Case Yellow launched early:

Titus_Pullo

Banned
So what might have happened if Hitler mistakenly assumes that the French were planning an attack, after German intelligence reports on French troop movements along the Belgian border?


Part 1.

January 11, 1940

Two thousand feet above the Ruhr Valley, a German Taifun BF 108 plowed through a low fog bank, as Major Erich Hoenmanns struggled to maintain his view of the landscape. What should have been a routine flight from Loddenheide airfield near the Dutch border to Cologne was made more complicated by nearly zero visibility that made it nearly impossible to tell where he was. Nevertheless Hoenmanns set a SSE course, as he assumed the course would take him along the Rhine and to Cologne which is situated along the Rhine. But he saw nothing below except a thick layer of fog. He decided to trust his navigator’s instinct, that his assumptions were correct, that he was indeed flying above the Rhine. At any other day this would have been a routine flight for the fifty two year old pilot as he had taken this same exact flight path countless times and as a veteran of the Great War, was not easily panicked. Flying with him was a passenger, Major Helmut Reinberger, a personal friend who had just arrived to Loedenheide the previous night. Hoenmanns upon learning that the Reinberger was headed to Cologne in the morning, had offered to give him a lift. Reinberger had initially planned to go to the Muenster railway station the next morning and travel to Cologne by train(some seventy nautical miles south of Loedenheide) Reinberger was assigned to the planning staff of the 7th Division commanded by Kurt Student. Not one to turn down a polite offer, Reinberger accepted the ride. As the lone BF 108 droned on, Reinberger grew increasingly uneasy. “its hazier outside than the officer’s club in Muenster” he muttered to himself. Hoenmann’s must not have heard him, through the din of the plane engine. Reinberger bit his lip and tried to repress the worst. He knew he was in clear violation of rules involving the carrying of important documents on flights, for with him, were plans for Case Yellow, hilighting the plans for the invasion of Belgium and France, set to commence on the 17th of that month.
“I can’t see a thing up here, I’ll have to descend to a lower alititude to see where we are,” Hoemann’s metalic voice rang out. As the plane sliced through the haze in what seemed to Reinberger the longest three minutes of his life, both men n saw no sign of the Rhine down below. Panicking now, Hoemann’s decided to change course again. Whatever he was feeling must have been doubly felt by Reinberger concerning the important documents he was carrying. People in Germany have disappeared for lesser offenses, and Reinberger shuddered at the thought. As they maintained their present course, the two lost majors were elated to spot a curved dark line on the horizon, which they were confident was the Rhine. Breathing a sigh of relief, Hoenmann’s set a course towards this dark line.
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Maj Reinberger carried the documents for case yellow
when his plane crashed in the Belgian countryside

Some historians disagree on what happened next. Some claim that as Hoenmanns tried to get a better view of what he thought was the Rhine, accidentally hit the fuel switch, while others argue that the plane had simply run out of fuel. In any case the lone BF 108 crashed. Losing two wings as Hoenmanns struggled to keep the plane’s nose up, the two majors escaped with only minor injuries. Their relief was short-lived as it dawned on them that this was not the Rhine but the Maas some fifty miles East. They were in Belgium. After the two men were taken into custody by Belgian authority, Hoenmann’s realizing the important documents he carried would compromise the upcoming Case Yellow operation, took out a lighter and attempted to burn them in a holding cell in front of an amused Hoenmann’s who had not known about the documents until now. Realizing what he was doing, a Belgian police officer managed to enter the cell and stomp out the fire, managing to salvage ten typewritten documents along with maps that were of clear military value. The plans which clearly showed Germany’s plan to violate Belgian neutrality were soon handed over to the Belgian and later also to the French army.
Meanwhile, as news of the crashed German plane reached Berlin and became international news, Hitler flew into a rage upon learning from the OKW that it was likely that Major Reinberger was in possession of valuable documents concerning case yellow, firing both Hellmuth Felmy and his chief of staff Col. Josef Kammhuber. If the Belgians were indeed in possession of these documents then it was likely that the January 17 invasion of Belgium and France were compromised. Most military historians argue that a combination of Belgian deception and French army movements along the Belgian border played a crucial role in Hitler’s decision to proceed with the January 17 operation. During the interrogation, Belgian authorities managed to successfully convince a panicked Reinberger (who, fearing reprisal from Hitler’s henchmen had unsuccessfully tried to commit suicide) that the documents seized from him were so badly burned that they were unreadable. This was quite easy to do as Reinberger himself had burned the documents and was himself convinced at the time that the papers, even those taken by the Belgian police were so badly damaged as to render them utterly useless, and those words that were readable appeared unimportant and nonsensical. So complete was the Belgian deception that the Luftwaffe attaché to the Hague, Ralph Wenninger, and the German attaché in Brussels, Col. Friedrich Carl von Pappenheim were also convinced during a briefing with Reinberger. Even Alfred Jodl who had urged scrapping the January 17 plans altogether became convinced that case Yellow has not been compromised. In his diary entry written on January 13, Jodl states, 'Report on conversation of Luftwaffe Attaché with the two airmen who made forced landing. Result: despatch case burnt for certain.”
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Maj Erich Hoenmann.
Unbeknownst to the Germans, the Belgians had already given the French liasson officer, Lieutenant-Col. Harcoeur, a two page summary of the documents. In a January 12 meeting between the French General Staff, and the Chief of Military intelligence, Col. Louis Rivet, Gamelin saw this as an excellent opportunity to try and convince the Belgians to allow the French into Belgium. Gamelin’s plan of launching an offensive against Germany no later than 1941 through the Low Countries, was however complicated by Belgian neutrality. Now he was convinced this invasion scare would finally make the Belgians finally join France and Britain, as it clearly served as a proverbial smoking gun, showing German intent to violate Belgian neutrality. The chance that the documents might themselves be a German deception didn’t matter in the slightest sense. In a sign that the Belgians were gradually coming around, the border barriers between France and Belgium were indeed removed, and Gamelin quickly deployed the 1st Army group and the 3rd Army to the Belgian border, both of which were rapid reaction divisions comprised of motorized units. The fact that an official invitation had not yet been given out by the Belgians, who were holding out until the allies could guarantee that they would not be excluded from any any and all negotiations in the event that a deal to settle the conflict became apparent. Indeed, the French column spent a freezing night camped along the border while the Belgians waited for a deal to be made from London. In what could only be called a blessing in disguise, the German Abwehr was monitoring the situation along the Franco-German border. German agents relaying reports back to Berlin indicated that the Belgians were inviting the French into the country. These initial reports was enough to convince Hitler that the French were preparing for an attack. Hitler realizes that the longer he waits, the invasion of Belgium would be much more difficult now with well entrenched French defenses waiting for them. Making matters worse, Belgium is much too close for comfort to Germany’s industrial area in the event that the French are preparing to launch an offensive. Some in the General Staff had been advocating a wait and see approach and postponing the Case Yellow operation entirely, atleast until the Spring. However, more convinced than ever that to wait now could prove disastrous overrules the General Staff, it was now or never, and the fuhrer orders the Luftwaffe to destroy a number of key bridges that the French are sure to use as it crosses the counrry. The first hit was the Belgian airforce, completely caught off guard its planes were picked off from the air by German stukkas.

