battles on the Soviet side does not qualify for preparation as most understand the term. |
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#69
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"Even Vietnam is a military failure: it's just not a failure at the tactical level, more of the strategic-logistical level."
Exactly, completely agree. "Winning hearts and minds is very important, but failure to do so does not tell us anything about the efficiency of an army, because winning hearts and minds is not the job of the military. The job of the military is to stab hearts and blow their brains out. "Here I disagree, winning hearts and minds in a conflict is vital. That dosn't mean your army still doesn't need to kill the enemy but they do need to win the political battle as well. This is what Giap and Ho Chi Minh realised and why the US lost in Vietnam. And Somalia, Beirut and is now losing in Afghanistan. Real wars are not simplistic computer games where all you need to do is rack up a score to win. The world has changed since 1945, and so has the way conflicts are fought. The homefront and the propaganda battle are just as important as some desert or jungle where heavily armed troops blaze away at shadows. Any worthwhile military knows that too, and taking this into account is the job of the military as it can make the difference between victory and defeat. Failure to adapt to the way wars are now being fought is inexcusable for any army. The failure of the US army to win the hearts and minds battle in Vietnam tells us everything about their failure to win the war; they didn't know how to beat the enemy, they didn't understand the enemy's strategy and they didn't even understand what their own country was thinking. There's an old saying that the surest way to lose the next war is to train to fight the last one. This idea that you can conveniently separate the military and political sides falls right into that trap. |
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#70
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#71
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Again Snake, I agree. Certainly with the Germans, I don't often comment on the board (I've doubled my posts in one day!) but I am a frequent reader and have followed many of the discussions about the two world wars and Germany's lack of a coherent strategy in either war and I agree with your analyses.
I hadn't thought of Napoleon's performance in this context but can now see that was the case in Spain at least, though in the Corsican's defence I think his ideas and the French Army's savage approach to dealing with the Spanish population were not unusual for the period. In hindsight, his response after the burning of Moscow is also a pretty strong argument that he was strategically bereft. In terms of now, the apparent inability of at least some influential sections of western militaries to understand this is puzzling. They all come from democratic societies with free speech and mass media, they graduate from military colleges that are supposed to offer the highest levels of training, they are even professionally trained to think for themselves more than the militaries of many other countries. Now there are even forums like this one where the lessons of history can be discussed in minute detail with people all over the world. So why are the same mistakes being made? Is it national/institutional arrogance or simple human stupidity? |
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#72
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Likewise, the Ho Chih Minh Trail was in a foreign country for much of its length. We couldn't perform a legitimate assault to destroy it without attacking Cambodia and Laos as well. |
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#73
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Which goes back to his point above that you can't separate the political context from the military situation.
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#74
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Wars in the modern age are total efforts invloving all aspects of society. If a war is lost, you can't just assign all the blame strictly on the military, when the loss has clear non-military causes due to flaws in society as a whole. The reason why the US has trouble in all these little wars is not because the military is not up to the task, but because American society as a whole is not willing to commit itself to the effort of winning them. |
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#75
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#76
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#77
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Once again for those with text comprehension issues:
on WW1 and Korea - The Korean war in it's final years, once the front had stabilized, aquired a static character like ww1, whithout room for sweping maneuvers (characteristic for ww2). Maybe the US Army culd have continued to push back the Chinese, but they didn't like the manpower costs associated with hea-on attacks against prepared positions, so they stopped. They were not willing to fight attrition warfare. On the Soviet army and attrition warfare. The Soviet Army after ww2, and based on the experience of Barbarossa, was prepared for attrition warfare. There are several clues pointing at this. One is the conscription system. The Soviets had a (relatively) large percentage of troops under arms and an even larger percentage of trained troops in reserve, that could be mobilised in short notice. This makes sense if you expect to need to "spend" lots of soldiers quickly (like in the case of attrition warfare) and need lots of reserves. A second clue was the design of soviet weapon systems. These are often stereotyped as cheap and lacking in quality - which is mostly wrong - but the core truth is however that the Soviet weapon systems did emphasise ease of production. The Soviets expected to need to porduce lots of equipment quickly. Take the exemple of the T-72 tank which is often said to have been a "mobilization" tank. It was not as powerfull as the "premium" T-80, or contemporary western tanks, but it was supposed to be produced in large quantities during wartime. This shows that the Soviets expected to be involved in large scale high intensity combat between conventional forces over long periods of time (which causes attrition). The problem is that this kind of conflicts never happened and probably could not happen in the atomic age. So they build a military, and a corresponding military-industrial complex, that probably would have been effective for it's specified task (I tink they could have beaten NATO in a conventional ww3) but in hindsight was a waste of money. |
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#78
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Ad Hominem is a sign of either arguing in bad faith or refusal to concede losing an argument.
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#79
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And clarify your statement. Why is "preparing for a conventional war of maneuver" incompatible with "preparing for attrition"? |
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#80
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In wartime the Izhmash factory could produce 13,000 rifles a day. The armored divisions would be padded with 'monkey model' replacements, the idea being no matter how good the tanks ether side had in their A-list armored divisions prewar, once the war heated up all those would eventually be destroyed through enemy action (conventional or nuclear) or wear and tear. But the same could be said of NATO's armored divsions. Since monkey model tanks could be produced faster than a tank with full features would they could restock their armored divisions faster than NATO could restock theirs, allowing them to keep the initiative. The same logic for missiles and so on. Better subpar quality missiles than no missiles. Very attritional mindset. Because by definition WW3 would result in heavy casualties and losses by both sides. Thats undeniable. Basic logistics becomes attritional as you try to figure out how to replace losses faster than the enemy.
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