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French tanks move into Belgium January 1940


Launching a military campaign in the dead of winter is a rarity in military history, where the campaigning season were almost always set for Spring and summer, this was true two thousand years ago and certainly rings true in 1940, atleast in retrospect, where mud and snow can drastically hamper modern equipment. Indeed military historians agree that the Germans began the campaign in the west was ill-timed, ill-concieved and doomed to fail from the get go. German collumn’s roll into hostile territory hampered by bad weather. Contrasted with the French who were now being begged by a frantic Belgium to come to its aid, and was, despite the inclement weather, atleast marching into friendly territory. Further adding to the logistical nightmare that snarled German traffic, the Germans are deploying to the Front in pieces. Adding to an already confusing situation, the fog that had helped bring down Major Hoemann’s BF 108 had not lifted and Belgium was enveloped by a thick fog cover, which also grounded German air support. Army commanders on both sides were hardpressed to coordinate troop movements in the dense fog as Belgian and German troops run smack dab into each other, resulting in a confused firefight characterized by friendly fire on both sides. With French troops arriving into the mix, elements of the 35th, the 6th and the 12th Seneglese stumble into the fray, and during three days of fighting halts, four German divisions, as soldiers on all sides fought and died in waist deep snow . Always low on ammunition, firefights often descended into brutal hand to hand combat in which the Seneglese made a name for themselves. Later writing of his experience as commander of the 12th, lieutenant Fornamy declared, “We managed to take 300 prisoners and have beaten back the German advance inspite of all efforts made by the enemy.” It was quite clear that bad weather has taken its toll on both sides, more so for the Germans however whose advantage in airpower and mobility has been rendered useless, neutralized by nature. For the type of war the French were expecting, the Germans had marched right into a battle not of their own terms, but of the French. Since the end of the last war, the French had trained for this type of fighting, which as the German timetable ticked, was turning more and more into the kind of stalemate that the Germans had wanted to avoid. In this sort of stand up slug match, the French are more than able to hold their own. The French army seemed to excell at wearing down the enemy face to face rather than trying to outmaneuver the enemy...


The German army, for the most part however was better trained and much more disciplined than its French and Belgian counterparts and it was extremely capable of siezing the initiative even when things don’t quite turn out as expected. Even in retreat the Wehrmacht had the ability of employing and forming ad-hoc units using what ever happens to be at hand, and turning them into a Kampfgruppe. Nevertheless, pleased with, and rather surprised at the weakness of the initial German thrust into Belgium, Gamelin was further emboldened to push deeper into the country, advancing farther than what he had initially intended or expected. If all goes well, he thought he may even execute his own offensive through the low countries earlier than he had planned. In any case, those plans would have to wait, as German paratroopers on January 15th suceeds in breeching several Belgian fortifications. The Germans are quick to exploit the breech and immediately begin throwing their available panzer units into the gaping holes, as German paratroops reek havoc behind allied lines. All of a sudden the rest of the Belgian forts along the river face the very real threat of being cut off and overrun. Realizing the danger, Gamelin hurriedly rushes one French light armored division and three
mechanized infantry divisions to undo some of the damages, in an attempt to plug the holes and block the German advance.



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A Char B 1 crew


The Germans outnumber the French in terms of tanks, and perhaps in a more cooperative weather and favorable conditions, the Germans might have won, as the German tanks were faster and more maneuverble. Mud, snow and fog however had greatly reduced this German advantage in mobility. Historians today still debate this issue , Stephen Ambrose characterized, the first tank engagement of the war as like a “slug fest” between two dumb street brawlers with very little attemp to outwit the other. Others, such as British military historian John Keegan point to the fact that French tanks outclassed German tanks in both firepower and armor. Keegan cites one particular encounter in which a single French Char B1 near Eben Emael, attacked thirteen German tanks head- on (all panzer IIIs and panzer IVs) and took them out all in the course of a few minutes. The Char B1 survived despite taking a direct hit no less than 140 times. In his memoir, Heinz Guderian recalled attempting “in vain to destroy a Char B with a captured 47 mm anti-tank gun; all the shells I fired at it simply bounced harmlessly off its thick armor. Our 37 mm and 20 mm guns were equally ineffective against this adversary. As a result, we inevitably suffered sadly heavy casualties". At Eben Emael, elements of the French 3rd Light Cavalry managed to knock out 40 Panzer IIIs, but lost nearly a third of its artillery, barely managing to hold out against superior numbers until the 1st DCR consisting of 124 tanks, supported by the 23rd alpine infantry division came to its rescue and suceeds in pushing the Germans back, of course the fact the German logistics was a snarled up mess also contributed to their defeat. By the 17th of January, it was the German paratroopers who were now cut off from their own lines, but doesn’t stop them from harassing French tanks at every turn. The French had to divert a considerable amount of troops just to hunt them down. This defeat shook German confidence to its foundation, sinking German morale to its lowest point since the Great War. On the other hand , certain defeatist rhetoric by some in the French officer corps were silenced. In short, French moral rises as German morale plummets. As a result the long standing mistrust the Army had of Hitler began to resurface, which never really went away even with the German success in Poland.....

Historians all agree that the Germans had simply overextended their flanks and all blame points to Hitler’s costly decision to launch an early preemptive strike into Belgium during the dead of winter just as the French were already on the move.. Had Hitler waited until atleast spring, as many in the General Staff had been advocating, things might have turned out differently. The Germans also found themselves in an increasingly difficult position of having to defend these overextended lines while fast running low on food, ammunition and above all fuel. The French and Belgians, even though experiencing similar difficulties that the Germans were facing, were atleast able to rush in more of their divisions to plug up the holes to stabilize the front quicker than the German could. It was clear to every reasonable person, that the situation in Belgium was fast deteriorating, the commanders on the ground knew it, and in order to save the German army from certain destruction, German commanders were now advocating pulling back. Enraged at the suggestion, Hitler hurls abuses at his generals and flies into one of his characteristic rants about cowards and traitors. In the furher’s eyes, he was the lone hero in a Wagnerian showdown in which he would lead the German army to a smashing victory at all cost. To the dismay of the commanders on the ground, and in an all or nothing bid to salvage the situation in Belgium, Hitler orders them to stand fast and hold their ground to the last man. This would prove to be the second of Hitler’s many military blunders, as a French counterattack on January 18 manages to sever one of the German supply columns . Suddenly several German mechanized infantry divisions as well as four panzer divisions found themselves trapped in a French pocket, and the French were slowly sealing that pocket. It was only thanks to the fact that overly cautious French commanders were slow in completely closing the remaining escape routs, that a German commander manages to stage a sucessful but costly breakout knowing he was in full violation of Hitler’s stand fast order. With every available tank and artillery the Germans could muster, they concentrated their firepower on a particularly weak sector in the French line with such ferocity that it buckled, creating a corridor that enabled most of the Germans to pass through and escape. They did so however at a tremendous cost in materiel, as men abandoned their trucks and tanks in the mud and snow many out of gas and others simply stuck in the mud. Almost 4,000 Germans, were taken prisoner, most of them wounded, who were simply left behind by the hasty German pull out. The Germans also left behind close to a 1000 tanks, about 1700 artillery pieces which included various anti aircraft and anti tank guns, which fall into French and Belgian hands. Some of the German heavy equipment were damaged, but for the most part most were in excellent to salvageable conditions, and German trucks and artillery are quickly pressed into French and Belgian service. German 88s, which had been pummeling French columns since the start of the German offensive, were turned against the retreating Germans.
A halfhearted German push towards the Ardennes on the 28th peters out, and with the exception of sporadic skirmishes, raids and the ocassional exchange of artillery fire in this sector, all military operations had, for the most part ceased… for the time being.
 
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..Hitler had wanted to start in the West in November 1939, which did cause a flap among his generals.

It is interestging from one perspective: BEF was no in place at all.

Ivan
 

Titus_Pullo

Banned
..Hitler had wanted to start in the West in November 1939, which did cause a flap among his generals.

It is interestging from one perspective: BEF was no in place at all.

Ivan

The BEF has a major role in this TL, I just haven't posted them all yet. In part 2 "The Allies Strike Back" the British will be making an arrival.
 
Titus,

I think it is an interesting TL you are building.

Consider a few options:

1) If Germany should attack in November 1939 (!), there would not be any alternative to Gelb as it was. The Ardennes only came because of the crash as you described it.

2) With BEF hardly even having arrived in theater, it is France vs. Germany (only)

3) Would the "improved" Schliefen have worked better in 1939 if BEF were not there?

----

I am not sure your scenario would have meant a big difference as February is too close to May to impact anything, except starting in bad weather.

Brooke is describing certain aspects in his books, among them that the screen is more or less wafer thin, but also that the build-up started immediately upon arrival. That buil-up is according to the Allied plan = anticipation of WWI all over again. But February would have seen something more substantial than November 1939 (?)

Good luck, and keep it coming

Ivan
 

Titus_Pullo

Banned
Part 2 The Center Holds

The immediate consequences of the German defeat in Belgium are numerous. First, it benefitted the French in several ways as captured German equipment that were salvageable found immediate use in the French army. The French are quick to mechanize three of their infantry divisions with trucks and other vehicles that the Germans were forced to leave behind in Belgium during the latter’s hasty pull out. In particular second rate French troops who were posted along relatively quiet sectors receive added mobility and firepower. German tanks that were not damaged are encorporated into the French army’s armored units, atleast until they break down for lack of compatible spare parts. Afterwards, they’re cannibalized, particularly their turrets, which are used to equip allied defensive fortresses in Belgium and along the Maginot Line. Impressed with the maneuverability of the panzer IIs and IIIs, French designers closely study them. French artillery firepower also gets an added boost from captured German 88s, which are heard rumbling along the German occupied area of the Ardennes. As for the Germans, losing so many of their vehicles and heavy equipment in Belgium has made them much poorer in equipment relative to the French. They have, afterall lost over a year’s worth of tank production, which were needlessly squandered in Hitler’s costly gamble, and along with it, the German lose close to 15% of their artillery. Whereas French production increases as French factories pick up pace in the production of tank and aircrafts. At the beginning of the battle of Belgium around 288 Somua S 35 medium tanks were in frontline service, this increases with the demand to counter the mobility of German panzer II and IIIs. French tank designers, examining captured German tanks, realized the Somua’s poor mechanical reliability. Prior to the battle of Belgium, its complicated suspension units made it a high maintenance tank, especially because the cast armor modules did not allow for easy access to the suspension engine. French tank designers modified the cupola by cutting off its top and installed a simple hatch. All through the remainder of January and all of February production increases as the date for the allied counterattack approaches.

French options have also vastly improved now that the Belgian Front has stabilized. By mid February, both sides have dug trenches and defensive anti tank barriers along the Belgian and French area of the Ardennes, and the near daily artillery duels and ocassional raids in this sector has taken on a sense of the stalemate that characterized the last war. It was clear that it would take some time before the Germans could reorganize and recover enough enough strength to go on the offensie again. Of course it didn’t help that after the January defeat, Stalin decided to get stingy with the German supply of raw maeterials, especially rubber, oil and steel. Now the Germans have begun feeling the pinch of these shortages. As Germany is now in a much weaker position, not just militariliy, but diplomatically than it was just over a year ago, the Soviets have begun pushing for more concessions from the Germans, in particular finished products which the Germans are just hardpressed to give them. Even worse Moscow has begun pressuring Berlin on the renogotiating of their non-Agression pact by asking for a ‘readjustment’ of their occupation zones in Poland. On the diplomatic level therefore, Germany is stuck between a rock and a hard place. The Germans therefore began transferring some of their panzer divisions to Poland in the event of a Russian attack. By May, it was clear that the Germans have recovered enough to launch another offensive in the West. But unlike otl, they are doing so considerably with a depleted panzer division. However atleast, this time there would be no weather factor to hamper the German offensive as this time they intended to bring down the brunt of their forces hard on the allies which they were not able to do in January. Sure enough the German attack commenced on May 10 with a simultaneous German push once again in the Ardennes, and Northern France. The French however concentrated a large amount of forces on the Ardennes and had been doing so in the lull that followed the last German offensive in January.
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The opening salvo of the German advance began at Sedan, On May 10, and as fighting errupted at Dinant, Giraud’s powerful VII army was dispatched by Gamelin to defend Sedan at all cost, knowing full well that the town was key to the Meuse. Since January, the overall morale of the French army was at an all time high, this was particularly true in Giraud’s VII Army. Confidence in their equipment and leaders had also vastly improved since the start of the fighting in January. Facing them was Guderian’s panzer corps, the same unit they had defeated at Ebaen Emael in January. In the early morning hours of the 11th, Guderian began the crossing operation under intense French artillery bombardment, anti armored guns, mortars and machine guns. Here the Germans run into well entrenched French positions. In addition to two French mechanized divisions (DLM) Giraud was supported by three regiments of three batallions of infantry and two regiments of artillery equipped with fifty two 25 mm and six to eight 47 mm, and 75 mm artillery, in addition to the captured German 88s (which the French were so impressed with that they had begun making ammunitions for them) along with 155 mm howitzers. It was almost immediate that Guderian had run right into a brickwall as the German panzers couldn’t extricate themselves out of tank obstacles and ditches which the French had constructed in the months between the fighting. Although a sudden concentrated German push managed to drive the French back, their second line of defenses made it impossible for Guderian’s forces to get cross the river in the face of murderous French artillery. Realizing that Sedan couldn’t be taken, Guderian got on the radio with his boss General Busch. It took a few minutes before Guderian managed to convince him to try to force the crossing at the Meuse via Montherne and Dinant, instead of having the 16th Army getting entangled in the prickly defenses of Sedan. By the time the Germans were moving again at Montherne and Dinant, the momentum was lost at Sedan and it would have dire consequences in the German advance towards Calais and the English Channel.
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a destroyed German tank at the Battle of Arras.

The second major tank engagement of the war took place at Arras, which was fought over a two day period on the 20th and the 21st of May. Despite the hold up at Sedan, the Germans continued to press their advance towards the channel coast in order to cut off the allied army from behind and trap them in Belgium. But by now however, the German timetable had been lost, and it became clear to the allied commanders Gamelin and Hobart what the German strategy was. The Germans were intending to circle around them by driving towards the English channel. As the Germans continued their drive west towards the channel coast, the German line of advance was constantly harassed by a tenacious French line of defenses mirroring the Geman advance running at an east to west parallel. The allies, in an attempt to stem the German advance, deployed their forces along St. Quentin to Lille in a north and south axis directly in the path of the German advance towards the English channel. The battle of Arras was technically not one battle but three separate battles, at Perronne, situated just to the south of Arras, Arras at the center, and to the north of Arras at Lens and La Bassee. Fighting began at Peronne where the French 6th and 9th armies demonstrated for the second time the superior armor and firepower of French tanks over German panzers. Just when it seemed the French lines would be overrun, the Germans were stopped cold by the heavier French armor as the fighting continued for two days at Peronne. As the engagement at Perronne raged, the German IV Army headed directly for Arras itself , here the French 9th army’s jurisdiction extended, but it also bordered BEF command of the British 50th and the 1st Tank Brigades. In addition, the outskirts of Arras was defended by two British infantry battalions, the 6th and the 8th Durham Light Infantry in support of of the 7th and the 8th Royal Tank Regiment. British forces at the center alone totalled 2000 men and 74 tanks. As a result the battle for the center was an often confusing allied defense with the British and French each rushing units to the other’s jurisdictional sector. The important point was the German advance to the center was checked. Despite the confusing allied defense for the center, the Germans took too long by getting themselves ensnared in the battle in and around the town where they took on heavy losses. At Arras, as in Sedan, the Germans were yet again hung up.
The third battle took place to the north the following day on the 22nd. Here at the towns of La Bassee and Lens the battle was its most desperate. Here it seemed the Germans threw everything they had against the British, as five panzer divisions including Erwin Rommel’s VII Panzer division made some progress. One column advancing towards La Bassee, spearheaded by the mechanized SS totenkopf regiments managed to take a few prisoners. But as the Germans enterred the town, their panzer IIs and IIIs proved no match for the heavily armored Matildas hiding in the town’s rubbles which proved a perfect spot to pick off German tanks and destroy them. Meanwhile at Lens, Rommel decided to press the advantage, by comitting his panzer units and suddently it seemed the Germans were poised for a breakthrough. The British formed a defensive line of tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft guns in a last ditch effort to block Rommel’s advance. Rommel suffered heavy losses as a result. Supported by the RAF the British launched a counterattack repelling the Germans completely. And with it, any German hopes of cutting of splitting the French and British armies.
Arras resulted in Germany’s second major defeat in their push to the west , and the German High Command’s confidence was yet again shaken. Rommel, later writing of the defeat at Lens, described “hundreds of allied tanks” in halting the German advance. Indicating the superiority of French and British armor over German armor. In any case, the German push at Arras met with the same result as Guderian’s at Sedan. Unable to force their way to the channel at Arras, they decided to go around it, and Guderian was instrumental in devising a new plan of attack that would encircle the allied army once and for all. Guderian convinced Runsdedt to redeploy the 16th Army and swing it around the 12th and 4th Armies just north of Lille where it would proceed directly towards Dunkirk. From there the 16th Army would head south and strike to the rear of Arras. On the 25th Guderian’s tank corps arrived at the coast. It was a brilliant feat of maneuvering, but unfortunately also coincided with the allied counter-offensive. That would negate all of Guderian’s efforts.

The allied counter attack began with a three pronged French assault at the Ardennes where the 1st French Army would strike, followed by Giraud’s VII Army driving towards Sedan. These first two attacks however were only a diversionary assault for a much larger push towards Montherne. Meanwhile, the main allied thrust would push towards its objectives of Dinant, Namur and Antwerp respectively. The Allied counterattack commenced with some 1300 French guns opening fire and delivering over a million shells on the German occupied sector of the Ardennes. When the bombardment had ceased the French 1st Army began assaulting the German occupied Western Ardennes. Here they ran right into well-entrenched German positions, as it was now the turn of French tanks to run into German tank obstacles and ditches. It was clear that the French weren’t going to break through anytime soon as the Germans were too well entrenched. At Sedan however, where the second round of the French attack came, the Germans were caught completely off guard. The French army struck hard at the eastern side of the Meuse and after severa hours of fierce fighting, it was clear that the Germans couldn’t hold. The French had managed to sever well over a third of the German line. As though that wasn’t bad enough, the main allied offensive was about to spring into action…..
 
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Titus_Pullo

Banned
Part 3: The Allies Strike Back



Since the defeat of the German push at Belgium in January, the allies began assembling a powerful allied mechanized force consisting of tanks and a motley assortment of motorized infantry at allied headquarters in Reims. They’ve kept this army in reserve up until now after the allied commanders have ascertained the nature of the German strategic aim (which became obvious at Arras) Gamelin reasoned that the Germans had to be contained as far east as possible, minimizing the fighting on French soil. The fact that the allies have done just that meant that the allied counter-offensive had a very good chance of success. The main allied offensive was concieved mainly by Lord Gort, De Gaulle, Percy Hobart and Gamelin and was designed to counter German mobility with allied mobility. This required a drastic change of French and for that fact British military doctrine concerning tanks. As early as 1934, De Gaulle had been advocating for the use of mobile armored divisions in the French army to compensate for France’s poor demography in relation to Germany, and to more efficiently and quickly enforce the Versaille Treaty. De Gaulle’s ideas were at once considered too radical by the French High Command, in particular Petain who advocated just the oposite- an infantry based and defensive army . The French Army largely remained so, until the January German offensive. Before the German invasion of Belgium, other French generals were not entirely oblivious to the fact that France was not ready for the type of mobile warfare in the event that hostilities with Germany breaks out. Gamelin, like many in the French High Command reasoned that the French army in its present state stood little chance of winning a fluid and mobile warfare with the Germans, this defeatism, of course was not without merit but was a common sentiment in the French Army, until it was silenced somewhat after French armor proved more than a match for the Germans at Eben Emael in January, where French armor and its superior firepower was a decisive factor in the victory. The events in January and in particular the capabilities from concetntrated French armor at Eben Emael, made the French high Command more receptive to the formation of combined mobile armored divisions earlier proposed by De Gaulle. Gamelin reasoned, quite correctly, the Germans would be more formidable under favorable conditions, especially in the wider operational theater of France, and France still lacked mobile divisions to stop them. Fighting therefore had to be contained as far east as possible, in Belgium. The Belgian theater presented the Germans with a far narrower front thereby containing their armored formations.

At the start of the second German offensive, the Germans attemped a breakthrough by concentrating all their armor, airforce and mechanized units. The Germans stood no chance of breaking through at the Maginot Line and so the French high Command paid little attention to it. However, at Namur, the river made a sharp turn east, creating a gap between itself and the river Dyle. This was known as the “Gembloux Gap” and it was ideal territory for tank warfare and the German presence there made it a particularly weak and dangerous spot for French defenses. Fortunately, the German attack at the center was hampered by the Meuse which presented them a natural barrier.

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Lord Gort at allied headquarters in Rheims discussing the allied offensive strartegy



Allied Command was ready to formulate their own mobile armored divisions and combined them into an Allied Mobile Force, (AMF) commanded by De Gaulle, which caused a bit of controversy because Montgomery had been expecting overall allied command to go to thim. De Gaulle and Montgomery were two allied commanders with notorious reputations of being difficult to work with and it was clear from the start the two men disliked each other. It was only when Gort put him in charge of the Allied Support Group that Montgomery was appeased somewhat. The AMF which was then the largest formation of mechanized divisions mounted thus far consisted a total of nine allied divisions. It was comprised of the 1st Armored Division (BEF), French 2nd DLM (Divisions Legeres Mecaniques) , 3rd DLM, and 4th DC, 51st Division (UK), 7th Dina (Division d’infanterie Nord-African and 7th DIC 3rd and 12th DIM (Division d’infanterie Marocaine) (French) and the 1st tank Bgde (BEF). In addition, this mobile strike force was to be supported by the RAF comrpised of 6 spitfire, 9 blenheim, 12 hurricane squadrons.. Dinant fell almost immediately, but the allied mobile force couldn’t move on to the next objective until the French VII Army, coming from the Meuse arrived to take up garisson assignment of this sector. Atleast ten hours was lost waiting. When the French VII finally arrived, the allied army was on its way again. Inspite of having lost ten hours, the second Objective of Namur was captured by the evening. The German put up a fierce resistance, but finally surrendered as they stood no real chance of stopping the allied advance.

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De Gaulle (left) and Montgomery (right) had a notorious reputation of being difficult to work with andtheir egos often clashed



Von Runsdedt, realizing that Antwerp was vulnerable, was left with little choice but to sacrifice the Ardennes to the 1st French Army, weakening German defenses there by withdrawing some German divisions and concentrating them on Charleroi and Namur instead. Although the Germans managed to secure Charleroi, Montgomery by now was firmly entrenched at Namur, and was thus well defended by the time the Germans attacked. Additionally Montgomery was reinforced by General Prioux’s cavalry corps composed mainly of the 2nd DLM. And 3rd DLM.

German strategic aims in the west was suddenly flung right in their faces as it was they who found themselves trapped in Belgium on May the 27th when the British and the Belgians linked up at Antwerp. It was clear even to Hitler’s inner circle, that his grip on reality was eroding fast. The fuhrer for weeks after the failure of the January offensive sank into a fit of depression and his personal physician Theodor Morell plied him with more medications that further made him more unstable. Hitler berrated Von Runsdedt and lectured him that a victory in Belgium was very much still attainable because Frederick the Great pulled off a miraculous victory against overwhelming odds at Rossbach. Increasingly irrate at Hitler’s nonsensical rants that had no bearing on the reality on the ground at present, von Runsdedt was heard to have uttered, “Mein Fuhrer this is not Rossbach and I am not Frederick the Great.” As in January, the Germans were now yet again forced to devise a plan to break out of Belgium or face certain destruction. And Von Runsdedt was later quoted in a conversation with his aid that "The German Army is now paying a price for selling its soul to the devil." From his headquarters in Brussels, Von Rundstedt immediately orders the 16th Army to fall back with the 12th and 4th Armies for a concetrated attack on Namur. The German strategic aim of trapping the allied army in Belgium was no longer feasible as it now appeared it was he who was now trapped. To escape, German Army wouldhave to fight its way out. Von Runsdedt orders the 16th and 12th Armies respectively to fall back through to the 4th and 6th Army. While the 4th and 6th would fight a rear guard action to delay the pursuing allies, the 16th & 12th Armies would then punch a hole through the Allied lines so that the rest of the German armies could escape. By now Guderian was still at the English channel awaiting further instructions and when he was informed of the plans to withdraw, he couldn’t believe what he was hearing. He wanted to press with the attack around Arras and attack the allies there from behind. In no mood to argue, von Runsdedt simply overrules him.

Murphy’s Law of combat states that everything that can go wrong will go wrong. Von Runsdedt’s plan lwould have been brilliant on paper, had it not been for the fact that it also complicated which left little room for error, furthermore, the ad-hoc nature of the German plan meant that there was little coordination. This was readily obvious when the 12th Army arrived at Namur on May the 29th and went ahead with the attack without waiting for the 16th Army to arrive. Furthermore, there was a lack of communications between Von Rundstedt’s headquarters and Von Bock’s 18th Army. Because of the lack of coordination in the German plan, Montgomery was able to repel the initial attack on Namur with relative ease.
The next day on May 30th, the Germans attacked again this time it was a half hearted attempt by the 18th Army. It met with the same result as the previous day’s attack and was beaten back by noon of the 31st. However Montgomery was now a little uneasy . To the east of him there were only two French divisions, ( the 2nd and 3rd ) Montogomery would later claim that De Gaulle was deliberately holding out on him, but the reality of it was, De Gaulle really had nothing else to send him as all available units were deployed all along where he expected the main line of the German attack to come from. The French 2nd Armored Div therefore would be Montgomery’s Reserve. Even though nothing in the German plans were going well, it hasn’t been smooth sailing for the allies either. Suffering fifty percent losses, the French 9th Army was a shattered remnant in no condition to mount any serious attacks. And the BEF was in no better condition either. Thankfully, the allies had fresh reserves of Anzacs and Canadian divisions available.


The Battle of Mons

On several occasions Rommel’s rear guard action enabled him to inflict some damages on the French in pursuit of him. As the French were eager to continue pushing the Germans back in order to deny them the chance to form a coherent defense line, it also caused probems for the French artillery. The further Rommel went, the further away the French were from the range of their artillery support. Demonstrating the wehrmacht adaptability and ability to inflict severe damages even when in retreat, the German 7th Panzer Division suddenly turned and hit the French so hard that the De Gaulle had to rush reinforcements from the decimated armored units of the French 9th Army. At the Battle of Mons, French and German tanks exacted a heavy toll on each other that stopped the French pursuit. In terms of battlefield losses the French knocked out 87 German tanks for every 55 losses, but the further depletion of the 9th’s armored brigades would have made the continued pursuit of Rommel “tantamount to suicide.” Next Rommel came under attack from the ANZAC infantry division, which he did not expect. Up until then, Rommel had been facing mainly tough British armored Matilda units. The sight of British infantry attacking was new, and Rommel was at once impressed by the tenacious effort put up by the ANZACS…..

The Battle of The Line

The fighting at Namur appeared to have settled down by the 1st of June but this was only the eye of the storm, the largest tank battle of the war was about to begin. For the Germans, the entire war depended on the survival of the German Army in the west. Destruction here meant that there would be virtually nothing to stop the allies from invading Germany and overrunning its industrial centers. Survival meant a repeat of the German breakout in January, only this time on a much larger scale. So far, the attempt to do so has not met with much success. This time however, the Germans made sure that the 12th and 6th Armies would coordinate a concententrated attack together. Launching a diversionary attack, the 10th Panzer ran head on into the British 1st Tank Brigade. The Germans had developed a grudging respect for the capabilities of the Matilda II at Arras, and after a light skirmish the 10th Panzer fell back.
On June 2. the largest tank battle of the war took place at Namur which would later come to be called as The Battle of the Line. The Germans intended to throw every available mechanized formations into Namur and the Germans scrounged up a formidable force of five panzer divisions,along with infantry to throw directly at Montgomery’s Allied Support Group which stood in their way. Montgomery knew he stood no chance and at once summoned the French 2nd and 3rd Armored Divisions which had been held in reserve for Montgomery. Montgomery deployed the French and British tanks in a line formation that repelled several German waves for the better part of the day. At about 1700 hrs, Guderian decided to concentrate all his firepower against the already weakened French 5th Division, which crumbled at the ferocity of the German attack. However, De Gaulle rallied his 4th Armored Division, smashing right through Guderian’s northern flank. Not far behind De Gaulle came the 2nd Armourd Division. De Gaulle’s maneuver had backed the Germans against the Sambre. The Germans now had to fight with their backs to the river as they were attacked by the French 4th and 2nd Armored Divisions. Although the allied line held, Montgomery now had no more reinforcements available to him after the destruction of the French 5th Division , with the French 2nd Armored comitted against the Germans at the Sambre, he was left with little choice but to withdraw by late evening behind De Gaulle. Thirty Years after the war, Montgomery would describe The Battle of the Line as "the trickiest I have ever fought," forgetting the fact that the French were there too. Guderian’s gamble worked, as Montgomery’s withdrawal left a corridor for which the Germans were able to pass, enabling them to link up with the 18th at Eben- Emael.
For the Germans it was a pyrrhic victory and the allies were detirmined to make them pay for every inch of ground. It seemed that every allied artillery within range came down hard on the retreating Germans adding further German casualties in three consecutive days of shelling day and night. As if not to be outdone the RAF bomber command and the French airforce decided to get in on the action by strafing the fleeing Germans every chance it could. By June 4th, the 7th Panzer Div was the last of the German units to cross the Corridor. However the allies were determined not to give the Germans a moment’s respite, hot on the trail of the 7th Panzer were the 2nd and 6th French armies and the BEF. German defensive lines extending from Namur and north to the Albert Canal was established for an allied attack. For their part however the allies were utterly spent, only the French 2nd Armored was in relative full strength but could not attack the German line by itself.
Then straight from the Fuhrer’s headquarters in Berlin came the order for the freshly arrived 7th Army to attempt an attack through the Ardennes and towards Paris. A visibly shocked Von Rundstedt could hardly believe what he was hearing. “Attack Paris with the 7th Army? Is he crazy? We’d be lucky if we even got across the fucking Meuse!” The order fell on deaf ears. Directly infront of the Germans lay Giraud’s 7th French Army, though Giraud’s army was in no condition to mount a major attack anytime soon. By the 24th of March the frontlines had stabilized and would remain that way for the better part of year. In July the Germans invaded Denmark and Norway but with their twin defeats in January and May still fresh on their minds…….


Next Part 4 Drive to the North.
 
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Is Winter in northern France really the best time to launch a war? I have little to no idea what Winter or 39-40 was like.
 

Titus_Pullo

Banned
Is Winter in northern France really the best time to launch a war? I have little to no idea what Winter or 39-40 was like.

That's the point. Its not. One of the best ways for the French and the British Expeditionary Force to have won would have been for ever thing to go wrong for the Germans and for ever thing and more to go the way of the allies. Ittl Hitler decides to invade in the dead of winter mistaking French movements along the Belgian border as a signal that the French are moving into Belgium. Waiting until May he reasoned would mean the Germans would be going into a carefully prepared defenses.

In terms of armor, the Allies had about 3000 tanks the Germans around 2,400 not including carriers or armored cars,Germany's armored Panzer force was not especially impressive at the start of the war,the Char s35 somua was probably the best medium tank at this time, but it had the disadvantage that the Commander also served as the gunner,leading to a conflict of attention and duty,also around four fifths of french tanks had no radios leading to poor command and control. Ittl With the German defeat in January, the added demand for French medium tanks also came with the demand that they all be outfitted with radios for better coordination and communication.
 
Interesting to see how this will turn out for Germany. I think they are already over stretched with the western front and now going after Denmark and Norway? I don't see Hitler lasting much longer either. I'm looking forward to the next update.
 
Seems like there's a coup of some sort in Hitlers future. And Stalin's probably going to press for quite a few more concessions in Poland to stay there.
 
Is Winter in northern France really the best time to launch a war? I have little to no idea what Winter or 39-40 was like.

That's the point. Its not. One of the best ways for the French and the British Expeditionary Force to have won would have been for ever thing to go wrong for the Germans and for ever thing and more to go the way of the allies.

The original plan WAS for a winter invasion. But the Luftwaffe needed a week or two of good weather for success, so it kept getting postponed. The loss of the original plans also delayed things.

The attack into France iOTL was a lot nearer run a thing than it looks like. The French COULD have stopped the Nazis a couple of places if there had been better communication, etc., and or happened to have the right units in the right place. The French were, as this TL points out, very unprepared for a fluid war of mobility, and the slightly more static lines here really help the West. The grounding of the Luftwaffe probably helps even more.


Oh. And Hitler's decision to not wait until May may actually be a lot saner here than some people think. If the WAllies manage to set up forward lines in Belgium, it would have been a lot harder to attack them. In hindsight, I suspect waiting for clear weather and being able to use the Luftwaffe more effectively might have been a bigger advantage than WAlly preparedness in Belgium would have been a disadvantage. Still, he could easily lose in either case. Rolling the dice was a very Hitler thing.
 
Great timeline really well written.:p
It would be ironic to see the allies using blitzkrieg tactic to invade Germany and time is on the side of the allies.
 

Titus_Pullo

Banned
Great timeline really well written.:p
It would be ironic to see the allies using blitzkrieg tactic to invade Germany and time is on the side of the allies.

Thanks. Unfortunately. I just dont have time to finish it. But if anyone would care to continue this be my guest.
 
Interesting TL but lacking two major issues; the Winter War is one. If Stalin due to German defeats in the west decide to play hardball Hitler may let Musso deliver the needed good to the Finns to off set the Soviet offensive even more than OTL.
Hitler tried to keep foreign aid from passing through German territory ITTL he will suddenly have an interest in letting the Finns make the Soviets pay even more costly for every inch of gained ground.
This combined with better Finn resources and Allied occupation in Belgium may butterfly away Plans R and Wilfred; partly because the WAllies will have less to spare and partly because the Scandinavians seeing the Finns better off may be willing to let stuff pass through to Finland.
If the Finns are able to stall the Soviet advances even more than OTL Scandinavian countries might even allow their servicemen to go there and get valuable combat experience; at least the Danes weren't allowed so.

ITTL the French Air Force would be much more busy than OTL when weather permits. This might though make the Luftwaffe much eager to set up airdefences like the Kammhuber Line early to counter French and British bomber attacks.
French Air Force ITTL could find more stomach for aggressive use of their aircraft downing more Luftwaffe than OTL simply by detailing more units to battle instead of getting them off to safety which ITTL woulnd't be the issue with the Germans contained in Belgium.
 
Interesting TL but lacking two major issues; the Winter War is one. If Stalin due to German defeats in the west decide to play hardball Hitler may let Musso deliver the needed good to the Finns to off set the Soviet offensive even more than OTL.
Hitler tried to keep foreign aid from passing through German territory ITTL he will suddenly have an interest in letting the Finns make the Soviets pay even more costly for every inch of gained ground.
This combined with better Finn resources and Allied occupation in Belgium may butterfly away Plans R and Wilfred; partly because the WAllies will have less to spare and partly because the Scandinavians seeing the Finns better off may be willing to let stuff pass through to Finland.
If the Finns are able to stall the Soviet advances even more than OTL Scandinavian countries might even allow their servicemen to go there and get valuable combat experience; at least the Danes weren't allowed so.
Winter War OTL started in November 1939 and ended March 13 th 1940.

In this TL Stalin started to press Hitler after January 1941 defeats and in mid February 1940 front stabilized somewhere in Belgium. According to timeline Stalin started to push Germans and Hitler somewhere between mid February and May (but date is not specified). Anyway on February 1st general Soviet offensive in Finland started and on February 15th Marnheim authorized general retreat. So actually any support will be to late. Support to Finns has to come sometimes in November, December early January to have some effect. Sorry, Finland will end up same way as OTL at least for now.
 
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